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ABSTRACT
AIDS and the Criminal Juatica System:
An Australian Peraoecttve
This thesis argues that the role of the criminal law in response to
the emergence of AIDS should be a limited one and that this is largely
dictated by the goals and processes of the criminal law. The research also
isolates questions which need to be addressed and changes that need to be
considered to present law, procedure and policies In light of AIDS, within
public health departments and the various arms of the criminal justice
system.
The first chapter describes HIV/AIDS Infection, compares it
epidemlologically with other infectious diseases and examines the present
and predicted global epidemiology of the disease. Chapter two focuses on
the alms of the criminal law simpliciter and in the context of AIDS. Chapter
three analyses how and if so, how well, existing criminal law provisions could
be applied to particular circumstances of HIV transmission. In chapter four
pre-existing public health legislation that penalises the transmission of
communicable diseases is examined in the context of AIDS. In this chapter
the political and societal processes that led to the adaptation of pre-existing
legislation to cope with HIV/AIDS are considered.
Chapters five through seven focus on how the public health and
criminal justice systems have adapted in light of HIV/AIDS Infection. The
theme behind this part is to examine how individual Interests are threatened
by the powers held by particular individuals and to strike a balance between-
competing interests. Chapter five considers the breadth of the powers of
public health officials to Implement procedures designed to control the
spread of communicable diseases. Chapter six considers how the criminal
justice system will impact upon both HIV-infected persons and their victims
duhng the criminal process. In particular, the chapter examines changes that
have or should be made to investigatory and trial procedures. Chapter seven
considers the nsk of transmission of HIVwithin the prison system and then
canvasses the legal implications of a variety of procedures that have been or
could be introduced with the aim of preventing the spread of HIV/AIDS within
Australian prisons. The dominating throughout these two chapters is to
consider whether the criminal justice system can make an effective and
worthwhile contribution to the overall strategy aimed at checking progression
of the AIDS epidemic. Chapter eight contains a general conclusion.
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INTRODUCTION
The emergence of the Human Immunodeficiency Virus (HIV) more
commonly known by its advanced stage of infection, the Acquired Immune
Deficiency Syndrome (AIDS), has reaffirmed that disease is a complex
phenomenon. To understand it one must be cognisant not only of its biological
dimensions but also of its social construction. History reveals that society turns
to the 'lawmaker' to unravel the social ramifications of disease. However, the
history of previous legal encounters with infection has not always been an
uplifting one. People panic. Out of panic come irrational and ineffective policies
and worse, harsh and oppressive laws.
Since the emergence of HIV in 1981, the ramifications of HIV/AIDS
infection have arisen in many areas of the law, including.the criminal law, public
health law, employment law, medical law, insurance law, the law relating to
public education, immigration and quarantine, civil and human rights. There is
no doubt that, 'AIDS has posed many challenging and sometimes unique
problems for the law'. 1 Uncertainties and debate which have flourished within
the sphere of medicine with respect to the disease have their associated
parallels within the law. AIDS elucidates the difficulties the law encounters when
efforts are made to regulate its transmission in light of the paucity of knowledge
about the disease. Indeed, the law's response to AIDS has varied world-wide as
have the views of academic writers in the fields of law, humanities and
medicine.
Although it is true to say that AIDS has produced a great deal of
literature, up until the late 1980s in Australia, few writers focused on the criminal
law and the criminal justice system. 2 Since 1990 the approach has still been to
1 Watson, L., and Godwin, J., TheAIDS Lawand Civil Liberties Project, New SouthWales,
AIDS Council of New South Wales Inc., 1988, at p. 1.
2 The article by Howie, R. N., and Webb, P. J., The Legal Responses to AIDS' (1985) 18(1)
Australian Journal of Forensic Sciences, 44-55 was one of the papers presented at the first
Australian National AIDS Conference held in 1986. Neither the second nor third National
AIDS Conferences dealt with AIDS and the Criminal Law or within the criminal justice system
as a whole, in any detail. A plenary session of the third Conference in 1988 was devoted to
AIDS in prisons and another section dealt briefly with the role of police and corrective
services departments. Since 1990, other organisations have exhibited a renewed interest in
the criminal law in the context of HIV/AIDS. This is reflected by the release of various
discussion papers prepared by the Intergovernmental Committee on AIDS such as 'Legal
Issues Relating to AIDS and Intravenous Drug Use' and 'HIV/AIDS Prevention,
Homosexuality and the Law', Canberra, Department of Community Services and Health,
1991. An HIV/AIDSLegal Guide was first published in 1991 and contained brief chapters on
criminal transmission of HIV and prisoners and the criminal justice system (Godwin, J.,
Hamblin, J., Patterson, D., and AFAG, Australian HIV/AIDS Legal Guide, Sydney, Federation
Press, 1991). These chapters were updated and enlarged in the 1993 edition (Godwin, J.,
cover particular areas to the exclusion of others. For example, the issue of
AIDS in prisons, 3 the general application of current criminal law provisions to
AIDS 4 and the question of decriminalisation of IV drug use ^ have received the
most attention. By 1994 it appears that little research or in-depth analysis has
been conducted within Australia into the purposes to be served by
criminalisation and the effect of HIV on both infected persons or those at risk of
infection during the pre-trial and trial processes and post conviction. Although
one Australian commentator has written on the efficacy of the criminal law in
curbing the spread of the virus,® none have considered the far-reaching
implications of criminalisation for the system of criminal justice as a whole. The
1989 Federal Government National HIV/AIDS Strategy ^ is silent on the use of
punitive measures for culpable behaviour and contains only fleeting references
to the criminal justice system. This is surprising, given that the criminal justice
system selects and filters a moderate number of persons at high-risk for
transmission of the virus, such as IV drug users. More recently, the Working
Party of the Intergovernmental Committee on AIDS implied that criminal liability
for transmission of HIV is an in appropriate response to controlling the
pandemic. 8Adecision of this kind should have been precipitated by a thorough
analysis of the aims of criminalisation made with a less than adequate
examination of the overriding aims of the criminal law in Australia.
Hamblln, J., Patterson, D., Buchanan, D., Australian HIV/AIDS Legal Guide, Sydney,
Federation Press, 1993).
3 This has been highlighted by the Australian Institute ofCriminology 'HIV/AIDS in Prisons'
Conference held Melbourne, November 19-20, 1990 which covered the area of HIV infection
in Prisons in some depth. Selected conference papers and other articles are referred to in
chapter seven.
4 Bronitt, S., 'Criminal Liability for the Transmission of HIV/AIDS' (1992) 16 Criminal Law
Joumal, 85-93. This selectivity is also common to many articles in the US in the area
including: Hermann, D. H. J. 'Criminalising Conduct Related to HIV Transmission' (1990)
dSaint Louis University Public Law Review, 351; Puhlman, M. E., 'The AIDS Challenge
Continues: Should Pennsylvania's Criminal Law Take on the Challenge?' (1992) 30
Duquense Law Review, 283.
8 The specificworks which focus on the question of decriminalising IV drug use in light of
AIDS are considered in chapter two, at fn 94.
8 Bronitt, supra note 4.
7 Commonwealth of Australia, National HIV/AIDS Strategy: a policy information paper,
Canberra, Australian Government Publishing Service, 1989; and a further paper:,
Commonwealth of Australia, National HIV/AIDS Strategy: 1991-1993, 1994-1996 Canberra,
Australian Government Publishing Service, 1993.
8 IGCA, Legislative Approaches to PublicHealth Control of HIV Infection, Canberra, IGCA,
1991, para. 3.3, at p. 24.
In the early years of the AIDS epidemic in Australia (1985-1987),
as in the rest of the western world, the issue was canvassed as to whether the
criminal law ought to be invoked to deal with the emerging AIDS 'crisis'. The
prevailing sentiment by law-makers and other interested groups at that time was
that the criminal law was not an appropriate tool by which to control the spread
of AIDS. 9 This decision was made with a less than adequate examination of
Australian criminal law itself or its underlying rationale. In fact, responses in the
criminal law sphere and in some instances in public health law, which has been
used as an alternative means by which to impose restrictions on individual
behaviour, have been dictated more by political convenience than careful
informed choice among the alternatives available.
In 1989 Neave predicted that 'as increasing numbers of people are
infected from a range of groups, there is likely to be increasing pressure on
existing [public health] policies combined with support for more repressive
strategies'. The prediction was correct because the 1990s has seen a
resurgence of interest in the application of the criminal law to HIV transmission.
There is no doubt that it has been prompted by the continued spread of the
disease, the number of HIV-infected persons passing through the criminal
justice system and the perceived increase in criminal activity involving threats of
transmission of HIV, particularly syringe-related activity. In the United States
since 1988, these same factors have led to an increasing number of jurisdictions
passing specific legislation criminalising HIV transmission. 12
The resurgence may be due also, in part, to the lack of a uniform
Australian definitive statement one way or the other about whether the criminal
law should intervene. It may be that interested writers concluded that the
current response to HIV/AIDS in Australia was inadequate in that it failed to
recognise the State's responsibility to protect the public from harm; and, to
appreciate the extent to which self-protection from HIV infection is not always an
option available to some sexual partners, for example, victims of sex crimes.
9 See Carr, A., 'AIDS: The Australian Response', Meeting the Challenge, Canberra,
Australian Government Publishing Service, 1986, 50-55. Kirby, M., 'AIDS Legislation -
Turning up the Heat?', (1986) 60 Ausfra//an LaivJourna/, 324-332. McGuirl, M. 0., and
Gee, R. N., AIDS: 'An Overview of the British, Australian, and American Responses', (1985)
14(1) Hofstra Law Review, 107-135. Howie and Webb, supra note 2.
Neave, M., 'AIDS and Women in the Sex Industry - Legal Approaches to Public Health'
(1989) 12(4) Community Health Studies, 423-430, at p. 423.
^^ this perception being most commonly perpetuated through the media.
•12 Harris, K. 'Death at First Bite: AMens Rea Approach to Determining Criminal Liability for
Intentional HIV transmission' (1993) 35 Arizona Law Review, 237-264, listsi 6 States where
legislation renders it a criminal offence to transmit HIV sexually.
prostitutes and women in general, particularly those from certain cultural
backgrounds where male dominance is unquestionable.
Therefore, the question of whether to impose criminal
responsibility for the transmission of HIV rekindles the debates about the proper
limits of coercive state action, about the interrelationship between law and
morality and the appropriate interrelationship or nexus that ought to be
developed between criminal law and public health law. Few people have
described the conditions that must be satisified before an activity becomes
eligible for punishment. In the absence of any sound Australian literature on the
point, solutions to every kind of social problem are frequently sought from the
criminal justice system. When we refuse to criminalise we are wrongly accused
of trying to suppress a problem. We suffer from overcriminalisation as a result
of this arid the politics of trying to keep the peace with the multiplying number of
societal groups.
As the criminal law is the strongest force by which the State can
control individuals, there needs to be justification for its use as a method of
control. The philosophical basis for criminalising behaviour which transmits HIV
must be addressed. The likely efficiacy of criminalisation and the application of
current laws to new problems will also arise for discussion. These questions
have been considered in the past with respect to homosexuality, prostitution and
drug use. All of these activities now carry the attendant risks of HIV infection
and it remains to be seen whether this new dimension changes any former
conclusions. In this thesis, the underlying assumptions behind imposing
criminal liability are analysed to see if they justify the intrusion of the criminal law
to prevent the spread of disease. This leads into a debate over the aims of the
criminal law: the enforcement of morality as against the prevention of harm to
others.
In considering these matters one needs to take into account the
fact that in Australia like other liberal democratic societies, the value of
individual autonomy has increased across all branches of the law including
criminal law and public health law. This increase in private autonomy rights will
create problems for the intervention of the criminal law in HIV/AIDS and must
be taken into account when formulating policy.
With respect to public health law, the emergence of the disease
has seen the application by Australian State and Territory governments of
inappropriate and archaic public health measures to a new disease with
allegations of resulting 'rights' violations. Criminal law and public health law
legislators have to work together on a policy to curb the spread of HIV infection.
Criminalisation should not serve to undermine the public health response. If it
does, then we must examine whether the gains are worth it. The policy should
attempt to balance public health interests of the community against potentially
conflicting individual rights. Therefore, the overriding public health aim must be
to control the spread of the virus without actively discriminating between societal
groups and implementing counterproductive measures. Uniform and effective
action is preferable to haphazard and piecemeal amendments to legislation that
are dictated by public sentiment.
It is not only public health administrators who must determine
medical facts to resolve legal controversies. The participants within the various
arms of the criminal justice system face similar roles, as the presence of AIDS
within the criminal justice system as a whole cannot be ignored. This disease
has resulted in, and has provided the impetus for questioning the
appropriateness of prior practices and fostering the refinement or even changes
in some of the procedures within the criminal justice system. These include the
procedures adopted by police and public health officials when HIV-infected
persons are arrested or detained, the consideration whether HIV-infection is
regarded as a mitigating factor for sentencing purposes and whether custodial
sentences should be imposed on HIV-infected persons. Many of the issues
raised by this thesis, for example, whether to order HIV blood testing of a sexual
offender as a condition of bail, have not yet been addressed by Australian law
makers or become the source of any guiding judicial precedents.
The underlying framework adopted in this thesis could be
described as a combined medico-moral-political analysis of how disease affects
society. From this there springs three main aims. Accordingly, the first aim is
to consider how the politics of AIDS and of diseases and social problems of the
past (and present) directly or indirectly underlies the way that governments,
legislatures and courts, have acted in the context of HIV/AIDS. This is examined
by comparing the response to HIV/AIDS vis-a-vis diseases of the past. The real
issues are about morals, sexual etiquette and individual freedom and how the
criminal justice system and the public health system fall in relation to each of
those issues. The second is to provide support for the view that the criminal law
should have a limited role in preventing the spread of the epidemic. Instead
primary responsibility should be placed on public health departments to detect
and manage recalcitrant sufferers. The final aim is to consider how the criminal
justice system has adapted or should adapt in light of the presence of AIDS.
This necessitates an analysis of the key areas which specifically impact on an
HIV-infected person and his or her victiiti.
This thesis is divided into eight chapters which fall into two notional
parts. The first part contains a philosophical analysis of criminalisation. The
other part is a practical examination of the justice likely to be meted out to HIV-
infected persons and their victims. In truth, these parts are interconnected
because any case for criminalisation cannot be analysed in the abstract but
must be grounded within the system as it operates at a particular time or as it is
planned to operate in the future.
The first chapter describes HIV/AIDS infection, compares it
epidemiologically with other infectious diseases and examines the present and
predicted global epidemiology of the disease. This chapter sets the stage for
considering if the magnitude of the problem justifies the intervention of the
criminal law. Chapter two focuses on the aims of the criminal law simpliciter and
in the context of AIDS. Chapter three analyses how and if so, how well, existing
criminal law provisions could be applied to particular circumstances of HIV
transmission. In chapter four pre-existing public health legislation that penalises
the transmission of communicable diseases is examined in the context of AIDS.
In this chapter the political and societal processes that led to the adaptation of
pre-existing legislation to cope with HIV/AIDS are considered. The arguments
for and against the establishment of an HIV specific offence are also debated in
this chapter.
Chapters five through seven focus on how the public health and
criminal justice systems have adapted in light of HIV/AIDS infection. The theme
behind this part is to examine how individual interests are threatened by the
powers held by particular individuals and to strike a balance between competing
interests. Chapter five considers the breadth of the powers of public health
officials to implement procedures designed to control the spread of
communicable diseases. Chapter six considers how the criminal justice system
will impact upon both HIV-infected persons and their victims during the criminal
process. In particular, the chapter examines changes that have or should be
made to investigatory and trial procedures. Chapter seven considers the risk of
transmission of HIV within the prison system and then canvasses the legal
implications of a variety of procedures that have been or could be introduced
with the aim of preventing the spread of HIV/AIDS within Australian prisons.
The dominating throughout these two chapters is to consider whether the
criminal justice system can make an effective and worthwhile contribution to the
overall strategy aimed at checking progression of the AIDS epidemic. Chapter
eight contains a general conclusion.
CHAPTER 1
GLOBAL EPIDEMIOLOGY AND MEDICAL ASPECTS OF
AIDS
1. INTRODUCTION
The Acquired Immune Deficiency Syndrome (AIDS) has
contributed to the death-rate in developed and developing countries in a
dramatic way. It is of pandemic rather than epidemic proportions. The legal
problems associated with this pandemic are vast and varied. In this chapter,
the extent of the problem of AIDS and the Human Immunodeficiency Virus
(HIV) will be addressed by focusing on the global epidemiology of the
disease. This must be gleaned before deciding whether to implement laws.
The medical aspects of infection with HIV, and the progression to AIDS, will
be outlined. A brief comparison will be made between the epidemiology of
HIV infection and other communicable diseases. Such a comparison is
included because past legislation enacted to control the spread of
communicable diseases will be relevant to the formulation of AIDS legal
policy.
2. THE GLOBAL EPIDEMIOLOGY OF AIDS
According to World Health Organisation (WHO) statistics, as at
December 31 1993, 193 countries or territories had reported a total of
851,628 cumulative AIDS cases. The total figure included 435,978 in the
Americas (North and South America with 339,250 cases in the United
States), 103,402 in Europe, 301,861 in Africa and 4,828 in Australia. ^
These figures cover certain stages of AIDS or HIV infection only
and there may be many more instances of HIV infection not recorded by
official statistics. In December 1992, WHO estimated that the cumulative
global total of AIDS cases was more than 2.5 million. ®As infection with HIV
will progress to AIDS and AIDS will lead to death (as there is no cure for
infection with HIV), confirmed figures of HIV-infection can be treated as the
likely future death-rate from AIDS.
Wkly Epidemiol Rec, 1994,69:5-8.
®Department of Health, Housing and Community Services, Communicable Diseases
Intelligence Bulletin, 1993, 17/8:161-165.
8Only a number of medical conditions satisfy the surveillance or
case definition of AIDS accepted for statistical purposes. For example, not all
indicator diseases of HIV-infection form part of the case definition set by the
Centre for Communicable Diseases in Atlanta, Georgia in the United States
and endorsed by WHO. Changes made to the case definition in 1987, 1988
and 1993 resulted in many conditions previously excluded being included with
a resulting increase in cases satisfying the case definition. The changes in
definition and identification methodology have generally been followed in
Australia ^ and replace the old classification system (using categories such as
AIDS 'A' and AIDS 'B' to represent AIDS and Aids Related Complex (ARC)
respectively) that had been recommended by the AIDS Task Force in 1985.
The old system was found to have ' ... little use as a prognostic guide.'
These changes to the case definition have also affected the accuracy of the
predictions made in early years as to the course of the pandemic.
Given the rudimentary or non-existent nature of reporting
mechanisms in developing countries the figures presented ought not be
treated as conclusive indicators of HIV-infection in those countries. For
example, the WHO figure for AIDS cases in Thailand in July 1991 was 106.
However, reports from the Prime Minister's Office suggested that in reality
300,000-400,000 persons at that time were infected with HIV. ^2 Further, in
many countries including Australia it must be recognised that estimates are
understated because often deaths from HIV/AIDS will be attributed to other
conditions to avoid the stigma and prejudice associated with the disease.
^ Neither Australia nor Europe agreed to follow the 1993 changes to extend the AIDS case
definition on the basis of the percentage of CD4+ T-lymphocyte count. In the United States,
adults and adolescents with diagnosed HIV infection who have a CD4+ T-lymphocyte count
of less that 200 ul of blood or a CD4+ T-lymphocyte percentage of less than 14, with or
without the diagnosis of disease(s) indicative of a defence in cell-mediated immunity, are
included in the definition (CDC, '1993 Revised Classification System for HIV Infection and
Expanded Surveillance Case Definition for AIDS Among Adolescents and Adults', MMWR,
1992, 41 (No. RR-17);1-19). As such Australia only agreed to extend the case definition to
include clinical conditions such as pulmonary tuberculosis, recurrent tuberculosis and
invasive cervical cancer. The reluctance of Australia and Europe to follow the changes in full
may result in some perceived under-reporting in the recorded case figures for AIDS in
Australia and Europe (Kaldor, J., and Hall, R., The United States Centre for Disease Control
1993 revised AIDS case definition: Implications for Australia' Australian HIV Surveillance
Report. 1993, 9(2): 8-9).
Whyte, B., and Cooper, D., The Surveillance Definition of the Acquired Immunodeficiency
Syndrome and the Clinical Classification of Infection with the Human Immunodeficiency Virus
Type 1', Med J Aust 1988, 149:368-373, at p. 370.
Chin, J., 'Public Health Surveillance of AIDS and HIV Infection', Bull Who 1990, 68 (5):
529-536.
"•2 Editorial, 'Poor Man's Plague', The Economist, September 21 1991, 21-24.
Although estimates cannot be made with any degree of certainty
13 and depend on the statistical models adopted. there have been many
predictions about the likely rate of increase of the disease. In 1988 Mann
stated 'the curve of reported cases has been rising relatively slowly to date
compared to the expected rise in the next five years'. These comments
were based on the belief of WHO that between five and ten million people
were then infected with HIV and that 10-30% of those infected would develop
AIDS five years hence. In 1988, the Foreign and Commonwealth Office in
London suggested that 'since the number of AIDS cases in a country reflects
infection rates from two to eight years previous; the current rate of HIV
infection is more important than the current number of cases, in estimating the
future development of the disease'. 1® On this basis in 1990 WHO stated that
by the year 2000, more than half of the predicted 5 million cases would
develop into AIDS. In 1992, this prediction was revised by Dr Mann,
formerly of WHO. Taking into account that more than thirteen million people
had already contracted HIV prior to February 1992, Mann predicted that AIDS
was 'spinning out of control' and will have claimed the lives of 24 million
people world-wide by the year 2000 leaving 120 million people infected with
HIV. 18 As an example of how uncertain the predictions are, WHO disagreed
with Mann alleging that at most only 40 million people will be infected by the
year 2000. i9
18 Especially since 1993 when an Australian study cast doubt on the validity of the HIV-
antibody tests on which the WHO predictions, in particular, are based (reported by
Hodgkinson, N., 'New Doubts over AIDS Infection as HIVTest Declared Invalid', The Sunday
Times, August 1 1993, pp. 1-2). Dax in reviewing a number of studies on the specificity of
the Western Blot test admits that in the early days of testing the number of different criteria
used to interpret Western Blot results led to a confusion in interpreting the Western Blot. She
suggests that as a supplemental test to distinguish true from false positive screening results,
tfie Western Blot, with the application of strict interpretation criteria, ishighly specific and 'still
the stalwart in anti-HIV testing stategies' (Dax, E., 'HIV Western Blot test' [letter] Med J Aust
1994,160:808).
1^ Solomon, P. J., Wilson, S. R., Swanson, C. E., and Cooper, D. A., 'Predicting the course
of AIDS in Australia', Med J Aust ^990, 153:386-392.
1^ Foreign and Commonwealth Office, 'AIDS: The World Summit and Its Outcome',
Background Brief, London, September, 1988, at p. 1.
18 Ibid, at p. 1.
1^Reported in Chin, J., Sato, P.A., andMann, J. M., 'Projections of HIV Infections andAIDS
cases to the year 2000', Bull Who, 1990, 68(1 ):1-11.
18Mann, J., 'AIDS-The Second Decade:A Global Perspective', in J Infect D/s1992, 165, fn
245.
19 Kirby, M., 'AIDS and the Law' (1993)21 Commonwealth LawBulletin, 350-366 at p. 355.
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Th6 greatest increase In AIDS cases has occurred in Africa and
Central America. Between January 1989 and February 1990AIDS cases in
Africa rose from 20,905 20 to 41,512 21 and in the Central Americas (including
the Carribean) from 10,172 to 15,163. r\/lore astounding is the rise from
41,512 AIDS cases to 92,957 cases in Africa between February 1990 and
July 1991 22 and then from 92,957 cases to 144,863 between July 1991 and
April 1992. 23 The greatest increase has been seen in the period from
December 1992 to December 1993 where AIDS cases soared from 211,032
to 301,861. 24 This huge increase over a short time in Africa is believed to be
due to a high basic reproductive rate, high rates of sexual partnership
(prostitution), high rates of other sexually transmitted diseases and 'chronic
activation of the immune system by other infectious diseases'. 25 One would
also have to concede that the better organisation of reporting in Africa would
have been of some effect. The contribution of the African epidemic to the
overall world total is reflected indirectly by the proportion of heterosexuals
infected in Figure 1. 26
Other/Unknown 2%
HoniDSC Heterosexual 71%
Blood 5
Iniection
Drue Use ''•«>
20 Communicable Diseases Intelligence Bulletin, 1989, 2:2-3.
21 Communicable Diseases Intelligence Bulletin, 1990,6:13-15.
22 Communicable Diseases Intelligence Bulletin, 1991,15/20:360-363.
23 Wkly EpidemiolRec, 1992, Vol. 67(14).
24 Wkly Epidemiol Rec, 1993,68:9-11 and 1994, 69:5-8.
25 Skegg, D. C. G., 'Heterosexually acquired HIV infection', BMJ, 1989, 298:401-402. This
view is supported by later research in the area: Anderson, R. and May, R., 'Understanding
the AIDS Pandemic', Sci Am 1992, 266(5): 20.
26 Adapted from GAPAC (The Global AIDS Policy Coalition) Estimate and Projections, of
Adult HIV infections and AIDS 1992-1995 to be found in Mann, J. M., Tarantola, D. J. M.,
Netter, T. W. (eds) AIDS in the World 1992, Cambridge, Harvard University Press, 1992, p.
33.
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As can be seen from Figure 1, the impact of the pandemic of AIDS
on the world population is felt more within certain societal groups such as
homosexuals, bisexuals, heterosexuals, IV drug users, transfused blood or
blood product recipients and haemophiliacs. In Africa the main route of
transmission of HIV is by heterosexual contact ^7 and it is likely that the
African cases are largely responsible for the large proportion of heterosexual
cases reflected in the pie-chart. This was not always the case. In the early
years of the pandemic, the pie-chart would have contained a section
corresponding in size to the current heterosexual group but it would have
represented homosexual transmission. In this respect, the 1990s has seen a
transformation of the disease across societal groups that has largely been
dictated by the receipt of transmission rates from developing countries.
By contrast, the impact of heterosexual transmission has been
slow in developed countries. Atransmission-type analysis of AIDS cases in
the United States still reveals that homosexual transmission is paramount. For
example, 58% of the total AIDS cases until June 1993 have resulted from
homosexual sex, 23% from intravenous drug use, 6% from homosexual sex
and drug use combined, and 6% from heterosexual sex (of which sex with
heterosexual drug users rejDresents the greatest number of cases). ^8
Similarly in Australia, figures as at December 31 1993 reveal that 77.9% of
AIDS cases have resulted from homosexual/bisexual contact with only 5.7%
of cases represented by the combination of homosexual conduct and IV drug
use and 6.5% of cases resulting from heterosexual contact. There is a further
figure of 2.6% attributed to the combination of heterosexual sex and IV drug
use. 29
In all countries the age group between 20-40 years is most
commonly infected. 3° Figures released in Australia, listing AIDS cases by
age at date of diagnosis to June 30 1993, reveal that out of the total 4,258
27 Quinn, T. C., Mann, J. M., Curran, J. W., and Plot, P.. 'AIDS inAfrica; an epidemiological
paradigm''. Science, 1986, 234:955-963. See also Reid, E., 'AIDS in Africa' (1988) 10/2
African Studies Association of Australia and Tfie Pacific Newsletter, 3-8 wfiere an early
estimate is provided tfiat 80-85% ofAIDS cases in Africa occur as a result of fieterosexual
contact (at p. 5) and see also Anderson and May, supra note 19.
28 'Update - acquired immune deficiency syndrome 1993' fvlMWR, 1993, 42(28):547-551.
29 National Centre in HIV Epidemiology and Clinical Research, HIV Surveillance Report,
1994, 10/2:9, Table 1.2.
20 For evidence of this in Africa see Reid, supra note 21, p. 4. In Australia, this is set out in
anyedition of Communicable Diseases Intelligence Bulletin that lists AIDS and HIV cases
by agecategory. In the United States, statistical reports from theCenters tor Disease Control
and Prevention appeared formerly in AIDS/HIVRec published byBio-Data and presently on
a quarterly basis in AIDS. In Europe, the World Health Organisation. Wkly Epidemiol Red
provides evidence that the 20-40year age group is commonly infected.
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cases, 2,526 or 59.3% fall in the 20-39 year age group. Of the 2,786 deaths
that have occurred in Australia from AIDS, 1,502 or 53.9% have occurred in
that age group. These figures represent infected persons that fulfill the
case definition of AIDS. Even in the HIV infection category, the mean age at
diagnosis from 1985-1993 for males is 32.4 years and for females 30.5
years.32 For developing countries, this age selectivity is more devastating
because the educated elite is affected, pushing back the entire continent's
economic and social development. 33 A number of developed countries also
report that there are more young lives lost by virtue of AIDS than by motor
vehicle accidents or suicide. 34 in the United States it has been calculated that
the years of potential life lost before the age of sixty-five increased by 9.9%
for HIV between 1989 and 1990. 35 jp 1992, HIV became the leading cause of
death for men aged between 25-44 years in the United States. 36
As at October 1988, Australia was ranked 24th in the world in
terms of notified AIDS cases. 37 By December 1992 Australia, was ranked
21st. 38 It Is useful to hypothesise on the accuracy of Mann's predictions for
Australia between 1992 and 1995. Mann predicted that by January 1st 1992
28,000 Australian/Oceania populations would be infected with HIV, wifh 4,500
Australian HIV Surveillance Report, 1993, Vol. 9/4; 8. Table 4.3.
32 Australian HIV Surveillance Report, 1993, 9/4:5, Table 2.1.
33 Rollason, R., 'A One-world crisis', McPherson, J., (ed) in AIDS and Compassion ,
Canberra, St. Mark's, 1988, at p. 105.
34 Valleron, A.J., 'Demographic Consequences of Mortality from AIDS in France in 1990:
AIDS Ahead of Suicide and Close to Motor Vehicle Deaths', in Papers , First International
Conference on the Global Impact of AIDS, 1988. The study by Marzuk, P.M., Tierney, H.,
Tardiff, K., et al, 'Increased risk of suicide in persons with AIDS', JAMA 1988, 259: 1333-
1337, concludes that an increasing number of suicides are committed by young men
suffering from AIDS. See also Kristal, A.R., The Impact of the Acquired Immunodeficiency
Syndrome on Patterns of Premature Death in New YorkCity', JAMA, 1986, 255:2306-2310.
By 1986, AIDSwas the eighth most important cause of loss of life in the United States (Mann,
J., 'AIDS Epidemiology, Prevention and Control', Reid, E., (ed), WHO/Australian Inter-
Regional Meeting on AIDS, Canberra, Australian Government Printer, 1987, 33-56, at p. 50).
In 1992 it was still the eighth most important cause ('Update: Mortality Attributed to HIV
Infection Among Persons Aged 25-44 years US - 1991-1992' MMWR 1993, 42(28): 869-772
at p. 869).
35 CDC, 'Years of Potential Life Lost Before Age 65 and 85 - United States 1989-1990'
MMWR, 1992, 41(18):313-315.
36 MMWR supra note 28.
37 Adams, A. I., 'IV International Conference on AIDS - Implications for Australia', ModMed
Aust 1988, 47-52.
38 Wkly Epidemiol Rec, 1993,68:9-11.
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AIDS cases. Given the fact that 15,679 Australians were found HIV positive
at the National AIDS Registry by December 31 1992^0; that Australia is one
country out of twenty-three in the Oceania region (with New Zealand and
Papua New Guinea the only other countries providing significant case
numbers); and, that Mann's estimates build-in a certain component for under
reporting, the prediction may be accurate. This is further supported by
examining the AIDS cases. By December 1992 3,615 AIDS cases had
developed in Australia and 348 AIDS cases in New Zealand. These figures
are not far off the predicted total of 4,500 for the entire region. By 1995,
Mann predicted there will be 40,000 cases of HIV infection including 11,500
AIDS cases in the Australian/Oceania region.'^2 gy mid-1994 it appears that
this estimate will not materialise. Figures for December 31 1993 reveal that
there are 5,303 AIDS cases in the region with 4753 and 413 represented by
Australia and New Zealand respectively. In addition, there have been 19,256
notifications of HIV infection recorded. This rate will have to double to reach
Mann's prediction by 1995. Such a result would be unlikely given the current
progression rate of the disease in this region. There is no suggestion that the
remaining countries in the Oceania region will see the dramatic increases
over short periods that has characterised the epidemic in Africa and some
Asian countries.
When comparing the reported AIDS case rate as of December
1992 in United Kingdom of 6,510 cases with that in Australia of 3,615 cases
and taking into account the fact that the United Kingdom as of 1992 had a
population of approximately 57.9 million compared to 17 million, the
ratio of cases per one hundred thousand of the population is higher in
39 GAPAC (The Global AIDS Policy Coalition) Estimate and Projections of Adult HIV
infections and AIDS 1992-1995 supra note 20, Table 2.3A, p. 885. Apparently, Mann did not
include any South East or North East Asian countries in the category 'Oceanic' since there
were separate categories for these areas.
'^ 0 Australian HIVSurveillance Report, 1992, 8(suppl 1): 16,Table 3.3.
In this context the writer is referring to those cases that fulfil the CDC case definition of
AIDS as adopted by Australia.
'^ 2 GAPAC Estimate and Projections of Adult HIV infections and AIDS 1992-1995 to be found
in Mann, etal, supra note 20, Table 2.3B, at p. 885.
^3 Australian HIV Surveillance Report, 1994, 10/2: 31, Table 7.1.
The population of the United Kingdom as of December 1992 when the last official census
taken was 57,998 million (Office of Population Census and Survey, London, reported in
Annual Abstract of Statistics, London, HMSO, 1994, Table 2.1,at p. 4).
'^3 Australian Bureau of Statistics, Australian Demographic Statistics, June quarter 1992,
Canberra, Australian Bureau of Statistics, 1993.
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Australia. In fact, figures reveal that Australia has a case ratio of 2.5/100,000
whereas the United Kingdom has a ratio of 2.2/100,000.At first glance the
conclusion could be drawn that HIV Infection represents a significant threat to
the health and the demographics of Australia. However, It Is the rate of
Increase that Is Important and It appears that In Australia the progression rate
has slowed. For example. In the United Kingdom between December 1992
and December 1993 the number of AIDS cases has Increased from 6,510 to
8,115 whereas In Australia, the Increase for the corresponding period has
been from 3,615 to 4,828 cases.
By 1989, the most Important and serious Implication of the AIDS
pandemic for developed countries was the emerging Impact of AIDS within
the heterosexual population and IV drug users. It was feared that the
criminal justice system would be selecting and filtering large numbers of
persons at-rlsk for HIV. Drew and Taylor In 1988 stated that there were
approximately 9,000 regular IV drug users In Australia who could potentially
die from AIDS contracted by 1990. They also estimated there were between
175,000 and 500,000 occasional IV drug users who were at high risk of
becoming Infected. The rate may be further exacerbated by the Increasing
number of narcotic drugs such as designer drugs, amphetamines and crack
that are Injected.
A study by Haverkos and Edelman In the United States reveals
that the heterosexual spread of HIV Is slow. In the absence of IV drug usage
and genital ulceratlve disease, This link may explain why there has been a
low rate of transmission of HIV from males to their spouses. The theory has
also been confirmed by European studies. 5"' In addition, Canada, United
Wkly Epidemiol Rec, supra note 32.
Haverkos, H.W., and Edelman, R., 'The Epidemiology of Acquired Immunodeficiency
Syndrome Among Heterosexuals', JAMA, 1988,. 260:1922-1929, Carballo, M., and Rezza,
G., 'AIDS, Drugs fvlisuse and the Global Crisis' in Strang, J., and Stimson, G. V., (ed), AIDS
and Drug Misuse, London, Routledge, 1990,16-26 at 18.
'tS Drew, L. , and Taylor, V., TheSecond AIDS Epidemic: Spread via Needle-Sharing to the
General Community: A Review, Canberra, Commonwealth Department of Health, 1988.
'*9 Des Jarlais, D., et at 'Crack Use and Multiple AIDS Risk Behaviours', J AIDS, 1991,
4:446. Hall, W., and Hando J., Amphetamine Use Among YoungAdults in Sydney, Australia,
Sydney, Drug and Alcohol Directorate of New South Wales, 1993.
Haverkos and Edelman, supra note 41, 1922-1929.
Confirmed by WHO Collaborating Centre on AIDS, 'AIDS Surveillance in Europe-
Quarterly Report', No. 21, March, Paris, 1989.
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Kingdom (particularly Edinburgh 52)_ United States, and many of the countries
in Europe have observed increases in HIV infection among IV drug users over
short periods.
Figure 2 (top and bottom graphs) shows in graph form the
increase rate of transmission of AIDS by the known high-risk practices in
Australia as at July 1993.
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and heterosexual contact, by
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which exposure to HIV was
injecting drug use, by year.
52 In fact, many studies have focused on Edinburgh because historically the city has had the
most noticeable drug problem. See for more detail studies by, Follett, E.A., fyiclntyre. A.,
O'Donnell, B., et al 'HTLV-III Antibody in Drug Abusers in the West of Scotland: the
Edinburgh Connection', Lancet, 1986, 2:446-447; and Robertson, R., 'The Edinburgh
epidemic - a case study', in Strang, and Stimson, supra note 41, 95-107.
53 Centre for Disease Control (US), 'Prevalence and Rate of Spread of HIV in the United
States', AIDS/HIV Rec, November, 1988, 10-11 in which it was stated that the proportion of
reported cases with a history of IV drug usage in the United States had increased from 24%
in September 1986-August 1987 to 29% in September 1987-August 1988. Loses, J., Wells,
G., Elmslie, K., et al, 'Acquired ImmuneDeficiency Syndrome in Canada: the First5 years of
Surveillance', Can Med Assoc J, 1988, 139:383-388. For Europe. IV International
Conference on AIDS, Stockholm, 12-16 June 1888, Abstract Volumes and V International
Conference on AIDS, Montreal 4-9 June 1989, Abstract Volumes, 117.
54 from Kaldor, J., McDonald, A. M., Blumer, C. E., et al. The acquired immunodeficiency
syndrome in Australia: incidence 1982-1991' Med J Aust, 1993, 158:10-17, Figures 1-2, p
12.
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Looking at the top graph above, the curve applying to
homosexual/bisexual transmission and blood transfusion related transmission
has stabilised markedly since mid-1989. Bycontrast, in the bottom graph the
cases attributed to the combination of male homo/bisexual contact/IV drug
use and other IV drug use have risen steadily from mid-1987. This trend has
continued into 1993. ^5 The link between heterosexual cases and IV drug use
is certainly supported by research that has been conducted in othercountries.
For example, in the United States at one STD clinic, 66% of AIDS cases
attributed to heterosexual contact involved persons who reported contact with
a person with increased risk for HIV infection because they were IV drug
users, bisexuals or recipients of infected blood products. Increases in
syphilis among heterosexuals, particularly among prostitutes, drug users and
their sexual contacts, as shown in the United States would also tend to
support this. ^7 in 1992 in Australia, of the 15,679 cases of HIV infection
(which are cases not fulfilling the 'case definition' of AIDS), 3.2% of that total
were infected through IV drug use/heterosexual contact and 1.6%of the total
through male homosexual/IV drug use. Figures quantifying heterosexual
transmission may not be accurate since an individual may be categorised in
another manner, for example, as an IV drug user, homosexual or bisexual.
Despite this, in 1991, Carr stated that in Australia the 'second wave' of cases
that was predicted within the IV drug user/heterosexual group had not
developed to the extent feared.
In 1991, Carr also stated that there was no evidence to suggest
that the course of the Australian HIV/AIDS epidemic would follow the course
of the United States statistics. He does acknowledge however that the
statistics presented may not Ipe complete and that it is the statistics for
antibody testing rather than the number of cases fulfilling the criteria of case
definition of AIDS which need to be focused on. Even then, such figures are
55 Australian HIVSurveillance Report, 1994, 10/2: 9, Table 1.2.
56 Centre for Disease Control (US), 'Update: Heterosexual Transmission of Acquired
Immunodeficiency Syndrome and Human Immunodeficiency Virus Infection - United States',
MMWR, 1989, 38:423-434. Thie study by the Public Health Laboratory Service Working
Group in England entitled, 'Prevalence of HIV antibody in high and lovi/ risk groups in
England', BMJ, 1989, 298:422-423, found that heterosexual spread of HIV in England isstill
largely confined to subjects whose partner has an identifiable risk such as IV drug use.
57 Centre for Disease Control, 'Relationship of syphilis to drug use and prostitution -
Connecticut and Philadelphia, Pennsylvania', MMWR, 1988, 37:755-780, at p. 764.
56 Australian HIV Surveillance Report, 1992, 8(suppl 1):84, Table 3.2.
59Carr, A., 'The HIV Epidemic: the next ten years' (1991) National AIDS Bulletin, October,
7-11, Table 10. at p. 10.
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not fully indicative of the total cases as most are obtained as the result of
voluntary testing. In fact, in a 1991 Victorian study, 82% of tests conducted
were of persons for which no HIV exposure category was reported. 6o This
would lend weight to the theory that at risk persons may not be coming
fonward for testing in Victoria. There is no reason to suggest that other States
might not be experiencing a similar pattern. For example, in Tasmania one
might expect fewer people to present for testing given that homosexual
conduct is still illegal in that State. 6i As a result of these findings, it is
reasonable to assume that relatively sizeable increases in infection in some
exposure categories can pass undetected for some time. As such, a further
spread of infection among IV drug users was regarded by Wodak in 1991 as
both 'inevitable and imminent'. ^2
However, by December 31 1993, the 'second wave' has still not
appeared. Table 2 presented below is most useful to illustrate this point.
DESCRIPTION 1985' 1988 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993
Tdtal Cases 394t 2629 2772 1712 1609 1405 1414 1206 998
Males f%t' 96.1 95.7 96.1 94.7 94.7 92.6 94.4 92.0 92.1
Mean Age:
34
Males 31 31 32 33 33 32 33 34
Females 29 32 32 31 28 30 31 33 29
State/Tefrttorvf%):
0.7 0.6 1.0 0.7ACT 0.7 1.3 0.8 0.7 1.1
NSW 70.6 72.7 75.1 68.1 59.1 56.0 57.8
56.4 51.0
fn" 0.2 0.2 0.5 02 0.4 0.6 0.4 0.5 0.9
OLD 4.4 5.8 5.0 7.1 102 10.5 11.1 13.1
14.3
SA 2.3 2.1 Z4 2.9 4.6 4.6 32 2.8 5.5
TAS O.t 0.1 02 0.1 0.8 0.6
0.4 0.8 0.4
VIC 18.5 13.5 12.8 16.9 20.3 21.7 21.8 212
22.9
WA 3.2 4.3 32 4.0 3.9 4.9 4.7 42 4.3
ExDosure Cateoorv
Male homosexual/bisexual
contact 83.5 84.0 86.0 83.3 80.7 79.3 78.8 74.4 76.6
Male homosexual/bisexual
contact and ID use 2.1 2.7 3.2 2.0 3.1 3.0 2.6 3.5 3.4
ID use (female and
lieterosexual male) 2.5 5.0 4.9 7.4 6.7 6.5 5.5 5.6 4.7
Heterosexual contact 1.3 2.0 3.0 5.1 7.2 9.5 11.2 14.6 14.4
Haemophilia/coagulation
0.0disorder 7.8 4.2 1.5 0.6 0.3 0.1 0.3 02
Receipt of blood trans
fusion, blood com
ponents, or tiasue 2.6 2.0 1.3 1.5 1.6 1.4 12 1.4 0.7
Mother with/at risk (or
HIV Infection 0.2 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.4 0.2 0.4 0.3 02
Ottier/undetarmined 54.3 50.6 40.5 24.2 26.2 30.7 28.4 162 14.9
1. Diagnoses in 1985 or earlier.
2. Prrjporton ofmales among cases wtxjse sex was reported.
3. The 'Other/urKjetermined" category was excluded from the calculation of the percentage of cases
attributed to each exposure category.
Gertig, D., Crofts, N., Stevenson, E., etal, The epidemiology of HIV-1 infection inVictoria',
MedJAust, 1993, 158/1:17-20.
Under section 122-123 of the Criminal Code (1924)(Tas.).
Wodak, A., 'To Take up Arms Against a Sea of Drugs: AIDS Infecting Drug Users and
Drug Policy', HIV Infection and AIDS, Sydney, Proceedings of the 1991 Annual General
meeting of the Australian Academy of Science, 1991, 61- 70, at pp. 64-65.
Reproduction of Table 1.1 Australian HIVSurveillance Report, 1994,10/2:8.
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Table 2 illustrates that of the total 17,737 cases of HIV Infection (from 1985-
December 1993) only 4.7% of the newly diagnosed Infections for 1993 were
transmitted by IV drug use/heterosexual contact and 3.4% of the total were
transmitted through male homosexual/IV drug use.
Two Important facts can be gleaned from the table. First, It Is
significant to note that If one follows through the exposure category for 'male
homosexual/bisexual contact and drug use' It can be seen that the rate Increased
moderately between 1991-1992 (a rise from 2.6% to 3.5% of the total cases) but
decreased marginally between 1992-1993 (from 3.5% to 3.4%). In the 'IV drug
use' exposure category the number of cases remained almost constant between
1991-1992, between 5.5-5.6% of the total but decreased between 1992 and 1993
(from 5.6% to 4.7%). It Is significant to note that the peak period for male
homosexual IV drug use was In 1992 when the rate was 3.5%. By contrast, the
peak period for heterosexual/IV drug use category was In 1987 and 1988 when
the figures were 7.4% and 6.7% respectively. The rate has decreased steadily
since then.
Second, It Is clear that In 1991 at the time of Carr's predictions there
was a large undetermined category (29.2% of the total) which has dropped to
14.9% In 1993. While the drop has brought some reliability to the 1993 figures,
the 1991 rate does bring Into question Carr's predictions at that time. The safest
conclusion that can be drawn as at June 1993 Is that the Increase attributed to IV
drug use has levelled off but it Is still unclear as to what has prompted this and to
what extent these figures are reliable at all. There could be a direct link between
containment of these figures and the establishment of needle-exchanges In
Australia. However, It Is difficult to assess In the absence of conclusive research
on the point and the reliability of such Information would be questionable given
the short life-span of these exchanges. One could posit though that drug users
do not appear to pose a significant risk to the criminal justice system or a drain
on public health resources In Australia.
There has been very little Increase In AIDS cases In the
adolescent/young adult age category In Australia. For example. In July 1988, 6
out of 943 or 0.6% of Australian AIDS cases were recorded In the 10-19 year age
category. 64 By December 31 1993 (5 years later) the case number had
^ Communicable Diseases Intelligence Bulletin, 1988, 17:3. The 10-19 year age group was re-
categorised in 1990 as 13-19 years.
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increased to 19 out of 4753 but represented only 0.4% of the total number of
cases. By contrast, the death rate from AIDS has been very high in that group
with 13 of the 19 or 73% of the total'adolescents having died since they have
acquired the disease.
Figures that indicate a low rate of increase among adolescents
should be viewed with caution since Australian and American studies have
established that teenagers still believe they are immune from HIV infection. A
1992 Queensland survey of 175 class groups from 72 randomly selected high
schools (students in years 10, 11 and 12) examined students' attitudes to sex
and antibody testing. The survey found that only 28% of girls and 53% of boys
always used a condom during intercourse even though they had received
education in safe-sex practices. In addition, one of the main reasons cited by the
students for not using a condom was that the female partner was on the
contraceptive pill, indicating that preventing pregnancy was more of a concern
rather than preventing disease transmission. ^7
3. THE MEDICAL ASPECTS OF AIDS
AIDS was first recognised in 1981®® after increasing numbers of
homosexuals developed hitherto unknown clinical manifestations, 'opportunistic'
infections (for example, PCP a form of pneumonia which until then had been
rare) and/or a form of skin cancer known as 'kaposi's sarcoma'. These men and
later, other non-homosexual AIDS persons, were found to have profound defects
Australian HIV Surveillance Report, 1994, 10/2:11, Table 2.3.
66 In Australia, Stollznow Research Ry. Ltd., Pilot Investigation into the Attitudes Adopted by
doctors Towards AIDS and a Study of 17-25 Year Old Attitudes Towards AIDS , Sydney,
Stollznow Research Pty. Ltd., 1988. In the United States, StrUnin, L., and Hingson, S. D.,
'Acquired Immunodeficiency Syndrome and Adolescents: Knowledge, Beliefs, Attitudes and
Behaviours', Paediatrics , 79(5): 825-828. In the more recent American study of Zimet, G. D.,
Diclemente, R. J., Lazelanik, et at, ('Changes in Adolescents Knowledge and Attitudes About
AIDS over the Course of the AIDS Epidemic', J Adolesc H, 1993, 14(2):85-90) it was concluded
that efforts must be increased to educate younger school students. This study found that
younger students had a lower AIDS knowledge score in 1991 than their similarly aged
counterparts did in 1989.
Study by Dunne, M. P., Donald, M., Lucke, J., and Raphael, B., from National Centre for HIV
Social Research, University of Queensland, National Centre for HIV Epidemiology and Clinical
Research, Australian HIV Surveillance Report, 1992, 8/4:1,3.
®® The initial cases were reported to CDC who published an account of them in 'Pneumocystis
Pneumonia - Los Angeles' MMWR, 1981, 30: 250-252; 'Kaposi's sarcoma and pneumocystis
pneumonia among homosexual men - New YorkCity and California', tvlMWR 1981 30:305-308.
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in their immune systems. Since these defects had become apparent during
adulthood, they were considered to be acquired rather than congenital (at birth).
By 1983, the Centre for Disease Control (CDC) in the United States, had formally
named this syndrome AIDS, and defined it as a disease or the end stage of
infection with a virus known as Human Immunodeficiency Virus (HIV). 69 To
understand the devastating effect of HIV it is necessary to examine what is
meant by immunity and how the immune system functions,
IMMUNITY
Human beings are exposed to a number of infectious agents. Most of
these organisms are killed before they cause serious harm. Immunity can be
classified into four groups: Innate Immunity, Acquired Immunity, Cell Mediated
Immunity and Immunisation. ^6 Innate Immunity is made up of four components
which act as barriers; the skin, the gastric juices and enzymes that line the
gastrointestinal tract, proteins in the bloodstream that neutralise bacteria, and
cellular components, such as white blood cells and macrophages. The process
of acquired immunity begins at birth and is characterised by a maturation of
lymphocyte cells. Lymphocytes pass into the bloodstream and enter the lymph
nodes where they reside until an infectious agent enters the body. They then act
69 Mann, supra note 28, at p. 35. The virus however, was not named the Human
Immunodeficiency Virus (HIV) until 1986. The name was recommended by the International
Committee on the Taxonomy of Viruses (Coffin, J., et al, 'What to call the AIDS virus?' Nature,
1986, 321:10). The virus was claimed to have been discovered by Montagnier and his colleagues
at the Institut Pasteur in Paris and Gallo of the National Cancer Institute in the United States.
An article appearing in Cancer Research by Duesberg in March 1987 challenged the
view that AIDS was caused by HIV (Duesberg, P. H., 'Retroviruses as carcinogens and
pathogens: expectations and reality'. Cancer Res 1987, 47:1199-1220). This led to a number
of comments being made by researchers in academic journals (see the arguments in favour of
HIV as the virus causing AIDS by Blattner, W., Gallo, R. C., and Temin, H. M., in 'HIV Causes
AIDS', Science ,1988, 241:514 and 517, and the arguments against HIV causing AIDS by
Duesberg, P.H., 'Duesberg's Response to Blattner and Colleagues', Science, 1988, 241:515-
516). The matter was expounded upon by Jad Adams in a book entitled AIDS: Jhe HIV Myth ,
London, Macmillan, 1989, which pointed to the commercial interests tied to the HIV view and
criticised the medical establishment for silencing or ridiculing Duesberg. Adams has not been
immune from criticism for his support of Duesberg and alternative theories. See 'AIDS and HIV:
Amyth?' Lancet, 1989, 2:1031 and Stewart, G. T., 'Uncertainties about AIDS and HIV, Lancet,
1989, 2:1325. The debate that HIV is an effect rather than a cause resurfaced again in 1992-
1993: Schechter, M T., Craib J. P., Gelmon, K. A., 'HIV 1 and aetiology of AIDS' Lancet, 1993,
341: 658-659. In light of the academic misgivings the best that can be said is that HIV is
generally thought by a majority of the medical fraternity, to be the cause of AIDS rather than any
other etiologic factor. To what extent this decision serves the interests of any particular group,
company, organisation or any individual in society will not be discussed in this thesis.
^9 Kimball, J. W., Introduction to Immunology, 2nd ed. New York, Macmillan, 1986, chapter 1.
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to neutralise that agent, Where antibodies remain in the bloodstream for years
protecting the individual from re-infection with the same organism, an individual
possesses what is known as acquired immunity.
The process known as cell mediated immunity is characterised by the
thymus gland producing a sub-population of lymphocytes called T-lymphocytes
which enter the bloodstream, attacking the offending infectious substance, and.
along with antibodies, help destroy it. T-lymphocytes have two sub-groups, T-
helper and T-suppressor cells. The helper cells enhance immune
responsiveness in fighting infection and the T-suppressorcells inhibit the immune
reaction after the infectious process has been cleared. ^2
Finally, the best known method of developing immunity to modern
diseases such as chicken pox, poliomyelitis, tetanus and the flu, is through
immunisation. This is the process whereby vaccines against the virus are
injected into the body of an individual in order to provide an immunity from that
disease.
HUMAN IMMUNODEFICIENCY VIRUS (HIV)
An individual may possess or acquire a deficiency in his or her
immune system either at birth (congenital) or during his or her lifetime (acquired).
AIDS is an example of the latter. Individuals with AIDS characteristically have T-
lymphocytes that are damaged by HIV. This increases their susceptibility to
'opportunistic' infections. The virus itself contains ribonucleic acid (RNA) together
with an enzyme called reverse transcriptase. HIV is a retrovirus which by
definition means that reverse transcriptase allows the virus' RNA to be
transformed or translated back into deoxyribonucleic acid (DNA), reversing the
usual sequence from DNA to RNA.
Moreover, prior to 1985, it was thought that there was only one HIV
virus. In that year data from West Africa revealed a new isolate; one that was not
Kimball, Ibid, at pp. 3-5
^2 Said, J., 'Pathogenesis of HIV Infection', in Nasfi, G., and Said, J. (eds). Pathology ofAIDS
and HIV Infection, Pfiiladelpfiia, W.B. SaundersCo, 1992,15-18 at p. 17.
Kimball, supra note 64, at p. 3-5.
74Mann, supra note 28, at p. 36. For a more detailed description of the biology of HIV, see:
Weber, J., 'AIDS: The Virus, Antivirals and Vaccines', Br J Hosp Med . February 1987, 135-141;
Gallo, R. C., and Montagnier, L., in 'AIDS in 1988', Sd Am, 1988, 259(4):25-32.
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simply a strain of the original HIV but a new virus designated HIV-2. Both HIV-1
and HIV-2 are similar in structure yet HIV-2 is epidemic mainly in West Africa.
In October 1988, Gallo and Montagnier stated that the pathogenic potential of
HIV-2 was not as clearly established as HIV-1. Since the RNA sequences
of HIV compare with that of the retrovirus from African Green Monkeys it is
thought that HIV-2 may have mutated from this simian immunodeficiency virus
(SIV) but not so for HIV-1. However, in 1989 scientists from the Centre
Internationale de la Recherche Medicale de Franceville in Gabon, West Africa
reported finding two wild chimpanzees that were seropositive for HIV. The virus
was found to be like HIV-1 and may provide evidence that the chimpanzees
could have been the source of the human infection. ^8 The fact that there is such
a wide variation of RNA sequences, leads to the concern that, as with influenza,
a single source of vaccine may not be sufficient to immunise against all such
variants.
The virus can infect those cells that have particular receptor sites on
their outer surface, such as T-helper lymphocytes (T4 cells), cells that express
the CD4 antigen. As the cell is penetrated, the reverse transcriptase works on
the RNA making DNA copies and that DNA then moves into the nucleus of the
host cell integrating itself into the genetic material of the host cell. HIV enters its
target cells by interacting (or binding) with the molecule called CD4. The virus
Clavel, F., 'HIV-2 - the West African AIDS virus', AIDS, 1987, 1:135-140. This position is still
regarded as correct.
Gallo and Montagnier, supra note 68, at p. 29. However, as HIV-1 and HIV-2 are identified by
the same tests and give rise to generally the same symptoms, in this thesis the term 'HIV will be
used in a general sense.
Albion Street AIDS Centre, The AIDS Manual, Sydney, The Albion Street Centre, 1989, at p.
9. See also, Gardner, M., Marx, P., 'Simian AIDS', in Advances in Viral Oncology, Vol. 5, New
York, Raven Press, 1985, 57-81. Kanki, P. J., and Essex, M., 'Origins of HTLV-III (HIV)', in
Wormser, G. P., Stahl, R. E., and Bottone, E. J., (eds), AIDS - and Other Manifestations of HIV
Infection, New Jersey, Noyes Publications, 1987, at pp. 250-256.
Short, R., 'HIV Infection and AIDS - The Global Scene', in HIV Infection and AIDS, Sydney,
Proceedings of the 1991 Annual General meeting of the Australian Academy of Science, 1991,
15-29, at p. 26.
Marx, J., The AIDS Virus Can Take On Many Guises', Science, 1988, 241:1039-1040.
The virus has also been found to infect cells lacking CD4 such B lymphocytes, promyolocytes,
fibroblasts and epidermal Langerhan's cells (Levy, J. A., 'Features of HIV and the Host Response
that Influence Progression to Disease', in Sande, M.A., and Volberding, P. A., (eds), 3rd ed. Viral
and Immunologic Factors in HIV infection, Philadelphia, W.B. Saunders, 1992, 18-22, at p. 19.
Fauci, A., etal, 'Immunopathogenic Mechanisms in HIV Ann Intern Med , 1991, 114:78.
23
also infects macrophages which Gallo and Montagnier believe bring the virus into
the brain. This explains the neurological conditions associated with HIV-infection.
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The virus lies dormant, but, when activated, it produces new viruses
which burst out of the cell, fusing with and killing healthy cells and infecting
others in order to continue the process. It is believed that the virus may become
active upon activation of the immune system. it is only upon cell activation in
this manner, that an individual will develop the clinical symptoms of AIDS. Prior
to this time, an individual may be infected with HIV but the virus lies dormant in
his or her body without developing into AIDS. The individual may at this stage
be an asymptomatic (symptomless) carrier of the virus. Factors that may be
responsible for activating HIV to progress to AIDS are discussed in a later section
of this chapter.
MODES OF TRANSMISSION OF HIV
The main body fluids through which transmission occurs are blood
and semen. The HIV virus has also been isolated in human tears, saliva
Gallo and Montagnier, supra note 68, at p. 29.
Kay, K. (ed), AIDS Virus Infection , Sydney, The Albion Street Centre, 1986, para. 2.1-3.8.
Mann, supra note 28, at p. 47, Marx, supra note 73, at pp. 1039-1040 and Weber, supra note 68,
at p. 136-137.
It is because of this capacity that AIDS is labelled a 'lentivirus' (slow virus) (Levy, supra note
74, at p. 18). Weber, in fact suggests that it is not correct to suggest that the virus is latent as a
whole in the body. He believes that there is a continuous low level replication of HIV throughout
the course of the infection (supra note 68, at p. 138).
85 Saliva is said to contain one-tenth to one-hundredth of the amount of virus in the blood and
plasma and at less frequency (Levy, supra note 74, at p. 21). Although it is thought that the virus
cannot be spread by casual social contact, for example, where saliva is exchanged. Lancet did
report one known case where it was likely that the virus was transmitted during a fight between
two sisters. The infected sister bit the other while her mouth was bleeding and infected the other
(Anon., Transmission of HIV by human bite'. Lancet, 1987, 1:522). It is more likely that this was
in reality an instance of blood to blood transmission. As Lifson, A. states, in 'DoAlternative Modes
for Transmission of Human Immunodeficiency Virus Exist?', JAMA, 1988, 259(9):1353-1356, 'If
HIV were readily transmitted through contact with saliva, itwould be most evident in one of three
settings: during traumatic exposures (such as bites), after parenteral or mucous membrane
exposures in the health care setting, or during sexual contact (oral-oral or oral-genital)'.
Correspondence in Lancet (Rozenbaum, W., Ghrakhanian, S., Garden, B., et at, 'HIV
Transmission by oral sex' 2:1395; Dassey, D. E., Delels, R,, Visscher, B, et at , 'HIV and
orogenital transmission' 1988, 2:1023-1024; Goldberg, D. J., Green, S. T., Kennedy, D. H., etal,
'HIV and orogenital transmission' 1988, 2:1248; Levy, J., Greenspan, D., 'HIV in saliva' 1988,
2:1363) debate whether HIV can be transmitted through orogenital contact. A 1989 study has
suggested that microlesions in the mouth cavity following vigorous kissing or teeth brushing may
result in blood in the saliva which may be"highly infectious in HIV infected persons (Piazza, M.,
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breast milk and cerebrospinal fluid. Although the possibility of transmission
by saliva has been considered, there has not been a conclusive documented
case of HIV being transmitted through this source alone. This renders the risk of
infection by biting or spitting exceedingly low. HIVhas been conclusively found
to be transmitted in four ways. These are through the exchange of bodily fluids
during intimate sexual contact; when infected blood or blood products are
used; when contaminated needles are shared amongst intravenous (IV) drug
Chirlanni, A., Picciotlo, L., et al, 'Passionate Kissing and Microlesions of the Oral l^ucosa:
Possible Role in AIDS Transmission', JAMA, 1989, 261:244-245). With respect to oral sex, one
report lists seroconversion in two homosexual men who did engage in rectal intercourse for at
least 5 years but had engaged in oral sex with ejaculation (Lifson, A.R., O'Malley, P.l^, Hessol
N.A.S., ef al' HIV seroconversion in two homosexual men after receptive oral intercourse with
ejaculation: Implications for counselling concerning safe sexual practices'. Am J Pub Health,
1990, 80:1509). By contrast in another study, no seroconversions occurred in 147 gay men who
practiced only oral sex (Kingsley, L. A, et al 'Risk factors for seroconversion to human
immunodeficiency virus among homosexuals. Lancet, 1987, 1:345-348). In 1991 there was
another report of HIV being transmitted to a male who engaged in oral sex only and who had not
had penetrative sex for 8 years or ever injected IV drugs (l^urray, A. B., et al 'Coincident
acquisition of Neissema gonorrhoea HIV from fellatio' [letter] Lancet, 1991, 338:830). In the
absence of any definitive statement, guidelines have been formulated worldwide to reduce
exposures to the saliva of infected persons in for example, health care, school settings and in
police departments.
Lifson, Ibid states that HIV has been isolated in breast milk and he cites the report from
Australia of Ziegler, J.B. et al, 'Post-Natal Transmission of AIDS-Associated Retrovirus from a
Mother to an Infant', Lancet, 1985, 1:896-897, where HIV was transmitted to an infant from its
mother who had received a HIV contaminated blood transfusion during labour. By 1992 breast
feeding was thought to account for a substantial proportion of mother-to-child transmissions or at
least substantially increase the risk of transmission of HIVduring the perinatal period (European
Collaborative Study, 'Risk Factors for Mother-to-Child Transmission of HIV-1', Lancet, 1992,
339:1007-1012).
Studies reveal that while there is a high level of the virus in this fluid, it is not a natural source
of infection (Levy, J. A., Hollander, H., Shimabukuro, J., et al 'Isolation of AIDS-associated
retroviruses from cerebrospinal fluid and brain of patients with neurological symptoms', Lancet,
1985,1:586).
See studies in footnote 79.
Marx, J. L., in 'Do Sperm Spread the AIDS Virus?' Science, 1989, 245:30 reports that
conflicting results of studies conducted during 1989 reveal that scientists are not willing to rule out
the possibility that sperm actually carry the AIDS virus because of the concentration of blood in
the sperm. Following this, Levy, supra note 74 states that genital secretions including sperm and
vaginal and cervical fluids vary in virus quantity but generally have much less than the blood (at
p. 21).
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users; and by mother to child either, peri- (before birth) or neo-natally (after
birth). 90 Each of these will be described briefly below.
(i) Sexual Transmission
It is now clear that HIV may be spread not only by homosexual
conduct but also by heterosexual sexual activity. As to genital secretions, Levy
has stated that 'up to 5% of white cells in seminal fluid, can be HIV infected'. 9i
He believes that the numbers of infected cells in the ejaculate relates directly to
the ability to transfer the virus to others. It might also explain why several
partners of some seropositive individuals do not get infected: the genital fluids do
not contain a large enough number of infected cells at a particular time.
The Center for Disease Control (US) has stated that a person's risk of
acquiring HIV through sexual contact is dependent upon a number of factors.
These include: the number of infected sexual partners a person has with whom
safe sexual practices are not adopted, whether if infected, the partner has STD
infections, the type of sex practice engaged in (anal intercourse is a higher risk
practice than vaginal (non-traumatic) sexual intercourse), the varying level of
infectivity of the partner (i.e the number of infected cells) due to the stage of the
disease in a partner, 92 and, whether the infected partner is homosexual,
bisexual, a prostitute or IV drug user and does not adopt safe sexual practices. 93
The presence of any or all these factors increases the risk of transmission. 94
Windom, R., AIDS and the Public Health Service, U.S. Department of Health and Human
Services, Atlanta, Centers for Disease Control, 1987. These observations of the modes of
transmission and the risk-groups have remained virtually unchanged since 1982.
91 Levy, supra note 74, at pp. 21-22. This is supported by Padian, N. S., Shiboski, S., and
Jewell, N. P., ('Female to l^ale Transmission of Human Immunodeficiency Virus, JAMA, 1991,
266:1664).
92 Where the CD4+ ceil count is fewer than 200/ly/llle, sex partners are more likely to become
infected (Goedert, J.J, Eyseter, M.E., Biggar, R.J., et al, 'Heterosexual transmission of human
immunodeficiency virus. Association with severe depletion of T-helper lymphocyte in men with
haemophilia', AIDS Rev. Hum Retrov, 1988, 3:355-361). See also study where transmission
common in partners with less advanced disease: De Vincenzi, I., Ancelle-Park, R., 'Heterosexual
transmission of HIV: Follow-up of a European cohort of couples'. Abstracts of the Seventh
International Conference on AIDS, Abstract MC 3028, Florence 1991.
93 Centre for Disease Control, 'Update: Heterosexual Transmission of Acquired
Immunodeficiency Syndrome and Human Immunodeficiency Virus Infection - United States'
MMWR, 1989, 38:423-434. Safe sexual practices involve the use of condoms, ascertaining the
risk category and antibody status of sexual partners and limiting the number of sexual contacts.
94 Ibid, 423-434.
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With homosexuality, it is anal intercourse and other practices resulting
in rectal trauma, such as fisting which increase the risk of infection. In
heterosexual terms for women also anal intercourse carries more risk of
transmission than vaginal intercourse.One study found that a person was 2.5
times more likely to become infected with HIV as a result of anal rather than
vaginal intercourse with an infected partner.®® Anal sex is frequently practiced by
heterosexuals in Africa as means of contraception, and this combined with the
high incidence of prior STD infection accounts for the high incidence of HIV
infection among heterosexuals in Africa.
In fact, the presence of other ulcerating sexually-transmitted diseases
in an individual is believed to be a co-factor in HIV transmission. ®8 Genital ulcers
are also a component which might explain why the disease spread so quickly in
Africa where genito-ulcerative disease is more common. Thus the probability
that any single episode of genital-genital intercourse will result in transmission of
HIV will be increased when these factors are present. ®® The link between HSV
(Herpes) and HIV has been found even after controlling for lifestyle and
behaviour. 100 If this is true, then strengthening of programmes to control
sexually-transmitted diseases is timely for public health departments, ""oi
Padlan Shiboski and Jewell, supra note 85.
®® Lazzarin, A., Sarocco, A., et al 'Man to Woman Sexual Transmission of the Human
Immunodeficiency Virus: F^isk Factors Related to Sexual Behaviour, Man's Infectiveness, and
Woman's susceptibility' Arch Intern Med 1991,151:411.
Quinn, T. C., 'AIDS in Africa; Evidence for Heterosexual Transmission of the Human
Immunodeficiency Virus', NY State J Med, May 1987, 286-289.
98 Piot, P., and Laga, M., 'Genital Ulcers, Other Sexually Transmitted Diseases, and the Sexual
Transmission of HIV, BMJ 1989, 298:623-624. This view is supported by studies that have
taken place in Central Africa including Greenblatt, R. U., Lukehart, S. L, Plummer, F. A., et al
'Genital ulceration as a risk factor for human immunodeficiency virus infection', AIDS, 1988,
2:47-50. Cameron, D.W., Simonsen, J.N., D'Costa, L.J., et al: 'Female to male transmission of
human immunodeficiency virus type 1, Risk factors for seroconversion in men'. Lancet 1989,
2:403.
®® Peterman, T.A, Curran, J. W., 'Sexual transmission of human immunodeficiency virus,' JAMA,
1986, 256:2222-2226.
100 pjot, p. Plummer F.S,. Mhaul, J.L. et al 'AIDS: an International perspective', Science, 1988,
239:573-577.
^8^ WHO in a consensus statement released in February 1989 suggested that genital ulcer
disease intervention may help to prevent sexual transmission of HIV. WHC, 'Consensus
Statements on HIV Transmission', Lancet, 1989, 31:96.
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As to risk analysis, Hearst and Hulley examined results from a
number of studies conducted in the United States between 1986-1988 in which a
variety of methodologies were used. After analysing the results of these studies
they concluded that the risk in one heterosexual encounter (without a condom)
with a person infected with HIV, to be about one in 500 while the risk for one
heterosexual encounter (without a condom) with someone whose HIV status is
unknown and is thought not be in any high-risk group to be one in 5 million. 102
The risk of seroconversion (risk of contraction of the disease) has been placed at
one in 1,000 for unprotected sexual intercourse (without a condom) with a person
in a high-risk group. Hearst and Hulley also believed that the risk of contracting
HIV in a single sexual encounter with a member of high-risk group while using a
condom is one in 10,000. When considering these figures it must be noted
that the methodology used in many studies was to interview persons (some of
whom were self-referred and others obtained from clinics and hospitals) about
their sexual history and that of their partner, and about their membership of a
high-risk group. It is therefore possible that an individual might have provided
inaccurate information with respect to these circumstances.
Further studies in the US have found that there are variable rates of
heterosexual transmission among sex partners of HIV-infected individuals. In
1992 the European Study Group on Heterosexual Transmission of HIV
concluded in a study of 563 stable couples (relationship of medain time of 3
years with sexual contact three times per week) that the transmission of HIV from
male to females was around twice as efficient as from female to male. In the
same year in the US, it was found that women accounted for the most persons
infected through heterosexual contact, los Some statistics are available for the
rates of infection across certain risk-groups. For example, the rates of infection
range from 9-20% for female sexual partners of infected male haemophiliacs; "•o®
Hearst, N., Hulley, S. B., 'Preventing the heterosexual spread of AIDS. Are we giving our
patients the best advice?' JAMA 1988, 259:2428-2432.
Ibid, at p. 2430.
European Study Group on Heterosexual Transmission of HIV 'Comparison of Female to Male
and Male to Female Transmission of HIV in 563 Stable Couples' BMJ 1992,304: 809. This
confirmed the earlier study of Radian, N., Marquis, L., Francis, D. P. et al. 'Male to Female
Transmission of Human Immunodeficiency Virus', JAMA 1987, 258:788
MMWR, supra note 22, at p. 551. Women in fact accounted for 59.4% of cases.
Mann, J.M., Quinn, T.C., Francis, H., et al 'Prevalence of HTLV-III/LAV in household
contacts of patients with confirmed AIDS and controls in Kinshasa, Zaire', JAMA, 1986, 256:
721-724.
28
26% for female sexual partners of bisexual men; 19.7% and 14.8%
respectively for female and male sexual contacts of transfusion recipients, ^0® and
47.8% and 50% respectively for female and male sexual contacts of intravenous
drug users. 109
(ii) Blood-Blood Transmission
Transmission of the virus through contaminated transfused or
transplanted blood or blood products is now well-known and well documented in
a number of countries, Blood products, particularly Factor VIII, a life saving
blood-clotting agent used by haemophiliacs to either stop bleeding episodes or
prevent new ones, has been associated with transmission because of the way in
which Factor VIII is prepared and manufactured. However, the practice in
developed countries of heating blood products to kill the virus has largely
eliminated transmission of HIV through this mode. '••'2 Where blood screening
•"07 Ryder, R. W, Hassig, S. E., The Epidemiology of perinatal transmission of HIV, AIDS
1988, 2(suppl1):S83-S89.
Center for Disease Control, supra note 87.
^0® Kelen, G.D., DiGiOvanni, T., Bisson, L, et a/,'Human immunodeficiency virus infection in
emergency patients: Epidemiology, clinical presentations, and risk to health care workers: The
Johns Hopkins experience', JAMA 1989,262:516-522.
See in the United Kingdom, Plowden, B., The Importing of AIDS', New Society, October 23
1987, 16-17. In the United States, Roling D. A., 'Transfusion-Associated Acquired.
Immunodeficiency Syndrome (AIDS):Blood Bank Liability?' (1986) 16 Baltimore Law Review, 81-
116. In Australia, Dwan v Farqhuar [1987] Qd R 600, H vRoyal Princess Alexandra Hospital and
Ors [1990] Aust. Torts Reports 80-000 and E vAustralian Red Cross Society (1991) 99 ALR601
are cases where the question of liability for the transmission of AIDS through infected blood
transfusions and blood products has been litigated with unsuccessful results for the plaintiff. An
analysis of civil liability of blood banks and other persons for the transmission of HIV to
haemophiliacs and others is beyond the scope of this thesis.
Kay, supra note 77, at para. 12.1-12.2. Between January 1, 1981 and September 4, 1987,
407 cases of haemophiliac AIDS had been reported to the Communicable Diseases Intelligence
(US). 257 or 63% of those persons had died by that date. The development of serologic methods
to screen blood donors has minimised the risk, but, many haemophiliacs had been infected and
this is why the numbers continue to increase. Stehr-Green, J. K., Holman, R. C., Jason, J. f^., et
al, 'Haemophilia AIDS in the United States, 1981 to September 1987', Am J Pub Healtti, 1988,
78(4):439-442. Many haemophiliacs are still at risk in rural areas of central Africa where blood is
not screened (Fiander, A., 'HIV infection in Africa', BMJ 1989, 299:260). Reid, states that the
position in Africa has improved between early 1988 and December 1988, so that by 1989 all
African countries have at least one blood screening facility (Reid, supra note 21, 3-8).
^^2 HIV can be destroyed outside the body by heat at 56 degrees celcius after a period of 20
minutes, in lyophilised preparations of protein (such as Factor VIII) after two hours at 68 degrees
celcius and within minutes in lower concentrations by Hypochlorite, isopropyl alcohol, ethanol.
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measures are mandatory as they are now in most developed countries,
transmission through infected blood and blood products is much less likely unless
administered with a syringe in a manner calculated to cause injury.
(iii) Needle Sharing and Needlestick Injuries
In addition, infected blood is transmitted through the sharing of
needles during IV drug usage. The risk of infection between iv drug users is said
to be reduced if clean needles are used and sharing is avoided. This is the
rationale behind the setting up of needle-exchange schemes. The risk of
seroconversion in any single case of percutaneous exposure to an infected
needle as would occur during IV needle sharing, is small - ranging from .03%-
.09%. 113 However, because episodes of injections by IV drug users may be in
the thousands the cumulative risk through drug use is high.
HIV has also been transmitted following needlestick injuries to health
care workers. There have been 22 reported and 17 documented cases of
needlestick injuries leading to HIV infection from six countries.
In Australia HIV infection following from occupational exposures has
been reported on two occasions, n® However the frequency has not been
hydrogen peroxide and certain detergents (/nfecf/dn Control Guidelines - Acquired Immune
Deficiency Sydrome (AIDS) and Related Conditions, March, 1988 ed. and 1990 ed., and Albion
Street AIDS Centre, The AIDS Manual, supra note 71, at p. 10).
US Friedland, G. H., and Klein, P. S., 'Transmission of the Human Immunodeficiency Virus',
New Eng J Med 1987, 317:1125-1130, at pp. 1127-1128. The risk has been calculated even
lower (0.35% (3:860) - 0.4%) by Marcus, R. The Go-operative Needlestick Surveillance Group
Surveillance of health care workers exposed to blood from patients infected with the human
immunodeficiency virus'. New Eng J Med 1988, 319:1118-1123.
In 1993 it is reported that during the course of the HIV/AIDS epidemic only six persons from
the United States who denied other risk factors for HIV infection had developed AIDS after
exposures to HIV infected blood in a health-care or laboratory setting (CDC, 'Update: Acquired
Immune DeficiencySyndrome and Human ImmunodeficiencyVirus Infection Among Health-Care
Workers', MMWR, 1993, 42:329-337). This would tend to confirm at least in the US, that the risk
associated from contact with infected persons in the health care setting may be very low.
A report has estimated that the magnitude of risk of seroconversion following
needlestick injuries to HIV-infected blood to be 0.4% (American College of Physicians,
'Occupational Infection with Human Immunodeficiency Vims', Ann Intern Med 1989,110(8): 653-
656, at p. 653). This has been confirmed by the later study of Gerberding, J. L., and Schecter,
S.,'Surgery and AIDS: Reducing the Risks', JAMA 1991,265:1572.
Australian InterGovernmental Committee on AIDS, 'Health care workers and the risk of HIV
infection' (1989) National AIDS Bulletin, June, 16-18. In 1993 the results of a study of HIV
transmission in health care workers that had been undertaken at Fairfield Hospital between 1985
and 1991 was reported. Of 230 occupational exposures to blood-borne pathogens, 75 of which
were HIV related, none of these cases seroconverted to HIV. It was conlcuded that the risk of
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systematically recorded and so the figures could be much higher, Deep
intramuscular penetrations are most likely to cause infections given the large
volumes of blood and prolonged duration of contact. The immunologic health
status of the recipient would be relevant to the success of transmission.
Infection control guidelines indicate that the risks of transmission by
needlestick injuries, may be minimised if proper precautions, such as use of
clean needles by IVdrug users and the implementation of universal infection
control procedures in health care settings is adopted.
(iv) Mother to Child (Vertical) Transmission
The final mode of HIV transmission is peri- or neo-natal
transmission. As noted earlier in this chapter, HIVhas been isolated in breast
milk. It is estimated that there is a 25-50% chance in Africa and a 16-30% in
the US that an infected mother will transmit the virus to her offspring, In
1992, in the US, the second largest increase in AIDS cases was recorded in
the perinatal transmission group, in Australia, by contrast an analysis of
figures over the last 5 years has revealed that the rates still appear to be
insignificant, jhe transmission may occur in
acquiring HIV through occupational exposure was very low (Bowden, F., Pollett, B.,
'Occupational Exposure to the HIV and other blood-borne pathogens: a six year prospective
study', MedJAust, 1993, 158:810-812).
"•f® Looke, D. F. M., and Grove, D.I., 'Failed Prophylate Zidovudine After Needlestick Injury',
Lancet, 1990, 335:1280. One such exposure occurred at Long Bay Jail where a prisoner
allegedly injected a prison warden with a needle containing HIV-infected blood. As this
incident was treated more as an intentional act than an accidental needlestick injury the
incident is discussed in chapter three, footnote 114.
Gerberding, J.L., Bryant Le Blanc, C.E., Nelson K.N., et al' 'Risk of transmitting the
human immunodeficiency virus, cytomegalovirus, and hepatitis B virus to health care
providers exposed to patients with AIDS and AIDS-related conditions (ARC)', J Infect Dis
1987,156:1-8.
"•"•S Infection Control Guidelines - Acquired Immune Deficiency Syndrome (AIDS) and
Related Conditions, March 1988 ed. and June 1990 ed.
Pizzo, E., 'Emerging concepts in the Treatment of HIV Infection in Children', JAMA,
1989,262:1989.
MMWR, supra note 22, at p. 551.
^21 The rates have remained effectively constant with any increase being marginal between
1991 and 1993 {Australian HIV Surveillance Report, 1992, 8/3:7, Table 1.3 and 1994,
10/2:12-13, Tables 2.4-2.5). This situation may be due to the higher standard of living and
pre-natal care for women of lower socio-economic class in Australia by comparison to the
United States. Both these factors may in tum be related to the lower population in general in
Australia and also to the relatively low incidence of crack cocaine abuse among pregnant
women in Australia.
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utero (in the womb), during birth by exposure of the baby to infected blood
and bodilyfluids of the mother, or by breast-feeding. 122
To summarise, it is unclear how efficiently HIV is transmitted
during a single exposure. It appears to depend upon how much virus is in the
particular bodily fluid. As the amounts of the virus are usually low in saliva it
is less likely that HIV will be transmitted during such an exposure. As the
levels have been shown to be high in blood, then effectiveness of
transmission increases during blood-related activities. This uncertainty must
be borne in mind when implementing laws relating to the transmission of HIV.
PROGRESSION OF INFECTION WITH HIV TO AIDS
After a person becomes infected with HIV, the virus reproduces
itself and infects other host cells. Some time elapses after exposure to HIV
before the development of detectable antibody. This particular time period is
often referred to as the 'window period' because during this period, although
the person is infected, antibodies cannot be detected in his or her blood by
any antibody test, Studies support the view that generally the 'window
period' could be between four weeks to three months. The degree to
which a person can infect another during the window period is unknown,
About 2 to 4 weeks after infection, a person may develop the first
clinical signs of infection in the form of an illness similar to influenza or
mbnonucleosis. It may involve fever or nightsweats, sore throat, swelling of
it has been suggested in the US that there is a link between pre-natal HIV infection
and drug use particularly crack use (Bopp, J., and Gardner, D. H., 'AIDS Babies, Crack
Babies: Challenges to the Law' (1991) 7/1 Issues In Lawand Medicine, 3-51, at p. 5).
"•22 Mann, supra note 28, at pp. 43-44 and study conducted by the European Collaborative
Study, 'Mother-to-Child Transmission of HIV Infection' in Lancet, 1988, 2:1040-1042. Both
peri- and neo-natal transmissions are examined in the study.
"•23 Mann, supra note 28, at p. 37.
^24 Communicable Diseases Intelligence Bulletin, 1990, 9:8;Tindall, B., Imrie, A., Donovan,
B., Penny, R., and Cooper, D., 'Primary HIV Infection: Clinical, Immunologic and Serologic
Aspects' inSande and Volberding, supra note 72, 68-84, at p. 74;Weber, 'HIV, the virus and
laboratory tests', in Strang and Stimson, supra note40 p. 35. But see, Horsburgh, C. R., Ou,
C. Y., Jason, J., etal' Duration of Human Immunodeficiency Virus Infection Before Detection
of Antibody,' Lancet, 1989, 2:637 where it is stated that the 'window period' is between two
months to four months and that 95% of persons register antibody positive within 5.8 months
of exposure to HIV.
125 imogawa, D. T., 'HIV-1 Infection in Homosexual Men Who Remain Seronegative for
Prolonged Periods', NewEngJMed, 1989,320:1458.
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lymph glands, muscle ache, diarrhoea and vomiting. This condition may appear
following infection but before developing antibody. ^26 jhis general state of
malaise may disappear, only to manifest itself in several other ways, such as,
persistent generalised lymphadenopathy (swollen lymph glands), or a number of
diseases indicative of AIDS such as pneumocystis carinii pneumonia (PCP) or
kaposi's sarcoma. 127 However, an individual may develop AIDS immediately
without passing through any preliminary stage. 128 jhe rate of movement through
each stage is not yet known.
AIDS is manifest in the form of several diseases including, PCP, and
other bronchial infections, kaposi's sarcoma (skin cancer lesions), candidiasis of
oesophagus or oral cavities (thrush or white patches of plaque or fungi on oral
mucosa), cytomegalovirus retinitis (which can cause loss of vision), HIV wasting
syndrome (chronic weight loss) and toxoplasmosis of the brain (a neurological
abnormality). 129
An individual may be infected with HIV but fail to develop any infection
or other illness that fulfill the definition of AIDS. This is often referred tp as a
period of latency. Indeed, an individual may remain in this asymptomatic state
with the virus laying dormant in his or her system for many years. Studies
conducted in 1989 have revealed that HIV can remain dormant longer than
previously thought. An period of up to approximately 10 years has been
frequently suggested. 12° Such individuals pose a threat to the rest of society as
126 jjndall, supra note 118, at p. 71.
12^ PCP and kaposi's sarcoma form part of the current case definition of AIDS and were
indicator diseases that formed part of AIDS Related Complex (ARC). ARC was a term used to
denote indicator diseases of AIDS that were not symptomatic but laboratory indicated. The term
was used in some older legislation in Australia, for example. Diseases Notification Regulations
(1984)(Vic.): Public and Environmental Health Acf (1987)(S.A.), well beyond 1987 when CDC
abolished the ARC classification.
128 Najera, R., and Herrera, M. I., 'Biology of the Virus', World Healthi March 1988, 10-11. See
also Isaksson, B., Albert, J., Chiodi, P., et al, 'AIDS - 2 Months after Primary HIV Infection', J
Infect Dis 1988, 158/4:866-868, where a case-study of a patient who rapidly progressed to
AIDS only two months from the date of infection is discussed. The authors conclude that the
case is unique.
129 Nash, G., and Said, J. (eds) Pathology of AIDS and HIV Infection, Philadelphia, W.B.
Saunders, 1992.
130 Bacchetti, P., and Ross, A. R., 'Incubation period of AIDS in San Francisco', Nature 1989,
338:251-253 and Hessol, N. Z., et al, 'The natural history of HIV infection in a cohort of
homosexual and bisexual men: a decade of follow up', Presented at the IV International
conference on AIDS - Stockholm, Sweden, June 1988. These studies have been confirmed by
Nash, G., 'Spectrum of Infection', in Nash and Said (eds) Ibid, 8-10, at p. 9.
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they are 'carriers' of the virus and in the absence of evidence to the contrary
presurned infectious. It is not known why HIV discriminates in this manner.
Studies are still being conducted to identify how the disease remains dormant. It
is thought than an active immune system in some individuals prevents
development. ""31 It has been found that CD4+ T cells serve as a reservoir for
latent HIV-1 viruses. These cells contain DNA sequences of HIV in 1/1000 cells.
In patients with AIDS the proportion is 1/100, and such patients lose CD4+T cells
progressively as the disease advances and they become profoundly suppressed
immunologically. ^32 a further study has revealed that the human herpes virus 6
(HHV-6) can interact with HIV in a way that may increase the severity of HIV
infection. ''33 Tests have shown that if the T cell js infected with HHV-6 at the
same time as HIV, it can activate the latent virus. "'34
4. EPIDEMIOLOGICAL COMPARISONS BETWEEN HIV AND OTHER
COMMUNICABLE DISEASES
During the course of some prior epidemics of communicable disease
restrictive legal measures have been set in place. It is to these legal procedures
and policies that legislators have turned when considering the appropriate legal
response to the emergence of HIV/AIDS. It is therefore necessary to briefly
compare the characteristics of HIV/AIDS infection with diseases such as the
plague, small-pox, yellow fever, cholera, tuberculosis (TB) and some of the
sexually transmitted diseases (STDs) such as syphilis, herpes and hepatitis B
(HBV). The listed diseases are all contagious. They are medically regarded as
resulting from the invasion of a living stimulus such as a virus or bacteria and
transmitted directly or indirectly through an infectious agent from one susceptible
host to another.
•'31 Levy, supra note 74, at p. 28.
132 Schnittman, S. M., Psaiiidapoulos, M. C., Lane. H. C.,Thompson, L., Baseler, M., et al. The
Reservoir for HIV-1 in Human Peripheral Blood is a T cell that Maintains Expression of CD4',
Science, 1989,245:305-307.
133 Gallo and Montagnier had stated that 'HBV underlies the capacity of HIV to remain latent for
a long period, then undergo a burst of replication ..." (supra note at p. 29).
13^1 Gallo and Montagnier, Ibid, at p. 31 and Holmberg, S. D., Stewart, J. A., Gerber A. R., et al,
'Prior herpes simplex virus type 2 infection as a risk factor for HIV infection', JAMA , 1988,
259:1048-1050.
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Although HIV/AIDS infection bears some similarity to these diseases,
there are characteristics of HIV infection that renders alignment of AIDS with
other diseases difficult. These medical features need to be focused on when
considering the application of laws developed in a prior era of communicable
diseases, to HIV/AIDS. The characteristics have been divided into three
categories and will be briefly considered.
MODE AND EASE OF TRANSMISSION
HIV infection most commonly resembles those diseases primarily
transmitted by sexual contact. Within that group, HIV shares similar modes of
transmission and group prevalences to Hepatitis B (HBV). For example, like HIV,
HBV is most commonly found in homosexuals, heterosexuals, IV drug users,
blood and blood product recipients, health care workers and prostitutes, More
particularly it is found in those individuals with multiple sexual partners and those
persons who share needles. Studies reveal that 10% of AIDS patiehts have
evidence of past HBV infection, is® Hovyever, HBV has been found to be ten
times more infectious than HIV. This is thought to be because there is a
lower level of HIV in the blood than the level of HBV in the blood of an HBV-
infected person and this is why the latter is more contagious, Therefore, the
risk of infectivity with HBV in needlestick injuries is higher than with HIV."'39
Further, HIV is not hardy and is readily susceptible to sterilisation and heating
procedures. •''^ 0
"•35 Ravenholt, R. T., 'Role of Hepatitis B Virus in Acquired Immunodeficiency Syndrome',
Lancet, 1983, 2:885-886 at p. 885.
13® Lebovics, E., and Dworkin, B. M., 'Tfie Liver in AIDS', in WormserStahl and Bpttone, supra
note 71, at p. 76
13^ Giesecke, J., Scalia-Tomba, G., and Furucrona, A., 'HIV Infectivity - the Hepatitis BLesson',
Scand J Infect Die, 1988, 20:385-387, at p. 386. Alter, M. J., and Francis, D. P., 'Hepatitis B
VirusTransmission Among Homosexual Men: AModel for AIDS', in Pearl and Armstrong, AIDS
and Infections of Homosexual Men, 2nd ed, Boston, Butterworths, 1989, 99-107.
138 Levy, supra note 74, at p. 24.
139 Shikala, T., Karasawa, T., Abe, K., et al 'Hepatitis Be antigen and infectivity of Hepatitis B
virus', J Infect Dis 1977, 136:571-576.
140 See supra note 106.
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The pneumatic infections suffered by the patient during the course of
HIV infection resemble infection with IB. '"'♦i This has led to a demand by the
public and by government officials to subject HIV-infected individuals to public
health measures similar to those invoked to deal with TB decades agoM^
However, the modes of transmissibility and group prevalences between TB and
AIDS are not readily comparable. For example, HIV is not spread by social
contact while TB is not spread peri- or neo-natally or through sexual intercourse
as is HIV. HIV is not as contagious as either airborne or bacterial viruses and
cannot be spread by casual or social contact which are all factors common to
smallpox 145 jB 146 and HBV. ""47 in addition, HIV cannot be spread by contact
""41 Duncanson, F. P., and Klein, N. C., Tuberculosis in AIDS', in Wormser Stahl and Bpttone,
supra note 71, at pp. 532-533.
142 Exemplified in Wilson Tuckey's speech to delegates of Third National Conference onAIDS,
in The Politics of AIDS: Wilson Tuckey's Address' (1988) 2/8 National AIDS Bulletin, 45-47 and
referred to by Buchanan, D., 'AIDS Legal Workshop HIV testing: Principles and, Policy' (1990)
National AIDS Bulletin, July, 25-29, at p. 26 where he says it is a common phenomenon to relate
HIV to TB in this manner.
143 tB is arguably not inherited although it was and still is thought to be bymany. Burnet and
White refer to a study conducted on twins by Kallmann and Reisner, where a high percentage of
TB was found in both the twins and to a lesser extent in their remaining family members,
providing support to the scientist's hypothesis that TB may be inherited (at p. 216). If such a
theory is a misconception it may have arisen because of the fact that infants born of parents
suffering from TB, 'are very likely to be infected in the first months of life and die of a generalised
tuberculosis in which the bacilli have passed to many parts of the body, especially the meninges
of the brain ... [or] get into the blood ... and set up a new infection in one of the bones or joints,
usually the spinal column or the hip' (Burnet, M., and White, D.O., Natural History of Infectious
Diseases, 4th ed, London, Cambridge University Press, 1972, at pp. 214-215).
144 Full Bibliographic details ofthese studies are contained in Lifson, supra note 79, at p. 1354-
1356.
145 Fenner, P., Henderson, D. A., Arita, L., et al, Smallpox and its Eradication, Geneva, World
HealthOrganisation, 1988,186-194.
145 There are however, non-contagious forms of TB, such as extrapulmonary disease, primary
pulmonary disease in children, bacteriologically unconfirmed pulmonary disease, and tuberculous
infection. 'Use of BCG Vaccines in the Control of Tuberculosis: A Joint Statement by the ACIP
and the Advisory ACIP Committee for Elimination of Tuberculosis', JAMA 1988, 260: 2983-
2991.
147 Centre for Disease Control, 'Hepatitis transmitted by a Human Bite', MMWR , 1974, 24.
Robinson, W. 8., 'Hepatitis B Virus', in Deinhardt, R., and J., (eds). ViralHepatitis: Laboratory
and Clinical Science, New York, Marcel Dekker Inc., 1983, 57-116, at p. 87. Evidence of lethal
HBV infection passed by a dentist, is covered in a study by Shaw, F. E., Barrett, C. L., Hamm, R,
etal, 'Lethal Outbreak of Hepatitis Bin a Dental Practice', JAMA 1986, 255:32^-3264.
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with contaminated food or water as is the case with cholera. Further, HIV is
not spread by either insect or rodent vectors as in yellow fever (mosquitoes) ^^9
and the plague (rodents). Humans are the hosts and agents of transmission.
PERIOD OFTRANSMISSIBILITY. INCUBATION AND ASYMPTOMATIC STATE
HIV has no acute period of transmissibility or definitive period when
the patient is contagious as is the case with the diseases of smallpox,
cholera, "'52 and yellow fever, ""sa jhis has often been a factor argued in support
of quarantining persons with those diseases.
Communicable diseases are all characterised by both symptomatic
and asymptomatic states. The latter, more commonly referred to as the 'carrier'
state is common to those diseases having a long incubation period such as
AIDS, TB,i54 hbV (sixty to ninety days and to those diseases where the
victim can harbour the infectious virus, including herpes,""s® latent and tertiary
Gangarosa, E. J. and Mosley, W. L., 'Epidemiology and Surveillance of Cholera' in Barua,
D., and Burrows, W., (eds) Cholera, Philadelphia, W.B. Saunders Company, 1974, 381-403, at
p. 394.
'•'fS WHO, Prevention and Controlof Yellow Fever inAfrica, Belgium, World Health Organisation,
1986, 1-19.
"150 Burnet andWhite, supra note 137, at p. 225.
"ISf Fenner, supra note 139, 186-194.
^52 Oseasohn, R. 8., et al, 'Clinical and Bacteriological findings Among Families of Cholera
Patients', Lancet, 1966, 340-342.
153WHO, Preventionand Controlof Yellow Fever InAfrica, supra note 143.
Rosencranz, H. A., and Lavey, W. G., 'Treating Patients with Communicable Diseases:
Limiting Liability for Physicians and Safeguarding the Public Health' (1987) 32 Saint Louis
University Law Journal, 75-101.
Robinson, W. S., 'Hepatitis B Virus', in Deinhardt and Deinhardt, supra note 140, at p. 91.
Krugman, S., Overby, L. R., Mushahwar, I. K., et al, 'Viral Hepatitis, type B. Studies on Natural
History and Prevention Re-Examined', New Eng J Med, 1979,300:101-106.
National Health and fyledical Research Council. Handbook on Sexually Transmitted
Diseases , Canberra, Australian Government Publishing Service, 1990, at pp. 33-34.
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syphilis and mild cholera.The carrier therefore poses a threat to public
health as he or she has the potential to unknowingly infect any given population.
AVAILABILITY OF A CURE
In general, treatment is available for the diseases referred to above
and the patient is capable of full recovery provided the correct diagnosis is made
and treatment implemented in time. However, with both Herpes and HIV/AIDS
infection, although treatments are available there is no cure. Asingle exposure to
smallpox, 159 yellow fever 160 and HBV 161 confers a life-long immunity on the
sufferer. Conversely, with TB, 162 HIV/AIDS and the remaining STDs (herpes, 163
syphilis i®^) a patient may be infected for life or suffer recurrent episodes.
Death is presently the end stage of HIV infection that progresses to
AIDS. Attention has been directed to the development of a vaccine but to date
this has not been successful and is unlikely to be available until the year 2000.
165 At best there is only a drug treatment programme for HIV-infected persons,
the effectiveness of which is currently in dispute, i®® Even the most favourable
157 Ibid, at p. 24.
158 Sack, R. B., 'Pathogenesis and Pathophysiology of Diarrhoea! Diseases Caused by Vibrio
Choierae and Enterotoxigenic Escherichia Coli', in Ouchteriony, O., and Holmgren, J, (eds)
Cholera and Related Diarrheas, Basel, S. Karger, 1980, at pp. 53-60.
159 Fenner, supra note 139, 186-194.
160 WHO, supra note 143, at p. 8.
161 Lebovics and Dworkin, supra note 130, at p. 76. However, it is thought that 10% ofpatients
will develop life-long infection (Aller and Francis, supra note 131, at p. 105).
162 Barker, R., Burton, J. R., and Zieve, P. D., Principles of Ambulatory Medicine, 2nd ed,
Baltimore, Williams &Wilkins, 1986, at pp. 370-371.
163 Chang, T. W., 'Genital Herpes and Type 1Herpes Virus Hominis', JAM4, 1977, 238:155-158.
164 National Health and fvledical Research Council, supra note 150, at p. 23.
165 Esparza, J., and Osmanov, S., 'The development and evaluation of HIV vaccines', Current
Opinion in Infectious Diseases, 1993, 6:218-229. American College of Physicians and
Infectious Diseases Society of America, 'Human Immunodeficiency virus (HIV) Infection' Ann
Intern Med 1994, 120:310-319, at p. 317.
166 For example, the Concorde Trial conducted in France which tested 1,762 people between
1988 and 1991 found that the benefit of AZT therapy in asymptomatic HIV-1 infected individuals
was transient. In addition, the increase in CD4+ counts which occurred in the group receiving
immediate therapy, did not translate into a clinical benefit by the conclusion of the three year
study (Aboulker, J. P., Stwart. A., 'A Preliminary Analysis of the Concorde Trial,' Lancet, 1993,
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studies will find that the drug Zlduvodine (AZT) will prolong life for a minimal
period only, le? Alternative drugs available for the prevention and treatment of
PCP have resulted in a decrease in the number of cases seen in medical centres
in the United States, Before such treatment was available PCP was by far the
most common AIDS-defining illness encountered in HIV-positive patients.
341:889-890). These findings are in contrast to the Australian-European Clinical Trial (Cooper,
D., Gatell, J., Kronn, S.. etal 'Zlduvodine in Persons with Asymptomatic HIV Infection and CD4+
CellCounts Greater than 400 per cubic Millimeter' NewEngJ Med, 1993, 329:297-303) which
found that the drug significantly reduced disease progression although it confirmed that the
benefits were time limited. Therefore the value of AZTin early treatment remains uncertain.
"•67 In a study by Pizzo, P., Eddy, J., et al, 'Effect of Continuous Intravenous Dosage of
Azidovudine on Children with Human Immunodeficiency Virus (HIV)', New Eng J'Med 1988,
319:889-896, it is concluded that AZT is beneficial in children with symptomatic HIV infection. A
studyconducted in Paris, concluded that the benefits of AZT are limited to a few months, six for
ARC and AIDS patients and then only for certain patients (Dournon, E., Rosenbaum,W., Michon,
C., et al, 'Effects of Zidovudine in 365 Consecutive Patients with AIDS or ARC, Lancet,
December 3 1988, 2:1297-1302). Further, it appears that after 12-36 months of taking AZT
people showincreased viral resistance to the drugs (RschI, M., 'Prolonged Zidovudine Therapy in
Patients with AIDS and Advanced ARC Complex', JAMA 1989, 262:249). The value of these
studies may be questionable now given the result of the Concorde Trials as set out in footnote
160.
1®® Saltier, F. R., 'Pulmonary Manifestations of AIDS: special emphasis on peumocystosis', in
Wyngaarden, J. B., Smith, L. H., Bennett, J. C. (eds) Cecil Textbook of Medicine, 19th ed,
Philadelphia, W.B. Saunders, 1992, 1932-1942.
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CHAPTER 2
THE ROLE OF THE CRIMINAL LAW IN
THE CONTEXT OF AIDS
1. INTRODUCTION
The emergence of the AIDS epidemic raises questions concerning
the proper limits of legal control over the behaviour of individuals in society. The
Criminal law has been criticised for casting too wide a net over the private lives of
members of society, with the result that decriminalisation or legalisation of
conduct such as, but not limited to, homosexuality, prostitution and drug use has
either been considered or implemented in many States of Australia ^ and other
^ In Australia, homosexual activity occuring in private has been decriminalised in all jurisdictions
except Tasmania (s. 122-123 Criminal Code (1924). The relevant provisions are: South Australia
since 1972 under s. 68A Criminal Law Consolidation Act, in New South Wales since 1984 under
SS78G-T of the Crimes (Amendment) Act , in Victoria under ss. 47-50 of the Crimes (Sexual
Offences) Act (1980), in Western Australia in March 1990 under the Law Reform
(Decriminalisation of Sodomy) Act (1989) which decriminalised homosexual activity between
consenting adults (over twenty-one years in private) and in Queensland in 1990 under the
Criminal Code and Another Act Amendment Act. In the remaining Code jurisdiction, the Northern
Territory, homosexual activity occuring in public is stated to be illegal under section 127 of the
Criminal Code (1983) (with the implication that activities occuring in private are not).
Prostitution-related activities are rendered offences in all Australian jurisdictions.
Offences include: loitering and soliciting in a 'public place', living on the earnings of prostitution,
procuration of children and adults for purposes of prostitution and offences connected with
keeping, managing or assisting in the management of a brothel. These offences are contairied in
the following Acts: ss. 15-20 Summary Offences Act (^988) (N.S.W.), ss. 91A, B (procuration)
and ss. 91C-F (child prostitution) Crimes Act (1958)(N.S.W.); ss. 8(1)(c). 8(1A)(2), 11, Police
Offences Act (1935){Jas.), ss. 128(b)-(d), 143 Criminal Code (Tas.); s. 10(1) (living on the
earnings), 100A),11(1) (keeping of a brothel not being one for which a permit has been
obtained) l/agrancy Acf(1966)(Vic.), s. 5 (soliciting), 6-9 (child prostitution) 10-11 (forcing adults
into prostitution) Prostitution Regulation Act (1986)(Vic.); s. 10 Prostitution Regulation Act
(1992)(A.C.T.); ss. 18A (soliciting), 188 (advertising prostitution), 18C (nuisances connected with
prostitution)Vafirranfs, Gaming and Other Offences Act (1931-1978) (Old.), ss. 217-218, 229G
(procuration), 229H, I, K (premises used for prostitution)Cr/m/na/ Code (1899)(Qld.); ss. 76F,
76G(1 )(a)(b) Police Act (1892-1982)(WA); s. 63 Criminal Law Consolidation Act (1935)(SA), ss.
25(a)(b), 26(1), 28. 29 Summary Offences Act (1953)(SA); ss 47A(1)(2)(a) Summary Offences
Act (1923)(N.T.), s 4,5 (management of brothels), 10 (soliciting), 11-12 (forcing adult into,
prostitution)Prosf/fu//on Regulation Act (1992)(N.T.). Victoria, in recognising the threat of the
spread of HIV by prostitution, has attempted to regulate the industry by the passage of the
Prostitution Regulation Act (1986) which tightens hygiene in light of AIDS (s. 13. yet to be
proclaimed). The legislation establishes a licencing system for brothels and provides for planning
controls of brothels (the latter is contained ss. 50-52 have been proclaimed). The 1992
Prostitution Regulation Act in the Northern Territory and the Prostitution Act in the Australian
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countries. 2
Capital Territory also have a similar aim. In New South Wales, section 13(2) of the Public Health
Act penalises the ownerof premiseswho allows a prostitute known to be infected with HIV from
engaging in sex without the consent of the client. The prostitute also commits an offence in those
circumstances under section 11 of the same Act. The Legal Working Party of the
Intergovermental Committee on AIDS (IGCA) in its 1991 report entitled HIV/AIDS: sex workers
and their clients, reiterate that laws criminalising sex industry work in brothels, escort agencies
and on the street should be repealed. In addition, laws associated with the sex industry except
for offences related to violence or coercion of minors should be repealed.
Drug use is illegal in all Australian States and Territories: (ss. 5 and 12(1) DrugsMisuse
and Trafficking Act (1985)(N.S.W.): s. 31(1)(b) Controlled Substances Act (1984)(S.A.); s. 55(d)
Poisons Act (1971)(Tas.); s. 75 Drugs, Poisons and ControlledSubstances Act (1981 )(Vic.); s.
6(2) Misuse ofDrugsAct 171 DrugsofDependence Act{^989){A.C.J.),s. 13-14
Misuse of Drugs Act (1990)(N.T.)). Under the Drugs Misuse Act (1987)(Qld.) the self-
administration of drugs is not criminal. However, under s. 9 of the same Act, possession is, and
in a practical sense a user found in possession of a prohibited substance would commit an
offence. There have been some legalisation of drug use in Australia. For example, in South
Australia, under the Controlled Substances (Expiation of Cannabis) Regulations 0988) a
person found in possession of less than 100 grams of cannabis is not convicted but completes an
expiation notice and pays a fee in order to dispose of the offence. In 1989 Victoria
decriminalised possession of cannabis in small quantities (s. 76 Drugs, Poisons and controlled
Substances Acf (1981)).
2 In New Zealand, the Homosexual Law Reform Act (1986) removed criminal sanctions against
consensual homosexual conduct between males of certain ages. In countries such as Spain, Italy
and France homosexuality has been left to the conscience of the individual rather than covered
by legislative controls (Waugh, M. A., 'History of clinical developments in sexually transmitted
diseases', in Holmes, K. K., Mardh, P-A., Sparling, P. F., et al. Sexually Transmitted Diseases,
2nd ed. New York McGraw-Hill, 1990, 3-16 at p. 14). In the United Kingdom, chapter 60 of the
Sexual Offences Act (1967) removed homosexual relations between consenting adults in private
from the sphere of the crirninal law. Priorto this date homosexual conduct constituted an offence
under both the Offences Against the Person Act (1861)(UK) and the Vagrancy Act (1898)(UK).
The law in Northern Ireland was brought into line with that in England and Wales in 1981
following the ruling in Dudgeon v UnitedKingdom (1981) 3 EHRR 40. In February 1994 after
vigorous debate from all interested parties the English House of Commons by a 265 majority
reduced the age of consent for homosexual intercourse from 21 to 18 years. The amendment to
equalise the age of consent for homosexual and heterosexual intercourse at 16 years, was
rejected ('Yes to 18, No to 16' The Guardian, February 22nd 1994; at p. 1).
In 1962, the American Law Institute issued its Model Penal Code recommending
decriminalisation of consensual private same-sex activities between adults (§ 213.2 note on
status of section (Proposed Official Draft 1962)). This was followed by a movement towards
challenging anti-gay administrative decisions in the late 1960s and early 1970s. However,
sodomy remains a crime in nearly half of the United States (Anon, 'Developments in the Law:
Sexual Orientation and the Law' (1989) 109 Harvard Law Review, 1508-161 at p. 1519; Tierney,
T. W., Criminalising the Sexual Transmission of HIV: An International Analysis' (1992) 15
Hastings International and Comparative Law Review, 475 at p. 485). The United States
Supreme Court in a 5-4 majority decision in Bowers and Hardwick(92 L.Ed. 2d 140 (1986), 478
US 186 (1986)), held that a Georgia State sodomy statute criminalising homosexual conduct
{GeorgiaCode Annotated § 16-6-2 (1988)) did not violate the constitutional right to privacy and
denied the applicants standing to challenge the constitutionality of the Georgia statute.
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The issue of transmission of HIV has given rise to moral debates.
This is due, in part, to the fact that HIV is primarily spread by certain sexual
activities such as unprotected anal sex and the sharing of unsterile needles
during IV drug use. In addition, statistics reveal that HIV infection has been and
continues to be prevalent within certain sub-groups of the population such as
homosexuals, drug users and prostitutes. 3 As a result members of these groups
are often viewed by the general populace as high-risk for transmission of HIV on
the ground that they are suspected to be engaging in high-risk activities such as
unsafe sex and using non-sterile needles. Viewing HIV/AIDS in this context, the
question whether the transmission of HIV should be expressly criminalised opens
up the long-standing debate about the morality of activities such as
homosexuality, prostitution and drug use.
3 The AustralianHIV Surveillance Report for December 1993 provides statistics that support the
vie\« that the incidence of HIV/AIDS is still most commonly situated in the male
homosexual/bisexual group. 83.3% of the total 4722 AIDS cases at that date are within that
category (National Centre in HIV Epidemiology and Clinical Research, Australian HIV
Surve;7/ance Report, 1994, 10/2:12, Table 2.4).
HIV infection among prostitutes has not been effectively measured in all Australian
States. The fact that they are a high-risk group is indicated by studies conducted into their
patterns of safe-sexual behaviour carried out by Harcourt, C., Philpot, C. R., and Edwards, J.,
'Human immunodeficiency virus infection in prostitutes', Med J Aust 1989, 150:540-541.
However, the same study found a rise in condom use among prostitutes from 47.3% in 1986 to
84.9% by1988. More recent studies conducted into the population ofsex-workers in New South
Wales have found that 70% of female prostitutes work in parlours and have responded most
significantly to AIDS education campaigns. Thegreatest risk ofHIV transmission is to found with
the street workers (who form 10%of the population of female prostitutes)who have a high level
of substance abuse (Egger, S., and Harcourt, C.. 'Prostitution in New South Wales: The Impact
of Deregulation', in Weiser-Easteal, P., and McKillop, S., (eds) Women and the Law, Canberra,
Australian Institute of Criminology Proceedings, 1993) 109-122). It is significant that there is still
no documented case of a female prostitute in Australia receiving or transmitting HIV infection
during sexual intercourse with a client (Eggar, at p. 112). A study by Lovejoy, P., Perkins, R.,
Corduff, Y., Deane, M. J., and Wade, A., AIDSPreventative Practices Among Female Prostitutes
and their Clients and Private Risk, Part 1, University of New South Wales, 1991, 5 confirms this
to be the case in New South Wales. This research also confirmed prior Australian research that
there is a moderate number of prostitutes who inject prohibited substances. For example of 280
women, 5% injected amphetamines, 2.5 % injected cocaine and 9.3% injected heroin.
IV drug use is documented as high-risk for transmission of HIV. However, statistically in
Australiathis category represents 5.5% of the total 4722 cases as at December 1993 {Australian
HIV Surveillance Report 1994, 10/2: 12, Table 2.4). It was stated in chapter one, that it is
thought that these figures may not be an accurate indication of prevalence due to the possibility
that an IV drug user might be categorised differently, for example, in the heterosexual
transmission category.
In 1993 sex workers, IV drug users and homosexuals are still regarded as high-risk groups in
Australia (Commonwealth of Australia, 1993-4 -1995-6 National HIV/AIDS Strategy, Canberra,
Australian Government Publishing Service, 1993, at p. 22).
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It is necessary to examine in detail how successful the criminal law
has been in controlling activities that carry moral overtones, in particular,
homosexuality, prostitution, and drug abuse. At first glance it may seem that the
arguments for and against criminalising homosexual sex or drug use are different
from the arguments for and against imposing liability for transmission of HIV.
However, it is the present writer's contention that many of the same questions
arise for consideration in both contexts. This is due, in part, to the fact that the
effect of criminalising HIV transmission is likely to be felt more in a psychological,
social and practical sense by those groups who are perceived to be at risk for
transmission. Therefore, an analysis of the past usefulness of the criminal law in
controlling activities such as homosexuality, drug use and prostitution must be of
some assistance to lawmakers in determining whether the criminal law is the
most appropriate tool with which to combat the spread of HIV/AIDS. In light of the
criticisms directed at the criminal law in this area, it may not be appropriate to
impose criminal liability by the use of traditional criminal laws on those who
spread HIV when engaging in sexual behaviour or needle sharing except in
limited circumstances.
This chapter introduces the aims of the criminal law. Following this
the arguments for and against the use of the criminal law in eradicating or
controlling the incidence of, for example, homosexuality, prostitution and drug
use will be considered in relation to the aims of the criminal law. The issue of
whether these aims can be served by criminalising the transmission of HIVwill be
covered. In this context, the question of whether the criminal law could have
some other function such as establishing symbolic values, attitudes and beliefs in
relation to HIV/AIDS will also be considered.
2. THE AIMS OF THE CRIMINAL LAW
One of the unsettled issues in the criminal law has been what its
aims are or should be. The aims of the law in general are expressed to be:
maintenance of public order, upholding of rights and duties, facilitating co
operative action, conferring legitimacy and communicating moral standards.
However, the aims of the law may differ depending upon from whose viewpoint
4 Broom, L. and Selznick, P., Sociology: A Text with Adapted Readings , New York, Harper and
Row, 1977, at pp. 408-410.
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they are examined. For example, from a lawyer's point of view the aims of the law
include the allocation of authority, the settling of disputes and the definition of
relationships within society. ^ For the law reformer, the aims of the law are to
educate and to facilitate social change.
Generally, three main aims of the criminal law can be identified,
namely the protection of private property, the enforcement of morality and the
prevention of harm to others. 6 It is the order of priority of these aims that has
given rise to debate historically. ^In common with the aims of the law in general,
the criminal law also seeks to influence public opinion, maintain public order and
communicate moral standards. ®
At least two commentators have argued that the aims of the
criminal law are deterrence, retributioni incapacitation and rehabilitation. ^ In the
view of the present writer, these are the aims of punishment. While crime and
punishment form an inseparable duo, deterrence, retribution, incapacitation and
rehabilitation are more relevant to discussions pertaining to punishment, and thus
have been discussed under sentencing of HIV-infected persons in chapter six.
The notion of protection of private property as an aim of the criminal
law is easy to support and is not an issue relating to the control of AIDS.
However, the other two aims, the enforcement of morality, and the prevention of
harm, are more controversial and require elaboration in order to determine
whether criminalising the transmission of HIV serves those aims.
The exact role that morality should play in shaping the criminal law
has been hotly debated. Three different but often interrelated positions can be
isolated within this debate.
5 Confirmed by Farrar, J. and Dugdale, A. M., Introduction toLegal Method, London, Sweetand
Maxwell, 1984, at pp. 5-6 where they hold that lawmaintains public order, facilitates co-operative
action, constitutes and regulates the principleorgans of power and communicates and reinforces
social values.
6 Broom and Selznick, supra note 4, at pp. 408-410.
^ the debate is considered in this thesis infra.
®Farrar and Dugdale, supra note5, at pp. 5-6.
9 Gostin, L, The Politics of AIDS: Compulsory State Powers, Public Health, and Civil Liberties'
(1989) 49 Ohio State Law Journal, 1017-1058; Burris, S., Dalton, H. Miller, J.L., and the Yale
AIDS Law Project, (eds) AIDS Law Today: A New Guide for the Public. 2nd ed, New Haven,
Yale University, 1993, at pp. 251-252.
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The first Is the fundamentalist approach which encompasses the
views of Sir James Fitzjames Stephen and Lord Devlin. For fundamentalists the
enforcement of morality is the overriding aim of the criminal law. 10 By contrast
the second approach encompasses the views of Mill and later H.L.A. Hart which
is here labelled as a combined utilitarian - liberal view. This view supports the
harm principle; that prevention of harm to others is the overriding aim of the
criminal law. The third approach described as Legal Paternalism sees the aim
of the criminal law as principally the prevention of harm to the actor him or
herself. 12 in that respect, the State has a right to intervene to protect the agent
from harm.
The debate between the fundamentalists and the
utilitarianists/liberals, came to a head in the 1960s following the release of the
Report by the Wolfenden .Commission of their inquiry into the criminalisation of
prostitution and homosexuality in the late 1950s. The Committee by a majority
of twelve to one recommended that penalties for homosexual activities between
consenting adults in private be abolished. This recommendation received
legislative effect by the English Sexual Offences Act (1967)(LIK).
According to the majority of the Commissioners,
Unless a deliberate attempt is to be made by society, acting
through the agency of the law, to equate the sphere of crime
with that of sin, there must remain a realm of private morality
and immorality which is ... not the law's business. To say this is
not to condone or encourage private immorality.
Devlin's thesis is contained in The Enforcement of florals , London, Oxford University Press,
1965, Chapter 1, 1-26.
Hart, H. L. A., Law, Liberty and f^oraiity, London, Oxford University Press, 1962 at p. 5 and
Mill, J. S., On Liberty. 2nd ed, London, J. W. Parker &Son, 1859 at pp. 15 and 18-19. Hart
points out that he does not defend all that Mill said since Hart believes that there are grounds
other that prevention of harm justifying the legal coercion of the individual. He stated; 'But on the
narrower issue of enforcement of morality, Mill seems to be right' (at p. 5).
"'2 It maywell be the case that there are few if any examples where conduct harms only the doer
of the act and not others. At this point the present writer merely seeks to draw a distinction
between the harm to others and harm to self doctrines as rationales for laws.
"•3 Feinberg, J., Harm to Others: The fdorai Limits of the Criminal Law , Vol. 1, Oxford, Oxford
University Press, 1984, at p. 12.
Home Office, Scottish Home Department "Report of the Committee on Homosexual Offences
and Prostitution" (Wolfenden Report) (Cmnd 247) London, 1957.
"13 /b/d, at para. 61.
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At approximately the same time the House of Lords in Shaw v DPP
16 handed down a judgement which recognised the crime of 'conspiracy to
corrupt public morals'. This provoked comments from both academic and judicial
quarters including responses from both Hart and Devlin. 1^ The essence of the
judgement of Viscount Simonds is that courts had a residual power to create
crimes to protect 'not only the safety and order but also the moral welfare of the
state' where no statute had covered that particular area. 18 in a dissenting
judgement, Lord Reid argued that apart from the fact that there was no such
thing as a conspiracy to corrupt publicmorals because a conspiracy required two
or more persons, he believed that Parliament was the only place where crimes
could be established and that Judges could not invent dubious crimes from
historical sources. 19 'When there is sufficient support from public opinion.
Parliament does not hesitate to intervene. Where Parliament fears to tread it is
not for the courts to rush in.' 20
H.L.A. Hart criticised Lord Simond's approach in Shaw on two
grounds. The first ground is that the decision would allow individual values of
judges and juries to be imprinted upon society in condemning conduct as
criminal. The second is that it showed disregard for the principle of legality,
which requires criminal offences to be defined as precisely as possible. 21 To the
contrary, Lord Devlin believed that it was a proper function of courts to enforce
morality and for juries to be involved in the enforcement. 22 jhe views of both
Hart and Devlin in general will be identified when examining what the aims of the
criminal law are or should be.
•>6 [1961] 2 All ER446.
Devlin, supra note 10. Hart, supra note 11.
•>8 [1961] 2 All ER446, at p. 455.
19 to/d, at pp. 458-459.
20 Ibid, at p. 457.
21 Hart, supra note 11, at pp. 7-12.
22 in TheEnforcementofMorals, supra note 10, at p. 21.
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THE ENFORCEMENT OF MORALITY THROUGH THE CRIMINAL LAW
A number of arguments often proffered in favour of the use of the
.criminal law in the enforcement of morality will be examined. They include the
need to protect a common morality, prevent social disintegration, the requirement
for the criminal law to set moral /standards as a symbol, and the role of the
criminal law as the educator of public morality.
(i) Protection of Common Morality
Fundamentalists such as Stephen and Devlin support the
enforcement of a common morality through the criminal law. They believe that
the criminal law is the protector and defender of moral values. 23 Although for the
fundamentalists the main aim of the criminal law is the enforcement of individual
morality, they also appear concerned with moral harm to the community. Within
this approach, Stephen presents what may be termed a moral absolutionist
argument. The criminal law should not only be used for protection against acts
dangerous to society but as a persecution of the grosser forms of vice.' 24 What
Stephen means is that whatever is immoral should be sanctioned by the criminal
law irrespective of established harm to an individual or society. 25
Devlin takes a somewhat different stance. Although he rejects
Stephen's view 26 that the criminal law exists to promote virtue among its
citizens, he believes that any community could exist only if it had a certain sense
of right and wrong and legal institutions had to represent the moral sense of the
community. To this end he makes it clear that sexual aberrations are monstrous
23 Friedmann, W., Law in a Changing Society, 2nd ed, Harmondsworth, Penguin, 1972, at p.
192.
24Stephen, J. P., Liberty, Equality, Fraternity, 2nd ed, London, Smith Elgard &Co., 1874, at p.
162.
25 Hart' sets out his viewof the difference between Stephen and Devlin. He states: 'We may ask
first. Does this act harm anyone independently of its repercussion on the shared morality of
society? And secondly wemay ask. Does this act affect thesharedmorality and thereby weaken
society? Themoderate thesis [Devlin's] requires, if the punishment of the act is to be justified, an
affirmative answer at least at the second level. The extreme thesis [Stephen's] does not require
an affirmative answer at either level' (supra note 11, at pp. 49-50).
26Stephen, supra note 24, at p. 159.
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sins. Given the fact that Devlin's view was expressed at the same time as the
release of the Wolfenden Commission Report, it is not surprising that he tends to
confine concepts of morality to the sphere of sex and sexual offences. He
emphasises the outrage to the moral sense of the community as the rationale for
the intervention of the criminal law. Thus the injured citizen is the morally
zealous bystander, not the person at whom the act is directed.
The views of Stephen and Devlin coincide where they both argue
that the fact an action is generally regarded as immoral in itself is at least a
sufficient reason, if not a good one, for it to be made a crime.
(ii) Prevention of Social Disintegration
In Devlin's opinion, the protection of a common morality and
prevention of social disintegration are inextricably linked, as he views the failure
to observe common morality as leading to social disintegration and harm to
society. 27 Control of personal freedom Devlin argues, is necessary for a well-
ordered society which gives the State the right to legislate against immorality. 28
His argument favours the harm principle but the harm is to the social order rather
than the individual.
[A]n established morality is as necessary as a good
government to the welfare of society ... There is disintegration
when no common morality is observed ... so that society is
justified in taking the same steps to preserve its moral code as
it does to preserve its government and other essential
institutions. The suppression of vice is as much the law's
business as the suppression of subversive activity. 29
While it is true that the notion of the smooth functioning of society underlies most
penal laws, for example, public disturbances, theft and personal attacks 20 the
27Devlin, supra note 10, at p. 10.
28 /b/d, at pp. 10-14.
29 /b/d, atp. 13.
80 Ibid, at p. 23.
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need to uphold the smooth functioning of society does not require that the law
interfere in all sexual behaviour.
However, Devlin disagreed with the Wolfenden Commission's
recommendation that homosexual activity occurring in private should be
decriminalised. 32 He believed that if homosexual acts arouse such general
abhorrence that they in fact threaten social disintegration, this gives the criminal
law the right to intervene in the private lives of citizens by penalising such
conduct.
Hart argued against Devlin's belief that the loosening of moral
bonds is often the first stage of social disintegration. According to Hart, 'no
evidence is produced to show that deviation from accepted sexual morality, even
by adults in private, is something which, ... threatens the existence of society.' 33
It is the present writer's view that Devlin's disintegration thesis is in fact a theory
which argues that morality should be enforced whether or not immorality itself
causes any harm.
(iii) Symbolic Value of the Criminal Law
The drafting and enactment of what might be termed 'symbolic'
legislation does not take into account whether the legislation can in fact be
enforced. In such circumstances, the aim of the law seems to be to proscribe
particular moral principles in private life irrespective of whether the offender's act
can be shown to cause harm to others or even to him or herself. The law is used
to set standards of acceptable social morality as a symbol. Symbolic legislation
can be distinguished from educative legislation on the ground that there is no
serious legislative intention of producing significant social change by means of
the former. Rather, the object is to placate certain sections of society demanding
it. 'Knee-jerk' or reactionary legislation can fall within this category.
Ten, C. L., 'Crime and Immorality' (1969) 32 Modern LawReview, 648-663, at pp. 658-659.
32 He has since indicated that he is not in favour of criminalising homosexual acts in private
(Harris, J., Legal Philosophies, Butterworths, London, 1980, at p. 124).
33 Hart, supra note 11, at p. 50. This is supported by Ten {supra note31, at p. 661), who also
remarks that Devlin provides no evidence that immorality threatens the common morality or that
certain legislation leads to a decline in morality, and by Dworkin, R., 'Lord Devlin and the
Enforcement of Morals' from Wasserstrom, R. A. (ed). Morality and the Law, California,
Wadsworth Publishing Company, 55-72 at p. 59.
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The main reason behind the use of such symbolic legislation was
aptly put by those in the Wolfenden Commission who were against the
decriminalisation of both homosexuality and prostitution. They believed that
leaving unenforceable crimes on the statute books may act as a deterrent for
some who might otherwise commit them, or alternatively their existence may be
seen as a declaration of what society condemns. ^4
This position is reflected in the arguments that have been advanced
by other writers against the decriminalisation of homosexuality. Some have
commented that decriminalisation would lead to an increase in the molestation of
minors. But, molestation is not the province of homosexuals exclusively. It is
prevalent among heterosexuals, more often aimed at girls by males and
commonly occurs within the family unit. 35 Alternatively, opponents argue that
decriminalisation of homosexuality would result in many more people leaning
toward this conduct as it is an acceptable form of social behaviour. Packer
supports this view.
When the threat of punishment is removed or reduced, either
through legislative repeal or (as ordinarily occurs) through the
inaction of enforcement authorities, conduct that has previously
been repressed ... tends to increase ... not merely because
people feel that a threat has been removed but also, and
probably more significantly, because the subtle process of value
reinforcement through the rites of criminal stigmatization comes
to a stop. 36
Whether this has been the case following decriminalisation of homosexual
conduct in Australia is open to debate, given that there is no sound statistical
evidence from which to clarify the point. Given the fact that a high percentage of
HIV-infected persons fell within the homosexual/bi-sexual group in Western
Australia, Queensland and Tasmania, 37 the States that still criminalised
homosexual conduct in private prior to January 1990 it is arguable that criminal
34 Wolfenden Report, supra note 14, Mr Adair at para. 61.
35 Tasmanian Law Reform Commission, Report on Victimless Crime, 1978, para. 6.9.
36 Packer, H. L., The Limits of the Criminal Sanction, Stanford, Stanford University Press, 1968,
at p. 109.
37 Communicable Diseases Intelligence Bulletin, 1990, 8:11.
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provisions in force to that date have not deterred homosexuals from engaging in
prohibited behaviour. If this is true then it is doubtful that the criminal law has
successfully enforced morality (if it is immoral to engage in homosexual conduct).
However, it can be argued that decriminalisation does not result in
an increase in the incidence of the relevant behaviour. The situation that Packer
foresees resulting from decriminalisation, does not have to occur if the conduct is
discouraged by education outside of the law. But, even education may not control
sexual preferences. There is evidence to suggest that sexual preferences are
determined by complex psychological and physical processes and the law is
essentially irrelevant in this regard. '[SJexuality is a powerful force, subject to
individual will but not completely so.' 3®
The argument that symbolic legislation has a deterrent effect is not
well supported by experience. While acknowledging that it is difficult to measure
deterrence, experience reveals that punishments have had no significant
deterrent effect on the drug addict. 39 This may be due to the fact that laws
prohibiting drug usage have not been strictly enforced (although prosecutions are
considerably more common than for either homosexuality or prostitution)./o
Further, the deterrence argument ignores the variety of reasons that people turn
to drugs and the fact that their addiction, can control them and in turn deny the
capacity to act rationally.
Likewise, prostitution has persisted through all civilisations and has
flourished regardless of laws. Throughout time, nations have used prostitution
for their own ends. ^2 jhe law has failed to enforce morality through the
38 Brandt, A. M., 'AIDS From Social History to Social Policy', in Fee, E., and Fox, D. M. (eds),
AIDS: The Burdens of History, Berkeley, University of California Press, 1988, 141-171 at p. 152.
39 Goode, E., The Criminology of Drugs and Drug Use', in Blumberg, A. S. (ed). Current
Perspectives on CriminalBehavior: Original Essays in Criminology, New York, Knopf, 1974,
165-191 at pp. 181-182. Whethersuch legislation may have deterred others from taking up drug
use is uncertain there being no published studies in Australia on this topic. On a related point,
there has been little research the determine what the relative contributions of policy, prevention
or treatments measures have been on the decreasing incidence of tobacco and alcohol use in
Australia.
40 Dobinson, I., Polietti, P., Buying and SellingHeroin: A Study of Heroin Use/Dealers, NSW
Bureau of Crime Statistics and Research, 1987.
41 Cohen, S., Delinquent Boys: The Cultureof the Gang, Glencoe, Free Press, 1955, 59.
42 See Bresler, F., Sex and the Law, Londori, Frederick Muller, 1989, 3-63; Daniels, K., So
Much Hard Work Sydney, Fontana Books, 1984.
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criminalisation of prostitution for two reasons both of which support the need to
decriminalise and regulate the industry. The first reason is that sexual habits
cannot be controlled through legal intervention. Some people have negative
attitudes towards certain sex norms which may render it impossible to ever
regulate or abolish prostitution. Second, as English legislators recognised in the
1860s. 'as long as there are men, there would be a demand; so long as there
was a market, there would be a supply.' If the client was removed the demand
for prostitution would cease. The need for easy money and drugs in turn
promotes the supply of prostitution. ^4
Viewed from this perspective, the symbolic argument as applied to
criminal legislation has a tendency to be used to provide justifications for laws
that are at best revenue raisers. This can be seen with laws pertaining to
homosexual conduct, prostitution and drug use. Their enforcement is not
successful but their presence on the statute books indicates that the activities are
not tolerated. In addition, the policy of fines provides revenue. Ideological
considerations prevent legislators seeing that 'efforts to stamp out crime actually
strengthen it...,' they cannot stand the "deviant" beating "the system", and public
funds need the fines; criminalisation of [these activities] provides persons with
jobs'.
(iv) Educational Role of the Criminal Law
Even though the criminal law contains instances of symbolism
which is simply meant to convey core social values (even if the same are not
generally those of the populace) the criminal law does aim to be educative in
nature, that is, there is some intent to produce social change or influence public
opinion or both. There is no doubt that for a social change to occur there must
be some effect on public opinion. The precise role that the law should play
Porter, D., and R., The Enforcement of Health: The British Debate', in Fee and Fox , supra
note 38, 97-120 at p. 105.
^ Bresler, supra note 42, at p. 13.
Goode, supra note 39, at p. 183.
"^^Tomasic, R., {e6), Legislation and Society inAustralia, Sydney, Law Foundation of New South
Wales and George Allen and Unwin, 1979, at p. 25.
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and does play in this regard is also a source of debate. As the Wolfenden
Commission observed,
On the one hand it is held that the law ought to follow behind
public opinion, so that the law can count on the support of the
community as a whole. On the other hand, it is held that a
necessary purpose of the law is to lead or fortify public opinion.
Certainly it is clear that if any legal enactment is markedly out
of tune with public opinion it will quickly fall into disrepute.
Clearly, legal moralists like Devlin and Stephen would support
legislation that aimed to educate the public in the sphere of morality even if it
involved a criminal penalty as part of its education. However, the fact that the
law seeks to penalise some conduct may lead to the public forming adverse
opinions as to the morality of that form of conduct. For example, American
society has been defined as homophobic. This may be because for the last
two to three generations homosexuality has been and still is illegal in nearly half
the American States. The view that homosexual conduct is immoral has been
handed down through generations. Similarly, in relation to drug laws, legislators
and agents of the criminal justice system believe they enforce drug laws because
drug use is "dangerous". The imputation of danger in actuality follows the belief
that the use of certain drugs is wrong or evil. The public do not believe a drug
should be criminalised because it is dangerous; they believe it is dangerous
partly because they think it is immoral to use it and partly because the use of the
drug is illegal, so in effect, a ' "rational" argument is superimposed on what is
Wolfenden Commission, supra note 14, at para. 16.
^ Kohier, M. P., 'History, Homosexuals andHomophobia; the Judicial Intolerance of Bowers and
Hardwick,' (1986) 19 Connecticut Law Review, 129-142 at pp. 130-131.
The States are listed in 'Developments in the Law: Sexual Orientation and the Law' (1989)
102 Harvard Law Review, 1508-1671, at p. 1519; Tierney, T. W., Criminalising the Sexual
Transmission of HIV: An International Analysis' (1992) 15 Hastings International and
Comparative Law Review, 475 at p. 485.
SO Richards, D. A. J., Towards New Perspectives on Drug Control: A Negotiated Settlement to
the War on Drugs' (1987) 11 Nova Law Review, 909-913. Husak, D., Drugs and Rights,
Cambridge, Cambridge University Press. 1992, p. 57.
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essentially a moral and Ideological conviction ...'. 5i in this way the criminal law
Imposes a view on society of what type of criminal Is morally bad.
A number of arguments can be raised against the enforcement of
morality being elevated as the overriding aim of the criminal law. These
arguments will be considered In turn.
(I) The Intrinsic Problem of Identifying a Common Morality
Even Lord Devlin realised that It was almost Impossible to ascertain
the moral judgements of society yet he went on to state that the criminal law had
to enforce the common morality. 52 Common morality depended upon the
collective wisdom of reasonable men. sacrltlcism has been directed at this part
of his thesis on the ground that the reasonable man has been devoid of accurate
definition. 54as one writer has stated: 'the reasonable man [sic] If he exists at all,
may be a bundle of prejudices, Ignorances and unresolved conflicts.' 55
The difficulty with arguing that the criminal law should and does
enforce morality Is that the scope of prohibited conduct depends on changing
values. The fact that In 1960 many people such,as Devlin and Hart began to
consider whether law should concern Itself with private morals was fundamentally
because It was becoming clear that there was no single clear moral code. Those
In the minority In the Wolfenden Commission who called for the retention of
homosexual offences on grounds of their symbolic value. I.e. that their retention
would Indicate what society condemns, have one major flaw In their argument. In
a pluralist society It Is difficult to ascertain what society generally condemns or to
Identify a common morality. For example, older people raised In a more
Goode, supra note 39, at p. 177. The dramatic shifts in the public perception of drug use in
18th-19th century America are covered in Duster, T. S., The Legislation of Morality; law, drugs
and moral judgment, New York, Free Press, 1970, at pp. 3-23.
52 Devlin, supra note 10,at pp. 4-5, 8-9.
53 Ibid, at p.'tS.
54Blom-Cooper, L, and Drewry, G., Law andMorality, London, ,Duckworth, 1976 referring to the
work of Sigmund Freund at p. 3.
55 Lloyd, D., IdeaofLaw, Harmondsworth, Penguin, 1987 at p. 61.
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restrictive atmosphere may abhor pornography peddlers whereas younger
people may be indifferent to them.
This change in social morality was in fact one of Hart's criticisms of
Devlin's thesis. Even if Devlin was correct as to his disintegration theory, it was
not clear to Hart that moral sentiments against homosexuality were a necessary
part of these shared moral beliefs. The possibility of temporal changes in moral
views is a factor that Devlin ignored, The very initiation of the Wolfenden
Commission indicates that there may have been a greater degree of
permissiveness becomirig evident within English society in relation to
homosexuality. Indeed, if it is true that society consists of a complex set of
moral ideas which its members hold at a particular moment in time, 'it is
intolerable that each such moral status quo should have the right to preserve its
precarious existence by force.'
Changes in views as to what is fnoral and immoral have been the
impetus in the movement towards decriminalisation and legalisation of not only
homosexuality, but also other 'victimless's® crimes such as prostitution and drug
use. In fact, changing attitudes and social conditions have led to the abolition of
conduct formerly condemned as criminal including homosexuality and abortion.
This exemplifies a change in social morality: or at least a change in permissible
sexual behaviour. 59 It also illustrates again that a common morality is hard to
find.
Increasingly, morality has become the preserve of the individual,
making responsible choices in the knowledge of the consequences of actions
and regard for the well-being of those affected. The 'common morality' of a
liberal democratic society in the 1990s may in fact require that we leave
sufficient moral space for people to choose and not be coerced. As it is
Hart, st/pra note 11, at p. 51. In fact, Devlin commented "... moral standards do not shift...
but the e)dent to which society will tolerate ... departures from moral standards varies from
generation to generation' (supra note 10, at p. 18 ).
57 Dworkin paraphrasing Hart supra note33, at p. 244.
58 The Tasmanian Law Reform Commission, supra note 35, at para. 2.16 doubted whether there
was in reality such a thing as a 'victimless crime' since almost any activity in which a person
engages has repercussions for him or herself, his or her family, employment or society at large.
Schur, considers that crimes without victims are those crimes where at least no one would
recognise himself as a victim (Schur, E. M., Crimes Without Victims: Deviant Behavior and Public
PoZ/cy, Englewood Cliffs, Prentice Hall, 1965).
59 Friedmann, supra note 23, at pp. 200-201.
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recognised that many of the laws express social attitudes of previous centuries
and do not necessarily represent the social attitudes of today, pressure groups
may seek to influence governments towardsdecriminalisation and legalisation of
victimless crimes. This may lead governments to decriminalise selected offences
to placate certain sections of society.
In the late 1980s Australians appeared divided as to whether
homosexual conduct was moral or immoral or perhaps more appropriately,
whether it was deserving of punishment or not. Acknowledging the sampling
problems of public opinion polls, a September 1989 Morgan Gallop Poll of
approximately 1,000 Australians showed that a clear majority supported
decriminalisation, of provisions penalising homosexual activities. For example,
74% of West Australians and 56% of Queenslanders supported decriminalisation,
but only 47% of TasmanianS did. The percentage of persons supporting
decriminalisation had risen 4% since 1974 when the last Morgan Gallop Poll was
taken. However, there was also an 8% increase in those persons advocating
that homosexual acts remain illegal; The result is of some importance
because it reveals that irrespective of the presence of HIV a significant
proportion of the persons polled favoured thedecriminalisation of homosexuality.
(ii) The Problem of a Critical Morality
The fact that many forms of behaviour which involve sexual activity
such as homosexuality and prostitution are regarded as immoral give rise to the
conceptof 'positive morality'. Positive morality is a term used to refer to the moral
code in existence at a given time. 61 Hart distinguishes positive morality from
more general moral principles used to assess whether any action is good or bad
or right or wrong. These principles according to Hart, constitute 'critical morality'.
62 Critical morality can be used to assess positive morality and might be used to
criticise a societywhose positive morality treated homosexual activity as immoral.
It is one thing to say that certain conduct breaches positive morality. It is a
different thing to say that such conduct ought to be prohibited by the criminal law.
6® Murphy, K., 'What you think'. The Bulletin, October 101989, 56-57.
61 A term used both byHart {supra note 11, at pp. 13, 17-20) and Feinberg, J., {Rights, Justice
and the Bounds ofLiberty, NewJersey, Princeton University Press, 1980, at p. 80).
62 Hart, supra note 11, at p. 13, 17-20.
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Imposing criminal liability in accordance with positive morality is dangerous given
that positive morality is based on public opinion which may itself be wrong.
Alternatively the perception of what the public condemn may have been
incorrectly ascertained. It may be difficult to establish with any degree of certainty
the percentage of a population who adhere to a particular view with respect to
certain behaviour. For example, one could guess that few would take issue with
the fact that torture and murder offends common moral standards, but, it would
be difficult to assess what the public in general felt about homosexuality. The
support for the former may be due to the overriding belief in the sanctity of
human life and the abhorrence of unnecessary cruel and inhuman treatment.
It is Hart's view as it was Bentham's before him, that more harm
may be caused to a community's values at large in enforcing a particular moral
position. 63 Jeremy Bentham writing in the eighteenth century believed that the
criminal sanction should not be used to support some vague standard of morality.
'The criminal law should not be used to penalise behaviour which does no harm.'
64 He believed that the criminal law should not be used to achieve a purpose
which could be achieved as effectively at less cost in suffering, or where the
harm done by the penalty was greater than the harm done by the offence.
There are a number of examples that can be cited that would tend
to show that strong moral disapproval does not necessary imply that there should
be a law criminalising the activity. Indeed sometimes the attempt to enforce
morality is self-defeating.
For example, it is often argued that although homosexuality and
prostitution may be immoral or undesirable, criminalisation produces more harm.
65 Victimless crimes 'often generate illegal behaviour and corruption on the part
of police in their zeal to enforce the unenforceable'. 66 Corruption of law
enforcement officials has been most evident in prostitution and has been aired in
63 to/d, atp. 27.
6^ Bentham, J., An Introduction to the Principles ofMorals and Legislation, 1789cited inWalker,
N., Punishment, Danger and Stigma: The Morality of Criminal Justice, Oxford, Basil Blackwell,
1980, at pp. 5-6.
66Hart, supra note11, at p. 27.
66Blumberg, supra note39, at p. 23.
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Australia through the Royal Commission Inquiry into Possible Illegal Activities
and Associated Police Misconduct (the 'Fitzgerald Inquiry') in Queensland.
If only a small proportion of homosexual crimes can be proven
against the perpetrators then the prohibition should not be included in the statute
books, because doing so brings the law into disrepute. Leaving unenforceable
crime on the statute books is dangerous since it encourages secondary crime
such as blackmail and extortion. 68 a study in Sydney has shown that until 1987
only a very small proportion of drug-related crimes resulted in charges or
convictions. 69 Random enforcement can have undesirable effects and is
objectionable on the grounds of fairness.
There are further reasons why the criminalisation of neither drug
usage nor prostitution can be commended. In relation to drug use, punitive
policies have worsened the drug problem. ^6 Admittedly there is very little
empirical evidence on which to base such an assertion, but it appears that a
decade of law enforcement in Australia at least has not reduced the number of
heroin users markedly. An addict subculture has surfaced accompanied by
criminal activity on the addict's behalf. An Australian study reveals that property
crime is predominantly motivated by the desire for heroin. Similar arguments
can be raised when considering prostitution. One of the commonly advanced
claims against the regulation of prostitution are that it implies moral approval.
Women are seen as persons who need rehabilitation and society 'senses the
seeds of social collapse in promiscuous, commercialised and uncontrolled sexual
6^ Commission of Inquiry Pursuant to Order in Council, Commission of Inquiry into Possible
Illegal Activities and Associated Police Misconduct (The Fitzgerald Report'), Queensland,
Government Publisher, 1989.
68 Morris, N., and Hawkins, G., The Honest Politician's Guide to Crime Control. Chicago,
University of Chicago Press, 1970, at pp. 5-6.
88 Dobinson and Poletti, supra note 40. Since the late 1980s and the implementation of the
'War on drugs' campaigns in Sydney, the number of people charged/convicted of drug-related
crime increased dramatically. For example, between 1983-1989the number of persons convicted
in NewSouth Wales HigherCriminal Courts increased by 200% (Australian Bureau of Statistics,
Higher Criminal Courts, 1983, Table, 7, p. 6., New South Wales Bureau of Statistics and
Research, Higher CriminalCourts Statistics 1989, Table 9, pp. 20-21).
^8Goode, supra note39, at pp. 181-2; Weatherburn, D., 'Crime and partial legalisation ofheroin'
(1992) 25(1) Australian and NewZealand Journal fo Criminology, 11-26, at p. 18.
Dobinson and Poletti, supra note 40.
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congress ^2 However, such a view is harmful to the position of women in
society by reinforcing patriarchal dominance over them.
There is a tendency to ignore the benefits that partial legalisation,
at least, of certain conduct may bring. For example, legalising IV drug use
would provide heroin of adequate purity at a lower price which would remove
the need for users to be in contact with criminals, to engage in prostitution to
support the habit and they could continue to hold jobs. The price would be so
low that it would undercut the black market or at least decrease its size.
It is true that legalisation could have detrimental effects. For
example, it could lead to more users; it may only prevent those activities which
people want to stop; unsterile needle sharing might continue regardless of
need; and, making heroin available to addicts may ignore the occasional usef.
Further, it is uncertain what it would cost to finance a scheme of administering
heroin to dependent users. However, since implementation of decriminalisation
in South Australia there has been no evidence of a flood of users. It is a
case of balancing the relative risks of continued criminalisation with partial
legalisation.
Some of these factors were recognised as providing a solid basis
for decriminalisation or legalisation of heroin use at a special Premiers
Conference convened in April 1985 to determine future drug policies in
Australia. Strategies developed as a result of that Conference focused on
reducing the demand for drugs and controlling the drug supply. The AIDS
pandemic has led to renewed calls to decriminalise IV drug usage. The 1989
^2 Esselstyn, T. C., 'Prostitution in the United States' (1968) 376 Annals of the American
Academy of Pdlitical and Social Science, 123-125, at p. 125.
Baume, P.,-'Overcoming Myths, Hypocrisy and Lies: Drug Law Reform in Australia', New
Doctor, Autumn 1989:8-9. Marks, R., 'Prohibition or Regulation: An Economist's View of
Australian Heroin Policy' (1990) 23 Australian and NewZealand Journal of Criminology, 65-87 at
p. 83.
Sarre, R., 'A Review of the South Australian Cannabis Expiation Notice System', presented at
the Fifth Annual Conference of the Australian and New Zealand Society of Criminology, Sydney,
July, 1989.
Department of Health, National Campaign Against Drug Abuse, Canberra, Australian
Government Publishing Service, 1985.
Drew, L. H. R., and Taylor, V. K., The second AIDSepidemic: spread via needle sharing to
the general community: a review, Canberra, Department of Community Services and Health,
1988, and see comment by Hawks, D., 'The proposal to make heroin available legally to
intravenous drug abusers', Med J Aust ^988, 149:455-456.Wodak, A.,'Heroin Legalisation: To
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Cleeland Report of the Parliamentary Joint Committee on the National Grime
Authority put a case for a regulated supply scheme. In addition, the
Commonwealth Government has urged State Governments to repeal legislation
criminalising possession of hypodermic syringes so as to facilitate the smooth
operation of the needle-exchange programmes that have been set up in each
State and Territory of Australia. However, the Commonwealth government
did not advocate decriminalising or legalising IV drug usage. In the 1990s
the issue is still being debated in both academic so and political circles. S""
(ill) The Limits of Legislation and the Practical Problems of Enforcement
One of the reasons for the failure of the criminal law to successfully
enforce morality, shape public opinion, and maintain the smooth order of society
is that legislation is often seen incorrectly as the cure for all social and moral
be or not to Be?' New Doctor, Autumn, 1989:4-7. There have been many newspaper articles on
this point: 'Legalise Heroin to Beat AIDS', Sunday Telegraph, June 18 1989, p. 3. There have
also been numerous challenges to these calls indicating that even the experts are divided:
'Warning on decriminalisation pf heroin'. The Age, September 9 1989 and ' "Legalise heroin" call
challenged'. The Mercury, April 18 1989.
Parliamentary Joint Committee on the National Crime Authority, Drugs, Crime and Society,
(Cleeland Report), Canberra, Australian Government Publishing Service, 1989 at pp. 112-113.
78 Cornmonwealth of Australia, National HIV/AIDS Strategy: A policy information paper,
Canberra, Australian Government Publishing Service, 1989, at para. 5.7.13. The HIV/AIDS
Preventative Measures Act (1992) (Tas.) endorsed the establishment of a needle-exchange
scheme in Tasmania.
79'Legalise Heroin toBeat AIDS', Sunday Telegraph, June18 1989, p. 3. Don Dunstan, former
Premier of South Australia and Alex Wodak, Director of the Alcohol and Drug Services at St
Vincents Hospital, Sydney, are both reported as concurring in this view. See 'Legal heroin
needed to fight disease, says Dunstan', The Age, August 18 1989 and 'Legailise heroin, says
expert', The Mercury, March 16 1989.
80 Reflected in the debate between Weatherburn, supra note 70, who concludes that there is no
case to be made to justifya change in the current heroin policy, and Mugford, S., 'Crime and the
partial legalisation of heroin: Comments and Caveats' (1992) 25(1) Australian and NewZealand
Journal of Criminology, 27-40, who believes that 'current laws fail to grasp the social
phenomenon of drug use correctly and hence [are] incapable of doing the job properly' (p. 37).
81 The ongoing political debate about a varietyof drugs including tobacco, alcohol and narcotics
is reflected upon by Baume, P., 'Alcohol and polities', Med J Aust, 1991, 154:840-841 and in
Carney, T., The Unwinnable WarAgainst Drugs - the Politics of Decriminalisation, Melbourne,
Pluto, 1991. It appears that in the 1990s in Australia the focus has shifted to developing supply-
reduction schemes (Wardlaw, G., 'Overview of national drug control strategies', in Comparative
analysis of illicit drug strategies. Monograph Series No. 18, National Campaign Against Drug
Abuse, Canberra, Australian Government Publishing Service, 1992, at p. 5).
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evils. As Morris and Hawkins state, legislation relating to drug use and sexual
behaviour 'is based on an exaggerated conception of the capacity of the criminal
law to influence men'. 82 indeed, the failure of the criminal law to eradicate
victimless crimes provides some support for the argument that the law
experiences difficulties in controlling some social and moral problems. The
unwillingness of people to face the fact that forces in society shape the criminal
and their devotion to the idea that criminal activity can be reduced by repressive
laws is at the heart of the problem.
Sumner is more emphatic that legislation cannot make mores. He
believes that to be strong and effective legislation must be consistent with the
mores of a society or the group affected but that it has little or no independent
influence on behaviour. 83 Similarly Cranston, while recognising that there is no
body of knowledge on how effective legislation is in influencing behaviour,
believes that legislation is an insignificant instrument of control when compared
with other social forces such as peer-group pressure. 84
Aubert points out, though, that continued violations of laws do not
indicate that legislation cannot change behaviour. 85 jhis is because action is
related to knowledge; if an individual does not know of the law then it is doubtful
his or her behaviour will change. Jo be effective the terms of a law must be
precise. 86 jhe person or group to whom the legislation is addressed must know
of it and the circumstances of its non-compliance. Broad statutory criminal
standards are publicly complied with if they 'correspond with societal values and
if they are precise and well known so that individuals can bring their behaviour
into line without much official guidance.' 87
Morris and Hawkins, supra note 68, at p. 2.
Sumner, W. G., Folkways: A study of the sociological importance of usages, manners,
customs, mores and morals. New York, New American Library, 1906, at p. 77.
Cranston, R., 'Reform Through Legislation; The Dimension of Legislative Technique', in
Tomasic, supra note 46, 88-106, at p. 89.
Aubert, V., (ed). Sociology of Law, Harmondsworth, Penguin, 1969,116-126 at p. 117.
Hardesty, D. 0., 'A Case Study of Legislative Implementation: The Federal Coal Mine and
Safety Act of 1969' (1972) 10 Harvard Journal of Legislation, 99 at pp. 124-5.
Cranston, R., in Tomasic, supra note 46, at p. 93.
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Socialisation has an important role to play in the success of
proscriptions. Individuals belong not only to society but also to individual groups.
The norms of the group may lead people to commit crime. Minority cultures often
commit crimes to outrage the dominant culture. Some criminal laws may have
' been formulated for the groups that, possessed the ability to dictate public policy,
for example, US drug legislation (the development of the Harrison Narcotic Act
(1914) ®9), but some were probably created for the benefit of the larger
community, for example, vagrancy legislation, Few people would take issue
with those laws, largely because they have been socialised to respect or fear the
law and legal institutions. Alternatively, people may commit crime out of dire
need and until that need is satisfied by behaviour that is legal, they will continue
tore-offend.
Legislation, rather than having the desired effect, may cause
unanticipated and undesired results. For example, initial studies of the efficacy of
drink driving legislation have found either that it has little deterrent effect or
that it is inconclusive whether the deterrent effect is merely temporary or
permanent. 92 in the United States legislation and policies designed to control
drug use have from their inception been a contributing factor in worsening the
drug problem. As Goode states ' ... punitive approaches have been an almost
unrelieved failure'. 93 The Australian Parliamentary Joint Committee on the
33Pryce, K., EndlessPressure, Harmondsworth, Penguin, 1979.
39Duster, supra note 51, at p. 23.
90 Hartjen, C. A., Hartjen, C. A., Crime and Criminalisation, 2nd ed. New York, Holt, Rinehart
and Winston/Praeger, 1974, 31-35 and 49.
91 Ross, H. L., The Scandinavian Myth: The Effectiveness of Drinking-and-Driving legislation in
Sweden and Norway' (1975) 4(2) Journal of Legal Studies, 285-310. A concern voiced by the
Australian Law Reform Commission in their report. Alcohol, Drugs and Driving, Canberra,
Australian Government Publishing Service, Report No. 4,1976, para. 258.
92 Reconviction studies do not support the fact that people with prior drinkdriving ofences are
more sensitive to the threat of sanction (Homel, R., 'Penalties and the drink driver: A study of
one thousand offenders,' (1,981) 14 Australian and New Zealand Journal of Criminology, 225-
241). This view has been supported in Canada by follow up studies by Donelson, A. C., Impaired
Driving Report No. 4. Alcohol and Road Accidents in Canada: Issues Related to Furture
Strategies and Priorities, Ottawa, Department of Justice, 1985 who concluded that low based,
punitive measures cannot alone produce large, sustained reductions in the magnitude of the
problem. He reaffirmed his conclusion in 1989 in The Alcohol Crash Problem and its
Persistence: The Need to Deal Effectively with the Hard Core of Drinking Drivers, Ottawa, The
Traffic Injury Research Foundation of Canada, 1989.
93Goode, supra note 39, at p. 179.
62
National Crime Authority has accepted that the policy of prohibition of drug use
currently employed in Australia is not successful.
There are also significant problems of enforcement for offences
involving sexual activity and drug use. The legislature deals with crimes in
advance of commission by the threat of condemnation and punishment to be
imposed by other agencies. The very fact that these other agencies are involved
may set limits on the ability of the legislature to accomplish what it sets out to
achieve. Many sex crimes suffer from this practical difficulty. Often the conduct
regarded as criminal on the statute book is committed in private, making police
surveillance an invasion of privacy. Alternatively, the police may choose not to
prosecute the conduct because of problems of proof.
In Tasmania, for example, the prosecution of victimless crime such
as homosexual activity has been negligible. Between 1969 and 1993 only 115
persons have been convicted of crimes relating to homosexual conduct under
sections 122 and 123 of the Criminal Code (Tas.). 95 The majority of those
convicted involved non-consensual conduct, with only 2 persons charged with
consensual homosexual conduct during that period. As most of the conduct
prosecuted was non-consensual it was brought to the attention of the police by
way of complaint, rather than through their detection. In one of the consensual
cases Cosgrove J held that he did not believe the behaviour engaged in created
any public mischief: 'it was a private affair between consenting adults.' 96 a 1988
Queensland District Court decision to discharge two males charged with sodomy
and gross indecency under sections 208 and 211 of the CriminalCode indicates
the courts' unwillingness to prosecute persons for the purpose of enforcing
Drugs, Crime and Society, supra note 77, at pp. 122-123. Similarly, Wodak, supra note 76,
at p. 7), Leader-Elliot, I., ('Prohibition Against Heroin Use: Can They Be Justified?' (1987) 19
Australian and New Zealand Journal of Criminology, 225); Mugford, supra note 80, at p. 27
remark that existing drug policies in Australia have not been effective and are unsustainable. But,
more recently Weatherburn, has asserted that the prohibition has not been shown to be
ineffective (supra note 70, at p. 1).
95 Calculated from research conducted of files supplied from the Department of Public
Prosecutions, Justice Department, Tasmania in 1991 and updated in July 1994. Tasmania was
selected as the sole jurisdiction of study because homosexual activity between consenting adults
in private is a crime.
95 VGarth, unreported judgment of the Supreme Court of Tasmania, March 13th 1980 per
Cosgrove J.
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97 Both examples are significant given that they came from States where
homosexual activity has been (Qld) and still is (Tas.), illegal.
(iv) Limited Use of Criminal Law for Educational Purposes
If there is a difficulty in determining a common morality in a pluralist
society, it must necessarily follow that attempting to use the criminal law as an
educator of common morality must be problematic.
In fact, it would appear that the law has a limited ability to educate.
Empirical studies support the argument that the criminal law has little educative
value. Experiments have shown that people's judgements on at least some
moral issues are influenced by what they are told is the majority view. 9® An
early attempt to measure this phenomenon was undertaken by Walker and
Argyle who surveyed attitudes to suicide after it was decriminalised. They found
that there was no tendency for students who knew the law had been repealed to
take a less strict moral view than those who did not know. 99 They concluded
that at least in relation to suicide, that it was not possible to influence the moral
opinions of students on the basis that a given action was prohibited by the
criminal law. In practice, there are very few recognised successes of the
criminal law operating to educate the public in crimes other than victimless
crimes with the most often quoted failure being the United States prohibition
laws. •'99
In relation to AIDS, Oppenheimer reflects on the strength of public
opinion and the difficulty the law has in overriding those opinions once formed.
He refers to the tendency of the Centre for Disease Control in the United States
in the early days of the pandemic to base AIDS transmission on a 'promiscuous'
lifestyle hypothesis. Such a hypothesis indirectly implied a moral judgement, one
97 In fact the court stated: 'the activities of two consenting adult males in the privacy of their own
home is no outrage to public decency' (Lane, B., 'Harassment of homosexuals in Queenslandi
Private lives, public "aimes"' 0988) 132(4) Legal Service Bulletin, 54-157.
98Walker, N., and Argyle, M., citing Dasheill in 'Doesthe Law Affect Moral Judgments?' (1964) 4
British Journal of Criminology, 571-581.
99 Ibid, at pp. 577-579.
••99 Friedmann, supra note 23, at p. 22 and see also Hartjen, supranote90 citing Sutherland at
p. 42.
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that the community at large picked up and adopted in their search for
scapegoats. "'O'' The media, particularly in the United States, also tended to back
this view, which in turn led to widespread reactions of distrust of and
discrimination towards certain groups in society. 102
There is no doubt that the law does not respond rapidly to changes
in the public opinion, especially with respect to moral issues. Stephen
recognised the need for the law to be in line with public opinion when he argued
that 'You cannot punish anything which public opinion, as expressed in the
common practice of society, does not strenuously and unequivocally condemn.'
103 Certainly eighteenth' century England relied heavily on public opinion for its
practice. Hay describes how the rulers of eighteenth century England spent
much time reading public opinion, the gentry aware that their security of position
depended on belief in the justice of their rule. 'Punishment at times had to be
waived or mitigated to meet popular ideas of justice ...'. 104
Friedmann endorses Stephen's position by arguing that in a
democracy the interplay between social opinion and the law activities of the State
is more obvious, being expressed through representatives in the legislative-
assembly, media and associations. uke Stephen, Friedmann argues that it is
not possible to impose a law on an utterly hostile community. 106 Group interests
may initiate and pursue a legal change in the face of the indifference of both
government and public opinion but for it to work there must be a minimum of
acceptance by the public:
Ideally public opinion must necessarily be ahead of legislative
action. The government of the day would be unlikely to want Parliament to pass
Oppenhelmer, G. M., 'In the eye of the Storm', in Fee and Fox, supra note 38, 267-300 at p.
279.
102 See Altman, D., AIDS in the Mind ofAmerica, NewYork, Anchor Press/Double Day, 1986 in
chapter 2: 'AIDS and the Media', at p. 16-21 where he makes reference to some sensational
headlines.
103 White, R. J., (ed), Stephen, J. F., Liberty, Equality andFraternity, Cambridge, Cambridge
University Press, 1967, at p. 159.
104 Hay, D., Albion's Fatal Tree: Crime and Society in Eighteenth Century England, New York,
Pantheon, 1975, at p. 51.
105 Friedmann, supra note 23, at p. 24.
106 Ibid, at p. 22.
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laws which a majority of electors considered obnoxious. Politicians will
endeavour to secure a political future by enacting legislation which is compatible
with both public and professional feeling. However, there is always the possibility
that if the law was to change to reflect public opinion it might lead to the
enactment of harsh and repressive policies. The Western Australian Parliamerit
exhibited this tendency in the passage of the 1992 juvenile justice legislation, 107
which was enacted in response to the despair of many members of the
community at the perceived increase in the level of offences being committed by
juveniles. The wisdom of the enactment has been debated; ""o® It is significant
that it contains a 'sunset-clause' confirming the fact that the legislature is 'testing
the waters' with respect to public opinion with this particular piece of legislation.
109
Practically speaking there are two distinct reasons why the law is
not ahead of public opinion. First, those who make legislative decisions are
unable to foresee the future. This is complicated by the fact that the changes in
society are both rapid and unpredictable and it is not possible to determine:
beforehand what legal situations and problems may arise. Second, it is difficult-
to predict the future public and professional feeling which will accompany future
circumstances; 'basic community views change from era to era'. ""o
If that is so then perhaps it is questionable that legislation has an
educative quality. It is argued above that changing attitudes led to the
amendment of legislation covering victimless crime. In the same manner,
legislation in the last fifty years has rarely been enacted to prevent a social, moral
or ethical problem. Legislation is usually enacted in the wake of an event. For
example, the thalidomide tragedy led to amendments to the Federal Food and
Drugs Act in the US and the enactment of the Therapeutic Goods Act
(1966)(Cth) in Australia. Prior to this date, there had been no legislative basis in
Crime (Serious and Repeat Offenders) Sentencing Act (1992)(W.A.).
108 wilkie, M., 'WA's Draconian New Juvenile Offender Sentencing Laws' (1992)
2{55)Aboriginal Law Bulletin, 1992, 15-17.
In addition, s. 13 states tfiat tfie effectiveness and operation of tfie Act will be reviewed every
three months.
Derham, Maher and Waller, Introduction to Law, 5th ed, Sydney, Law Book Company, 1985,
at p. 207.
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Australia for the safety of marketed products to be monitored. Even with respect
to AIDS, legislation generally has been implemented in the wake of the
pandemic, for example, legislation limiting the liability for agencies providing
contaminated blood in circumstances where the provision of such blood was
without negligence.
Earlier in this chapter, figures were provided frorri the Morgan
Gallop Poll on homosexual conduct. The Poll indicated that 74% of the persons
polled in Western Australia in 1989 supported decriminalisation. It is significant
that in March 1990 the West Australian legislature decriminalised homosexual
activities between consenting adults (over twenty-one years) in private. ^^2 jhjs
legislation reflects the dependency of lawmakers on public opinion. It may also
reveal that governments are influenced by legislative activities in the other
jurisdictions of a federation.
However, governments will not always act even in the face of
strong local lobby groups. The slow progress of gay law reform in Tasmania is
an example. In 1978 the Tasmanian Law Reform Commission report on,
victimless crime suggested that homosexual acts between consenting adults no
longer be a crime. The matter of decriminalisation was left in abeyance, but
resurfaced in that State in 1987 with the advent of the AIDS epidemic. At that
time the Tasmanian Parliament refused to repeal existing proscriptions against
homosexual conduct despite the intensity of gay law reform movements in the
State, Then the Commonwealth National HIV/AIDS Strategy in 1989 urged
States in Australia that still penalise homosexual conduct between consenting
adults to consider repealing those provisions. In an.action that might be
s. 21 DA Human Tissue (Amendment) Act (IQBVyU.S.SN.y, Health (Blood Donations) Act
(1985)(Vic.); Blood Contaminants Act (1985)(S.A.): BloodDonation (Limitation of Liability) Act
(1985)(W.A.); Blood Donation (Limitation of Liability) Amendment Act (1987)(W.A.); Blood
Transfusion (Limitation of Liability Act) (A986)Jas.)'. Notifiable Diseases Act (^985)(N.T.)^, Blood
Donation (Acquired Immune Deficiency Syndrome)Ordinance (1985)(A.C.T.), Blood Donation
(AIDSAmendment) Act (1986)(A.C.T.)
^ 2Throughthe LawReform (Decriminalisation of Sodomy)Act (1989).
113 supra note 35, at para. 6.19.
11^ See 'Male homosexuality bid vetoed by MLC's', The Mercury, June 5 1987.
115 National HIV/AIDS Strategy, supra note 78, at para. 5.7.11-5.7.12. See also, 'Gay law
change in AIDS fight'. The Mercury, October 10 1989, p. 5, which suggested that although
legislation to decriminalise was being considered by the Tasmanian government'... as part of a
package to fight AIDS', itwould be unlikely to be introduced into Parliament in 1989.
67
regarded as one where a State government refused to submit to the will of a
Federally backed policy, the AIDS Preventative Measures Bill (1990) was not
passed by theTasmanian Legislative Assembly. ^^6 jhjs Bill contained provisions
which would have decriminalised some homosexual practices and also legalised
the setting up of a needle-exchange in that State. In 1993 the Bill was passed in
an amended form which did not include homosexual law reform,
In summary, for the reasons advanced in this section, the
enforcement of morality is not a justification itself for the criminalisation of
homosexuality, prostitution or drug use. It will now be considered whether the
aim of preventing harm to others will provide the justification.
THE PREVENTION OF HARM TO OTHERS THROUGH THE CRIMINAL LAW
Two schools of thought support the view that the overriding aim of
the criminal law, is the prevention of harm to others. Utilitarians believe the
prevention of harm should be the overriding aim. Liberals believe it is the only
ground upon which the criminal law may intervene in the private lives of its
citizens. This notion of harm is tied to the question of liberty of the person. The
classical statement of this aim of the criminal law is found in the writings of Mill
and more particularly in his essay On Liberty:
[T]he only purpose for which power can be rightly exercised
over any member of a civilised community, against his will, is to
prevent harm to others. His own good, either physical or moral,
is not a sufficient warrant. He cannot rightfully be compelled to
do or forbear because if will be better for him to do so, because
it will make him happier, because, in the opinion of others, to do
so would be wise, or even right,
•< •<6 •HIV/AIDS Bill to be amended' (1991) National AIDS Bulletin, August, p.5.
The HIV/AIDS Preventative Measures Act (1993) includes anti-discrimination clauses,
provides the specifics of conducting HIVtests and provides legislative support for the compulsory
testing of prisoners. The Tasmanian legislature's failure to decriminalise homsexual conduct has
been held to be a breach of Australia's human rights obligations by the United Nations Human
Rights Committee {Toonen vAusfra//aGCPR/C/50/D/488/1992 reported in Anon, Tasmanian gay
activist wins in the UN' (1994) 5/2 HIV/AIDS Legal Link, 1,9).
Mill, J. S., On Liberty, London, J.W. Parker &Son, 1859, 'Introductory' at p. 22.
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For Mill the harm to others principle is the only valid reason for
limiting liberty. Mill exempted consenting sexual conduct from legislative restraint
because he believed it failed the test of immorality. In his view for an immoral act
to be a criminal act it had to fall in the category of one which involved deliberately
doing something that caused palpable harm. ^
Mill believed that the criminal law should only address a very
narrow range of anti-social behaviour. Writing in an era of excessive use of
penal measures he believed that the criminal law had no jurisdiction over 'self-
regarding' (or victim-less) offences such as abortion, homosexuality, and
alcoholism, all which occurred in private and harmed only the individual involved
in the activity. It is on this point that some inherent contradictions appear in Mill's
theory. Forexample, he believed that prostitution should be criminalised. '•20 yet,
under his own rules' prostitution would fall within the category of a 'self-regarding'
offence.
The difficulty with Mill's thesis is that in a complex society the sort of
liberty that Mill referred to is unrealistic. There are social costs associated with
the free pursuit of interests. For example, those who smoke and drink may
affect other people in two ways. First, the smoker may damage the health of the
non-smoker by exposing him or her to passive smoking. Second, those who
drink and then drive may injure others by involving them in a car accident which
in addition may lead to an increase in insurance premiums for the whole
population.
Notwithstanding the criticisms that can be made of Mill in the
1990s, the Wolfenden Committee in the 1950s also came to a similar general
conclusion. 121 According to the Committee, the aim of the criminal law is to
... preserve public "order and decency" to protect the citizen
from what is "offensive or injurious", and to provide sufficient
safeguards against exploitation and corruption of others.
"•"•S Mill, J. S., utilitarianism , Liberty and Representative Government, Dent &Co, 1910, at
p.134-135.
120He believed that soliciting caused 'offence' to others whereas prostitution in private harmed
no-one. The only reason offered for this view appears in his commentary on slavery; that any
contract to be a slave even if voluntary would be null and void ' because (a person] abdicates his
liberty' {supra note 118 p.125). Apart from this fact there seems no reason in principle why
prostitution should have been considered as more 'harm producing' than either homosexuality or
adultery.
121 and infact retained prohibitions against prostitution-related activities.
69
particularly those who are specially vulnerable because they
are young, weak in body or mind, inexperienced, or in a state of
special, physical, official or economic dependence ... ^22
It was the members' belief that there is a sphere of morality which is best left to
the individual conscience. It was not the role of the criminal law to 'intervene in
the private lives of citizens, or to seek to enforce any particular pattern of
behaviour'. 123
While Hart in principle agreed with Devlin that homosexuality,
prostitution, fornication and adultery were substantially immoral he argued that
they should be exempt from legislative restraint. For Hart, the right to
undisturbed performance of private consenting acts is more important than the
immorality of the act.
Recognition of individual liberty, as a value involves, as a
minimum, acceptance of the principle that the individual may do
what he wants, even if others are distressed when they learn
what it is that he does - unless of course, there are other good
grounds for forbidding it. ^24
The last few lines of this quote would seem to suggest that Hart
would agree with Mill that the only right to interference in the sphere of private
morality is if harm occurs. However, Hart indicated that he did not agree with Mill
in totality. He thought
there may be grounds for justifying legal coercion of the
individual other than the prevention of harm to others. [125] But
on the narrower issue relevant to the enforcement of morality
[that the criminal law can only be used to enforce morality where
harm is likely to flow to others from the activity]. Mill seems to me
to be right. 126
122 Wolfenden Committee, supra note 14, at para. 13.
123 Ibid, at para. 14. As Duster, T. S. notes 'An important contemporary shibboleth is"you can't
legislate morality"' {supra note 51, at p. 3).
124 Hart, supra note11, at p. 47.
125Here Hart is making reference to the fact he favours legal paternalism: that a man's good
may justify interference.
126 Hart, supra note 11, at p.5. It is also important to note that Hart did not agree with Mill on
his views as to the role paternalism played in the shaping of criminal offences. In fact his
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In the 1970s Morris and Hawkins argued that 'the prime function of
the criminal law is to protect our persons and our property.' 127 jhey proclaimed
that the criminal law must 'strip off the moralistic excrescences' leaving the
criminal justice system to concentrate on the essentials. 128 jhey commented,
... [wjhen the criminal law invades the spheres of private
morality and social welfare, it exceeds its proper limits at the
cost of neglecting its primary tasks ... For the criminal law at
least, man has an inalienable right to go to hell in his own
fashion, provided he does not directly injure the person or
property of another on the way. ''29
It would appear that all these writers recognise that the State had
by the implementation of victimless crimes sought to enforce a common
morality through the criminal law. They argued that this was an unnecessary
intrusion into the private lives of citizens except in cases where immorality
would harm other members of society.
Advancing the harm principle as the overriding aim of the criminal
law does leave many questions unanswered such as what is to count as harm?
How is harm to be proved? The term harm itself is vague. A person may
suffer harm without suffering injury. For example, a victim of defamation suffers
harm to his or her reputation but may not suffer physical or economic injury. Of
course injury itself is problematic. One may be injured economically by a fall in
the stock market but not injured physically.
Harm is usually used where some act of a person is involved.
The intention of the actor is important to the concept pf harm. Not all intentional
infliction of pain is harmful. Equally, some infliction of pain is harmful but not
intentional. It also depends upon whether one is focusing on the actor or the
victim. If a victim is burglarised without his or her knowledge he or she is
harmed but not in the sense of hurt or pain.
comments attack both Mill and Devlin on this point. About Mill he comments, 'Mills protest
against paternalism ... may now appear to us fantastic' (supra note 118, at p. 32) and at p. 31,
he criticises Devlin's view that prohibitions were there to enforce morality, not to protect that
agent from harm in a paternalistic fashion.
^27 Morris and Hawkins, supra note 82, at p. 2.
"•28 Ibid, a\ p. 2.
"•29 Ibid, a\ p. 2
71
Further, not all harm is treated as criminal. Feinberg argues that
the only concept of harm that can be rightly considered by the criminal law is
that which involves the 'setting back of an interest'. ^3° A person harms another
in this sense by invading and thwarting or setting back his or her interest. For
example, if money is stolen from an individual he or she has less money and so
his or her interests are set back in that sense. Feinberg also believes that the
sense of harm employed in the harm principle 'represent setbacks to interests
that are wrongs and wrongs that are setbacks to interests.'
Hence, Feinberg argues that not every act that causes harm to
others can rightly be prohibited but only those that cause avoidable and serious
harm. Encompassed within his theory, is the proportionality principle: if the
benefit outweighs the harm the conduct involved should not be characterised as
harmful. For example, imprisonment is clearly a harm, but is seen as justified
according to sentencing principles for particular offenders. Feinberg sees a
need to grade harms in terms of their seriousness. He identifies three
categories of harm, namely, serious, intermediate and lesser harms. This,
grading system, however, is highly abstract. Feinberg does not indicate how
certain harms are to be classified.
Adding to the complexity is the individual's view of harm. The
individuals view may be directly related to how successful a proscription is in
controlling behaviour. For example, some people may believe that it is harmful
to engage in smoking marihuana, while others may not. Those who believe it is
not harmful may not be persuaded by proscriptions to avoid smoking the drug. If
a community consensus were to be obtained as to what was harmful before a
certain activity were prohibited it is doubtful whether a conclusive common
ground could be found.
Harm may also be direct or indirect. The diversion of funds from
public taxes to the rehabilitation of drug addicts is not as readily identifiable as
a harm to the public interest. However, there is no reason why economic harm
should not be considered within the realm of harms which may justify criminal
prohibition. Stamping out direct harm to an individual's or the community's
health through criminalisation of drug use may reduce or eradicate indirect
^30 Feinberg, supra note 13, at pp. 33-36.
^31 Ibid, a\ p.36.
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harm to the public interest through depletion of public monies spent on
rehabilitation. jhis is of course based on the assumption that the
proscriptions would be followed and the history of drug use world-wide reveals
that prohibitions have not been followed. Irrespective of this fact, the decision
as to whether or not conduct should be labelled as criminal should take into
account direct and indirect harms to the public interest and whether the
eradication of one harm would likely eradicate another. It is possible though that
the categorisation of 'direct' or 'indirect' would prove just as problematic as
Feinberg's 'serious, intermediate and lesser harms' dichotomy.
LEGAL PATERNALISM
Those who support the view that legal paternalism is the
overriding aim of the criminal law believe that the State has a right to intervene
to protect the agent from harm. Paternalists would argue that restraints must
be imposed in order to protect the individual from moral, physical and/or
psychological harm. Taken to its extreme, paternalism could be said to apply in
a totalitarian society where governments adopt social and cultural policies
which are objectionable to a majority of citizens of a country.
Paternalists differ from fundamentalists such as Devlin or Stephen
because they are more concerned with harm to self than harm to society or
others. 133 Paternalists also differ from utilitarians or liberals because they
believe intervention is always necessary to prevent harm to the agent be it
moral or physical harm. Mill as a utilitarian quite clearly advocated that
interference for the good of the agent was not a sufficient ground for
interference. ""34 His view was that any State invasion in self-regarding offences
is a wrong because it is a violation of the privacy of the self.
However, as utilitarians. Hart and Feinberg acknowledge that
132Although it is recognised that it is more than likely that rehabilitation will be needed in
tandem with a policy of criminalistion to eradicate drug use.
133 Feinberg, J., Harm to Self, Vol. 3, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1984, chapter 17, 3-26.
Stephen has been described as a 'Victorian utilitarian' by Harris, supra note 32, at p. 117.
134 Mill, supra note 118, at p. 15.
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paternalism underlies much of the criminal law. ""ss in liberal democratic
countries this has always been accepted as encompassed within the parens
patriae power of the State. This is in accord with the original aim of the criminal
law which was to protect a person for the good of society. This is clearly
reflected in the laws relating to mayhem or maiming. For example, duelling and
fighting were lawful but where a maim occurred they were rendered unlawful
because the King was deprived of the services of an able-bodied man for the
defence of the realm, it might be argued that during the nineteenth and
twentieth centuries we have moved to a more restrictive role for the State as
illustrated by the decriminalisation movement for victimless crimes. However,
there are more crimes on the statute books in the 1990s than there were in the
1890s.
Paternalism restricts the occasions for interference to cases
where there are harmful consequences to the agent or where the agent's
decision is suspect. At least one commentator has usefully divided the
paternalistic response into 'hard' and 'soft'. The soft response would involve
intervention only where the agent's apparent choice was not truly his, that is to
say, it was not voluntary. The hard response defines the situation of intervention
where the apparent choice was voluntary but the State decided to intervene
anyway. There is no doubt that the criminal law displays instances of at least
'soft' paternalism. For example, the law as to when consent may or may not be
a defence is based on notions of paternalism; that an individual cannot
adequately look after himself or herself. Where the defence is raised in sexual
asisault cases the State will Intervene and deny the defence if, for example, the
consent is not voluntary because it was obtained by fraud, force or threats. Few
would take issue with this form of protection. However, instances of 'hard'
paternalism are more controversial. One example is the notion that an individual
cannot consent to death. The current stance towards criminalising euthanasia
is an example of 'hard' paternalism. The argument often advanced against
legalising euthanasia is that the dying patient may not know his or her mind and
^35 Hart, supra note 11, at p. 32; and Feinberg, supra note 13, at p. 26-27. These two
philosophers could be said to reject both the view that protection of the person from himself is
always justified and the view that it is never justified.
Hawkins Pleas of the Crown, Vol. 1, 8th ed, 1824, chapter 15.
^37 Feinberg, supra note 61, at p. 80.
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that he or she may have a transitory desire to die dependent on mood cycles.
138 'Hard' paternalism also appears as the driving force behind drug legislation
which sees the administration or use of intravenous drugs illegal in all States
and Territories of Australia (except Queensland). 139 Consent is irrelevant to
such an activity due to the underlying rationale of preventing harm to the agent.
It might also be argued that the limitations on consent in this example are
intertwined with the notion of protecting the public order and good morals. This
is manifested in the common law prohibiting persons from consenting to acts
that are contrary to public policy. I'loConsidering these examples, it is arguable
that paternalists would support the enforcement of a common morality through
the criminal law in cases where it was necessary to protect the agent from
harm. On those occasions, the State has a right and a duty to maintain
victimless crimes.
Relying on paternalism perse as a justification for criminalisation
of certain behaviour is problematic for the following reason. It is essentially anti
democratic. One may question what expertise the person has who makes the
decision as to what is or is not harmful to the agent. For example, the effect of
drug use on the individual is fraught with medical controversy, i^i The effects of
some drugs are incontrovertible but others are plainly grey areas, for example,
heroin as opposed to cannabis. Is such dubiously based paternalism
acceptable? This is an important question if paternalistic notions lead to the
criminalisation of some mood-altering substances and not others. For example,
the use of marihuana is not fully legal as opposed to both tobacco and alcohol
which have been shown to be harmful i42, yet both are legal activities.
139 Gillett, G., 'AIDS; The Individual and Society', in Legal Implications ofAIDS, Legal Research
Foundation, Auckland, May 1989,101 -110 at p. 110-111.
139 The provisions were outlined infootnote 1.
1'18 Consent is covered in more detail inchapter three.
141 See the official report of the. National Commission On Marihuana and Drug Abuse,
Marihuana, A Signal of Misunderstanding (Shafer Report), New York, Signet, 1972 and Siegel,
S., 'Alcohol and Opiate Dependence. Re-evaluation of the Victorian Perspective', in Cappell, H.
D., Glaser, F. B., and Israel, V., et at, (eds). Research Advances in Alcohol and Drug Problems,
Vol. 9, New York, Plenum Press, 1980, 279-314.
142 In fact, in 1992, from a total of26,355 drug-related deaths in Australia, opiates, barbiturates
and other drugs caused 816 deaths compared to 6,547 alcohol-related and 18,965 tobacco-
related deaths (National Drug Strategy, Statistical Update, Canberra, Department of Human
Services and Health, 1994:3, Table 2, p. 2).
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Criminalising drug use may have been motivated by paternalistic notions
or by the desire to enforce morality, but it has not been successful. Like
prostitution, money and need universally override morality in the area of drug
abuse. In any event the rationality behind criminalising drug use is based on a
possible misconception that drugs such as heroin and marihuana have been
proven to be dangerous. Hence, it could be argued that such dubiously based
paternalism has not been acceptable.
However, there appears to be general agreement among
philosophers that paternalism is sometimes justified. In addition, it must be
accepted that some of the paternalistic regulations are reasonable. This is
probably because many have come to acknowledge the merits of the 'soft' as
opposed to the 'hard' paternalistic response. If one were to give due weight to
Mill's criticism that paternalism tends to be blind to the fact that each person is
the best judge of his or her own interests, then the aim of lawmakers would be
to prevent self-inflicted harms without compromising a persons' individuality.
What results is a division between justified and unjustified paternalism and a
difficult line needs to be drawn between the two. In the final analysis, it is likely
that the only way an attempt can be made to resolve the conflict between
individual freedom and social responsibility is to consider paternalism on a
case-by-case basis.
3. APPLYING THE AIMS OF THE CRIMINAL LAW TO HIV TRANSMISSION
The foregoing has indirectly established that history provides
many examples of the fact that criminalisation of any form of social behaviour is
tied to the politics of particular governments at certain periods. The continual
reluctance of the Tasmanian Legislative Assembly to lift prohibitions against
homosexual conduct in that State when it has been decriminalised in all the
others is an example. Many health-related issues such as Smoking, alcohol,
drug abuse and transmission of disease have created problems of control for
governments. For example, when dealing with drug use it has been questioned
whether it is a medical, moral, social, public health or criminal problem. Is it a
matter for legislation and enforcement? Hence drug use cannot be neatly
categorised into any convenient paradigm or framework to explain the world.
A term used by Kuhn, T. S., Structure of Scientific Revolutions, Chicago, University of
Chicago Press, 1970.
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In addition, paradigms change. The various paradigms of drug use have
changed in Australia and throughout the world shifting between the medical and
penal explanations. Paradigms can also co-exist. For example, for one person
prevention of drug use may mean education programmes and for the
government minister responsible for law enforcement, prevention may mean
strengthening penal deterrence or announcing a legal war on drugs. This
divergence of opinion is also present in arguments surrounding the
criminalisation of HIV/AIDS. It may be that governments will elevate one aim of
the criminal law over another in this area. It is therefore necessary to consider
whether each of the aims of the criminal law outlined atove would be served by
the express criminalisation and prosecution '•'^ '^ of HIVtransmission.
First, however, it is necessary to clarify the three ways in which
the criminal law could be used to criminalise the transmission of HIV. There is
the indirect method by way of applying laws which criminalise sodomy,
prostitution or drug use. Under such provisions it would not be necessary to
prove that an accused was HIV-infected. The second method is more direct
and would involve applying traditional offences to the transmission of HIV. The
third method would involve the establishment of an HIV-specific offence.
Criminalisation by indirect means is discussed below.
THE ENFORCEMENT OF MORALITY AND HIV TRANSMISSION
It has been stated in the introduction to this chapter that HIV/AIDS
is more prevalent in those sub-groups of the population addressed in this chapter
such as homosexuals, prostitutes and drug users. The lack of zeal in
prosecuting the activities engaged in by these groups may be viewed by some as
contributing to the spread of HIV through the heterosexual population. The fact
that a number of homosexuals are also both bisexuals and IV drug users and
The present writer treats these terms as separate. Criminalisation refers to the labelling of
an activity as criminal by its placement in the statute books or the extension of existing laws to
cover a particular activity. Prosecution requires another active step taken by law enforcement
agencies rather than the legislature in charging a person for the offence and then applying the
trial process to him or her.
The second method will be considered in chapterttifee and the issue of establishing an HIV-
specific offence will be covered in chapter four, pp; 146-156.
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many prostitutes also engage in IV drug use fuels the debate. "''^ 6 As these
activities have for time immemorial carried moral overtones, the incidence of HIV
infection within these groups provides moral fundamentalists with more
support for the proposition that the law should step in to curb the social excesses
of these individuals in particular.
If the enforcement of morality is to be regarded as the overriding
aim of the criminal law then it is likely that particular groups will be selected as
sources of infection for prosecution under the guise of criminalising for
transmission of HIV. As such status rather than conduct would be the major
impetus behind selection and hence criminalisation. It is also likely that the
problems of enforcement that were discussed in relation to other 'immoral'
activities would be encountered since the activities capable of transmitting
the virus are often conducted in private and with apparent consent,
Stepping up prosecutions for prostitution and drug-related offences in an
attempt to curb the spread of HIV would serve no purpose other than that which
has already been achieved prior to the advent of HIV. In fact, with prostitution
such a stance is unjustified given that there is no documented case of HIV
being transmitted by a prostitute to a client in Australia, ""so
In fact, while prostitution and drug use continue to exist, self-
regulation and education may be more effective in curbing the spread of HIV
when it occurs during the course of those activities rather than legislative
••46 See article Perkins, R., Lovejoy, F., Dean, M.J., Wade, A., 'AIDS preventative practices
among female prostitutes in NSW and ACT' (1991) National AIDS Bulletin, September,28-32.
Here evidence is provided that there has been a decline in use of "heavy" drugs by prostitutes
between 1985/6 and 1990 (p. 30-31). In 1991 it was thought that 90% of street workers (who in
total comprise only 10% of the total female prostitute population) in Sydney were IV drug users
(Philpot, 0. R., Harcourt, 0. L., and Edwards, J. M., 'A survey of female prostitutes at risk of HIV
infection and other sexually transmitted diseases', GenitourMed, 1991, 67:354-388).
"147 jhe National HIV/AIDS Strategy (supra note 78) acknowledges that Australia has a low
prevalence of HIV among the sex-industry. Among the reasons given are that there have been
many representative organisations that have acted early to provide peer-based educational
messages (at para. 4.2.19). See also studies in footnote 3 supra. It is significant that in Australia
there is actually no documented case of HIV being transmitted by a prostitute (Donovan, B.,
'Female sex workers: so far so good' (1990) 4 National AIDSBulletin, 17).
148 Leading to entrapment as a principal means of securing prosecutions (Lane, B, 'Harrassment
of homosexuals in Queensland: Private Lives, public "crimes"' (1989) ^3(4) Legal Service Bulletin,
154-157, at p. 156).
149 This issue of informed consent is considered in chapter six, pp. 245-246.
150 See Donovan, supra noteM7.
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prohibitions. The Commonwealth Government has recognised this in relation to
prostitution since 1989 when they suggested that 'State governments review
legislation, regulations and practices that impede HIV education and prevention
programs among prostitutes and their clients.' a 1991 report released by the
Queensland Criminal Justice Commission argues that the reduction of
restrictions on soliciting by prostitutes in New South Wales has had a direct
impact on the success of HIV and other SID prevention programmes in that
State. ^52 Laws against prostitution are detrimental to the position of women in
society. We should be empowering women and encouraging them to adopt more
barrier methods rather than stigmatising them.
In relation to drug use, given that all Australian Governments have
set up needle-exchanges and repealed provisions prohibiting the possession of
hypodermic needles and syringes, it would be hypocritical for governments to
either penalise transmission of HIV indirectly through needle sharing in the
absence of evidence of fraudulent conduct as to the contents of the syringe, or
increase penalties for heroin abuse. To do so would be a step backward from
all the work that has been done trying to bring IV drug users 'up from
underground'. It is imperative that the issue of HIV transmission is not obscured
in the debate about the morality or otherwise of homosexual conduct,
prostitution and drug use.
PREVENTION OF HARM TO OTHERS AND HIV TRANSMISSION
There is no doubt that the harm principle enjoys a privileged
status for it is rarely questioned whether or not the criminal law should prevent
harm to others. The main problem that needs to be focused on is how the harm
principle should be interpreted and applied to particular cases. The question
that is often asked in deciding whether or not to criminalise certain conduct, is
whether or not criminalisation will produce better consequences for society and
for most people, than would the failure to act at all. The converse is also
important, i.e. whether criminalisation will produce more harm. This is where a
"151 at para. 4.2.22 ofthe National HIV/AIDS. Strategy{supra note78).
152 Criminal Justice Commission, Regulating Morality, Criminal Justice Commission Research
and Co-Ordination Division, Queensland, 1991. in New South Wales, the soliciting provision
under section 19(1) of the Summary Offences Act (1988) refers to soliciting in a public place. The
effect of the provision is to prevent soliciting in residential areas only.
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number of arguments that were raised when considering the prevention of harm
in the context of homosexual conduct, prostitution and drug use become
applicable to the question of criminalising HIVtransmission.
For example, it was suggested earlier in this chapter that it must be
considered whether more harm will result from a given activity being regarded as
illegal. Accordingly, if criminalising transmission of HIV resulted in many HIV-
infected persons going 'underground', Bentham would probably have held that a
greater harm had resulted to society and to the individual who would not be
counselled and cared for and might infect a greater number of the population. It
is reasonable to assume that many persons will not present for HIV testing,
treatment or counselling if they fear prosecution. In fact, this point has been
consistently made with respect to the criminalisation of HIV transmission as it
has by those in favour of decriminalising homosexual conduct, prostitution
and drug use. In regard to STDs, Saragin in 1974 noted that penalties imposed
for failing to name partners suffering from infectious sexually transmitted
diseases deterred diseased persons from co-operating with authorities,
In order to consider the aspect of criminalising HIV transmission
on the ground of preventing harm to others further, it is instructive to return to
Mill's thesis. Mill stated that individuals should be free to do whatever they
choose, so long as their chosen activities do not seriously and directly cause
harm to others. He thought that individual liberty would be generally beneficial
because each person is the best judge of his or her own interests. Mill himself
might retract this if he could see the present day drug scene. Nevertheless,
Mill's thesis in its underlying theme that every society should allow some scope
for self abusive, reckless, or corrupting conduct, is right. Criminalisation must be
Millman, C., 'Sodomy Statutes and the EighthAmendment' (1988) 267 Columbia Journal of
Law and Social Problems, 304-360 at p. 305. Baliard, J., The Politics of AIDS', in Gardner, H.,
The Politics of Health: The Australian Experience, London, Churchill Livingstone, 1989, 349-375.
This view is the underlying theme of the early article by Kirby, M. D., 'AIDSLegislation - Turning
up the Heat?' (1986) 60 Australian Law Journal, 324-332.
Indeed the Preamble to the Criminal Code and Another Act Amendment Act (1990)(Qld.)
which decriminalised homosexual activity in that State indicates that the threat of HIV infection is
at the heart of the move to decriminalise. Paragraph 5 of the Preamble reads: 'rational p ubiic
health policy is undermined by criminal laws which make those who are at high risk of infection
unwilling to disclose that they are members of a high risk group'.
^55 Saragin, E., inBlumberg, supra note 39, at p. 157andsee comments madeto this effect by
LeoAbse during his speech for the second reading debate on the Sexual Offences (No. 2) Bill in
1966, cited in Blom-Gooper and Drewry, supra note 54, at p. 110.
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limited in a manner which does not restrict people's private enjoyment but
recognises that others may be harmed.
A perceived harmful link does exist between these activities and
HIV transmission by virtue of the fact that unsafe sexual conduct believed to be
associated with homosexual and prostitution activities and unsafe needle
sharing conduct associated with IV drug use, operate as some of the vehicles
for transmitting HIV. As such, there Is some merit in the argument that
homosexual conduct, prostitution and drug use are harmful in an indirect sense
because they are high-risk activities for transmission of the virus. This is the
impetus behind arguments in favour of stepping up surveillance of these
activities in order to curb HIV transmission.
Criminalising consensual ""se activities that take place in private on
the basis that they are harmful requires a very broad definition of what is
'harmful'. If events are confined to and occur between willing partners in a private
place and do not affect the function of the participants in society, then history
shows that it serves no useful purpose for authority to criminalise them. By
contrast, if events do intrude into the lives of other members of society, and. as
such are likely to affect the health and welfare of these members, then it is the
duty of authority to proscribe such intrusion. HIV however it is transmitted is a
death producing virus. It is this factor that separates the transmission of HIV as
particular conduct worthy of criminalisation from homosexual conduct, prostitution
and drug use. It is not then in Mill's sense, a 'self-regarding' or victim-less
offence.
However, criminalising the transmission of HIV by focusing on
homosexuals, prostitutes and drug users would at best focus on criminalising the
'risk' only of harm to others. We need to decide if the causing of offence or the
creation of risk is to count as harms? If the latter is to be the case the pool of
potential offenders widens. This would lead to the creation of a crime that would
be indirectly harmful to others whereas other crimes are directly harmful to
156 \/vhat constitutes consent or lack of it in relation to an HIV infected partner will be discussed in
chapter three, 114-123.
Although it does need to be reiterated that depending on one's perspective it might be
possible to argue that prostitution and drug-use are not self-regarding where, for example, the
drug user depletes the family income and renders his or her dependents homeless to satisfy his
or her habit. It might be argued that a person who contracts HIV/AIDS through sexual contact or
needle-sharing actively participates in the very action that harms him or her and as such, is not a
victim.
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others. This is not the only ground why HIV transmission should not be
criminalised in this way, for the criminal law already prohibits a number of indirect
offences under the name anticipatory or inchoate offences, for example, attempts
and conspiracy. The rationale behind these offences is to prohibit conduct x
because it increases the likelihood of harm y. In this respect having sexual
intercourse with a prostitute or homosexual or sharing drugs could be rendered
criminal because it increases the likelihood of harm y occurring (transmission of
HIV). This is the same rationale for why drug use or possession is criminalised
because it will often lead to burglaries. However, to justify this the causal
connection between the two must be established together with a proven
substantial risk of harm y occurring in a high percentage of cases. It is doubtful
that this could be done in relation to prostitution given the fact that it is well-
documented that prostitutes engage in oral sex (which is of little or no risk of
transmission)158 750/^, of the time. Commentators have long stated that the
criminal law should not proscribe trivial harms; the rule known as de minimis non
curat lex. The criminal law should tread carefully here because the wide use of
anticipatory offences results in an expansion of police power. This may ultimately
result in an enlargement of the harm principle exponentially so that it will cover a
broader range of conduct. By doing this the definition of harm is expanded to
include those acts that 'threaten harm' as well. When this fact is combined with
the tendency for law enforcement agencies to target specific sub-groups of the
population who readily come to their notice, such as drug users, it suggests that
such a course should not be adopted.
To criminalise all who facilitate HIV transmission without question
would be to ignore the circumstances surrounding a particular transmission
episode. For example, homosexuals engaging in anal intercourse and IV drug
users sharing needles would be treated the same as, for example, the bandit or
the HIV-infected rapist who either threatens to or injures V with an HIV
contaminated syringe. The criminal law should seek to prohibit only those acts
which involve the intentional or wilful and even reckless transmission of HIV
through direct, uninformed and non-consensual activity, i.e. this is the only level
of harm or the 'threat of harm' that should be brought within the criminal law.
The elevation of the harm principle as the overriding aim of the
criminal law is threatened by a 1993 decision of the House of Lords which has
158 See chapter one and Decker, 'Prostitution as a Public Health Issue' in Burris, supra note 9,
at p. 81.
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implications for the status of legal paternalism and the enforcement of morality
in the context of HIV/AIDS and will be covered below.
LEGAL PATERNALISM AND HIV TRANSMISSION
In 1993 the House of Lords handed down a decision which is
likely to be accepted in Australian common law jurisdictions at least. In Brown
•"59 the House of Lords by a 3:2 majority on appeal found the defendants guilty
of assault occasioning bodily harm under section 47 of the Offences Against
the Person Act (1861)(U.K) where they had practised sado-masochistic
activities on consenting males. This was irrespective of the fact that the
activities were carried out in private, the injuries were not permanent (although
were more than merely transient or trifling) and that there were no
complainants. The tenor of their Lordships judgement was to elevate either the
enforcement of morality or legal paternalism or a combination of both over the
prevention of harm as the aim of the criminal law. This was manifested under
the guise that the public interest demanded that people should not be able to
harm others or consent to being harmed in private for no good reason; ""^oin
reality their public interest argument translates into a public morality one. In
addition, if the majority decision in Brown is correct, a person can only give
consent to bodily harm where it serves the public interest. Allowing the judiciary
to determine issues on a case-by-case basis is unsatisfactory bringing
uncertainty to the criminal law. The dissenting judges in this case were
concerned about this very fact. 162 it js likely that if their Lordships were faced
with a case where two parties had consented to activity high-risk for
169 [1992] 2 WLR 441 (CA), [1993] 2 WLR 556 (HL)
160 This represented the decision ofJhe Courtof Appeal as expressed by Lord Lane CJ at p.
449. This principle derived from an earlier judgment of Lord Lane in Attorney-General's
Reference No. 6of 1980 [1981] QB 715 was upheld on appeal to the House of Lords.
161 Forexample. Lord Justice Templemanstated 'the question whether the defence of consent
should be extended to the consequences of sado-masochistic.encounters can only be decided by
considerations of policy and public interest' (at p. 563). Lord Justice Jauncey seemed to be
concerned with the dangerousness of the activity and the need to deter and prevent corruption of
the young (at p. 574).
162 Both Mustill LJ (at p. 600) and Slynn LJ (at p. 608) thought that it was for Parliament not the
judiciary to decide if this behaviour was so extensive in society and undesirable that it should be
brought within the criminal law.
83
transmission of HIV, they would rule consent inapplicable. By the same
token, where a person transmits a disease which does not seriously affect the
health of another consent may be raised as a defence. It remains to be seen
whether the decision in Brown will encourage law enforcement agencies to
step up prosecutions against those perceived as engaging in high-risk
behaviour such as homosexuals, prostitutes and drug users. It is too early to
detect such a pattern in England and Wales.
The Brown case also reinforces the fact that liberal principle is
often one of the considerations missing when paternalism is being debated.
The debate is conducted in utilitarian terms. The missing consideration is
whether people should have the right to do whatever they choose, even if the
social consequences of such permissiveness are less than optimal. If we wish
to be properly liberal we should resist all forms of social paternalism. However,
self destructive harm cannot be separated from harm to the community. '•64
Drug use with its resulting increase in property crime is one example. The
effect that the incidence of HIV/AIDS has had on the economic, social and
political structures of some developing countries is another. 165
It could be said that saving a person from harming him or herself
is less of a compelling interest for the State than saving them from harming
each other. In fact, in the context of HIV, a policy of prosecution based on
paternalism would not actually advance the welfare of the HlV-infected person
because it may deter him or her from medical care to his or her detriment.
Therefore, State intervention would not protect such persons from moral,
physical and psychological harm. In addition, and of concern to both utilitarians
163 Especially since the issue of HIV came up as a material factor directly related to the
dangerousness of the activities engaged in, in the judgments of Templeman LJ (at p. 565),
Jauncey LJ (at p. 574) and Lowry LJ (at p. 583). This is in direct conflict with the case of Clarence
((1888) 22 QBD 23)) which is covered in detail in chapter three. In Clarence some members of
the court (Hawkins J, at p. 54 and Field J, at p. 58) were of the opinion that the risk of quite
serious harm, including venereal disease, might be freely consented to, thereby making serious
assault lawful. Later cases, such as Donovan [1934] 2 KB 498 and Attorney-General's Reference
(No. 6 of 1980) [1981] QB 715 suggested this was outdated but did not clearly state what level of
harm is legally permissible. Their Lordships in Brown were therefore faced with vague legal
precedents when considering the case before them.
164 This was in fact the gist of Stephen's criticism of Mill's thesis for liberty. It is in fact a
weakness of Mill's thesis because it can be argued that a harm is a harm whatever its cause.
Stephen believed that no clear line could be drawn between acts which harmed others and acts
which harmed only oneself.
165 Cross, S., and Whiteside, A., (eds) Facingup toAIDS: Socio-Economic Impact on Southern
Africa, London, Macmillan, 1993.
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and liberals, criminalisation on the grounds of paternalism may, in fact, impose
a greater harm on a third party.
4. CONCLUSION
The focus in this chapter has been on considering whether the
debated aims of the criminal law - the enforcement of morality, prevention of
harm to others and paternalism individually or collectively justify the
criminalisation of HIV transmission either directly or indirectly. The discussion
has necessarily led to the examination of the liberal and conservative legal
philosophies that differ radically in locating the point at which individual liberties
should yield to the general interest. In essence the aim has been to differentiate
between types of activity that are and are not protected by the principle of
autonomy both generally, and in the context of HIV infection.
The experience of legislatures attempting to use the criminal law to
control the incidence of homosexuality, prostitution and drug use was examined.
It was noted that the criminal law has failed to eradicate these activities. Indeed,
the prosecution of these practices has little to commend it. Prosecutions have
been rare for homosexuality and prostitution where the conduct is consensual
and occurs in private. By contrast, the prosecution of drug use has been more
widespread but prohibitions have not been successful in eradicating the conduct.
As a result, public support for the continued proscription of victimless crimes such
as these is questionable and the legislatures in many countries including
Australia have succumbed to group pressure or public opinion by decriminalising
the conduct.
History has revealed that legislation is not a suitable weapon to
deal with personal morality, or impose a pattern of moral behaviour, since it is
intrusive, ineffective, and in some ways quite self-defeating. In fact the
introduction of moralism into the AIDS debate serves little purpose, for society
will never agree on morality. The issue of morality will always be seen by those
who do not share it as representing an attempt to capture State power for
sectional ends. By its nature, moralism tends to be blind to the bad
consequences that imperfect compliances with the laws may cause. In this
respect morality can become a subjective criterion upon which to base laws.
The legal moralist argument requires that the conduct merely be
wrong as opposed to harmful. As such it is not in the 1990s a sufficient reason to
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impose criminal punishment because in the context of AIDS it will lead law
enforcement agencies to focus on the 'classic' wrongful conduct such as
prostitution, homosexuality and drug use. Thus, to allow the prosecution of HIV
transmission could conceivably lead to a 'witch-hunt' of individuals among the
high-risk groups. Surveillance of activities associated with HIV infection would
be as difficult as any presently encountered. This may result in the development
of ineffective ways to deal with the spread of the disease which could drive the
high-risk activities 'underground.' Although some respect ought to be given to
those in society who believe transmission of HIV is immoral that in itself cannot
become a respectable moral argument on which to base criminal legislation. As
Feinberg has stated, for morality to have the effect desired, it must be enforced
'fearlessly but ferociously [in a manner] that shows no respect for anyones
privacy'. ^6® If legal moralism were to win in this debate, then HIV transmission
could be indirectly criminalised without reference to the harm it might cause
either to oneself or to others.
The harm principle jtself was also examined in some detail. It was
recognised that few would take issue with the fact that the criminal law should act
to prevent harm to others. But, not all harm must necessarily be regarded as
criminal. Admittedly the harm arising from HIV is different from the harm arising
from drug use; the latter essentially non life threatening. However, it has not been
proven that the public fear criminal conduct involving HIV as much as rape or
robbery. nq criminal theorist has clearly stated why it is that sortie harms are
treated as civil and others treated as criminal or why former classifications should
still hold weight in the 1990s, The current differentiation is likely to be
supported merely by administrative convenience rather than by philosophical
principle. Just because a harm is life threatening does not mean that it is only the
criminal law that should have jurisdiction. It is generally accepted that public
health authorities should intervene in a quarantine sense where life threatening
Feinberg, supra note 61, at p. 82 whichwas earlier implied by Packer when he said that the
criminal sanction is the best available device for dealing with gross and immediate harms and
threats of harm but it becomes largely inefficacious when it is used to enforce morality (The Limits
of the Criminal Sanction, Stanford, Stanford University Press, 1968, at p. 365).
In fact studies on the fear of certain crimes have not yet included fear of HIV-related crime as
a category.
Indeed, it has been cogently argued by MacKinnon that rape, for example, should not be
regarded as a criminal act but as a civil one (MacKinnon, C.,Feminism Unmodified: Discourses on
Life and Law, Cambridge, Harvard University Press, 1987, chapter 7).
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illnesses such as cholera are involved. In fact, from the standpoint of history
alone, the criminal law has rarely intervened to curb the spread of disease. A
strong case can be argued for placing primary responsibility for curbing the
spread of HIV on public health departments. This theory will be developed
through chapters three, four and five of this thesis.
A strong paternalistic rationale for criminalising HIV transmission
would not be justified. One can conceive of governments closing down gay bath
houses,and providing quarantine for an HIV-infected person as necessary for his
or her own protection. Evidently, a majority of the populace would see these
measures as an unjustifiable intrusion into the lifestyles of consenting adults. In
fact, this example indicates how 'hard' paternalism can conflict with the harm-
minimisation approach. In any event, it is possible that a 'soft' version of
paternalism can be and is currently accommodated under the auspices of
preventing harm to others. Drink-driving legislation illustrates how the
criminalisation of acts calculated to cause harm to others may also prevent harm
occurring to the agent himself or herself. If a stronger version of paternalism is
adopted by governments there is the potential for unjustified invasions of
personal liberty to occur in a manner similar to that seen when the criminal law
aims to enforce morality.
A harm-minimisation approach to law and order is current in
Australian society. Under this paradigm only those acts of HIV transmission
calculated to cause harm to others would be acceptable for prosecution either on
philosophical grounds, on the grounds of efficiency or by support of the majority
of the populace. Existing legislation developed with a view to curbing the
incidence of homosexual activity, prostitution and drug use should not be used to
seek out and prosecute HIV-infected persons engaging in consensual activities
which may place others 'at risk of transmission. Such an indirect means of
prosecution would be isolating in effect. It would contradict other pragmatic and
integrating approaches to curbing the spread of HIV such as the establishment of
needle-exchanges. The question that remains, is how to deal with the recalcitrant
HIV-infected person and the the individual who uses HIV in a threatening manner
to carry out a course of criminal conduct. In the next chapter it will be examined
whether acts of HIV transmission calculated to cause harm to others could be
prosecuted directly under existing criminal law principles or whether express
provision would need to be made for them.
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CHAPTER 3
THE CRIMINAL LAW ASPECTS OF AIDS
1. INTRODUCTION
In chapter two it was concluded that, although the criminal law
has generally not been successful in imposing a pattern of behaviour upon
individuals, if that behaviour results in harmful acts which intrude into the lives
of other members of society then it is the duty of law makers to proscribe
such intrusion. The intentional or reckless transmission of a death producing
infection is just as dangerous as other behaviour that the criminal law already
prohibits.
In chapter two it was recognised that although there are a
number of ways by which the criminal law could be used to criminalise the
transmission of HIV, the indirect method should be avoided. This chapter will
consider whether direct criminalisation by the application of traditional
offences to HIV transmission would be the more appropriate course. The
third method which would involve the establishment of an HIV-specific offence
will be canvassed in some, detail in chapter four.
In most common law countries the intentional or reckless
transmission of HIV would be punishable under traditional criminal law
principles and under public health legislation. However, studies early in the
epidemic from the United States the United Kingdom 2 and Canada 3 reveal
that the causation and evidential problems associated with the prosecution of
HIV transmission related offences have resulted in some prosecutions being
Gostin, L., 'The Politics of AIDS: Compulsory State Powers, Public Health, and Civil
Liberties' (1989) 490/7/0 Sfafe Law Journal, 1017-1058.
2 Forlin, G., and Wauchope, P., 'AIDS and the Criminal Law', TheLawSociety'sGazette, 25
March 1987, 884-885. Laurie, G., 'AIDS and Criminal Liability Under Scots Law' (1991)
Journal of the Law Society of Scotland, August, 312-318.
3 Ducharme, T., 'Preparing for a Legal Epidemic: An AIDS Primer for Lawyers and Policy
Makers' 988) XXy\{3) Alberta Law Review, 471-520. This point is also reflected in an
article describing the preliminary inquiry on charges relating to having sex while knowingly
infected with HIV (Johnston, C., 'Controversial AIDS-transmission case sent to trialby the
Ontario Judge', Can MedAssocJ 1992,147: 522-523).
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dropped or cases dismissed. This awareness prompted the American Bar
Association to conclude:
HIV-specitic sanctions should play a limited role in
combating the HIV epidemic, ... prosecutions under
traditional criminal laws pose extraordinary proof problems
... these obstacles will not disappear if HIV-specific statutes
are enacted. ^
This chapter will examine whether the same conclusion can be
drawn in relation to criminalising transmission in the Australian context by
considering liability for transmission of HIV under pre-existing criminal law
provisions. The chapter will also analyse whether criminal activity involving
the use of infected syringes can be accommodated within existing provisions.
2. CRIMINALISING THE TRANSMISSION OF HIV UNDER PRE-EXISTING
CRIMINAL LAW PROVISIONS
A number of criminal law provisions and principles would be
applicable to HIV transmission. Those offences, most likely to be invoked to
punish transmission of HIV include murder and manslaughter, now that
liability for the death of a person where HIV has been transmitted is
practically open in some Australian jurisdictions. This is due to the
widespread abrogation of the 'year and a day rule' which formerly applied to
all homicides and is explained below. In addition to homicide, attempted
murder, assault, various sexual offences and other miscellaneous offences,
may be raised depending on the circumstances surrounding the criminal
activity involving HIV. All these offences will be considered with reference to
the common law which is still an important source of the criminal law in
Victoria, South Australia and New South Wales and by reference also to the
Criminal Codes of Western Australia, Queensland, Tasmania and the
Northern Territory, which upon their enactment abrogated the common law
rules with respect to crime in those four States.
^ 'Criminal Laws Will Not Playa Big Role in AIDS, Judges Told' (1989) 20(8) Criminal Justice
Newsletter, 1-3 at p. 2.
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MURDER
If a person infected with HIV were found to have transmitted the
virus to another with the result of causing that person's death, he or she might
be charged with murder or manslaughter. Murder is distinguished from the
lesser crime of manslaughter by the more culpable state of mind required for
a murder conviction. For an individual to be found guilty of the crime of
murder a number of elements must be proved by the prosecution. The fact
that HIV infection may or may not progress to AIDS can present major
difficulties for the application of the criminal law.
For a successful homicide conviction, the criminal law requires
that the accused perform a voluntary act which causes the death of V. ^ a
causation problem arises given the characteristics of HIV infection. Causation
may be more difficult to prove in the context of AIDS where the victim has
engaged in multiple high-risk activities. ®In chapter one it was stated, that
despite one study to the contrary, HIV is unlikely to be spread by one sexual
contact with the infective agent. The risk of infection increases or decreases
depending on the activity involved. For example, it is more likely that AIDS
would be transmitted by either sexual intercourse or the injection of
contaminated blood than by spitting or biting. ^ US prosecutors can be
criticised for proceeding with cases where the mode of transmission is low
5 s. 270 W.A. Code; s. 291 Old. Code; s. 153 Tas. Code ; s. 162 N.T. Code; s. 18 Crimes
Act (1900) N.S.W.. and R v Royall (1991)100 ALR 669; Hailet [1969] SASR 141(S.A0.
Historically the law has created convenient fictions to remedy a causation problem. An
example is the principle developed in Thabo-Moll [1954)1 All ER 373. This was a case in
which a series of acts occurred but the act causing death was unaccompanied by intent. The
court held that it would be sufficient if an intent to kill existed at the outset. Therefore,
contemporaniety of the mental state and the act causative of death would not be required.
Another example is the case of Hailet which supports the 'operating and substantial
contribution' theory. In this case, the court considered the situation where the accused
commits one act not capable of causing death but V dies from a subsequent act of a third
party or intervening agent (human or nature). The court held that where A's first act is still an
operating and substantial cause at the time of death the accused will still be criminally
responsible.
® Even though DNA testing has advanced to the stage where it is now possible to determine
the source of HIV infection and hence confirm the identity of a perpetrator this may be of little
use in circumstances where the sexual partner (thought to be the infected agent) is unknown
to the person who has acquired the infection from him or her. This dilemma will be
exacerbated where the victim has had many anonymous sexual partners. Apparently, the
only way a person could be traced conclusively is if the DNA codings of the population were
to be taken at birth and stored in a data-bank. Such a development has privacy and data
protection implications. The recent development of AIDS gene testing may resolve these
evidential difficulties. The new process claims to identify, to a high degree of probability, the
particular person who transmitted the virus {The Sunday Telegraph, July 19 1992, at p. 1.)
^ see studies listed in footnote 79 in chapter one.
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risk, for example, where spitting or biting is involved. ^ Experience from the
US reveals that litigation in the future will likely turn on challenging the
experts that are called to give evidence as to the risk and modes of
transmission. 9
In addition, the latency in the development of the disease is an
exacerbating factor in this regard. It was shown earlier that the incubation
period ranges from six months to five years, or conceivably longer. The
'window period' between when infection occurs and antibodies are detectable
by blood testing is now believed to be between four weeks to three months.
The longer the duration before the appearance of symptoms or antibodies the
more difficult it will be for a jury to be sure that A was responsible for
transmitting the infection, especially if V may have subsequently had contact
with other high-risk individuals. In addition, the jury may not be satisfied that V
was not already infected prior to his or her contact with the accused. The
criminal law requires that elements of the crime be proven beyond reasonable
doubt.
A further difficulty in relation to homicide (and applicable to
manslaughter) is provided by the requirement that death must result within a
year and a day from the date of infliction of the injury leading to death, the so-
called 'year and a day' rule, '•o Death from AIDS will rarely occur within a year.
This outmoded rule has already been abrogated in New South Wales,
Victoria, Western Australia, South Australia and Tasmania.
® For example, see State v Haines 545 N.E.2cl 834 (Ind. Ct.App. 1989) p. 841 where
conviction for attempted murder upheld on appeal where contaminated blood was sprayed at
police; and, the biting case of US v Moore USDC D Minn. No. Crim 4-87-44 and on appeal
846 F.2d 1163 (8th Cir.). The defendant had been charged with assault with a deadly and
dangerous weapon. See also spitting cases of State v Cummings 153 Wis.2d 603, 45l
N.\A/.2d 463 (Ct. App. 1989); Texas v Weeks No. 15-183 (Texas District Crt. Walker City),
Nov. 4 1989. 1988). In both these spitting cases the charge was attempted murder.
9 In Texas vWeeks , Ibid, a spitting case, the prosecution provided an expert to testify that
HIV could be transmitted through saliva and the defence provided an expert witness testifying
to the contrary. The jury believed the witness for the prosecution and A was convicted of
attempted murder
Formerly contained in 276 W.A. Code; s. 155 Tas. Code; and still laid down in s. 299 Qld.
Code . The former applicability of the rule in the common law jurisdictions is supported by
Gillies, P., Criminal Law 2nd ed, Sydney, Law Book Company, 1990, at p. 574.
The Crimes (Injuries) Amendment Act (1990) (N.S.W.) inserted section 17A into the
Crimes Act (1900) (N.S.W.); the Crimes Legislation (Miscellaneous Amendments) Act (No. 2)
(1991) inserted s. 9AA into the Crimes Act (1958)(Vic.); s. 6 Criminal Law Amendment Act
(1991) (W.A.); s. 18 Criminal Law Consolidation Act (1935)(S.A.); Criminal Code Act (Year
and a Day Rule Repeal) Acf (1993)(Tas.).
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It must be shown that A possessed one of the alternative mental
elements required for murder. Most Australian States require for a murder
conviction that A specifically intend or desire that V die or intend grievous
bodily harm to V. jhe latter would need to be defined to include infection
with an incurable, fatal virus as a 'permanent injury to health',
In the AIDS context, A has to intend that V should die from
infection with HIV or intend that he or she will suffer grievous bodily harm
from the act which transmits the virus. But, the term intention itself is difficult
to define. In fact there is 'no [one] accepted final definition of intention ...
Intention may be thought of as a purposive concept. Some offences only
require a purposive intent to act, others require that the defendant had a
purposive intent to bring about a consequence. The concept of intention to
produce a result is more complex than that of performing an intentional act. It
has long been held that an 'intentional act' is one which the actor knows what
he or she is doing and means to do. The notion of intending to produce a
result or consequence involves mental processes on the part of the actor
which may be relatively complex. There are often questions as to what extent
the actor considered the consequences that might flow from the act
contemplated.
It would seem logical that where A must intend the
consequences to which liability will attach, that knowledge of the likely
consequences would be a concomitant requirement. Only section 157(1)(b) of
the Tasmanian Code statutory definition of murder specifically includes this
requirement as part of the mental state for murder. In the context of AIDS,
this raises questions such as; must A know he or she is infected with HIV
and that transrnission could occur by the particular act? It may also require
that A receive a positive antibody test result or have symptoms diagnosed as
AIDS, prior to the date of the crime as a matter of evidence. This could prove
to be costly and elusive as law enforcement officials attempt to track a
s. 157(1)(a) Tas. Code\ s. 278, 279W.A. Coc/e; s. 302(1) Qld. Code, s. 18(1) Crimes Act
(1900) N.S.W. The common law position in Victoria and South Australia is set out in Miller
[1951] VLR 346.
In 1992 the terminology used in s.1(4)(d) of the Western Australian Criminal
Code, was amended so that a reference to causing grievous bodily harm to a person now
includes causing a person to have a 'serious disease'. Therefore, ss. 278 and 279 (the
murder provisions) of the Code might have application where HIV infection is involved. This
issue is discussed in more detail infra.
O'Connor, D., and Fairall, P. A., Criminal Defences, 2nd ed, Sydney, Butterworths, 1988,
at p. 9.
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person's medical history to find out if he or she had ever submitted to a test.
One can envisage situations where prosecutors may try to rely on A's
knowledge of his or her infected status to prove an intention to kill.
In the context of AIDS it may be somewhat easier to prove
reckless murder rather than intentional murder. This may be due in part to the
fact that intentional infliction of death through HIV would be rare. There are
reported instances from the United States where original charges have either
been dropped or modified because of the difficulty of proving intention. In
Indiana v Haines, a prisoner was charged and convicted of attempted
murder (which also requires an intention to kill) after spraying contaminated
blood on a policeman and medical personnel. On appeal, the judge
substituted the verdict of attempted murder for another offence (assault) on
the basis that an intent to kill was not established on the evidence. In all
Australian jurisdictions similar factual circumstances may lead police to
engage in the fairly standard practice of charge bargaining. The health of an
accused person in non-AIDS related cases has been held to be relevant
consideration when negotiating charges.
When focusing on statutory murder in the common law
jurisdictions, only New South Wales specifically includes reckless indifference
to life as a sufficient mental state for murder. ^8 a person may be said to be
reckless with respect to the consequence of his or her actions when he or she
foresees that it is likely to occur but does not desire it or foresee it as certain
(as is the test required to be satisfied for intentional murder). The fact that the
actor must foresee it as likely to occur clearly embodies a subjective test of
foresight, The degree of risk that must be foreseen by A before he or she is
"•8 For example, the case of People vMarkowski where the defendant was charged with
attempted murder for selling HIV-infected blood to a Los Angeles blood bank. The charges
were later dropped for lack of evidence of an intent to kill. Unreported judgment derived from
newspaper releases (Cummings, G., 'Charges Filed Against Blood Donor in AIDS Case',
New York Times, June 30, 1987: A 18, col. 1; 'Man with AIDS', New York Times, March 30th
1988 (reporting that case was dropped).
"•6 Teppencanoe County (Ind) Super Ct. No. S-5585, 1987. Although on appeal to a higher
court, the jury's verdict was reinstated on the ground that the jury could find that the
defendant took a substantial step towards the commission of the murder {State v Haines 545
N.E.2d 834 (Ind. Ct. App. 1989) p. 841.
Wilson VMcCormack, unreported judgment Supreme Court of Tasmania, 32/1968, per
Chambers J.
18(1) Cr/mes Act (190O)(N.S.W.).
"•9 In the context of Vallance [1961] 108 CLR 56, Dixon CJ stated that Vallance would be
convicted of unlawful wounding 'if in firing the air gun he fired towards the girl foreseeing or
adverting to the likelihood of wounding her but heedless of such a consequence' (at p. 61)
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adjudged reckless, will ultimately depend on the facts and the social value of
the activity involved but in general the risk must be substantial. 20
There is some debate as to whether subsections (b) and (c) of
section 157 (murder provisions) of the Tasmanian Code both contain
foresight elements. 21 Unless recklessness comes into section (b) by way of
the requirement that A 'knew his[her] actions were likely to cause death', and
that knowledge equals foresight, as held by Brennan J in Boughey vR, 22 it is
difficult to see from where in the Code such a requirement is to be derived.
The matter is clearer only if the term 'intention' is held to equal recklessness.
Ascertaining the meaning of the term intention as opposed to
recklessness has been further complicated by various judgements at common
law with respect to the crime of murder.• This has resulted in some
controversy as to what position recklessness plays in the crime of intentional
murder both at common law and under the Codes. 22 In fact, the question that
has arisen is whether recklessness is considered part of intent. This has
implication for statutory definitions that refer only to the term 'intention'. If
intention includes recklessness then the Prosecution may be able to prove a
lesser mental state as sufficient for murder under those provisions. In
Queensland this question has been settled by R v Willmot No. 2 24 where a
majority of the court held that recklessness had no place in intentional
murder. 25 Similarly, Burbury, CJ in the Tasmanian case of Vallance v R
stated that
in the case ... of. a statutory crime in which a specific
intention to bring about a particular result is a defined
ingredient, it is not sufficient that the accused foresees the
consequences of his conduct and thinks the consequences
likely or possible, if he foresees the consequences but does
and affirmed in Wilkinson Unreported decision of the Supreme Court of Tasmania 43/1985
by Nettlefoid J, at p. 5. .
20BougheyvR 986) 65 ALR 609, at p. 624.
Neasy, F., The Mental Element in the Law of Murder', Paper presented to the 3rd
International Criminal Law Congress, Hobart Tasmania, September 26 1990, at p. 25.
22 Boughey vR supra note20, at p. 633.
23Campbell, I. A., 'f3ecklessness in Intentional Murder Under the Australian Codes' (1986)
10 Criminal Law.Journal, 3-23.
24[i985]2.QdR413.
Ibid- per Connolly J at'p: 418 and Campbell J at p.. 416.
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not desire , them it cannot be said he intends the
consequences. 26
Clearly on his view, recklessness is not part of the mental element for murder
under section 157(1)(a) of the Tasmanian Criminal Code. Therefore, under
the Codes (with W.A. and NT. following suit), if V dies as a result of A
transmitting HIV recklessly, then A is not responsible for murder.
In the common law jurisdictions of Victoria and South Australia
the position with respect to reckless murder is not as clear. A majority of the
High Court of Australia in R v Crabbe 27 held that if A did an act 'expecting
that death or grievous bodily harm will be the likely result, for the word
"probable" means likely to happen .... that state of mind is comparable with an
intent to kill or to do grievous bodily harm.' 28 This judgment may support the
conclusion that recklessness and intention are the same. However,
comparable does not mean identical and later in the judgment the court
specifically left open the question whether recklessness and intention were
identical: 29 Certainly other passages of the judgment would indicate that the
Court believed that intentional and reckless murder are two discrete heads of
murder at common law . 3°
The court in Crabbe also referred to the concept of wilful
blindness as providing the mens rea for the crime of murder. The court held
that wilful blindness was no substitute for actual knowledge where knowledge
is required. Their Honours adopted the view that it cannot be said than an
accused was wilfully blind to the consequences of his or her acts unless he or
she knew that those consequences were probable. If that is correct, then the
doctrine has no part to play in murder given the mental state required at
26(1961) Tas. S.R. 51 at p. 65.
27 (1985)59 ALJR 417.
26 Ibid, Gibbs, CJ,Wilson, Brennan and Dawson, JJ, at p. 419. Reckless murder unders. 18
of the Crimes Act (N.S.W.) and reckless murder under the common law as expressed in
Crabbe have one important difference. Under the common law liability extends from
knowledge of probability of death as well as grievous bodily harm as the probable event.
Under s. 18 reckless murder is not committed where A acted simply with the knowledge of
the foresight of grievous bodilv harm as a probable event. A would incur responsibility for
manslaughter only in those circumstances.
26 Ibid, at p. ,419.
60 Ibid, where the court (at p. 419) unanimously followed the judgment of Gibbs J in La
Fontaine, (1976) 136 CLR 62 , at p. 75. Gillies, supra note 10, at p. 583 endorses this view.
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common law. However, in Giorgianni v R 3^, a case which concerned
culpable driving causing death, the court also held that it is actual knowledge
that must be proved where it is an element of intent and not knowledge which
is imputed or presumed. Subsequently, though, in He Kaw Teh v R , a case
involving a charge of importation of narcotics, Gibbs CJ, with whom Mason J
agreed, suggested that if the accused wilfully shut his eyes to the probability
that he was carrying narcotics he might be treated as having the necessary
guilty knowledge. 32 Brennan J disagreed, relying on Giorgianni and holding
that a state of mind less than knowledge of the probability would not be
sufficient to establish intent. 33 jhis clear division of opinion
was subsequently resolved by Bahri Kara! v 34 and Pereira v DPP . 35 it
was clarified in both these cases (which concerned the importation of
narcotics) that, while knowledge as an ingredient of an offence may be
established by inference, it must be established as a fact. The term wilful
blindness cannot be used as a basis for imputing knowledge where actual
knowledge is not proved. In the context of murder then, it is not sufficient to
establish the requisite intent that the accused foresaw only the possibility of
death or serious bodily injury, but took no steps to ascertain the magnitude of
the risk. At most, wilful blindness might be evidence of the actual knowledge
or foresight of the accused but it cannot take its place.
Unless adequately explained tp a jury there is a real danger that
wilful blindness will translate knowledge into recklessness. This could
possibly be avoided by instructing the jury that the Crown must show that A
knew other facts suggesting a very high probability of the "fact" the accused
was trying to avoid knowing.
Wilful blindness may have some application in the context of
AIDS. If A knows that he or she is infected and knows that he or she is likely
to pass HIV to his or her victim if safe practices are not adopted then there is
good chance that the jury will find that A had actual knowledge and the
concept of wilful blindness will be irrelevant. However, if A's conduct can be
classified as high-risk and he or she has deliberately refrained from
31 (1985) 156CLR 473
32 (1985) 59ALJR 620 per Gibbs CJ at p. 625with whom Mason J concurred.
33 Ibid, per Brennan J at p. 640.
34 (1987) 162CLR 502.
35 (1989) 63ALJR 1.
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ascertaining his or her antibody status, yet engages in activities with V without
adopting safe practices, this 'combination of suspicious circumstances and
failure to make inquiry may sustain an inference of knowledge of the actual or
likely existence of the relevant matter.' 3® This might be a set of facts where
the jury would be invited to draw that inference and this failure to inquire could
then be termed 'wilful blindness'. In this context, the term is being used
merely as a shorthand expression to indicate circumstances which warrant
the drawing of the necessary inference. This does not offend the decisions of
Bahri Kural or Pereira so long as knowledge as an ingredient of the offence,
although established by inference, is established as a fact. This could arise,
under a knowledge provision such as in section 157(1)(b) of the Tasmanian
Criminal Code.
Section 157(1)(c) of the Tasmanian Criminal Code is also
relevant. The mental element required to be proved under this section is that
the offender knew or 'ought to have known' his or her act or omission to be
likely to cause death although he or she had no wish to cause death or bodily
harm. The High Court in Boughey held that the term 'ought to have known'
refers to what the particular accused with his or her capacity and knowledge
ought to have known in the circumstances in which he or she was placed.
The words do not refer to what he or she would have known if he or she had
taken the trouble to find out. 37 it is questionable whether the use of wilful
blindness in conjunction with 'ought to have known' would apply in the
situation where A did not know he or she was HIV-infected but should have
suspected it given his or her practices.
In most cases it is unlikely that the mental state for murder will
exist given that transmission of HIV commonly occurs through acts of passion
(sexual intercourse) or out of dire need (intravenous drug use). Further,
these methods would seem highly indirect for the person whose purpose is to
kill. Where the mental element for murder is not established A may still be
held responsible for f\/lanslaughter provided that A can be conclusively linked
to V's death. The 'year and a day' rule would also be applicable under
manslaughter.
MANSLAUGHTER
36 Ibid, at p. 3.
37 supra note20 perMason, Wilson and Brennan JJ at p. 622.
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Both at common law and under the Codes, the classifications of
manslaughter are divided Into voluntary and Involuntary manslaughter. 38
Voluntary manslaughter covers the situation where provocation and self-
defence are relevant. There are a number of categories of Involuntary
manslaughter both at common law and under the Codes , namely,
manslaughter by the Intentional Infliction of bodily harm, manslaughter by a
negligent act or omission and manslaughter by an unlawful and dangerous
act. Each will be examined to determine Its applicability In the context of
AIDS.
(I) Manslaughter by Intentional Infliction of Bodily Harm
Manslaughter by Intentional Infliction of bodily harm applies In
the common law jurisdictions and under each of the Codes with the
exception of that of the Northern Territory. At common law, and In
Queensland 39 and Western Australia manslaughter by Intentional Infliction
of harm has three necessary elements, namely, a battery or assault by
application of force accompanied by an Intention to Inflict physical Injury or
bodily harm with death resulting. in Tasmania, the scope of liability Is
broader.
Under section 156(2)(a) A must either perform 'an act Intended
to cause death or bodily harm, or which Is commonly known to be likely to
cause death or bodily harm ...' and which Is not justified by any other
provision under the Code (such as self-defence). Bodily harm has been
defined as Including 'any hurt or Injury calculated to Interfere with health or
comfort...' {R v McCallum ^2). The term 'commonly known' has been defined
to mean 'matters of common knowledge of men to be related to conduct to be
expected of a reasonable man In the circumstances'. The words thus
express an objective as distinct from a subjective criterion of conduct' {Phillips
38 In jurisdictions where the criminal law has been codified a definition of manslaughter is
provided (s. 303 Qld. Code ; s. 156 Tas. Code;', s. 163 N.T. Code; s. 280, W.A. Code ).
Only under the Tasmanian Code is a very detailed definition provided (s. 156).
39 ss. 23, 300, 303 Qld. Code.
40 ss. 23, 277, 279 W.A. Code.
41 Holzer [1968] VR 481 per Smith J at p. 482.
42 [1969] Tas SR 73, per Burbury CJ at p. 88.
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V R ) and it is sufficient under this section that there is an objective
likelihood of bodily harm.
The viev/ has been expressed that the term 'act' in section
156(2)(a) 'comprehends acts which would be lawful but for the fact that such
acts are, objectively considered, "likely to cause death or bodily harm"'.
there is nothing in the Code to justify A's act then the homicide is culpable.
There is no requirement that the act causing death, be an assault or otherwise
unlawful. This view means there is a distinction between section 156(2)(a)
and (c) because the latter refers to acts that are independently unlawful.
Accepting this view, the 'act' in the context of transmitting HIV
under section 156(2)(a) could be a lawful one such as sexual intercourse.
However, if the act is viewed solely as this then it is unlikely A would be
convicted. This is because an act of sexual intercourse simpliciter would not,
on the wording of the section, be an act 'commonly known to be likely to
cause death' The act should be viewed in its context as suggested in the
non-AIDS related case of Fleeting vR ^5. Following this view, the 'act' could
then be termed 'transmitting HIV. This would rhore likely satisfy the
requirement that the act be 'commonly known to be likely to cause death or
bodily harm' and would cover the situation where A knew he or she had the
virus but did not intend to kill V. However this formulation of 'act' could be
criticised since viewing the act as 'transmitting HIV would include both the act
and the consequence and would be contrary to authority which prefers a
narrow view of 'act' (not including the result) to be adopted. Perhaps
defining the act as 'sexual intercourse in circumstances of HIV infection'
would be more appropriate.
Since HIV infection is really the transmission of bodily fluids it
may be questioned whether the transmission could be a willed act. The
exchange of bodily fluids may be regarded as an involuntary reflex action.
Justice Windeyer's judgement in Ryan may be relevant to resolving the
[1971] ALR 740 per Windeyer J at p. 758.
44 per Brennan J in Boughey vR , supra note 20, at p. 634 and supported by earlier case
of Phillips , Ibid, per Windeyer J at p. 757.
45 [1977] 1 NZLR 343.
46 from the case of Vallance , supra note 19. However, It could be argued that the
consequence is something other than transmitting HIV, such as developing AIDS (which is a
consequence which follows from transmission at a later time).
47 (1967) 121 CLR205 .
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matter. In that case His Honour held that the accused could not argue that his
act of shooting was unwilled simply because he depressed his finger on the
trigger following the victim's sudden movement towards the alarm button.
Justice Windeyer stated that where an accused performs all the prior
necessary steps such as loading, cocking, aiming the rifle and removing the
safety catch, he or she cannot claim that the subsequent shooting is a reflex
action. Similarly, if for example, an infected male finds himself in a position
where he does not intend to exchange bodily fluids during sexual penetration
but it occurs, he could not reasonably argue that this was involuntary when he
has placed himself in a position where he may not be able to exercise control.
An analysis of the second limb of section 13 (Tas.) or 23 (Qld.,
W.A) also raises the 'defence' of accident. The test that has been applied to
this limb is that the event or injury to qualify as an accident, must be
unintended, unforeseen and unforeseeable by the doer of the act.'*® A
further qualification was made to this foreseeability test in the case of
Boughey. In this case, a doctor pressed on the victim's carotid arteries during
lovemaking. He believed that it increased her passion. However, the
pressure was too great, and the victim died. The doctor claimed that the event
occurred by accident. The court disagreed, stating that a reasonable person
in the doctor's position, and with the doctor's knowledge would have foreseen
that pressure on the carotid arteries could reasonably lead to death. Thus,
the event was not an accident.
When applying this reasoning to a case of HIV transmission two
points can be made. First, following Boughey, if a person is aware of being
HIV positive but does not believe that transmission will occur, the knowledge
of his HIV status will be attributed to the reasonable person in determining
whether the event was reasonably foreseeable. Second, although the
probability of transmission of HIV through one contact with the infected agent
is low, the test of accident is one of foreseeability not probability. It is likely
that a jury faced with the gravity of the possible harm and the relative ease of
reducing the risk through the adoption of safe sexual practices, would be
likely to find.that the resulting transmission was reasonably foreseeable and
not accidental.
The unlikelihood of an accident defence being successfully
raised leaves consent as a justification. The requirement that the act be
unjustified under the Tasmanian Code would appear to allow A to lead
^® By a majority of the court in both Vallance supra note 19, and Kapronowski (1973) 1
ALR296.
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evidence of consent (s. 53). Since the consent defence is most likely to arise
in the context of HIVtransmission it is necessary to consider it at this point.
The criminal law nullifies consent to death as a defence in all
Australian jurisdictions. Section 53 of the Tasmanian Code states Vcannot
consent to death (s. 53(a)) or an 'injury likely to cause death' (s. 53(b)). The
Court of Criminal Appeal in Boughey so equated the term 'injury' in section
53(b) with 'bodily harm'. So if Aknows his or her act is likely to cause death
or bodily harm, and it is objectively likely to, then, by virtue of section 53, and
following the interpretation of the court in Boughey, Vcannot consent
However, the Queensland Court of Criminal Appeal in
Lergesner v Carroll si has held that there is no rule of law under the
Queensland Code that a person cannot consent to bodily harm. If there is a
policy judgment to be made to limit the consent which may be given then only
the Legislature can provide the limitation by necessary enactments. S2 Both
Cooper and Stephenson JJ believed that in all cases it was a question of
fact to determine if the degree of violence to the person assaulted exceeded
that to which consent was given. 53 jlie accuracy of this decision is
questionable in light of the House of Lords judgment in Brown. 54Although
only persuasive on Australian courts, their Lordships did deem consent
irrelevant in cases where the conduct concerned was contrary to public
policy. The merits of this decision were discussed in chapter two.
The 'defence' of consent could arise in the situation where A told
V he or she was infected but V nevertheless consented to the 'risk' of death
associated with HIV infection. If V consents to the 'risk' only of death, this
may not be within the scope of section 53. However, section 53 of the
49 s. 261 W.A. Code; s. 284 Qld. Code; s. 53 Tas. Code . It is a well-established principle of
common-law as affirmed in England and Wales in 1993 in the case oi R v Brown 2 WLR
556 which is discussed infra.
90 Unreported decision of the Court of Criminal Appeal of Tasmania, No. 5/1985 per Gibbs
CJ at p. 22 and Cosgrove J at p. 17.
91 [1991] 1Qd. R 206.
92 Ibid, per Cooper J at p. 216. This was also the tenor of the dissenting judgments in
Brown[1993] supra note 49 as discussed in chapter two of this thesis.
93 /b/d, at pp. 212 and 217 respectively.
54 supra note 49. The issue of consent is discussed under the section headed 'Assault'
later in this chapter.
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Tasmanian Code specifically states that one cannot consent to the infliction
of an injury likely to cause death. Clearly this would mean that the victim's
consent would be ineffective. In practice, this would only be relevant to an act
of sexual intercourse or needle sharing since it is most unlikely that a person
would consent to an act of biting or spitting or being stabbed with a syringe.
(ii) Manslaughter by Negligent Act or Omission
Homicide may also be culpable when A is criminally negligent.
This form of culpability for manslaughter is recognised in the common law
jurisdictions^s and the Code States 56(with the exception of the Northern
Territory 57). in the Code States however, liability for negligent acts is
minimised, the focus being placed more on omissions.58
Negligent act manslaughter at common law requires that death
is caused by an act which is objectively one of a risk-producing character. It
appears that Australian authorities do not require proof of awareness of risk
on the part of the defendant, but instead tend to view the offence as proven
upon proof of risk-producing behaviour on D's part which is, on an objective
view, such as to produce a risk to life and limb and which is to be
characterised as grossly negligent. 59 This lack of mehs rea (i.e. there is no
requirement of awareness of risk on D's part) could be problematic for D in a
given case. For example, D might have obtained a syringe full of heroin from
X and injected it into Y. Y some time later dies from an overdose of pure
heroin. D argues.that he or she did not know that the syringe contained pure
heroin. Would D be regarded as objectively negligent? This may depend if
IV drug use is on an objective view regarded as risky to life and limb. This
step can be taken further by hypothesising the situation where D a drug user
and unaware of the. risks of HIV/AIDS injects Y during a heroin shoot-up using
58 For negligent acts; Nydam v R [1977] VR 430, R v Taktak (1988) 14 NSWLR 115; for
negligent omissions: Russell (1933) VLR 59, R v Taktak.
ss. 285-290 Old. Code: ss. 262-267 W.A. Code; s. 156(2)(b) Tas. Code in conjunction
with ss. 144-151.
57 In the Northern Territory, section 154(1 )(3) of that Code may be applicable (causing
death by an act or omission which causes serious or actual potential danger to life, health or
safety). •
58 There is no specific reference to negligent acts under the Codes although there are
provisions pertaining to 'doing dangerous acts' exist in each of the Code jurisdictions (s.
288 Qld. Code,s. 265 W.A. Code,s. 149Tas. Code\ s. 154 N.T. Code).
59 Nydam supra note 55 at p. 445.
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an HIV contaminated needle. Y Is later found to be HIV antibody positive and
D has transmitted HIV to Y. Given that the community has been well advised
about the risks of HIV and, in particular, the use of contaminated needles then
objectively D has produced a risk to life and limb which may be characterised
as grossly negligent. It is unlikely that the principle developed in Boughey
whereby the reasonable person is placed in the position of the accused would
be applicable. If it was, it would bring a subjective quality to the conduct,
conflicting with the theory that a negligent omission is not regarded as an
offence of mens rea.
Manslaughter by criminal negligence by way of omission has
four elements. First, there must be a duty owed by A to V to preserve life.
The second element is a breach by omission to perform the duty. The
omission must then amount to criminal negligence; and, fourth, the omission
must cause the death of V. Under the Codes there is no duty unless it is
provided for by way of statute.
The most relevant provisions in the context of HIV infection are
those that pertain to the duties with respect to handling a dangerous thing.
Under section 150 of the Tasmanian Code , which is equivalent to section
287 of the Queensland and section 266 of the Western Australian Codes
respectively
[i]t is the duty of every person who has anything in his charge
or under his control, ... which in the absence of precaution or
care in its use or management may endanger human life, to
take reasonable precautions against, and to use reasonable
care to avoid, such danger.
Two difficulties arise with respect to this provision. First, it may be ludicrous
to argue that A has charge of HIV and it is under his or her control. If
anything, the virus has taken control of A although he or she does control
whether it is passed to another person or not. It is more problematic to state
that he or she uses or manages a virus like HIV as set out in the wording of
the provisions.
The other technical difficulty is how the term 'anything' would be
defined or assume relevance in the context of HIV. It is certainly arguable that
HIV is a dangerous virus. However, the 'things' that the section has
previously referred to have been cars or guns, not a virus like HIV. Given that
some criminal activity has involved spitting and biting, a situation could arise
where the prosecution may try to argue that the mouth or teeth of an HIV-
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infected person are dangerous 'things' for the purpose of provisions like
section 150 of the Tasmanian Criminal Code.
The issue has been debated in a number of non-AIDS related
cases. For example, \n McCallum Burbury CJ held that section 150 'applies
to things which have inherently dangerous characteristics, and require careful
handling . This part of the provision could cover HIV. However the
provision continues:' ... in putting them [the things] to the use for which they
are designed if danger to life and limb is to be avoided'. Clearly the last part is
not so relevant especially since Burbury CJ then referred to examples such
as cars and guns. Burbury CJ also held that the section did not deal with
things that were 'normally harmless' and that the provision 'referred to things
dangerous per se '. S"" It could not easily be argued that a virus is normally
harmless.
By contrast the Queensland Supreme Court in fl v Dabelstein
62, when considering the corresponding provision in the Queensland Code ,
held that the section did not necessarily apply to things only dangerous per
se. The court there held that a sharpened pencil, was a dangerous thing.
This view is supported in the widest, sense by the Queensland case of
Jackson v Hodgetts 6^ in which the term 'thing' in the corresponding section
287 of the QueenslandAA/estern. Australian Code was held to cover a meat
preservative, therefore widening the previous scope of the provision.
Notwithstanding the case law the section would more appropriately apply to
the situation where a lab technician in breach of his or her duty sprays HIV
contaminated blood on another person. 6^ It would also likely cover the
situation where a contaminated needle was left lying around in a house where
the other occupants are known to use IV drugs. 66 The section may also apply
60 As in the biting case of USv Moore (discussed infra), textand footnote 164.
supra note 42, at p. 77.
62 [l966] Qd R411.
66 Jackson vHodgetts (1989) 44 A. Crim. R. 321.
64 This mayalso be regarded as a negligent act contrary to s. 288 ofthe Queensland Code ,
for example.
66 Thisfactual scenario bears some similarity to the facts of Jackson vHodgetts, supra note
63, where the two accused left a can of soft drink containing meat preservative in a place
where they knew it was likely that V would pick it up and drink it. Leaving syringes
contaminated with HIV in areas where other persons may come into contact with them is
technically covered by other legislation. For example, s. 10(4)(a) of the Drug Misuse Act
(1988)(Qld.) for failing to dispose of syringes in accordance with procedures. Such an
offence is punishable by two years imprisonment. However, the level of punishment for such
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where a person injects Vwith a contaminated needle without V's consent. In
this latter situation however, it is more likely that the person intends to pass
the virus and so despite the needle being a dangerous 'thing' negligence is
not the appropriate state of mind.
The most difficult requirement to prove in respect of
manslaughter by criminal riegligence is that Amust be shown to be negligent.
In criminal law a person acts negligently when he or she fails 'to comply with
a standard of conduct with which any ordinary reasonable [person] could and
would have complied'. The test is objective and it is irrelevant that A did
not foresee the consequence of his or her actions. The degree of negligence
required to establish criminal liability has been said to be that which goes
beyond a mere matter of compensation between subjects
and show[ed] such disregard for the life and safety of others
as to amount to a crime against the State and conduct
deserving punishment, s®
Later courts have held that it is preferable to rely on adjectives
such as "gross", "wicked" and "criminal" to express the degree of negligence.
Overall it appears that as with negligent acts Australian courts view
negligent omissions as proved upon proof of risk-producing behaviour which
objectively is grossly negligent, ''o If HIV is transmitted to V as a result of A's
negligent handling of a syringe which has resulted in V's skin being pierced
then A will be criminally responsible'for the transmission of HIV, provided the
jury are satisfied that the criminal standard of negligence is satisfied on the
facts. Despite this, it is unlikely that negligence will be applicable in many
factual circumstances of transmission.
(iii) Manslaughter by Unlawful and Dangerous Act
an offence would not reflect the gravity of the injury if a person became infected with HIV due
to this omission.
In fact, it might be more appropriate to bring an offensive weapons charge.
Hart, 'Negligence, Mens Rea and Criminal Responsibility', in Guest, A. G., (ed) Oxford
Essays in Jurisprudence, Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1961, at p. 61.
per Lord Hewart CJ in R v Bateman [1925] All ER 45 at p. 48. This test has been
adopted in Tasmania in R vMcCaiium, supra note 42.
69 Kong CheukKwan vR (1986) 82Cr. App. R. 18at p. 26.
^9Nydam vR, supra note 55 and Jackson vHodgetts, supra note 63.
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Another form of involuntary manslaughter Is that by unlawful and
dangerous act. This applies in each of the common law jurisdictions but,
under the Codes, only in Tasmania. The elements are the same at both
common law and under section 156(2)(c) of the Tasmanian Code.
For the unlawful act doctrine, it is not sufficient that death result
during the course of unlawful activity. In the case of McCallum Burbury CJ
held that the wounding, which was the injury, made the act unlawful. ^2 if that
view is applied to the transmission of HIV, the fact that V becomes HIV-
infected would make the act of sexual intercourse unlawful and manslaughter.
However, it is argued that Burbury CJ's view in McCallum which suggests
that the act should encompass the result is incorrect and contrary to the
principle established in Vallance. In Vallance the court held that, for the
purposes of section 13(1) and the crime of unlawful wounding, the 'act' was
the 'physical action of the accused' and did not include the result, the
wounding. It is difficult to see how the term 'act' can be given different
meanings throughout the Code, especially since manslaughter does not
require that A intend the result.
However, unlawfulness can derive from the dangerousness of
the act in question. The English Court of Appeal in R v Cato ^^held that the
act of injecting another with heroin was unlawful not because it amounted to
an offence but because it was dangerous. The administration itself was not
unlawful because V consented, and the fact that the possession of the heroin
was unlawful was irrelevant because that did not directly cause V's death.
The principle from Cato might be used in cases to convict consensual
needle sharers who transmit HIV to others.
Both at common law and under the Tasmanian provision, the
unlawful act must be independently unlawful of its consequence, death.
Under the Code, an unlayvful act may be one which is unlawful under other
R VLarkin (1943) 29 Cr. App. R. 18. Fisse is of the view that the status of this rule is
doubtful and refers to the fact that the Victorian Law Reform Commission proposed that
manslaughter by unlawful, and dangerous act be abolished in that jurisdiction, Fisse, B (ed)
Floward's Criminal Law, 5th ed, Sydney, Law Book Company, 1990, citing Law Reform
Commission of Victoria, Homicide, Discussion Paper No. 13, Victoria, LRC, 1991, at pp. 65-
68.
^2 supra note 42, at pp. 86-87. This view was also inconsistent with otherstatementsmade
in his judgment at pages 85-86 and the view His Honour held in Vallance , supra note 26 (at
pp. 67-68) with respect to the definition of the term 'act' for the purposes of section 13(1).
(1976) 62 Cr. App. R. 41. The decision has been criticised in Brett, Waller and Williams,
Criminal Law , 6th ed, Sydney, Butterworths, 1983, at pp. 260-261.
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Code provisions and in the common law jurisdictions under other legislative
enactments. For example, administration (or injection) of illegal drugs under
the Poisons Act (1971)(Tas.) is unlawful and if it results in death would
provide the unlawful act for the purposes of section 156(2)(c) of the
Tasmanian Criminal Code. The administration of narcotic drugs is illegal in all
Australian States. The presence of consent may complicate the matter
since it is unlikely that a person who consents to sharing a needle
contemplates that death will result. If the consideration is always, what did V
think he or she was consenting to, then it is unlikely V was consenting to
death.
Under the Codes there are a number of provisions which in the
AIDS context would supply the unlawful element. For example, section 175
of the Tasmanian Code renders the act of administering poison or other
noxious thing with intent to injure and thereby endanger the life of V, unlawful.
Although poison is not defined, in the case of Ciarence^^ Stephen J held that
'an infection is a kind of poisoning'. It is arguable that transmission of HIV by
sexual intercourse, by injection or by spitting or biting would fall within the
term 'administer' and would certainly endanger life at the very least.^® HIV-
infected semen may be regarded as a noxious thing. If this section would
not provide the unlawful act for manslaughter it may stand on its own (if
judges are willing to be flexible with the interpretation of the term 'administer')
as a separate charge since it does not require that the victim die within a
specific period. There are similar provisions to this in other jurisdictions.
Certainly these provisions would seem the most appropriate for
indicting a person who deliberately injects another with an HIV-infected
syringe. Some provisions have more direct applicability. For example, section
The legislation is set out in footnote 1 in chapter two.
75 (1888) 22 QBD 23, at p. 42.
76 In the United Kingdom where a similar provision under section 24 of the OffencesAgainst
the Person Act has been considered there has been a difference of opinion by the Court of
Appeal. For example, the court in Gillarcl (1987) 87 Or. App. R 189 was prepared to construe
the term 'administer' broadly whereas Danes [1987] Crim LR 682 where the accused
squirted ammonia at V, the Court were prepared only to construe the term narrowly.
77 Although, admittedly this did not succeed in a Canadian case in 1992 resulting in charges
on administering a noxious substance being dropped (Eastwood, E., and McKelvey, IVI.,
'AIDS in Ontario', Lancet, 1993, 341:1653-1654).
78 ss. 322, 323(2) Old. Code ; ss. 300, 301(1) W.A. Code\s. 177 N.T. Code, s. 39 Crimes
Act (N.S.W.) (1900); s. 26 Criminal Law Consolidation Act (1935)(S.A.); s. 19 Crimes Act
(1958) (Vic.).
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19 of the Victorian Crimes Act (1958) states that the administration without
consent of a substance known by the accused to be capable of interfering
substantially with the bodily functions of V is unlawful. In addition, the reckless
endangerment provision in Victoria (s. 22 Crimes /Act (1958)(Vic.)), the
provision penalising the 'causing' of a grievous bodily disease (s. 36 Crimes
/Act (1900) (N.S.W.)) and the provision prohibiting 'acts endangering life' in
South Australia (s. 29 Criminal Law Consolidation Act (1935)(S.A.)), would
also provide the unlawful act for this type of manslaughter.
Sections 122-123 of the Tasmanian Code, which criminalise
indecent practices between males, may also supply the unlawful act
requirement. This section penalises sexual intercourse between males and
would thus cover homosexual activities which spread the virus. Consent is
irrelevant to a charge under these provisions. As homosexual conduct has
been decriminalised between consenting adults in private in other States
then unless such practices took place without consent it would not provide the
unlawful act for this head of Manslaughter. In the Code States other sexual
offences such as rape or sexual assault may supply the unlawful act.
Assault will most appropriately provide the unlawful act for the
purposes of homicide and has done so at common law. 83 An assault is
occasioned by either (a) a direct or indirect intentional application of force, (b)
a threat by gesture to apply force or (c) by an attempt to apply force. Each
of the discussed modes of transmission, sexual conduct, needle sharing and
biting would qualify as an assault if non-consensual and intentional as they all
involve a direct application of force. Assault is discussed in more detail in a
later section of this thesis.
The unlawful act must also be an inherently dangerous one.
The dangerous act has been defined by Windeyer J in Phillips as an act
which 'a reasonable man would know was fraught with a risk of serious harm
This was previously the position under ss. 208 and 211 of Queensland Code prior to
Criminal Code and Another Act Amendment Act (1990) which removed the term 'acts against
the order of nature' from s. 208 and replaced it with 'anal intercourse'. The act also
decriminalised sexual activity between consenting males above 18 years. Similarly sodomy
was decriminalised in Western Australia in March 1990 between consenting adult males, but
the age is 21 not 18 in that State (Law Reform (Decriminalisation of Sodomy) Act (1989).
Legislative provisions were detailed in chapter two, footnote 1.
s. 185 Tas. Code; s. 347 Old. Code ; s. 192 N T. Code.
82 s. 325 W.A. Code .
83 R Holzer [1968] VR 481 and RvWills [1983] 2 VR 201.
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to some person whether or not the accused actor was actually aware of this.'
8"^ The requirement of dangerousness Is therefore assessed objectively.
However, it is accepted at common law in Australia now that, in considering
whether a reasonable person would appreciate the danger, the physical
features of the situation and the nature of the action of the accused are
relevant considerations.
This factor was not alluded to by Windeyer J in Phillips.
However, the court in Boughey held that the circumstances of the accused
together with his knowledge were relevant details to be considered in
assessing whether a reasonable person 'in his position' ought to have known
death was likely under section 157(1)(c). It is likely that a Tasmanian court
would adopt a similar view to the test of a reasonable person in connection
with manslaughter under section 156(2)(c). Hence, all an HIV-infected person
needs to knovy is that a particular act will expose others to an appreciable risk
of really serious injury, s®
ATTEMPTED MURDER
A charge of attempted murder is more logical in the AIDS
situation given that a finding of guilt does not depend on the victim dying at all
or within a certain period of time. Guilt for an attempt turns principally upon
the intent of the would-be perpetrator. However, an attempt may impose
liability in situations where it is not desirable. It would potentially apply not
only when the victim has not died but when the victim has not yet become
infected. Since there is no limitation period with respect to criminal offences
this is not too problematic, except that it may be difficult to point conclusively
to A as the perpetrator as time passes. Attempt law may reach very few
cases, as it requires a specific intention to bring about the desired result, for
attempted murder, death. It is also possible to attempt an assault, a sexual
assault and grievous bodily harm.
Even if the intention is present the criminal law requires that
there must be a proximate act or omission which is not too remote and which
is part of a series of events which if not interrupted would constitute the actual
commission of the crime. The courts in various jurisdictions have not been
84 per Windeyer J, in Phillips , supra note 43, at p. 758.
Wills supra note 83, per Fullagher J at 212-214 .
86 Ibid.
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able to agree on a universal test of proximity which will determine whether an
act is sufficiently proximate to qualify as an attempt.
The position is less complicated with respect to the relevance of
impossibility in attempts. Impossibility in attempted murder could arise in the
situation where A believed he or she was HIV positive but was not and hence
despite A's intent and conduct he or she could not transmit the virus and so
commit murder. In this situation it might also be argued that there was not a
proximate act. A further example where impossibility might arise is where A is
prevented from carrying out his or her purpose because a policeman
intervenes and arrests A before A has a chance to stab V with a syringe.
On the authority o1 R v Donnelly, a case based on the New
Zealand Crimes Act (1961), both instances are examples of what is termed
factual impossibility but which still give rise to an attempt. However, where A
is not HIV positive, different categories of factual impossibility are conceivably
relevant. The situation could be regarded as one where inefficient means are
used (labelled category four in Donnelly ) or one of physical impossibility
(category five in Donnelly ). Category five differs from category four because
what A proposes to do is impossible, not by reason of insufficiency or
inefficiency of means (for example, the blood is not contaminated with HIV),
but because it is for some reason physically not possible whatever means are
adopted (for example, cannot transmit HIV without contaminated blood).
The attempt provisions of the Western Australia and
Queensland Codes (s. 4) and the Tasmanian Code (s. 2) are worded similarly
to the New Zealand statute. Factual impossibility is not a 'defence' where
there is a proximate act under the Australian Codes. For example, section 4
of the Western Australian Code read3 'it is immaterial that by reason of
circumstances not known to the offender, it is impossible in fact to commit the
offence.'
The position at common law is different. The majority of the
court in the English case of Houghton v Smith held that physical impossibility
(category five in Donnelly ) was a 'defence' to a charge of attempt. Although
this decision has been reversed by section 1(2) of the Criminal Attempts Act
(1981)(UK) it is still applicable in some common law jurisdictions in Australia,
This is exemplified in the judgments of the Court of Criminal Appeal (Gibson, ACJ, Neasy
and Crisp JJ) in the case of Haas v R [1964] Tas. SR 1, and by the diverging views of
Sheehy Jin R v Chellingworth [1954] OWN 35 and Stable J in f? v Williams [1965] Qld R 86
in Queensland, and R vBorinelli [1962] SASR 214 in South Australia.
[1970] NZLR 980 and see the judgment of Turner J at p. 990-993 where he sets out the 6
different scenarios where impossibility may or may not be a defence.
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for example, South Australia. ^9 Hence where A Incorrectly thinks he or she is
infected, A would not be held guilty of attempted murder in that State if it was
decided that the impossibility fell within the fifth 'Donnelly' category.
In one Australian State, provision has been made for attempted
offences involving HIV. Under sections 27 and 29 of the New South Wales
Crimes Act (1900) an accused faces a maximum penalty of 25 years
imprisonment for attempted murder by the administration of 'any poison or
other destructive thing.' This charge could cover syringe attacks. In July
1990, a prison warder at Long Bay Jail in New South Wales was injected with
HIV-infected blood by a prisoner with a syringe.^o The prisoner was charged
with attempted murder but the charge was later reduced to maliciously
administering poison. The accused died from an AIDS related illness prior
to trial. His conduct could also have provided the foundation for an assault
charge.
ASSAULT
It has been stated that the an assault may provide the unlawful
act for Manslaughter under the unlawful and dangerous act doctrine.
However, while it might provide the unlawful act for manslaughter (and
murder under s. 157(1)(c) of the Tasmanian Criminal Code), death would still
have to result within a year and a day from the date of the original injury. A
charge of assault though could stand as a separate, more appropriate charge
because the victim need not die within a specified period. Assaults in
Australian jurisdictions are covered generally by statutory definition and are
divided in terms of seriousness between common assaults, ^2 assault
89 fl VCollingridge (1976) 16SASR 117.
90 'AIDS jab may bring murder attempt count'. The Mercury, July23 1990, p. 1 and 'AIDS
stabbing case in court'. The Mercury, August 7 1990.
Anon, 'Transmission Offences' (1993) 4(2) National HIV/AIDS Legal Link Newsletter, 2-3.
92s, 61 Crimes Act (N.S.W.); s. 335 (Old.) Code ;s. 313(W.A.) Code, s. 182 (Tas.) Code, s.
188(1) (N.T.) Code; s. 39 Criminal Law Consolidation Act (S.A.).
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occasioning bodily harm ^^and serious assaults/acting with intention to cause
grievous bodily harm or wounding. An assault may be committed by:
(a) a direct or indirect intentional application of force without consent (spitting,
'95 biting, sexual intercourse, fighting) which is known at common law as a
battery, or
(b) a threat by gesture to apply force (covers situation where accused
threatens to inject V with a contaminated syringe or uses AIDS as an invisible
weapon: "if you come near me I will spit on you and I have AIDS") which is
known at common law as an assault, or
(c) an attempt to apply force.
Subject to the existence of consent, a direct or indirect
intentional application of force may amount to an assault under the Codes if
the action is either voluntary and intentional (Tas ) or willed (Qld., W.A., N.T.).
96 Neither poisoning 97 nor communication of disease 98 has been held to
be conduct that will constitute a battery/assault. With respect to poisoning it is
likely that this view has been taken due to the fact that there has always been
a specific provision relating to poisoning. When considering communication of
disease, courts have expressed their reluctance to extend assault too far
beyond its designated realm.99
93 s. 59 CrimesAct (N.S.W.); s. 339 (Qld.)Cocfe ; s. 317 (W.A.)Code; s. 182 (Tas.)Code; s.
188(2)(a) (N.T.) Code; 8. 31 Crimes Act (yic.), s. 40 Criminal Law Consolidation Act .(S.A.)
94 s. 33 CrimesAct (N.S.W.); s. 340(2) (Qld.)Code; s. 318 (W.A.)Coc/e; ss. 114, 170, 172
(Tas.) Code, s. 193 (N.T.) Code (assault with intent to commit an offence); s. 31 Crimes Act
lv\c.); s. 21 Criminal Law Consolidation Act .{S.A.).
95RVCotesworth (1706) 6 Mod. Rep. 172 where spitting in the face was held to constitute
a battery per Holt CJ. A more recent Australian example classifying spitting as an assault in
a non-AIDS related case can be found in Bennett v Morden unreported judgment Supreme
Court of South Australia per Duggan J., SCGRGA21160, 18.6.92.
96 perCrisp J in Vallance, supra note 26, at p. 101 andMacrossan J in R vMclver (1928)
22 QJPR 173.
97 Lambert (1976) 65Cr. App R. 12.
93 Clarence, supra note 75. Hawkins J (at p. 54) and Reld J (at p. 58) thought that the risk
of quite serious harm including the transmission of venereal disease might be freely
consented to, making a serious assault 'lawful'. The present writer suggests that this could
not have been correct in law even before Brown , supra note 49, given the majority decision
in Attorney-Generals Reference (No. 6 of 1980) [1981] 1 OB 715.
99 Stephen J., in Clarence, Ibid, at p. 39.
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As to the mental element for this assault, It has not been
conclusively determined if recklessness would be sufficient although it is at
common law. '•oo The High Court of Australia in Boughey held that
the absence of... hostility or hostile intent towards the person
against whom force is applied neither precludes the
intentional application of force to the person of another from
constituting ... assault under the Code nor, of itself,
constitutes a justification or excuse for it. 101
However this case revealed that, at common law, hostility is a required
element of an assault although their Honours glossed over the issue of what
'hostility' entailed. ''02
In all Australian States, a threat by gesture to apply force
requires that the person making the threat causes the other to believe he or
she has the present ability to effect his or her purpose. in addition the
threat must be accompanied by a gesture. Words alone would not be
sufficient although the common law has held otherwise \n R v Knight,
provided the threat was one of immediate violence.
The mental element for a threat by gesture type assault under
the Codes was stated by Green CJ in R v Thornton 105 and affirmed by His
Honour in Wood v Beach and by Kennedy and Smith JJ in Hall v Foneca
.107 Their Honours held that in order to prove this type of assault A must
threaten V with the intention that V be induced to apprehend fear that force
100 Nettlefold J in Wilkinson , unreported judgment Supreme Court of Tasmania 43/1985 at
p. 4. The common law position is found \n R v Venna [1976] QB 421 as accepted by the
Victorian Full Court in Rv Bacash (1981) VR 923.
"'O"' supra note 20, per Mason, Wilson and Deane JJ at pp. 618-619.
102 The court merely referred to Barwick CJ's judgment in Phillips (1971)45 ALJR 467 at p.
472 where quoting from Hawkins Pleas of the Crown the Chief Justice suggested that an
assault had to committed in 'an angry, revengeful, rude, insolent or hostile' manner.
"•03 /-/a//V Foneca [1983] WAR 309; BradyvSchafze/[1911] St RQd 206; Thornton Courtof
Criminal Appeal of Tasmania, unreported judgment No. 81/1984, confirmed by the wording of
s. 182(1) Tasmanian Criminal Code. But the belief must be based on 'reasonable grounds':
R VhAcNamara [1954] VLR 137; Rozsa v Samuels [1969] SASR 205.
(1988) 35 A. Crim. R. 314, now questioned by Zander v Vartzokas (1988) 34 A. Crim. R.
11.
105 supra note 103, at p. 9.
106 unreported judgment SupremeCourt ofTasmania, 39/1985 per Green CJ at p. 3.
107 supranote 103, at pp. 313-315.
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may be applied to him or her. Therefore it is the defendant's intent not the
victim's belief that is relevant. Green GJ has been criticised for this opinion
because if one follows his judgment to its logical conclusion, it is possible to
assault a sleeping person. Nettlefold J in f? v Wilkinson 108 can be said to
have questioned the accuracy of this view given that he held V had to be
aware of the threat. This point was also confirmed by a majority of the court
in Hall v Foneca. Being aware of a threat and fearing injury are slightly
different circumstances. It may be that a person is aware they are being
threatened by a person wielding an alleged HIV-infected syringe but if they do
not believe that is the case they may not fear imminent injury. Hence whether
liability is dependent on the defendant's conduct and intent rather than the Vs
belief is fairly significant.
There is a diversity of opinion in the court in Thornton as to the
requisite mental element for an assault when it takes the form of a threatening
gesture to apply force. Green CJ's view has already been described.
Cosgrove J held that it would be sufficient if A either intended those threats
or V perceived his conduct as threats.""og Cox J's judgment gives some
suppprt for the proposition that if A acted recklessly as to whether V was
induced to apprehend fear he or she would be guilty of an assault, although
he made it clear that it.was not dependent on him in that case to determine
this point conclusively. 110 In Hall v Foneca the majority of the court were of
the view that V had to know he or she was being threatened and declined to
decide whether recklessness would be sufficient. It is doubtful in the AIDS
context that the matter of assaulting an unconscious victim would present for
argument, since A's victims are nearly always conscious, the threat of HIV
infection being used to obtain Vs compliance with A's demands. The
distinction between awareness of a threat and fearing injury is not adequately
grasped by the Judges in these two cases.
At common jaw there is authority for the view that recklessness
is sufficient, that it is enough that A foresees it as possible that V will be put in
fear by A's conduct. To be guilty of an assault under the Codes or at
common law in the AIDS context it would be unnecessary to prove A was
"•08 supra note 100,at p. 4.
1Q9 supra note 103, at p. 5.
"I "10 Ibid, at pp. 4-5.
1 ^ McPherson v. Brown [1975] 12 SASR 184.
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actually Infected or carried an infected syringe since all A has to do is intend
to induce a state of fear in V that he will carry out his or her purpose and V in
fact, is fearful of A. Whether A could in fact carry it out successfully is
irrelevant. if as a result of A's threats V suffers bodily injury A will be
charged with an indirect application of force, or a battery. ''•'3 At common
law, it is fairly clear that a mere awareness of the threat will not be sufficient
to ground liability. In addition, V must actually fear that injury is imminent.
The common law may act as a precedent for interpretation of the Codes
where the matter becomes relevant.
Threatening behaviour involving HIV has been directed at police
officers acting in the course of their duties. This practical example is a
useful illustration both of the factors to be considered in such circumstances
and how courts can side-step difficult issues involving HIV.
In all jurisdictions, a person resisting, assaulting or obstructing a
police officer in the due execution of his or her duty could be charged for both
resisting lawful apprehension and assaulting a police officer. hiV-
infected person may engage in behaviour which aims to prevent officers from
arresting him or her. Such behaviour may involve threats of infection. A
suspect may either threaten to, or actually engage in, some act such as
112 McPherson vBeath [1975] 12SASR 174.
112 Zander vVartzokas, supra note 104.
11^ Many Instances have been reported in the media, for example, 'AIDS victim charged'.
West Australian, February 2 1990, which involved an HIV-infected person biting a policeman.
'AIDS biter on attempted murder count', The Mercury, July 3 1987, which involved and HIV-
infected person biting police officers and rubbing blood fromwounds on them. 'AIDS jab may
bring murder attempt count' Sydney Morning Herald, July 23 1990, recounting the stabbing of
a prison officer at Long Bay Jail in Sydney by an inmate. The officer later tested positive for
HIV. The inmate was charged with attempted murder but died after a committal hearing.
'AIDS woman on spit charge',, The Mercury, April 4 1991, concerning an infected prostitute
spitting at a police officer.
More numerous are the instances of this threatening behaviour being applied to
citizens in the course of criminal activity: 'Warning of attempted murder charges for AIDS
syringe threats'. The Mercury , July 31 1.990, detailing use of blood-filled syringes at
robberies as a threatening weapon during an assault; 'Assault charge against AIDS man
dropped'. The Mercury February 2 1991, which involved an infected person spitting at an
uninfected person; 'Kidnapping plot AIDS threat to wealthy parents'. The Mercury, March 3
1988, which involved the kidnap and subsequent threat to infect an abducted child with AIDS-
infected blood if a ransom was not forthcoming.
112 S. 114(1)(2), Tas. Code-, s. 340(2) Old. Code, s. 318(c)(d)(f) W.A. Code ; s. 20 Police
Act (W.A.); s. 43(b)(c) Criminal Law Consolidation Act (1935)(S.A.); s. 3^{b)Crimes Act
(1958) (Vic.); s. 188 Code (1983)(N.T.); s. 33 Crimes Act (1900)(N.S.W.).
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biting or fighting which may transmit the virus to the officer through blood to
blood contact,
In the Tasmanian case of R v Palmer , the accused had been
informed that he was under arrest after refusing to leave licenced premises
when asked by police. In attempting to resist arrest Palmer assaulted the
police. The assault included not only inflicting actual physical injury on
officers through fighting and biting but also threatening to spit at the officers
and kill them since, as he alleged, he was suffering from AIDS. In Palmer,
an assault by way of threat by gesture under section 182 of the Tasmanian
Criminal Code was not argued. The fact that the accused threatened to
transmit AIDS was not considered relevant to the charge. The charge focused
on the physical assault perpetuated by the actual bite under section 114 of
the Code , which refers to assaulting police officers in the execution of their
duty. The accused was later found not to be HIV antibody positive following a
test which it appears he consented to.
Palmer also illustrates that given the asymptomatic nature of
the disease police have little choice but to treat tfireats they receive from
suspects relating to HIV as true and be aware that certain suspects might be
carrying potentially HIV hazardous objects. However, excessive use of
protective devices to make an arrest should be avoided as these would likely
reinforce the irrational fear that HIV could be spread by casual contact.
One of the main obstacles to obtaining a successful prosecution
for an assault where the transmission of HIV occurs is the presence of
^ The risks of transmission through blood-to-biood contact were considered in chapter one,
pp. 28-30.
117 R VPalmer Complaint No. 10282/87 heard in the SupremeCourt ofTasmania, August
1987. Palmer pleaded guilty to all counts of assaulting police officers under section 114 of
the Code and was remanded in custody for pre-sentence and psychiatric reports. From
court transcripts.
11® As depicted in 'Police Fear AIDS attacks'. West Australian, June 1 1991 where a
Victorian Police Association representative is reported as having stated, '[a]ny police officer
confronted by a villain with a blood-filled syringe carrying the AIDS virus should get out his
gun and shoot him' (per Detective Danny Walsh, Association Secretary). In 1990 the Deputy
President of the New South Wales Police Association suggested to police that criminals
wielding AIDS infected syringes as weapons should be treated as armed and shot if
necessary (per Phil Holder Deputy President in 'Police told to draw their guns on syringe-
wielding criminals', T/re/Wercury, June 18 1990).
119 This has occurred in the United States. For example. District of Columbia Police have
used disposable clothing, gloves and masks and have escorted suspects from court after bail
applications dressed in such protective gear, from Note, 'All Inmates Entering or Leaving
Federal Prisons to get AIDS Test' (1987) 18(12)Cr/m/na/ Justice Newsletter, 1-3.
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consent. It was stated in Schloss wMaguire ^20 'an assault with consent is
not an assault at all.' In chapter two it was stated that the criminal law should
focus only on non-consensual conduct. The question though is locating the
point when apparent consent is vitiated, The Intergovernmental
Committee on HIV/AIDS in their 1991 report 122 on control of HIV infection
failed to deal adequately the issue of consent in the context of HIV
transmission. As the issue of consent is likely to play an important part in
most prosecutions for HIV transmission it requires some analysis. The
modes of transmission will be considered in turn.
(i) Biting, Spitting and Fighting
It is highly unlikely that consent would be raised as a defence to
a biting or spitting charge as it rare that a person would consent to being
bitten or spat at. Whether the defence would be available in circumstances
where HIV was transmitted during the course of a consensual fight where the
parties are exposed to each other's bodily fluids needs to be considered.
Under some legislative provisions the position is relatively clear. For
example, under section 182(4) of the Tasmanian Criminal Code , an assault
will still be unlawful despite the presence of consent if the conduct engaged in
is otherwise unlawful, injurious to the public as well as to the person
assaulted and involves a breach of the peace. There is no doubt that fighting
would amount to an affray under section 80 of the Code and hence satisfy
the requirement of otherwise unlawful and would involve a breach of the
peace if committed in a public place. Likewise, under the Western Australian
and Queensland Codes fighting in public 123 participating in an affray ^24 or
challenging another to a fight ""2515 unlawful. Hence if bodily harm is intended
120 (1897) Q.C.R. 337 at p. 339.
^21 As will be seen in chapter four, this question arises with respect to provisions in public
health legislation that penalise the transmission of HIV in circumstances where there is an
absence of consent. Current public health legislation does not set out the parameters of
consent or deal with the matter of fraud as to consent clearly.
122 igcA, Legislative Approaches to PublicHealth Control ofHIV Infection , Canberra, 1991.
^23 Forexample, s. 71 W.A. Code,s. 93(C) Crimes Act (N.S.W.).
•>24 s. 72 Qld. Code .
125 s. 72 W.A. Code-, s. 73 Qld. Code.
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or likely then, irrespective of HIV infection the conduct would technically
constitute an assault.
The common law jurisdictions appear to follow the English
common law position since there is no authoritative statement to the contrary.
In England, one cannot consent to the infliction of bodily harm in public or
conduct offending public morality, for example, sado-masochistic beatings,
even if the latter are committed in private, The case of Attorney-General's
Reference (No. 6 of 1980) established the principle that one cannot
consent to bodily harm that is intended or likely. The court held that it is not in
the public interest that people should try to cause each other bodily harm for
no good reason.
In 1993 in England, the principle in Attorney-General's
Reference was reaffirmed by the House of Lords decision in Brown, 128 a
case involving the sado-masochistic activities of a group of homosexual men.
Even though the court accepted that, all the actions had been done with the
consent of the participants; there was no permanent injury; no infection of the
wounds and no evidence of any medical attention being sought, their
Lordships still held that the defendants could be charged and convicted of
assault occasioning bodily harm under section 47 of the Offences Against the
Person Act (1861)(U.K). The satisfaction of sado-masochistic desires was
not regarded as a 'good reason' for inflicting bodily harm. This decision may
have implications for the common law and to a lesser extent, the Code
jurisdictions in.Australia in a variety of circumstances including where HIV
infection is involved. Given the facts in Brown, where consensual activities do
result in bodily harm which cannot be described as either trivial or trifling (as
in the transmission of HIV) then there are even stronger grounds for the
judiciary to strike out consent as a relevant consideration.
The case of Brown raises the question that was debated in
chapter two at some length, of how far the State should be involved in
regulating relationships by deciding in what circumstances consent may be a
defence. On the one hand, not to recognise such a defence would be to
ignore liberty on the ground that properly informed adults should be free to
take risks that might appear ridiculous to others. However, on the other hand,
a paternalistic approach would suggest that it needs to be recognised that
Rv Donovan [1934] 2 KB 498 at p. 507.
^27 [1981] 1 QB 715 per Lord Lane.
2^8 supra note 49.
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liberty is not an absolute value and may be necessarily overridden for the
purpose of promoting an equally important value, such as preventing the
spread of HIV/AIDS. Leaving Brown aside, it is at least reasonable that the
State would have some difficulty in sanctioning as a defence the conduct of a
person consenting to sexual activity that places him or her at risk of acquiring
HIV infection.
As the common law position as stated in Attorney-General's
Reference and by implication. Brown, is inconsistent with the interpretation of
the Code provisions 129 then the examination of consensual conduct in
Queensland and most likely Western Australia, would focus on the scope of
the consent rather than whether it can be given or not. Likewise, in Tasmania
where assaults occur in private and do not involve breaches of the peace, the
question should be what in fact did V consent to given his or her knowledge.
It is easy to see how courts might be disposed to hold that
fighting was intrinsically harmful in circumstances where one party is infected
with HIV and the other ignorant of this fact. But where V is fully informed of
the infected status of A and takes part in a fight with A, then commonsense
dictates that consent should operate as a defence. In these instances it could
be said that V has consented at the very least to the 'risk of infection.
(ii) Sexual Intercourse
The issue of consent will also arise when the virus is
transmitted by sexual intercourse and V has consented to the act of
intercourse. It will always be difficult to ascertain what conversations have
taken place between the participants of intimate activities where there is no
third person to corroborate the story of either party. In the context of HIV, one
of the most concerning features where sexual intercourse is involved, is
where A either (a) misrepresents his or her antibody status, or (b) does not
disclose his or her antibody status to V. The legal effect of A's behaviour in
both instances warrants examination.
A misrepresents his or her antibody status to V
The conduct anticipated in this situation could also be described
as fraudulent or deceptive conduct. Most criminal statutes and the common
^29 due to the decision in Lergesner vCarroll [1991] Qd R206.
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law In Australia provide that consent is not freely given if it is procured by
fraud. 130 These provisions have application whether one considers assault or
the various sexual offences that require consent as an element to be proven
by the prosecution. In the absence of a complete statutory definition of fraud,
these provisions need to be read with key common law cases on the point.
What appears as a consensual act of intercourse should be
rendered non-consensual if V is either not informed as to the infected state of
A or is misled as to that state. However, \n Clarence it was stated that fraud
will only vitiate consent if it is fraud as to 'the nature of the act itself or the
identity of the person who does the act'. 131 since Mrs Clarence knew it was
her husband and knew the act was sexual intercourse the concealment by
her husband of his condition of gonorrhoea was not, relevant to consent and A
was not guilty of assault occasioning bodily harm under section 47 of the
Offences Against the Person Act. This decision can be contrasted with the
earlier English decision \r\ R v Bennett. 122 in Bennett, V was infected with a
venereal disease following an act of sexual intercourse with A. The court
instructed the jury that they could find A guilty of indecent assault if V did not
know A had the disease, even if V could be deemed to have consented to the
act of sexual intercourse. The court held that A's concealment amounted to
fraud and that fraud vitiated Vs consent. The court seems to have adopted a
wider view of the term 'fraud' by including the inducing causes.
It rhay be possible to distinguish Bennett from Clarence since
the partners involved in Clarence were married, a fact which was important to
the court in the latter case who viewed the wife's consent as implied by law.
133 However, the legal principle which emerged from Clarence was endorsed
130 s. 2A Tas. Code' s. 319(2)(a)W.A. Code: s. 347 Qld. Code. The common law position
is stated in Papadimitropoulos (1957) 98 CLR 249 at p. 261 and is set out in statutory form in
s. SIR N.S.W. Crimes Act. Victoria has enacted a detailed provision on factors relevant to
consent (s. 36). However, fraud perse is not one of them. Fraud is covered by a separate
section; procuring sexual penetration by threats or fraud (s. 57). The insertion of section 36
in 1991 was arguably motivated by the decision in the case of Mobilio (1991)1 VR339.
131 supra note 75, per Stephen J at p. 44. Since this decision there has been some
intermingling of 'nature'.of the act with 'quality 'of the act in other jurisdictions, most notably,
Canada {Harms [1944] 2 DLR 61). This position has not been followed in Australia, see infra
and Fisse, supra note 71, at p. 181; Bronitt, S., 'Rape and Lack of Consent' (1992) 16
Criminal Law Journal, 290-314, at pp. 296-298.
132 170 er 925 (1866). Thisdecision was followed a year laterin f? vSinclair 13CoxC. C.
28 (1867) where A was found guilty of assault for infecting a twelve year old girl with
gonorrhoea. The girl's consent was held ineffective because she did not knowof A's infected
condition.
133 supra riote 75, per Willes J at p. 27-29, 32 andSmith J concurring at p. 37.
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by the High Court of Australia in Papadimitropoulos v R and affirmed by
the Victorian Court of Criminal Appeal in 1990 in Mobilio v R. Hence, as
the present law in Australia focuses on the nature or character ol the act
rather than its quality, if A misrepresents his or her HIV antibody status to V
and obtains V's consent to sexual intercourse on that basis, Vs consent will
not be held to be vitiated. This is an area of the criminal law where on its
application it could be said that there is a serious deficiency. The current law
on fraud as to consent encourages deceptive conduct on behalf of sexual
partners which could have catastrophic consequences.
There is one unreported Australian decision where a contrary
view to Papadimitropoulos and Mobilio has been endorsed. Gibson J in v
Hurst •'3® held that any fraud which procures V's consent will vitiate that
consent. This case confirms the Bennett view. Unlike the English position as
exemplified in Clarence , United States courts have held that a woman's
consent to sexual intercourse is vitiated by A's concealment of his infection
with a venereal disease. This view has been adopted irrespective of whether
or not the parties were marital partners. •'37
It appears that whether consent will be vitiated by fraud depends
on how the act or conduct is defined. If on the facts of Clarence it was
defined as 'infection free sexual intercourse' then there would have been no
consent on the facts. Similarly in the context of AIDS if it is defined as 'non-
HlV-infected sexual intercourse', there would be no consent where A falsely
leads V to believe he or she is not infected; there is fraud as to the nature and
character of the act. If defined merely as sexual intercourse then irrespective
134 (1957) 98 CLR 249. The position has been followed in Tasmania by Crisp J in fl v
Schell [1964] Tas SR 184. The court in Papidimitropoulos , supra note 130, did use the term
'mistake' rather than fraud which is arguably an extension of Clarence, Ibid. The effect of this
is to focus on the victim rather than the defendant, i.e. the victim's mistake and not the
defendant's fraud. A mistake as to marital status which precedes sexual intercourse will
vitiate consent now under an amended section of the Crimes Act (1900) (N.S.W.) s.
61R(2)(a)(ii).
135 [1991] 1 VR 339. The High Court refused special leave to the Crown to appeal from this
decision (1990) 24 Leg. Rep, 14-15.
136 Unreported decision ofSupreme CourtofTasmania 8th June, 1960.
137 State vMarcks , 140 Mo. 656, 657, 43 8. W. 1095, 1097 (1897) where a rape conviction
was upheld because V's consent was held vitiated by fraudulent concealment of venereal
disease. See Ex Parte Brown, 770 Okla. crim. 96, 139 P.2d 196 (1943) where A was held
criminally liable for exposing Vto venereal disease; and Epps v State, 69 Okla Crim 460,
104 P.2d 262 (1910) where Awas held liable for infecting his spouse with venereal disease.
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of the fact that V believes that A is not infected, V has clearly consented to
the act of sexual intercourse and the inducing causes are irrelevant. ^38
It appears however, that unless the view in Hurst is adopted,
then on the authority of the High Court in Papadimitropoulos, when dealing
with the offences of rape or sexual assault, a narrow view of 'act' will be
taken, i.e. the 'act' must be viewed as 'sexual intercourse'. Similarly,
Australian precedent would demand that the 'act' for the purposes of assault
must be viewed as 'an application of force', It may be possible that the
courts will choose not to follow such an interpretation given that the disease
being concealed is one that results in death whereas syphilis was treatable at
least in its early stages. This factor may be a basis upon which to distinguish
Clarence and avoid the interpretation of the courts in Papadimitropoulos and
Mobiiio. In any event, since Clarence was concerned with the transmission
of disease, and neither Papadimitropoulos nor Mobiiio were, it may be
possible to distinguish the latter cases on that ground alone, leaving Clarence
as the only authority to guide the court. And it may be that 1990s courts will
decide that Clarence is an archaic authority given that it implied that the wife
consented to the transmission of disease on the basis of being simply a
marital partner. As marital immuriity for rape has now been abolished in both
Australia and England the decision in Clarence lacks legitimacy. The
This point as to inducing causes was clearly stated in Papldimatropoulos , supra note
130, at p. 261.
This view has been endorsed in the HIV-rel,ated Canadian case of Ssenyonga (1993) 81
C.C.C. (3d) 257 (Ont. Ct. (Gen. Div.)). The accused who was HIV positive and knew the risks
of transmission through unprotected sex, had sexual intercourse with the complainants
without informing them that he was seropositive and infected them with HIV. He was charged
with aggravated sexual assault and criminal negligence causing bodily harm. The
aggravated sexual assault charges were dismissed by McDermid J and the accused died
before the trial on the criminal negligence charges could be completed. McDermid J
accepted the defence's argument that the failure to disclose HIV status did not constitute
fraud because it did not go to the nature and quality of the act. McDermid J stated 'what
created the danger was not the application of force but the presence of the virus ... they did
consent to the application of force inherent in the acts of sexual intercourse, which force was
not in itself excessive or dangerous'. McDermid also refused to import a requirement of
informed consent into the criminal law. The decision itself is surprising given that the
terminology in the Canadian Criminal Code in s. 263(3)(c) (which deals with consent for all
assaults including sexual assaults) had changed in 1982 from 'false and fraudulent
representations about the nature and quality of the act' to 'fraud' simpliciter. There is
previous dicta in Canada which suggests that where the term 'fraud' appears simpliciter, it
should be read more widely (Spence J in R v Bolduc and Bird [1967] 3 CCC 294, [1967] 2
CRMS 40, at p. 45 (SCC), and R v Maurantonio [1968] 2 CCC 115. at p. 117, 2 CRMS 375,
65 DLR (2d) 674) where Laskin JA believed the case should be treated as one of assault not
indecent assault. He pointed out that there was a difference in wording between the assault
and indecent assault provisions in that under the former the 'test is wider in that only fraud is
required').
RvL (1991) 103 ALR 557 abrogated the dubious common law rule that by marriage a
wife gave irrevocable consent to sexual intercourse with her husband. In England during
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House of Lords decision in Brown in 1993 may also be seen to have
weakened the decision in Clarence. Later courts following Brown may
decide that a person cannot consent to bodily harm simpliciter or bodily harm
involving HIV infection for no good reason. An innocent victim should not be
held to have consented to contract a disease merely because he or she
chose to engage in intimate relations. Certainly such comments have been
made in a number of United States cases on the point as early as the 1920s
and continuing to the 1980s.
There have been some statutory amendments which may
operate to reduce the harshness of the Papadimitropoulos line of decisions
for a person who consents to sexual intercourse following misrepresentations
as to HIV status. For example, following amendments to the Criminal Code
i
in Western Australia in 1985, a failure by one sexual partner to inform the
other of his or her HIV-infected status may fall under the term 'deceptive' in
section 319(2)(a) so as to nullify consent. This would avoid the difficulties
that have resulted from the legal interpretation of 'fraud'. In Victoria, section
57 of the Crimes Act (1958) was amended in 1991 to create a separate
offence of procuring an act of sexual penetration by fraudulent means.
The provision would cover the situation where A misrepresents his or her
infected status to V as a prelude to obtaining consent to intercourse.
A fails to disclose his or her antibody status to V
There is no legislative provision or case-law in Australia which
would support the view that the failure to disclose information or some
material fact, unaccompanied by any fraud or deceit, may result in a person
being charged for a criminal offence. In addition, it is unclear as to whether it
would be likely to render what appears to be a valid consent, null and void.
Liability only ensues for a failure to act and as stated earlier in this thesis, this
liability is only imposed where a person has a recognised duty to act and
1993 the House of Lords handed down a similar decision in R v R [1991] 4 All ER 481
casting doubt again on the decision in Clarence, supra note 75, which relied on the common
law rule.
Crowell VCrowell 180 N. C. 516, 103 S. E. 206 at 210 (1920).
••42 Kathleen K. v Robert B. 150 Cal. App. 3d 992 at 997, 198 Cal. Rptr. 273 at 276-277
(1984).
'''*3 Similar provisions exist in other jurisdictions: s. 218(2) Old. Code, s. 66 Crimes Act
(N.S,W.);s. 64(b) Criminal Law Consolidation Act (S.A).
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breaches the duty resulting in harm to V. This is in contrast to civil law where
the matter has been debated in the context of medical treatment. In Australia,
where a doctor fails to advise a patient of material risks inherent in the
treatment and the latter suffers damage that is not too remote then the patient
would have an action based on negligence rather than battery against the
health professional. A material risk is one which a reasonable person in the
patient's position if warned of the risk would be likely to attach significance to
it, or one which a medical practitioner is or should be aware that a particular
patient, if warned of the risk would be likelyto attach significance to.
It could be said, that where A knows of his/her condition and
fails to disclose it then this is akin to fraudulent behaviour, albeit of a passive
kind. The criminal law does not appear to draw a distinction between an
active type of fraudulent behaviour which occurs in circumstances where the
actor knows of, for example, his HIV-infected status or the fact he or she is
married but consciously misrepresents a different state of affairs, and, the
situation where the actor merely refrains frpm saying or doirig anything. In
fact, current case law and legislation would appear to support only the active
type of fraudulent behaviour, hiV infection brings to the forefront the
deficiencies in current law on this point. In particular, the actor who remains
silent is less likely to be prosecuted if it cannot be proven whether he or she
underwent an HIV antibody test and was informed of the results prior to
engaging in sexual intercourse with V. The present writer suggests that rather
than looking to fraud to vitiate consent one can simply suggest that
transmission of HIV is beyond the scope of the initial consent. Admittedly, if
this view was adopted, sex with an infected person must always amount to
rape or sexual assault if the victim is unaware of the infection. However,
the known presence of HIV is so inherently dangerous that sex with someone
Rogers v Whitaker (1992) 109 ALR 625, at pp. 633-634. See also chapter six where
the matter of informed consent to medical treatment is discussed in more detail, pp. 245-246.
However, in some states (e.g. Criminal Code (W.A) s. 319(2)(a)) terminology such as
'any fraudulent means' may cover passive fraud. There is some Canadian authority to
suggest that fraud must be a positive fraud (R v Brassso Datsun (Calgary) Ltd (1977) 39
C.R.N.S. 1 (Alta. S.C.T.D.). There is however, one Canadian case where it was held that
non-disclosure of employment status amounted to fraud contrary to what is now known as s.
360(1) of the Criminal Code (R vMonkman (1980) 4 Man. R. (2d) 352 (Co. Ct ). Whether
non-disclosure can stand on its own as a circumstance that will vitiate consent has not been
decided.
One could take this position further and suggest that following the principle in DPP v
Brown [1992] 3 WLR 556 where the victim consents to sexual intercourse with a person who
the victim knows is infected with HIV, his or her consent is likely to be deemed null and avoid
as against the public interest. See also chapter two, text and footnote 163 where the case is
discussed in some detail.
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who is HIV positive extends beyond the norm of scope of conduct initially
consented to in the same way that tackles behind the play in a rugby match
would be outside the rules of the game and hence outside V's scope of
consent. However, in Ssenyonga the judge believed that this view was only
relevant to assault and not to sexuahassault. In sports such as hockey
McDermid J held that the concern is about the nature of the force used and
whether it exceeds the scope of implied consent; in the .case of sex, the
degree of force is not related to the risk of being infected with HIV. It is
submitted that this decision does not deal with the main argument being
raised, that the conduct exceeds that to which consent was given. The
problem is getting around what the criminal law has said a person consents
to, for example, the criminal act rather than what they really consented to,
infection free sexual intercourse or intercourse free from the risk of
contracting a serious disease.
SEXUAL OFFENCES
HIV may also be transmitted during non-consensual sexual
activity. Non-consensual sexual assault or rape is an offence in all Australian
jurisdictions. Absence of consent is a required element and the issues that
will arise on that point have already been covered under heading 'Assault'. In
some jurisdictions, if the sexual assault takes place in aggravating
circumstances the offence becomes an aggravated sexual assault,
Although the provisions relating to aggravated sexual assault do not include
A's affliction with a disease as an aggravating circumstance, such a factor
could be regarded as such in the future.
Under section 319(1)(a)(i) of the West Australian Code, a
circumstance of aggravation is defined to include the offender being 'armed
with any dahgerous or offensive weapon or instrument or [where he or she]
pretends to be so armed'. This could cover the situation where V is
threatened with a syringe and forced to submit to sexual intercourse out of
••47 s. 185 Tas. Code ; s. 325 W.A. Code ; s. 347 Old. Code ; s. 192 N.T. Code; s. 61!
N.S.W. Crimes Act ; s. 38 {V\c.)Crimes Act; s. 48 {S.A.)Criminal Law Consolidation Act.
s. 61 (J).Cr/mes/Acf (N.S.W.); s. 326 W.A. Code. In other jurisdictions, aggravating
circumstances rather than create a separate offence will command a higher penalty in
sentencing.
For example, in the English case of F? vMalcolm[1988] Grim. LR 189, the risk of a rape
victim contracting AIDS was discussed as an aggravating feature in sentencing.
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fear that HIV will be transmitted through a needlestick injury. Similar
aggravating circumstances are also covered in New South Wales ^soand
Victorian legislation, it was unanimously held by all members of the court
\n R V Tout 152 that on a literal reading of section 61(c)(1)(b) (now section
61K) of the Crimes Act (1990)(N.S.W.) it is unnecessary for the offensive
weapon to be produced to have the effect of a threat under this specific
provision.
In Code jurisdictions where the aggravating circumstances that
the court can consider are specifically listed by way of statute, the inclusion
A's HIV status as an aggravating circumstance would not be possible without
legislative amendment. However, in Western Australia, section 319(1)(a)(iii)
of the Code also lists as an aggravating feature circumstances where the
offender does bodily harm to any other person. When read with the section
1(4), the interpretation provision in the Code, a reference to causing or doing
bodily harm to a person includes a reference to 'causing a person to have a
disease which interferes with health or comfort'. Hence if an accused were
to inflict HIV or a sexually transmitted disease on V in the course of a sexual
assault, it would be properly labelled a aggravated sexual assault. Western
Australia is one of the few jurisdictions to specifically legislate to cover such
circumstances. .
Threatening conduct may also vitiate consent in circumstances
of sexual assault or rape. In most States and Territories in Australia, threats
of violence will be render consent null and void. 153 Some jurisdictions also
cover the situation where threats are made to V concerning third persons. 154
In the AIDS context the circumstances might well involve an accused person
threatening the victim with a needle full of contaminated blood, to engage in
sexual intercourse with A. In addition to this being a threat by gesture type
assault it would, as already indicated, be either an aggravated sexual assault
or rape if V consents to sexual activity, as the consent would have been
150 s. 61J(2) Crimes Act (1900) (N.S.W.).
151 s. 41 read in conjunction with s. 38of the CrimesAct (1958)(Vic.).
152 (1987) 11 NSWLR251.
153 s. 2A Tas. Code; s. 319(2)(a) W.A. Code; s. 347Old Code; s. 61K(violent threats) and
s. 65A (non-violent threats) Cr/mes Act (N.S.W.); s. 92P(1)(a)-(j) Cr/mes Act (A.C.T); s. 57(1)
Crimes Act (Vic).
154 s. 61K(b) Crimes Act (N.S.W.); s. 92P(1)(a)(b) Crimes Act (A.C.T); s. 36(b) Crimes Act
(Vic) stated to be a circumstance where consent would not be 'free'.
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induced by threats of bodily harm. Clearly if A threatens V that he or she will
stab V with a syringe full of contaminated blood, A is threatening bodily harm
at the least. It would also seem sensible that the apprehension would need be
reasonable in the objective sense although this is not conclusive from the
statutory provisions. Some account needs to be taken of V's views in this
regard and of the surrounding circumstances. Arguably, on the grounds of
adhering to the principle of 'take your victim as you find him or her', the jury
should just consider whether V's fear has destroyed his or her ability to
consent. To hold that V's fear must be reasonable in these circumstances
would be contradictory to the common law rule relating to rape which states
that a defendant's mistake as to whether V is consenting to sexual
intercourse does not have to be objectively reasonable.
SYRINGE RELATED OFFENCES
Needle sharing is an offence under drug-misuse legislation in all
Australian States and Territories, irrespective of whether HIV is transmitted or
not. iss However, the ramifications of imposing liability in the context of HIV
transmission were canvassed in chapter two with the conclusion drawn that
increased prosecutions for drug use would be counterproductive to present
policies such as the establishment of needle-exchanges designed to curb the
spread of the virus. As stated earlier, if the criminal law is to have a role at all
in the context of AIDS, its focus should be on non-consensual harmful
conduct. The fact that there have already been reported incidences of
Needle-sharing is illegal indirectly in all Australian States and Territories. The provisions
applicable relate to permitting another to inject him or herself with a prohibited substance or
self-administration provisions could be applied to each party, (ss. 5 ('use' defined as
including introducing into any part of another person) and s. 12(1) (self-administration) Drugs
Misuse and Trafficking Act (1985)(N.S.W.); s. 31(1)(b) Controlled Substances Act
(1984)(S.A.); s. 55(d) (self-administration) Poisons Act (1971)(Tas.); s. 74 (injecting another
with drug of dependence), s. 75 (self-administration) Drugs, Poisons and Controlled
Substances Act (1981)(Vic.): s. 6(2) Misuse of Drugs Act (1981 )(W.A.); s. 169(2) self-
administration or s. 169(4) permitting another to administer a drug of dependence including
cocaine, and s. 171(2)(3) is of the same effect with respect to prohibited substances of which
heroin and cannabis are included Drugs of Dependence Act (1989)(A.C.T.); s. 13 (self-
administration), s. 14 (permitting another to use) Misuse of Drugs Act (1990)(N.T.)). Under
the Drugs Misuse Act 0987)(Qld.) the self-administration of drugs is not criminal. However,
under s. 9 of the same Act, possession is, and in a practical sense a user found in
possession of a prohibited substance would commit an offence. Section 6 renders it an
offence to 'supply ' another with a prohibited substance which would technically cover
needle-sharing. Further, s. 10(4)(a) states ' a person who has in his possession a thing being
a hypodermic syringe or needle who fails to use reasonable care and take all reasonable
precautions in respect of such a thing so as to avoid danger to the life, safety or health of
another commits an offence against this Act'. Section 10(5) gives police the power of arrest
a person found committing the behaviour outlined in sub-section (4)(a). This could be used
to harass users in 'shooting galleries' (where needle-sharing is frequent).
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robberies and sexual offences committed in Australia using HIV-contaminated
syringes as offensive and threatening weapons supports this view,
Clearly a 'threat by gesture' assault charge is appropriate in the
situation where A brandishing a syringe threatens to inject V with HIV
contaminated fluid if he or she does not comply with A's request. At first
glance, a possible causation problem arises because the risk of transmission
varies depending on the amount of contaminated substance in or on the
needle. However, if the various criminal law provisions are applied to syringe
attacks the causation concern becomes irrelevant. Under the provisions, and
following Tout, it is the threat, and the fact that another person fears for his or
her personal safety or submits as a result of the threat, that completes the
offence.
The fear associated with contaminated syringes may be
completely unfounded where there is a low risk of transmission. Criminals by
using them as weapons are elevating the perceived risk of transmission by
this mode. If citizens behave as if criminals pose a risk they will enable such
persons to continue to hold others to ransom through irrational fear.
Admittedly, asking individuals to ignore this type of threatening conduct is
tantamount to asking threatened individuals to adopt bold action by standing
their ground. Magistrates and Judges need to be suitably dismissive in their
approach to these incidents. This will rapidly defuse the myth perpetuated by
the media that there is a high-risk of transmission by this mode. "'57
Irrespective of assault, behaviour involving the use of HIV-
infected syringes would give rise to other offences. For example, syringe-
related offensive conduct could fall within the phrase 'uses any personal
violence' in section 240(1 )(b) of the Tasmanian Criminal Code to give rise to
a charge of robbery with violence, or aggravated robbery or robbery under
section 393 of the Western Australian Code. It would be an offence under
section 94 of the Crimes Act (1900)(N.S.W.); assault with intent to rob any
person (here the charge assumes A does not successfully carry off the
property); under section 95: robbery in circumstances of aggravation (where
some violence is used); under section 96: robbery with wounding; and under
156 Law is gunning for the syringe bandits'. WeekendAustralian, August 4-5, 1990, at p. 5,
'Warning of attempted murder charges for AIDS syringe threats'. The Mercury, July 31 1990,
'Police near AIDS-threat rape arrest'. West Australian, July 9 1991. In 1992 in New South
Wales, a person who had held up a supermarket with a syringe was convicted of armed
robbery under section 95 ((1993) 4(2) National HIV/AIDS Legal Link Newsletter, 2.)
^57 Pintos-Lopez, H., 'Reflections on Needlephobia' (1990) National AIDS Bulletin,
November, 30-32.
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sections 97 and 98; robbery with an offensive weapon. Most of these
offences carry a maximum penalty of 20-25 years imprisonment. Across the
Australian jurisdictions various offences of demanding with menaces,
conspiracy to extort money and threats to kill, would also be open,
Under most of the legislation relating to offensive weapons in
Australia, a syringe is capable of being regarded as offensive. The definition
of an 'offensive weapon' varies across the jurisdictions. Under section
240(1 )of the Tasmanian Code, although an infected syringe would not fall
within the definition of 'offensive weapon' as set out in section 1, it may fall
within the term 'instrument' also referred to in section 240(1 )(a). An offensive
weapon under the Northern Territory Code is defined as 'any article made or
adapted to cause injury or- fear of injury to the person or by which the person
having it intends to cause injury or fear of injury to the person.' This is clearly
wide enough to cover a syringe allegedly containing HIV-infected blood. By
contrast, in the United States a syringe used for injecting poison was held not
to be a deadly and dangerous weapon, but merely a vehicle for injecting the
poison. isQ
There are many offences in various State criminal legislation
which might also have application in the AIDS context where syringes are
used. These include possessing an object with an Intent to kill or cause
grievous bodily harm ""so and being idle and disorderly and in possession of
an offensive weapon or anything adapted thereto. However, the penalty
for these offences would not match the severity of the injury if HIV
transmission has occurred. Hence, they are not useful prosecutorial
alternatives to offences against the person.
It is possible that objects other than syringes could fall within the
terms of provisions like those in Northern Territory. Although the matter has
not yet arisen for consideration in Australia, in the United States the mouth
s. 99 Crimes Act (N.S.VJ.y, s. 35B Crimes Act (Vic.); ss. 414, 415 Code (Old.); s. 338,
338A, 396, 397, 398 Code (W.A.), s. 166 Code (N.T).
United States v Narciso, 446 F. Supp. 252 (E.D. Mich. 1977) at p. 211.
s. 31 Criminal Law Consolidation Act (1935)(S.A.), s. ^5 Police Offences Act (S.A.)
where an intention to harm has been held to transform an instrument otherwise innocent in
itself into an offensive weapon {Pelvay v Bresner [1963] SASR 36).
s. 69(1) Police Offences Act (1957)(Vic.); s. 65(4a) Police Act (1892)(W.A.); s. 56(1)(d)
Police and Police Offences Ordinance (1923)(N.T.); s. 6(1)(e) Vagrancy Act (1966)(Vic.).
although it could have been in the Tasmanian unreported case of Palmer
discussed supra note 117.
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and teeth have been held to be deadly and dangerous weapons regardless of
the presence or absence of HIV. This decision in United States v Moore
was a landmark one which held that parts of the human body were capable of
constituting deadly and dangerous weapons, despite authority to the contrary.
164 This was all the more problematic given that there was no evidence on
the facts of that case that the skin of the victim had been punctured by the
bite. Although the court ignored the AIDS aspect of the case, the decision
could be used as a precedent in the United States to find someone who
attempted to transmit HIV guilty of assault with a deadly and dangerous
weapon. The court held that as the human mouth harboured germs it was
capable of being such a weapon. The court in Moore reached the same
decision as it would have done if it had held the mouth was a deadly and
dangerous weapon because of its capacity to transmit HIV. This is somewhat
misleading because of the low rate of transmission through this mode.
Since Moore, there have been US decisions that have
supported this ruling and others 165 which have indicated an uncertainty
about whether the human bite is capable of transmitting HIV. Liability in
Australia will likely deperid upon the interpretation of the relevant statutory
provisions which define 'offensive' or 'dangerous' as applied to weapons. It
may also depend on the particular advocates performance and the experts
that they call to give evidence. The Moore case illustrates again how difficult
it can be to fit the unique circumstances of HIV transmission into existing
definitions for particular offences.
MISCELLANEOUS OFFENCES
A number of offences not already covered could be applied to
HIV transmission. These include transmission offences under public health
legislation (to be considered in chapter four), the offence of nuisance and
offences relating to conduct endangering life and conduct causing a grievous
bodily disease.
"•63 USDC DMInn. No. Crim 4-87-44and on appeal 846 F2d 1163 (8th Cir. 1988).
Stansbury, C. D., 'Deadly and Dangerous Weapons and AIDS: The Moore Analysis is
Likely to be Dangerous' (1989) 74 Iowa Law Review , 951 -967.
165 Brock VState 555 So.2d 285 (Ala. Crim. App. 1989) 287-288.
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(i) Nuisance
The offence of Nuisance as contained in the Codes and at
common law would also be applicable in the context of AIDS, In
Queensland section 230 of the Code states that a person who
does any act or omits to do any act with respect to any
property under his control, by which act or omission danger is
caused to the lives, safety, or health, of the public; ... or the
property or comfort of the public ... and by which injury is
caused ...
would commit a common nuisance. Under the provision the community
rather than an individual must be affected. This would have application where
HIV is transmitted through the use of needles or the failure to dispose of them
properly, although specific offences have been enacted to cover needle
disposal in Queensland and the Northern Territory. 1^7
There are no Australian cases on point, and under English
common law, charges of nuisance based on the communication of disease
have concerned the risk of contagion by casual contact, iss it js possible that
a person could be charged with common nuisance where he or she
continually places others at risk by his or her sexual behaviour. In the
context of HIV, in Thornton the Supreme Court of Canada upheld a
conviction for common nuisance under section 180(2) of the Criminal Code
where a person had donated blood knowing that he had twice tested positive
for HIV. In Canada, conduct which has the potential to endanger the life,
safety and health of the public may constitute a public nuisance, even where
the risk of actually causing harm to others is minimal. Given that the
terminology of the legislation is similar to that in the Queensland Code, it is
likely the Canadian decision would be a valuable precedent in that State. It
appears that it is unnecessary to prove that a person becomes infected, just
that the accused has exposed another person or persons to a risk of infection.
Contained in Tas. Code in s. 140.
For example, s. 10(4) of the Drugs Misuse Act {^986)(Q\d.)] s. 12(5) Misuse of Drugs Act
(1987)(N.T.).
Rv Vantandillo (1815) 4 M & Sel 73, 105 ER 762.
••69 (1991) 1 o.R. (3d)480;(1993)2R.C.S. 445.
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In another Canadian decision, R v Summers, the accused
was convicted of nuisance under section 180(2) where he placed sexual
partners at risk by having unsafe sex with them after he knew he was infected
with HIV. However, in Ssenyonga it was suggested that unless a person
offered himself to the general public the provision would not be satisfied. On
that ground, the charges relating to nuisance were dropped at the preliminary
hearing.
The case of Summers, is another example where more serious
charges of aggravated assault were reduced to common nuisance. If one
looks behind the judgment clearly the court was more concerned that the
accused did not practice safe sex and overlooked the fact that it is more
reprehensible that he engaged in sexual intercourse without telling the victim
of his infected condition. Judges must be careful what they communicate to
the public by focusing on specific activities and thereby impliedly labelling
some (in this instance, safe sex) as more important than others (such as
truthfulness as to HIV status). In Australia, it is more likely that this set of facts
would lead to a prosecution for another offence which would adequately take
into account that the accused acted with knowledge of his infected status.
(ii) Endangering Life; Causing a Grievous, Serious Bodily Disease
These types of offences have been enacted primarily in
response to the. AIDS epidemic in New South Wales, Victoria and Western
Australia. In New South Wales, maliciously and intentionally causing (or
attempting to cause) a person to contract a grievous bodily disease is an
offence under section 36 of the Crimes Act as amended in 1990. In the
future there will need to be a determination whether HIV infection is a
'grievous bodily disease'. If the provision does include HIV infection then the
section could be used to charge a person who stabs another with a syringe
containing HIV, and, where A transmits HIV to V through sexual intercourse.
The section does not cater for reckless activity. Further, it is unclear what role
consent would have in determining liability. Since this is a species of assault
then it is arguable that it may be raised as a defence.
A 1992 amendment to the interpretation section of the Western
Australian Criminal Code by the Criminal Law Amendment Act (No. 2) (W.A.)
inserted a definition of 'serious disease' into the Code. Section 1(1) defines
170 Summers vR (1989) 73CR (3d)32 (Alberta CA).
171 (1992)73 CCC (3d) 216 (Ont Prov. Div.) per Livingstone J.
132
serious disease as 'a disease of such a nature as to (a) endanger, or to be
likely to endanger life; or (b) cause, or be likely to cause, permanent injury to
health. Section 1(4) states 'In this Code, unless the context otherwise
indicates -
(a) a reference to causing or doing bodily harm to a person,
includes a reference to causing a person to have a disease
which interferes with health or comfort;
(b) a reference to intending to cause or intending to do bodily
harm to a person includes a reference to intending to cause a
person to have a disease which interferes with health or
comfort;
(c) a reference to causing or doing grievous bodily harm to a
person includes a reference to causing a person to have a
serious disease;
(d) a reference to intending to cause or intending to do
grievous bodily harm to a person includes a reference to
intending to cause a person to have a serious disease.
The effect of the legislation is to render a person who intends to
'infect another person with a disease of such a nature as to endanger, or be
likely to endanger life, or to cause, or be likely to cause, permanent injury to
health', to be liable for doing grievous bodily harm. Under the Code, murder
under section 279(1), grievous bodily harm under sections 294(8) and 297
and assault with intent to do grievous bodily harm under section 318(1)(b)
would be open in circumstances involving HIV infection as a result of these
amendments. In addition, a person who attempts to spread a disease that is
non life-threatening but would 'interfere with health or comfort' would also
commit an offence. There is one problem with the current definition of serious
disease which is the fact that it omits any mention of death. As such, it is
possible to argue that the so-called AIDS specific amendments in Western
Australia do not even cover HIV/AIDS because HIV is not just 'likely to'
endanger life or cause a permanent injury to health. HIV will lead to AIDS
which will result in death there being no cure for the disease.
As a result of the amendments, criminal liability is now
unacceptably wide as the failure to define 'disease' means that the provision
could conceivably cover medical conditions such as the measles. While the
theme behind the terminology would appear to be to avoid AIDS
exceptionalism, a narrowly directed prosecutorial policy would be needed to
prevent the transmission of diseases such as tuberculosis, and other airborne
infectious diseases being regarded as criminal. In any event, as the public
would not likely support the prosecution of transmission of such diseases
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such a provision merely promotes disrespect for the criminal law. There is the
danger though that such a broadly drafted provision might be used to
prosecute a person infected with IB who is behaving in a way that places
another at risk, in order to give credibility to the purpose behind the
enactment of the section.
In Victoria under a 1991 amendment to section 22 of the Crimes
Act (1958), the prosecution is required to prove that A intended to engage in
the conduct and that a reasonable person in the accused's position would
have realised that his or her conduct would or might place another in danger
of death. ''72 in victoria, in 1991 two sex workers were charged under this
section of the Crimes Act (1958) for conduct endangering life, The
charge, has since been dropped; In 1992 another charge was laid under
the section and at a committal hearing the accused was ordered to stand trial.
175 A further offence has been created by the Crimes (HIV) Act (1993) which
inserted section 19A(1) 'intentionally causing a very serious disease' (defined
in sub-section (2) to be HIV only) into, the Crimes Act. The offence carries a
maximum penalty of 25 years.
: The focus on intention and the exclusion of recklessness would
fit with earlier arguments about the need to reduce the numbers of persons
who might fall within such a provision. However, given that intention is least
likely to accompany transmission, there being few incidences of such
malicious conduct excepting syringe activities, then it could be argued that its
enactment is misdirected. If the argument in favour'of its introduction is
based on symbolic or educative grounds, it is hard to understand why it was
needed given the existence of section 22. Rather than act as a deterrent,
such legislation and the media's reporting of HIV-related criminal behaviour
may actually fuel criminals to commit certain acts such as syringe-related
offences.
Finally, the passage of legislation such as that in Victoria and
New South Wales was unnecessary given the amendments to public health
legislation in those States which will be analysed in chapter four. In fact.
172 f?v/Vur/(1990) VR 641.
173 Murray, A., and Greenwood, D., 'Endangering Life in Victoria?' (1991) National AIDS
Bulletin, August, 33-34.
174 Note, 'Police Face Costs as charges dropped' (^99^\)National HIV/AIDS Legal Link
Newsletter, December, at p. 6.
175 Anon, Transmission Offences' (^993) 4{2) HIV/AIDS LegalLink, 2-3, at p.3.
134
there is now an overlap of offences In the criminal and public health sphere.
The VVestern Australian approach is preferable despite definitional problems
because an attempt has been made to integrate criminalisation of HIV
transmission within existing law by the inclusion of definitions rather than to
isolate AIDS as the most dreaded disease, which in terms of history it is not.
The amendment which sees the transmission of HIV infection and possibly
other sexually transmitted diseases as an aggravating feature in sexual
assaults is commendable and long overdue.
It is unlikely that the prosecution agencies in New South Wales
and Victoria, States which have the highest incidence of HIV but also with the
most vocal AIDS activist groups, would be able to successfully mount
prosecutions under such provisions both politically and practically.
Prosecutorial policy requires that cases should not be prosecuted unless
there is a 'reasonable prospect of conviction'.There are also discretionary
factors which would need to be taken into consideration when deciding
whether to prosecute, such as the effect on public order and morale; whether
the prosecution would be counterproductive; whether there are other
alternatives to prosecution; the harsh and oppressive consequences of
conviction; the attitude of the victim; and the likely sentence outcome.
The legislation does not attempt to remedy the causation and evidential
problems addressed in this chapter. It does not appear to aim to educate
either. These factors alone render it more probable that such offences are
purely meant to be symbolic.
3. CONCLUSION
This examination of Australian State and Territory criminal law
principles and provisions has revealed that dealing with criminalising HIV
transmission through the direct application of pre-existing criminal law
provisions relating to the traditional offences of murder, manslaughter,
attempted murder, assault, sexual assaults and other miscellaneous offences
is generally fraught with difficulties. These include both evidential concerns
In 1985 the Shorter Trials Committee recommended that a uniform prosecutorial policy
be adopted using the reasonable prospect of conviction test. Sallman, P. (ed.). Report on
Sfiorter Criminal Trials, Canberra, Australian Institute of Judicial Administration Incorporated,
1985, 50-53. The policy has been adopted in all Australian States and Territories.
These factors constitute the prosecutorial policy followed by Australian DPP's. Brown,
•., Farrier, D., Neal, D., and Weisbrot, Criminal Laws: Materials and Commentary on
Criminal Law and Process in New South Wales, Sydney, Federation Press, 1990, at p. 296.
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and the problem of malleability of narrow statutes and criminal law principles
to cover the transmission of HIV infection. In this respect Australian
prosecutors would experience the same problems as those in Canada, the
United States and the United Kingdom have done.
For example, no matter how blameworthy or malicious, in a few
remaining jurisdictions, a murderer cannot be convicted unless the victim of
the accused dies within a specified period because of the applicability of the
'year and a day' rule to homicide. Further, homicide ignores consent as a
defence but consent may be a feature of most HIVtransmissions. In fact, the
offence of homicide does not differentiate between those who inform their
partners of their antibody status and those who do not but then neither does
assault law. In Australia, the precise terms that an informed consent must
take in the context of HIV/AIDS are not covered by existing criminal
proscriptions. There is a serious lacuna in the law, a lacuna which existed
prior to the advent of HIV with respect to fraud as to consent and the
difference to be drawn, if any, between an accused who is actively fraudulent
with respect to antibody status and an accused who fails to disclose his or her
status. The principle that inducing causes are irrelevant to determining the
nature of the act consented to should be outmoded as it currently encourages
deceptive conduct on behalf of sexual partners.
.As the intervention of the criminal law will be necessary in some
situations which involve either the use or threatened use of HIV, it is
necessary to have a clear view as to when criminal liability should be
imposed. If the prevention of harm should be seen to be the overriding
consideration in imposing criminal liability, as stated in chapter two, this aim
can be accommodated by treating as criminal only those activities that can be
characterised as clear non-consensual wanton acts of aggression or those
accompanied by an intent to cause harm. This chapter has revealed that pre
existing criminal law provisions and principles can be used in a few
circumstances and it is these circumstances where HIV is likely to be
relevant. This would be where A clearly knows of and misrepresents his or
her infected status and fails to use protective precautions, either intending to
infect another with HIV through high-risk conduct or where A recklessly and
not caring or not thinking whether V might become infected or not engages in
behaviour that places V at risk of infection. As the former is a highly indirect
means of trying to kill another it is unlikely that it would occur with great
frequency. It is significant that during the last decade of AIDS in Australia that
there has not been one reported incidence of this conduct occurring. It is the
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latter activity that is more likely to occur and would include syringe-related
criminal behaviour. Assault and attempted murder would be the most relevant
offences in the above examples and these offences are the also the most
malleable.
However, it is as a result of the perceived inapplicability of
existing criminal principles to HIV transmission that some States have
enacted HIV-specific offences within criminal legislation. As there are similar
offences set out in public health legislation the overlap is questionable and
provides some support for the view that the criminal provisions are purely
meant to be symbolic: a declaration of what society condemns. Although titles
have been given to these new offences such as causing a grievous bodily
disease they do not disguise the fact that they are intended for application to
HIV. Even though such provisions have been implemented in the US, that
does not justify their necessity in the Australian criminal law context. As
reported instances of transmission or attempted transmission of HIV have
been minimal in Australia, the types of situations most likely to arise for
consideration are already covered adequately by existing offences. A
separate statutory provision placed among criminal provisions would separate
HIV from other forms of disease. Enacting criminal laws meant to apply to
HIV/AIDS transmission solely may stigmatise carriers further. Decriminalising
conduct such as homosexuality, prostitution and drug use is undermined by
the enactment of HIV specific criminal offences which are then used to
prosecute sex workers and other more visible groups.
The politics surrounding HIV is readily identifiable by such an
act of the legislatures. As HIV is not as contagious as other serious
communicable diseases such as IB and Hepatitis B there is no justification
for this type of exceptionalism in dealing with HIV/AIDS. Such a stance will
bring the law into disrespect. It is not enough to say that we should focus on
HIV because death from AIDS will inevitably result from an act of
transmission. We should only criminalise and prosecute acts if there is a
substantial likelihood that transmission will occur. Viewing transmission in this
manner, it is obvious that the transmission of both Hepatitis B and IB should
be criminalised as well.
"'^ ®The legislation is set out in Tiemey, T. L, 'Criminalising the Sexual Transmission of HIV:
An International Analysis' (1992) 15 Hastings international and Comparative Law Review,
475 at p. 499.
^ see supra note 174.
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Placing HIV transmission in the sphere of the criminal law by
enacting a specific offence increases the scope for moral judgements to
creep into the criminal processes. Where juries are involved in the decision-
making process irrational fear and prejudice could affect their decisions.
There is the potential no matter how well directed by the Judge for jurors to
assess guilt by deciding how people should act according to their own moral
code. Such moral standards applicable to disease are better incorporated
within the realm of public health law. The case for the application of public
health laws and more specifically the creation of an HIV specific provision to
the spread of HIV in the public health context will be considered in chapter
four.
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CHAPTER 4
APPLYING AUSTRALIAN PUBLIC HEALTH LAW
TO THE TRANSMISSION OF HIV
1. INTRODUCTION
Prior to the emergence of AIDS, the only existing forms of liability
that directly criminalised conduct that would transmit disease related to
contagious diseases. One of the more controversial issues that has arisen
with respect to the AIDS epidemic is whether pre-existing public health or
criminal law should be applied to curb the spread of HIV/AIDS. Australian
State and Territory public health legislative provisions have historically
imposed liability on an individual who transmits a communicable disease to
another whether it be an airborne disease or a sexually transmitted disease.
As these provisions were specifically drafted to deal with the transmission of
disease, they may fit HIV transmission more readily than the pre-existing
criminal offences examined in chapter three. If this is correct, then there is
some support for arguing that penalties for transmission of HIV remain the
domain of public health law and not the criminal law.
However, amendments have been made to public health statutes
in some Australian States and Territories in recent years that were arguably
motivated by the emergence of HIV/AIDS. This was prompted by interested
lobby groups who made it clear to legislatures that a 'best fit' could not be
achieved by the application of out-moded provisions to the control of
HIV/AIDS. In this chapter individual liability under public health legislation for
transmitting or attempting to transmit HIV or exposing others to the risk of
infection with HIV will be considered by focusing first on the pre-AIDS public
health legislation, and then on the post-AIDS amendments. The separation
between the two periods of legislative activity will allow focus to be placed on
the political processes apd societal forces that have underlined amendment in
this area. The utility, both practically and politically, of an HIV-specific
transmission offence and whether it should be placed within public health or
criminal legislation, will also be examined. Overall, the aim of this chapter is
to construct a solid basis for why control of the HIV/AIDS epidemic should
rest primarily with public health departments. We can begin this quest by
examining the historical role of public health departments.
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2. HISTORICAL ROLE OF PUBLIC HEALTH DEPARTMENTS
It has always been the case in Australia in the sphere of health,
that the power to control, to intervene and to provide has rested with the
government. Prior to the eighteenth century in both the United States and the
United Kingdom this was not the position. Before the development of Boards
of Health, the maintenance of health was regarded as an individual's
responsibility. There was resistance to the threat of government intervention
in health as many in the population saw it as an interference with their private
rights. •" The government's role in matters of health may have been accepted
eventually because of the obvious success of public health in most developed
countries in improving the standard of living, reducing infant mortality, and,
mortality in general from both infectious and non-infectious diseases.
When Australia inherited the English public health system on
colonisation, the government presence in health was well-established. 2 it
became a colonial and later State government affair. After Federation in 1900
the States conceded none of their powers to the new Commonwealth or
Federal government following passage of the Constitution (1901). The
development of the Commonwealth was instrumental as far as health is
concerned in providing the budget for health matters although this role did not
coincide with federation itself. ^
In Australia and elsewhere public health can been regarded as an
agent of change, not just for the sake of change but to make possible the
achievement of other social goals. To this end, the role of public health
departments has been to foster social change and to motivate improvements
in health in individuals by changing lifestyles that minimise the potential
impact of behavioural and other health hazards. ^ The powers of public
health departments have expanded gradually from merely control over
sanitation and infectious diseases to controls affecting areas of lifestyle and
^ Pickett, G., and Hanion, J. J., Public Health Administration and Practice, 9th ed, St Louis,
Mobsy Publishing, 1990, pp. 8 and 99.
2 Although initially it was a power invoked by the Premier. It was not until the plague
epidemic in Sydney in 1900 that Sydney developed a Board of Health. This development
only occurred Curson believes due to pressure being placed on the Premier from the New
South Wales Branch of the British Medical Association to place discretion for health matters
(particularly decisions regarding quarantine) in a Board of Health (Curson, P., and
McCracken. K., Plague in Sydney, Sydney, New South Wales Press, 1990, p. 168).
3 Daniel, A., Medicine and the State, Sydney, Unwin Hyman, 1990, p. 4.
Davies, B. M., and Davies, T., Community Health, Preventative Medicine and Social
Services, 6th ed, London, Balliere Tindall, 1993.
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behaviour, environmental health, human biology and the organisation of
health systems and institutions. During the 1950s focus began to be placed
on health education as being the main way to achieve these goals.
One overriding aim that has always been present in public health
policy is prevention. The fact that public health officials must think and act
prospectively is what distinguishes it as a field of discipline from other
branches of therapeutic medicine. Decisions about preventative interventions
involve trade-offs: choices involving costs and benefits and choices involving
personal freedom and community values. Traditionally public health powers
have been broad in the area of infectious diseases. They have included the
authority to identify infectious diseases through screening programmes and to
require physicians and others to report names of persons suffering frorri such
diseases to the State. Screening and reporting have been accepted as
legitimate public health methods designed to protect the health and safety of
citizens. The ability to confine persons involuntarily illustrates the broad
scope of the State's public health powers.
Public health work is now also interdisciplinary and
interorganisational. It has the capacity to draw on wide ranging resources.
Even in the past many public health departments have required the police
power of government to implement its own powers. Non-governmental
organisations were not equipped to perform this function. Historically, police
involvement in matters of public health came to the fore during periods of
quarantine and originated from the law of nuisance. Quarantine was
regarded as abating a nuisance. ^ From that period enforced isolation of
individuals was always considered a legitimate police power. Nevertheless,
public health departments have always retained the primary, power to detain
and isolate.
The content of the powers of the public health official ®as opposed
to the police with respect to controlling behaviour that places others at risk of
harm is fundamentally different, reflecting the contrast between the overriding
aims of the criminal law and public health law. As noted, in the arena of public
health, prevention of harm in general is the overriding aim. As a collateral
point, historically public health law has been more concerned with preventing
danger to society than danger to an individual.
5 Cursor), supra note 2, at p. 168. See also Schwarz, B., The LawinAmerica, 1974, pp.
450-46.
®These powers are analysed indetail in chapter five.
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Although prevention of harm Is an aim of the criminal law, In
contrast to public health law, It seeks to endorse this aim by acting after the
event rather than focusing on preventing a circumstance occurring. In this
respect, the criminal law for the most part punishes people for what they have
done or failed to do rather than for what they might do. Therefore, the
criminal law by Its nature must Individualise social problems. The
Indlvlduallsatlon of criminality was a core Ideology of the Victorian era.^
By contrast public health seeks to minimise the chance that the
worst possible outcome will occur. It accepts risks as an essential component
of life and tries to manage It In a calculus that combines and estimation of
both benefits and costs. Although public health departments have been
criticised for laying too much emphasis on Individual behaviour as responsible
for societal Ills,® the overriding historical aim of prevention and the
Infrastructure of public health departments are In alignment with the ultimate
theme In the control of the spread of HIV: prevention. In addition, the modern
public health or health department has lost many of Its functions In the area of
mental health and environmental health to outside agencies. This
development places public health departments In a prime position to
concentrate on the prevention of communicable diseases. An analysis of past
and present legislation Is necessary to build the case for the responsibility of
curbing the spread of HIV/AIDS to remain with public health departments.
3. PRE-AiDS PUBLIC HEALTH LEGISLATION
Generally from 1983 across Australia, Initially AIDS and AIDS
Related Complex were added to the lists of venereal, dangerous-Infectious,
Infectious and/or notifiable diseases under either venereal disease or public
health legislation. ^ A number of other provisions became applicable to AIDS
^ Norrle, A., Crime, Reason and History: A critical Introduction to criminal /aw, London,
Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1993, at p. 31.
^ The 1970s tendency of US and Canadian public health departments to lay the blame for
drug and alcohol abuse on individuals led to an era of 'victim blaming' which was still in vogue
at the time of the emergence of the AIDS epidemic.. Public health policy ignored the role that
large tobacco and alcohol corporations played in the development and exacerbation of drug
abuse. (Pickett, supra note 1, at p. 99).
9 Venereal Diseases Act (1918)(N.S.W.), August 1984, AIDS 'A' and 'B' notifiable (former
classification for AIDS and ARC respectively) Public Health (Proclaimed Diseases)
Amendment Act (1985)(N.S.W.), April 1986, AIDS (all categories) proclaimed disease.
Diseases Notification Regulations (1984)(Vic.) Schedule 3 applicable to Health Act
(1958)(Vic.) required AIDS, ARC and lymphadenopathy syndrome to be notified, August
1984. Queensland Government Gazette 76 declared AIDS a notifiable disease under the
Health Act (1937)(Qld.) July 1983. Health Act Amendment Act (No. 2) (1984)(Qld.),
142
by the designation. These included provisions relating to quarantine, isolation
or detention, removal to hospital for treatment and compulsory examination
orders. In three jurisdictions, Queensland, Tasmania and the Australian
Capital Territory, however, only AIDS was added. This is short-sighted
because it is unlikely that persons suffering the debilitating effects of
symptomatic AIDS would be likely to engage in conduct that may transmit the
virus to provoke the implementation of compulsory measures to control them.
It is more likely that asymptomatic HIV-infected persons pose a threat to
society in this respect. Recognising this, frorri 1989 onwards HIV has been
added as an infectious and notifiable disease in all jurisdictions with the
exception of Northern Territory. 10
A number of pre-AIDS Acts provided penalties for persons who
while suffering from any infectious disease exposed themselves in any public
place without proper precautions against spreading the disease. The latter
December 1984, added AIDS to the definition of venereal disease under the Health Act
(1937). However, under new Health Act Amendment Act ('\988){Q\6.) ss. 53-58 relating to
venereal disease were repealed. AIDS is now referred to as a controlled notifiable disease
(s. 32). Health Act (1911)(W.A.), AIDS 'A' notifiable, September, 1983. AIDS 'B' (referred to
HTLV-III) notifiable January 1985, under Health-Dangerous Infectious Diseases Order
(W.A.); Health Infectious Diseases Order February 1993 designates AIDS and HIV as
infectious diseases. In December 1984, AIDS 'A' and "B' notifiable under Health Act
(1935)(S.A.). This Act was repealed by the passage of the Public and Environmental Health
Act (1987)(S.A.), proclaimed in 1989. The first Schedule defines notifiable disease to include
AIDSand AIDS related Complex. Public Health Acf(1962)(Tas.) from August 1983, AIDS 'A'
infectious and notifiable disease. AIDS was added to the list of infectious and notifiable
diseases under section 13(1) of that Act rather than to the list of venereal diseases, defined in
section 3 of the Act. Accordingly any provisions in that Act relating to venereal diseases will
have no applicability to AIDS. Schedule 3, Notifiable Diseases Act (1981)(N.T.), from July
1983, made AIDS a notifiable disease. In the Australian Capital Territory, the Public Health
(Infectious and Notifiable Diseases) Regulations Amendment (1980) September 1983,
added AIDS to the list of 'notifiable' but not 'infectious' diseases. In the legislation in South
Australia, Tasmania, the Australian Capital Territory and the Northern Territory, 'AIDS' is not
defined.
Public Health Act (1991)(N.S.W.) Schedule 1 and s. 14 specify that AIDS and HIV
infection are Category 5 'medical conditions' which are notifiable. Under the Health
(Infectious Diseases) Regulations (1990)(Vic.) AIDS (as defined in accordance with the
Center for Disease Control surveillance case definition of 1987) is notifiable. The Public
Health and Environmental Health (Notifiable Diseases) Regulations (1989)(S.A.) were
amended in 1991 to include HIV as a notifiable disease. In 1989 HIV infection ('all stages')
was added to the list of infectious and notifiable diseases by the Public Health Notifiable
Diseases) Regulations (1989)(Tas.). An amendment to the Public Health (Infectious and
Notifiable Diseases) Regulations (A.C.T.) in 1992 rendered HIV notifiable. By the Health
Infectious Disease Order (1993)(W.A.) both AIDS and HIV were declared infectious diseases.
s. 42 of the Public Health Acf (1902)(N.S.W.); s. 30 Public Health Acf (1962)(Tas,); section
135 Hea/fh Acf (1958)(Vic.) and s. 264 /-/ea/fh Acf (1911) (W.A.). Under s. 256 (1)(i)(ii) of the
South Australian Criminal Law Consolidation Act (1935) a person who wilfully exposes
him/herself without proper precaution against spreading any dangerous infectious disease or
enters any public conveyance 'without notifying the fact that he is so suffering to the ... driver
of the conveyance' is guiltyof an offence. Until this provision was repealed in 1992, South
Australia was the only State where exposing another to a disease was covered in criminal
law provisions.
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type of provision is obviously not applicable to a disease like HIV/AIDS that is
not spread by social or casual contact or by mere proximity. ""2 It is therefore
difficult to understand why section 11 of the 1991 New South Wales Public
Health Act was enacted. Under the section, a person commits an offence if
while suffering from a Category 2 (TB) 3, 4 or 5 (HIV infection or AIDS)
'medical condition', is in a public place (includes public transport) and fails to
take reasonable precautions against spread of the 'medical condition'. The
provision by its terms equates TB with AIDS even though their levels of
contagiousness differ markedly. Perhaps the section is aimed at prostitutes
which is unacceptable given the fact that the threat of HIV infection posed by
this group has been shown to be minimal.,
A number of pfe-AIDS statutes also contained sections which
rendered the transmission of infectious and/or notifiable diseases an offence.
This was generally through venereal disease legislation, under which either a
fine or a period of imprisonment could be imposed. These provisions were
retained in venereal disease or public health legislation for decades. The
legislation did not provide a right of appeal for the party convicted. There was
also no provision for confidentiality in proceedings to be maintained. In
light of this, it is fortunate that venereal disease commanded, in general, an
unenthusiastic prosecutorial policy. Transmission offences in New South
Wales venereal disease legislation were only repealed in 1988 following the
passage of the Summary Offences Act: Likewise in Victoria such provisions
were repealed in 1990 following proclamation of the Health (General
Amendment) Act (1988). In South Australia repeal followed the proclamation
of the Public and Environmental Health Act (1987) in 1989 and in Queensland
repeal of such provisions followed the passage of the Health Act
(Amendment) Act (1988).
"12 Perhaps this problem was recognised by the Parliamentary draftsperson in the Australian
Capital Territory, because the PublicHealth (Infectiousand Notifiable Diseases) Regulations
Amendment of 1983 added AIDS to the list of 'notifiable' diseases only and not the list of
'infectious' diseases. Hence s. 13 penalising exposure whilst suffering from an infectious
disease would not apply to an AIDS infected person.
as covered in chapter two of this thesis, footnote 3.
"''^s. 21 Venerea/D/seases Acf(1918) (N.S.W); s. 25 Venerea/D/seases Acfs (1918-1958)(
Vic ); s. 13 Venereal Diseases Act {^947) (S.A.); s. 54(12) Health Acf (1937) (Qld ); s. 310
HealthActA.).
This was with the exception of Western Australia (ss. 312, 314 Health Act (1911)(W.A.)).
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Prosecutions were laid in some States following contravention of
the pre-AIDS provisions. Statistics from Victoria between 1917 and 1920
reveal that 62 orders were Issued requiring persons to attend for treatment, 5
prosecutions were laid for disobeying orders, 3 warrants for apprehension
were Issued, 2 persons were prosecuted for Infecting other persons with
venereal diseases and 170 male and 129 female prisoners were detained for
treatment. "'6 Statistics are unavailable between 1921 and the late 1960's. At
the Commonwealth level this was due to a gap In compulsory reporting of
venereal disease. There was also a haphazard system for reporting among
the States with almost no record of prosecutions for offences Involving
transmission of a venereal disease between these periods. There Is one
reported Instance In 1963 of a male person who knowingly Infected another
with a venereal disease being sentenced to 9 months hard labour for breach
of section 21 of the Venereal Diseases Act (1918)(N.S.W). It Is curious that
the prosecution of prostitutes or any person or group of persons for
transmission of venereal disease was rare since prostitutes were targeted for
other types of practices such as compulsory examination and treatment
during the Wartime periods.
Despite the repeals already referred to, venereal disease
transmission offences are still applicable In Western Australia 20 and In
Tasmania. 21 in some jurisdictions transmission provisions relevant to
HIV/AIDS will also apply to other sexually transmitted diseases. 22 The haste
to criminalise the risk of HIV transmission Ignores the failure of previous
"•6 Lewis, M., Healthand Disease inAustralia: AHistory, Canberra, Australian Government
Publishing Service, 1989, at p. 269.
Hall, R., 'Notifiable Diseases Surveillance, 1917-199T, Communicable Diseases
Intelligence, 1993, 17/11:226-236.
Report of the Director-General of Public Health, N.S.W., 1963-1967.
documented by Daniels, K., So Much Hard Work, Sydney, Fontana, 1984. The position of
prostitutes was similar in the United States (Brandt,.A., A. M., No Magic Bullet: A Social
History of Venereal Disease in the United States since 1880 , New York, Oxford University
Press, 1987); and, in England (Walkowitz, R., Prostitution and Victorian Society: Women,
Class and the State, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1980; Mort, P., Dangerous
Sexualities, Medico-moral politics in England since 1830, London, Routledge and Kegan
Paul, 1987).
20 s. 310 Hea/f/7Acf(1911)(W.A.).
21 8. 49 Public Health Act(1962)(Tas.).
22 For example, s. 11 PublicHealthAct (1991)(N.S.W.) and s. 32A HealthAct(1937)(Qld)
as amended in 1988. These provisions are discussed infra.
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attempts to control venereal disease. In fact, when venereal disease
transmission or notification legislation has been enforced in the United States,
there has been no discernible effect on the rate of transmission of such
diseases. 23 Likewise in Australia, Commonwealth statistics reveal that there
was a steep increase in notifications for gonococcal infection, syphilis and
Hepatitis B in the mid-late 1970's and again in 1991. 24 it is uncertain whether
these trends are merely reporting peculiarities prompted by swings in medical
thought at particular periods. Admittedly, deterrence is hard to measure
statistically but the US experience of venereal disease legislation at least
would indirectly support the view that the mere existence of an HIV-specific
transmission offence on the statute books may have little effect oh the rates of
infection.
The provisions which imposed penalties for transmission of
venereal diseases were similarly worded in each State and Territory (with the
exception of the Australian Capital Territory, where transmission of a venereal
disease is not penalised under the Venereal Disease Ordinance {1956)
renamed Sexually Transmitted Diseases Act). But in 1984 AIDS was added
to the list of venereal diseases only in the States of New South Wales and
Queensland. 25 This effectively meant that in these States, a person could be
charged for transmitting HIV under provisions relating to epidemiologically
different diseases.
Section 21 of the New South Wales Venereal Diseases Act (1918)
read as follows:
No person shall knowingly infect any other person with a
venereal disease or knowingly do or permit or suffer any act
likely to lead to the infection of any other person with such a
disease.
The provision was unusual in public health legislation. Generally regulatory
offences created under-statutes excluding Crimes Acts or Criminal Codes,
such as public health or traffic legislation, will not specify a particular mental
23 Brandt, supra note 19, at p. 239. Endorsed also by Selvin, M., 'Changing Medical and
Societal Attitudes Toward ^xually Transmitted Diseases: AHistorical Overview', in Holmes,
K. K., Mardh, P., Sparling, P. P., and Wiesner, P. J. (eds). Sexually Transmitted Diseases,
New York, McGraw-Hill, 1990, 3-18, at p. 18 who suggests that statistical evidence shows a
steady increase in the incidence of venereal disease throughout the world from the
nineteenth century into the twentieth century.
24Hall, supra note 17, at 231-232.
Health Act {^937){Q\6),s54, Venereal Diseases Act
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element {mens rea ) within the terms of the offence. The offence is then
complete once the external elements (actus reus ) have been proven. 26
There is a presumption at common law that mens rea is required to constitute
any statutory offence. However, the presumption may be rebutted not only by
the words of the statute creating the offence, but also by the nature of the
subject matter with which it deals. 27 in 1985, a majority of the High Court of
Australia in He Kaw Teh v 28 held that the presumption of mens rea will
not readily be displaced. Nevertheless, later courts have cited this case with
approval but held that the statute in question imposed strict liability. 29
Section 21 of the New South Wales provision was not a strict
liability one given the inclusion of the terms 'knowingly' and 'permit'. 20 Hence
the provision would have required that A knew his or her infected status and
that the act engaged in was likely to lead to infection. By including the term
'knowingly' in the provision it would, in the AIDS context, encourage persons
to avoid seeking testing which would confirm their HIV antibody status.
Under this provision it would also have been necessary to prove beyond
reasonable doubt that A infected V, which is a part of the actus reus.
The Venereal Diseases Act (1918)(N.S.W.) did not specify the
procedure to be adopted for dealing with transmission offences. However,
section 19 of the same Act stated that where a matter was to be heard by a
26Where a specific mental state is not required to be proven bythe prosecution the offence
is known as one of either strict liability or absolute liability. With a strict liability offence the
defence of honest and reasonable mistake is open to A but is not with an absolute liability
offence: Gillies, P., Criminal Law, 2nd ed, Sydney, Law Book Company, 1990, p. 103.
2^ Sherras vDe Rutzen [1895] 1 QB 918. In Sherras vDe Rutzen Wright J stated the
following as exceptions to the rule:
1. acts "which are not criminal in any real sense, but are acts which in the public interest are
prohibited under a penalty,"
2. public nuisances,
3. "cases in which although the proceeding is criminal in form, it is really only a summary
mode of enforcing a civil right" (at p. 921-2). See also Lord Diplock in Sweef v Parsley
[1970] AC 132 at p. 162. Approved of by the High Court of Australia in Cameron v Holt
(1979) 54 ALJR 202 at 203.
Hence, where laws are made for the protection of the public health, safety or general
welfare the presumption may be displaced.
28 (1985) 59 ALJR 620.
29Asche J in Chiou Yaou Fa vMorris (1987) 46 NTR 1.
80Gillies, supra note 26, at p. 713 where he cites Lord Goddard in Reynolds vG. J. Austin &
Sons Ltd [1952] 2 KB 135 at p. 147 citing Somerset v Wade [1894] 1 QB 574: "a man cannot
be guilty of permitting that of which he does not know."
81 Where an offence using the term 'permits' is construed as requiring mens rea,
recklessness will be sufficient (Gillies, supra note 26, at p. 714).
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Magistrate, proceedings would be in private. It is not clear whether a
transmission offence would have been a matter to be heard by a Magistrate
although presumably if the defendant pleaded not guilty it would be. Further,
many of the provisions relating to venereal disease had no applicability to
AIDS. For example, provisions that contain clauses 'when free from infection'
have no applicability to a disease like AIDS where there is no cure. Flence,
adding AIDS to the list of venereal diseases in the New South Wales
legislation was a mis-guided response by the legislature.
Pre-AIDS public health statutes would be overinclusive with
respect to HIV infection because they would penalise mere exposure where
that behaviour is not likely to lead to the spread of the disease. Venereal
disease statutes are underinclusive because HIV can be spread by means
other than sex, for example, by needle-sharing or blood transfusions. In
addition, the statutes ignore the fact that AIDS is a fatal and incurable
disease. To impose only summary liability for transmission of a disease that
will inevitably result in death could be viewed as too lenient. The problem lies
simply in the fact that these statutes were not devised with AIDS in mind. The
knowledge of this fuelled arguments towards the creation of an HIV-specific
offence.
4. CREATING A SPECIFIC HIV TRANSMISSION OFFENCE
It has been stated earlier that historically in Australia there have
been few reported prosecutions for the transmission of venereal disease
despite the existence of a specific offence. This has also been the position in
both the United Kingdom 32 and the United States. 33 This may have been
due to two facts, the first that it was difficult to adduce supporting evidence
from unwilling complainants and second that it was rare for the disease to be
used in a threatening manner. Overall, it would be correct to suggest that
there was some prosecutorial apathy in the public health sphere with respect
to venereal diseases. By contrast, the advent of HIV has been accompanied
by a flurry of amendments in the criminal law sphere in Australia and the
United States reflecting an apparent interest in prosecuting transmission.
Given that the problems of proof that were encountered with venereal disease
32 Catterall, R. D., and Nicol, C. S. (eds). Sexually Transmitted Diseases, London, Academic
Press, 1976.
33 Cutler, J. 0. and Arnold, R. C., 'Venereal Disease Control by Health Departments in the
Past: Lessons for the Present' Am J Pub Health, 1988, 78/4:372-376, at p. 372.
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prosecutions will be likely to arise in the context of HIV, this recent policy is
rather curious.
By contrast, in the United Kingdom a similar policy has not been
adopted.34 This reluctance in the United Kingdom, in England and Wales at
least, may be fostered by the centralised system of government where public
approval for legislative action may be difficult to obtain due to the large
number of groups with pluralist ideas and values. In a federation,
notwithstanding the fact that pluralist groups abound, populations within a
State can be small and dispersed. In addition, a State can be characterised
as adhering to a particular political persuasion. In such an environment public
approval for legislative action could be gained in at least one State where the
general ethos of the population is either conservative or liberal. This is more
likely if the population rate is low. The continued reluctance of the Tasmanian
State government to legalise homosexual conduct between consenting adults
is testimony to this view.
Both criminal law and public health law claim responsibility for
imposing penalties following HIV/AIDS transmission. This concurrent role is
not unconstitutional as the States have powers to legislate in both areas, but it
is the present writer's view that there are strong arguments that can be
mounted as to why a specific HIV offence should be placed in one legal area
or the other and not both. The question whether there needs to be a specific
HIV offence requires a two-fold analysis in order to be answered. First it
needs to be clarified why a specific transmission offence is required and
whether it should be placed within either the criminal law or public health law.
Second, it needs to be decided what the terms of such an offence will be.
THE NEED FOR AN HIV-SPECIFIC OFFENCE - A CRIMINAL LAW OR
PUBLIC HEALTH CONCERN?
The first issue that needs to be addressed is why there needs to
be a specific offence at all. Although they do not explain why they concluded
as they did, the Intergovernmental Working Party on AIDS were against the
creation of a specific offence. This was despite the fact that the Party was in
34The Law Commission in their 1992-3 report on legislating for a new criminal code did not
cover the issue of transmission of disease (Law Commission, Legislating the Criminal Code:
Offences Against the Person and General Principles, Consultation Paper 122, London,
HMSO, 1992 and Report No. 128, London, HMSO, 1993).
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favour of the criminal law having application to the control of HIV/AIDS.3^ The
arguments for and against a specific provision need to be considered.
The obvious argument in favour of a specific offence is the issue
covered in previous chapters relating to the inappropriateness of applying pre
existing legislation. Both the criminal law and public health law are aligned on
this point. Under public health law as well as criminal law, the evidentiary and
causation problems as outlined in chapter three and this chapter and inherent
in transmission of the virus would be difficult to overcome. A Sydney
prostitute detained under section 32A of the Public Health Act (1902) (N.S.W.)
in August 1989, who publicly admitted continuing to 'work the streets' after
contracting AIDS 36_ was not prosecuted under section 50(N)) of the Public
Health (Proclaimed Diseases) Amendment Act (1985)(N.S.W.) (now known
as s. 13(1) of the Public Health Act (1991)), which penalises a person
engaging in sexual intercourse while infected with a proclaimed disease
(which included AIDS and mow HIV). This was despite the fact that in this
particular case there was a clear admission of having penetrative sex with
intention to transmit the virus. It is not clear why a prosecution was not laid.
Perhaps there was no complainant. The New South Wales provision requires
that the defendant be infected with HIV at the time of engaging in sexual
intercourse. Since the provision does not require proof of infection in the
victim, i.e. that transmission has been successful, then causation should be
easily established providing that there is evidence that the accused was
notified of a positive test result for HIV infection prior to sexual intercourse
taking place. Hence, the enactment of a provision specific to HIV exclusively
may potentially remedy some of the defects outlined earlier in this chapter
and in chapter three. 37
The second argument commonly advanced in favour of a
specific offence pertains to symbolism. In chapter two the necessity for
symbolic legislation in the context of the criminal law was canvassed. It was
stated that often offences with a moral component are seen as worthy of
33 IGCA, Legislative Approaches to Public Health Control of HIV Infection, Canberra,
Department of Community Services and Health, 1991, at p. 45.
36 'Prostitute with AIDS detained'. The Age , August 1 1989, at p. 3 'AIDS Prostitute freed
from prison'. The Age , August 2 1989, at p. 3.
37 Although the New SouthWales statute was dearly enacted with HIV/AIDS inmind it is not
truly specific to HIV infection and hence there is some lack of clarity. This point is covered
later in this chapter under 'Post-AIDS Public Health Amendments' where the New South
Wales statute is considered in some detail in conjunction with other State legislation on the
topic.
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criminalisation to set social standards as a symbol in order to have a deterrent
effect. Whether or not a provision is merely to have a symbolic effect is an
important question to be resolved as the motive behind any enactment will
surely be relevant to the effort taken to clarify its terms.
The creation of an HIV-specific offence on the basis of its
deterrent value may receive the support of some members of the community.
3® But, apart from the obvious argument that legislation is not a suitable
instrument to convey an acceptable standard of morality, the so-called
deterrent effect of punishment is difficult to test empirically. At least one
commentator 39 believes that such an offence can only act as a deterrent if it
is placed in the criminal law because otherwise people will not know of its
existence. The implication here is that people are more likely to know about
criminal penalties than public health ones. There is no evidence provided in
support of his theory.
An HIV-specific criminal sanction in the criminal law context is
likely to be superfluous depending upon who it is meant to apply to. For
example, it would be unlikely to be invoked against someone who is suffering
the debilitating effects of symptomatic AIDS. It may well be unlikely to deter
those who know they are dying irrespective of their stage of infection. In
addition, its existence in any sphere is debatable when one considers the
evidence in Australia of behavioural changes occurring amongst homosexual
men and prostitutes despite the creation of criminal offences relating to AIDS.
40 It is thought that education has been the catalyst for thgse behavioural
changes rather the threat of public health penalties or the fact that existing
3® Smith, K. J. M.; 'AIDS and the Criminal Law' (1991) 42(4) Northern Ireland Legal
Quarterly, 309-331; Tierney, T. W., Criminalising the Sexual Transmission of HIV: An
International Analysis' (1992) 15 Hastings International and Comparative Law Review, 475;
Anon, 'The Politics of AIDS: Wilson Tuckey's Address' (1988) 2/8 National AIDS Bulletin, 45-
47.
39 Smith, Ibid at p. 329.
40 See study by Harcourt, C., Philpot, C. R., and Edwards, J., 'Human Immunodeficiency
Virus Infection in Prostitutes', Med J Aust 150, 1989, 150:540-541 and discussed in
chapter two, footnote 3, and in relation to homosexual men in Guinan, J. J., Kronenberg, C.,
Gold, J., et al, 'Sexual behavioural change in partners of homosexual men infected with
HIV,'/WedJ Ausf, 1988, 149:162; Ross, M., Herbert, P., 'Response of Homosexual men to
AIDS'. Med J A'ust, 1987, 146:280; Commonwealth of Australia, A time to care, a time to act:
A strategy for all Australians, Canberra, Australian Government Publishing Service, 1988, at
pp. 67-69. The conclusion has been drawn in the latter articles that while an increasing
number of homosexuals were engaging in safe-sexual practices, voluntary HIV antibody
testing and counselling were listed as possibly being the only effective way to induce
changes in sexual behaviour. These articles were written before the legislative amendments
in both New South Wales and Victoria that took place in 1991 and 1993 which are discussed
in chapter three.
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criminal law provisions could be used to launch prosecutions. In fact, present
proscriptions against homosexuals, prostitutes and drug users have been
held to be responsible for driving those persons underground during the AIDS
crisis.
This leaves protagonists of HIV specific offences with their third
argument relating to education. Here it is said that an HIV specific offence is
needed for the purpose of promoting change. Smith, ^2 then goes further and
suggests that it is for this reason that such an offence should appear in the
criminal law rather than in public health law. This point has some intuitive
appeal but he offers it up as pure assertion without any empirical or
theoretical support. In fact, this thesis has illustrated to the contrary that the
law (particularly the criminal law) has a limited ability to lead and educate.
Using an HIV transmission offence as a teaching tool within the criminal law
is likely to be no more successful than present drug prohibitions have been in
educating people to stay off drugs. In addition, if the method behind
criminalisation is to show people that HIV is an evil to be avoided this may
not be justified if people already know that certain activities are in fact low-risk
for transmission and, that campaigns divorced from the criminal law, for
example, in the public health arena, have been instrumental in their current
education.
If the State is to be given the right to prevent a person from
acting it would need to be shown not only that the population were ignorant of
the modes and risk of HIV transmission but that the risk was extreme and
objectively unreasonable. If for example, people knew the risks but not the
magnitude would that level of ignorance justify even a 'soft' paternalistic
response? It would be near to impossible to claim that people are ignorant or
at least find such a percentage of the population that were, to justify such a
criminal law. By the same token, mere knowledge of a risk is not sufficient to
show that persons assume it voluntarily. If a law could be drafted in such a
way that its main purpose was to educate then there would be some use in
placing it within public health legislation.
Finally, the issue of creating an HIV transmission offence cannot
be considered in isolation of questions of administrative practicality. This is
not to say that practical concerns should be paramount but they are of some
Commonwealth of Australia, Ibid, at pp. 69 and 125.
Smith, supra note 38.
The issue of deterrence was considered in detail in chapter two, pp. 61-67.
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significance in deciding whether to place a penal provision in a statute book
and gain respect for that law. Such a transmission offence even within the
public health sphere would currently be unworkable because police (who
would also have jurisdiction on behalf of public health officials) will find it
difficult to detect cases and the presumption of innocence and burden of proof
all count against transmission being proved in a causative sense in a majority
of cases. However, in the public health sphere this may be remedied by the
duties imposed on doctors to notify public health departments of cases and
individuals who are endangering the public health. Police do not generally
have access to details about individuals who are posing a risk in the
community.
For the reasons discussed above and also in chapter two, if the
aim behind enacting an HIV specific offence is not to punish or deter
simpliciter but is to achieve behavioural change then this is a solid argument
for asserting that public health law rather than criminal law would be the
appropriate mechanism to bring it to fruition. If it can be shown that prevention
by education is enhanced by the inclusion of such an offence then the present
writer supports its establishment within the realm of public health. The
establishment of an HIV-specific offence within the criminal law which covers
a wide range of mental states may impede efforts towards further behaviour
change and should be resisted. Further, it may add little to already existing
offences.
WHAT SHOULD BE THE TERMS OF AN HIV-SPECIFIC OFFENCE?
If an HIV ispecific transmission offence was to be placed in public
health law it is highly likely that the drafting of the provision would be
problematic. There are many situations that surround an act of transmission.
It would not be an easy task to create provisions that both penalise and seek
to educate. It would also be difficult to draft penal provisions applying to HIV
infection without allegations of discrimination arising. Laws that penalise
transmission of the virus should not appear to discriminate against certain
identifiable social groups. The creation of sexual offences with respect to HIV
invites intrusion into the private lives of citizens particularly if they are
homosexual or drug users. The US experience shows that the creation of
specific offences does not preclude some groups being selected for
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discriminatory treatment. 44 jhjs has also occurred in Australia. 45 in reality,
persecution will exist with or without an HIV-specific statutory provision being
enacted given the fact that the groups afflicted with HIV infection are already
marginalised in society.
It would be necessary to consider whether an HIV-specific offence
should be one of strict liability. As noted earlier, many regulatory type
offences do not require proof of a .mental element to secure a conviction. In
1947, Starke J in Poole v Wah Min Chan 46 held that an Act of Parliament
may prohibit an act in such a way as to make the prohibition absolute.
However, the High Court in He Kaw Teh 47 sounded the death knell for such
. a stance by holding that it would be a rare situation where the presumption of
mens rea would be displaced. Since the transmission of HIV results
ultimately in death, the penalty should be severe and criminal principles
applicable to public health regulatory type offences would require that mens
rea be proven beyond reasonable doubt. To do otherwise would also
represent a.departure from previous practice with regard to criminalising the
transmission of venereal diseases only upon proof of 'knowing' transmission.
However, as Starke J suggests, such legislation commonly imposes penalties
without requiring proof of mens rea. 48 There are examples from drug
legislation, particularly drug trafficking offences, where legislatures are
prepared to erode fundamental rights by in some cases by reversing the onus
of proof and also imposing strict liability and high penalties.
A provision based on objective fact and not moral judgment and
narrowly targeted on the most dangerous modes of transmission would be the
most acceptable type to enact. Statutes must not be too broad based. An
example would be a statute that criminalised transmission accompanied by a
wide range of mental elements. The converse is the statute that is
overinclusive in terms of conduct. For example, in the Commonwealth of
Independent States (CIS) (formerly Soviet Union), under legislation passed in
1987,
44 Forexample, in the United States, many ofthe provisions that are HIV-specific, focus on
prostitutes (Tierney, supra note 38, at fn 199).
48 Asdiscussed in the conclusion to chapter three, footnote 179 citing fn 174.
46 (1947) 75 CLR 216.
47 (1985)59ALJR620.
48 in Poole vWah Min Chan (1947) 75 CLR 218, at p. 231.
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any person who knowingly exposes another person to the
risk of infection by AIDS shall be liable to deprivation of
liberty of up to five years.
Similar terminology appears in section 189 (as translated) of the Czech
Republic (formerly Czechoslovakia) Penal Code (1961), which reads;
Any person who intentionally occasions or aggravates a
danger of the introduction or spread of an infectious human
disease [AIDS included] shall be liable to a sentence of up to
three years imprisonment or to correctional measures,
Chapter one has revealed that not every action is likely to transmit
HIV. Many are very low risk for transmission. However, under these
provisions such activities are criminal. Adding terms such as 'grave and
unjustifiable risk of infection' encourage the need for definition and would lead
to a debate about the degree of risk involved in some activities compared to
others. Vague terminology such as the phrase 'intimate conduct' which
appeared in the Illinois Annotated Statutes 1989 should be avoided.
Carefully crafted laws could serve to ensure that liability is
clearly delineated to protect both the victim and the accused. The elements
of the offence need to be in a format that can be comprehended by both A,
who is obliged to observe the law, and, where appropriate, by a jury
empanelled to participate in the enforcement of the offence.
Such an offence would by its terminology need to ensure that the
transmission of HIV should only be penalised if the person:
(a) knows that he or she is HIV-infective and has been advised
not to engage in unsafe sexual or needle-sharing activities,
(b) does not notify his or her partner of his or her HIV antibody
status or does not take precautions to prevent the exchange of
infected bodily fluids, and
49Paragraph 2 of Decree of 25August 1987 of the Presidiurti of the USSR Supreme Soviet
on measures for the prevention of infection by the AIDS virus (Izvestia, August 26 1987, p. 2)
inserting new section 115 into the Penal Code of the RSFSR (1960) reproduced in WHO,
Legislative Responses to AIDS, Dordrecht, Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 1989, at p.193).
^9 Czech Socialist Republic Notice of 2 December 1987 of the Ministry of Justice of the
Czech Socialist Republic establishing the list of communicable disease in main for the
purposes of sections 189-190 of the Penal Code of 1961 (Sbirka zakonu Ceskoslovenska
socialisticka republika, December 16 1987, No. 23, Serial no. 104, at p. 574) reproduced by
WHO, Ibid, at p. 43-44.
§ 12-16.2. Crim. Transmission of HIV, Illinois Annotated Statutes, ch. 111^1, para. 7306,
1989.
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(c) engages in sexual penetration or needle sharing or
engages in needle trauma (includes injecting infected syringe
into another).
The penalty should reflect the fact of the gravity and incurability
of HIV-infection.
Even these characteristics could be criticised on a number of
grounds. For example, criterion (a) would encourage persons not to appear
for testing. On the other hand, it could be argued that it is unjust to
criminalise unknowing transmission. Criterion (a) reduces problemsof proving
that A was indeed infected at the time of the act said to transmit HIV to V
although it does not solve the problem of ascertaining if V was already
infected. Medical evidence could be called to document A's infected status.
The ignorant would not be charged under the provision. Further, it does not
call for inferences to be drawn that A should have known what would occur
because he or she was a member of a high-risk group. The provision also
places the onus on medical practitioners to advise an HIV-infected person to
take precautions to prevent the infection being transmitted to others. Under
this provision, the fact that there is a low probability of HIV being transmitted
on one occasion is ignored. It reality, this provision penalises health
endangerment which is a sound idea if it is to be placed in public health
legislation.
The advantage in criterion (b) is that it encourages notification and
honesty in relationships and educates the public as to the need for
precautions to be adopted. By adopting safe sexual practices for HIV,
protection would also be afforded against the transmission of other sexually
transmitted diseases. The IGCA Working Party suggested that an insistence
or agreement on use of safe sexual practices should be made a partial
defence to transmission offences. ^2 Community groups by contrast have
argued that it be a complete defence. This is not appropriate as the risk of
transmission should be known and consented to by both participating partners
even if the risk is small, for example, if a condom breaks or lesions are
present. Any defence of safe practices should depend upon who instigates
the measures, a point which the Working Party did not consider. In the
Working Party's view a full defence is available where a person consents to
the risk of infection and understands both the nature and quality of the act.
Although some people will accept the disclosure and act accordingly because
they do not accept the risk to be great, the law in one sense would be
^2 IGCA, supra note35, at p. 47.
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encouraging people to consent to death given the incurable nature of HIV
infection. 53 Bronitt believes that a defence of protective measures is
unnecessary because use of such measures would negate the intent required
for committing the offence. 54 While true from a legal liability standpoint, one
must bear in mind the purpose behind the establishment of the offence and
the educative aspects to be gained.
Rather than to simply invalidate consent in all circumstances, it
would be preferable to encourage or legally require the disclosure of HIV
status between persons. This is in effect what the draft provision seeks to do.
Such a requirement is less of an inroad on individual freedom than outright
restrictions on consent. If a person is fully informed or has taken precautions
to protect himself or herself against transmission of HIV when engaging in
activities that are recognised as high-risk such as sexual intercourse and
needle-sharing then the risk could not be said to be extreme so as to warrant
interference with his or her ability to consent. This 'softer' form of paternalism
is likely to be more acceptable to the public. It has not been considered
whether an individual should both fully inform his or her partner and take
precautions when engaging in high-risk activity. Such a requirement might be
expecting to much of some people leading them to neglect both and thus
places others at risk. It is preferable to leave the choice open to people. It is
understandable that some individuals would be more likely to use precautions
than advise their prospective partners of their HIV status because they fear
an irrational response from their partner.
Criterion (c) covers those activities medically documented as
being most at risk for transmission of HIV. Hence not all. sexual activities
(such as oral sex) are covered. This keeps interference in sexual
relationships to the minimum. Moreover, biting and spitting which are low risk
for transmission of HIV would not be covered by the provision.
Under this proposal it would be unnecessary to prove an intent to
harm or that HIV was actually transmitted. This does not mean that the
offence is one of absolute liability. The provision requires actual knowledge on
the part of A that he or she is infected. It also assumes that A knows what
activities are likely to transmit HIV because he or she has been counselled
53 If such a defence were to be enacted in the criminal law sphere there would at least in
Tasmania be some conflict with section 53 of the Code, which states that a person cannot
consent to an injury likely to cause death.
54 Bronitt, S., 'Criminal Liability for Transmission of HIV/AIDS' (1992) 16 Criminal Law
Journal, 65-93, at p. 92. This point is not strictly relevant to the draft provision under
discussion since there are no mental states prescribed.
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after receiving the test result. The proposed offence is therefore more likely
to be one of strict liability. As such the defence of honest and reasonable
mistake would be open to A. ^5
Terms denoting the mental states of intention, recklessness and
negligence are avoided. This means that these terms would not need to be
defined within the statutory provision and any State or Territory differences in
their interpretation (for example, the argument whether intention includes
recklessness ss) could be ignored. It could be argued that there is no reason
why recklessness or negligence in the transmission of HIV should not be
criminalised. In fact, it was suggested in chapter three, that these mental
states will most commonly accompany HIV transmission. In addition, reckless
or negligent acts are often treated by the,criminal law as no less serious than
intentional ones; but, in the case of HIV/AIDS they may be harder to prove
than the deliberate and intentional wanton acts of aggression of, for example,
the syringe bandit. Criminalising reckless or negligent transmission in the area
of public health may provoke the use of safe precautions by infected persons
and encourage disclosure to sexual partners. It is true that if negligence
were to be a form of liability then the facts which would prevent liability and
those which would need to be proven to incriminate a person, could be clearly
set out. For example, to negate a finding of negligence a person could be
required to show that he or she had obtained a negative test result prior to the
offence and that precautions had been used. However, it is arguable that the
draft provision covers this very situation without resorting to terminology which
is apt to confuse.
Conversely, prosecuting the reckless or negligent transmission of
HIV would affect a very large population. People might be held accountable
not only for what they know, but also for what they reasonably should know,
and there are potentially thousands of people who could be susceptible to
criminal charges if this were the case. With respect to negligence, A could be
held responsible even if he or she did not know he or she had HIV so long as
a reasonable person in his or her circumstances should have known or should
have taken steps to find out. It is more difficult to support liability in negligence
which runs counter to the subjectivist nature of criminal law within Australia.
Arguably the criminal stigma should be reserved for conscious wrongdoers.
The fact that negligence which is objectively based on community standards
supra note 26.
discussed in chapter three (pp. 89-94) where the mental states of intention and
recklessness are considered in the crime of Ivlurder.
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is omitted from the proposed statutory provision would mean that juries would
not have the final decision on what A should have known. Some members of
the jury could have irrational views embedded in their minds by the hysteria
that has surrounded HIV/AIDS.
5. POST-AIDS PUBLIC HEALTH LEGISLATION
As noted earlier in this chapter, it may have been the recognition
fostered by particular lobby groups and the various governmental AIDS
Committees, ^7 of the shortcomings of the pre-AIDS public health statutes,
that led some legislatures to devise a new offence dealing with transmission
of infectious diseases. Amendments to many statutes resulted in repealing
former venereal disease legislation and rewriting much of the former
communicable disease provisions in public health statutes.
It also brought to the attention of legislators and those within public
health departments the opportunities for the exercise of investigatory and
prosecutorial prejudice provided by the former venereal diseases legislation
which has in the past affected certain groups, such as prostitutes. However, in
light of this the initial legislative response was not acceptable. Although
HIV/AIDS was taken out of the realm of venereal disease, focus was again
placed on the activities of minority groups. During the reign of syphilis in the
nineteenth century these provisions had been enforced against women and
particularly 'fallen women' or prostitutes. ^8 yyjth the so-called AIDS
amendments governments through their public health policies again allowed
women as prostitutes and male homosexuals to be singled out as the sources
of infection. 59 iv drug users were also focused on but by the police who
were using their powers under drug misuse legislation. It has been argued by
some that this is an 'unavoidable discriminatory consequence of the present
distribution pattern of infection'.5o While true to some extent there is no need
for this to be manifested in prosecutorial policy which places education of
heterosexuals at risk. Such a policy merely supported.what has always been
asserted, that only the highly visible will be selected by law enforcement
57Commonwealth ofAustralia, supra note 41.
58 Daniels, supra note 19;Brandt, supra note 19;Parmet, W. E., 'AIDS andQuarantine: A
Revival of an Archaic Doctrine' (1985) 14 Hofstra Law Review, 53-90.
59 as the case of 'Charlene', illustrates, supra note 36 and isdiscussed in chapterfive.
88Smith, supra note 38.
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officials who cannot enter the bedrooms of the nation. In the middle to late
1980s one would not have been mistaken for thinking that Australia's public
health policy had not advanced far from that existing in the nineteenth century
except that there was one important difference. Instead of women being
marginalised as with the venereal disease policy of the two Wars which was
aimed at prostitutes exclusively, in addition, AIDS saw the marginalisation of
other social minorities: homosexuals and IV drug users.
An examination of the legislation would support these views. In the
middle to late 1980s Queensland, New South Wales, South Australia and
Victoria passed new public health legislation that created an offence for a
person to transmit HIV to another person. The provisions were not directly
AIDS-specific offences but could be said to have been highly motivated by
AIDS. The interpretation provisions in the Acts have been amended and
government proclamations have been passed to include AIDS or HIV infection
(in various stages) as infectious diseases for the purpose of the provisions.
The passage of the Queensland and New South Wales legislation
may be perceived as a political move to calm community responses in the
early days of the epidemic. The resulting legislation has been condemned as
an example of ill-considered action by governments.®"' The enactment has
been criticised as exemplifying the reluctance of politicians to accept
unanimous advice from experienced professionals that legislation may not be
a panacea for society's ills. ®2 in 1993 Tasmania passed legislation also
covering this area. The legislation from each of the States will be examined
separately in order to focus on the breadth of the provision and whether it
corresponds adequately to the ideal legislative provision set out in an earlier
section of this chapter.
QUEENSLAND
The Queensland Health Act Amendment Act (No. 2 )(1984)
followed the 1984 'baby transfusion cases'. Three babies died after birth from
Altman, D., AIDS in the Minds of America, New York, Anchor Press/Doubleday, 1986, at
p.185. He refers to the sensationalism by the press as it appears in 'States Move on AIDS
Peril', Sydney Morning Herald, November 17 1984, and Yvonne Preston, The AIDS Panic: a
Modern-Day Witch-hunt', Sydney Morning Herald, December 10 1984.
See Carr, A., 'AIDS: The Australian Response', Meeting the Challenge, Canberra,
Australian Government Publishing Service,1986, 50-55, Kirby, M., ineffective and Unjust
Laws, unpublished abstract, 1987 and Dwyer, J. M., 'Legislating AIDS Away', Med J Aust
1985, 143:276-277. McGuirl, M. C., Gee, R. N., 'AIDS: An Overview of the British,
Australian and American Responses' (1985) 14 Hofstra Law Review, 107-135.
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receiving transfusions of blood donated by an infected carrier. Altman
describes the pandemonium that erupted in Queensland as a "modern-day
witch hunt", in which the conservative party of that state 'insinuated that gays
were deliberately setting out to contaminate others with "bad blood"63
Section 3(a) of the Health Act Amendment Act (No. 2 j(1984)
added AIDS to the list of venereal diseases for the purpose of section 54 of
the Health Act (1937). Subsections 3 (f)-(i) of the Act imposed a penalty of
$10,000 0/ 2 years imprisonment or both on any person who knowingly
infected any other with AIDS unless, at the time the infection was transmitted,
the infected person was the spouse or connubial of the first-mentioned
person, knew about the conditiori of the infected person and voluntarily ran
the risk of being infected. Therefore A would not be able to rely on a defence
if the virus was transmitted to V even if A .disclosed his or her infected status
to V unless A was married to or a de facto of V. Although the provision may
be viewed as having a realistic application in the sense that it is rare for HIV
to be contracted through one contact with the infected agent, it could also be
argued that the provision is ill-conceived because it appears to encourage
honesty between persons only involved in more permanent relationships. This
section could also have applied to the transmission of HIV through needle
sharing, as a particular mode of transmission was not specified.
In 1988, the Health Act Amendment Act was passed which
technically repealed these provisions and removed AIDS from the list of
venereal diseases. This was timely because adding AIDS to the list of
venereal diseases gave moral connotation to the disease, and ignored the
fact that the virus could be spread by other means. The 1988 legislation did
re-enact some of the old provisions but with different definitions guiding
interpretation. For example, under the 1988 Act. AIDS is regarded as a
'controlled notifiable disease'. Section 48 repeated section 3 (f)-(i) of the old
1984 Act, except it had application to other 'controlled notifiable diseases'.
This Queensland provision only perialised the person transmitting
the infection upon proof of infection. In addition, the section was couched in
terms of knowingly infecting another person, not knowingly creating a risk of
infection. The former would require that the infection be transmitted whereas
the latter would not. Under the former the accused must know that AIDS will
be transmitted. The fact that the legislature did not frame the offence in
terms of the full range of risk-creating conduct with respect to the
63 Altman, supra note 61, at p. 185.
161
transmission of HIV is very likely to be taken to indicate that there must be at
least a high probability of transmitting AIDS and the accused knew this,
before the offence will be committed. This means there will be many cases
where conviction for knowingly infecting will not be possible, whereas it would
have been if the provision had imposed liability where A engages in conduct
at risk of transmitting AIDS. It is preferable for the provision to have an
educative function; it should seek to prevent people placing others at risk of
infection.
The 1988 provision was defective because medically one cannot
transmit AIDS. Only HIV infection can be, transmitted. Therefore, the
offence of knowingly infecting another with AIDS was medically impossible to
commit and could have resulted in charges against an accused person being
dismissed. In 1993, the provision was amended by providing two alternative
heads of liability. Under the amendments, 'a person must not deliberately or
recklessly put someone else at risk of infection from a "controlled notifiable
disease"' (s. 48(2)) or 'must not deliberately or recklessly infect someone with
a controlled notifiable disease' (s. 48(2)(A)). The defect with respect to AIDS
and HIV terminology has also been corrected.
NEW SOUTH WALES
Under section 50(N) of the Public Health (Proclaimed Diseases)
Amendment Act (1985), which has been reproduced in amended terms as
section 13(1) of the Public Health Act (1991), it was an offence to have sexual
intercourse (which is not defined) with another person,
if that person knows he suffers from a
sexually transmissible medical condition
unless before sexual intercourse takes place,
the other person has.
(a) been informed of the risk of contracting a
proclaimed disease from the person with
whom sexual intercourse is proposed, and,
(b) voluntarily agreed to accept that risk.
This problem has been an ongoing one in the criminal justice arena, It can be seen in the
judgments in US \f Moore (USDC D Minn. No. Crim 4-87-44 and on appeal 846 F 2d 1163
(8th Cir. 1988)) fuelling the hysteria that AIDS itself can be transmitted rather than HIV. In
Australia in 1993 a sentencing judgment set down the importance of the difference implying
that there is some level of judicial ignorance on the point (R v Dowlett unreported judgment
NSW Court of Criminal Appeal, 6 July 1993).
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For the purposes of this section a 'sexually transmitted medical condition' 65
is defined to include AIDS and HIV.
Section 50(N) was criticised as likely to drive HIV sufferers
underground instead of presenting themselves to clinics for treatment, advice
or counselling. 66 in addition, section 50(N) came into effect at a time when
medical knowledge about the virus, its modes of transmission and methods
of prevention, were inconclusive. The legislation was passed prior to April
1985 when blood screening procedures were first implemented at blood
facilities in Australia. Hence, the legislation became underinclusive as more
scientific knowledge was acquired, particularly that HIV could be transmitted
also by needle sharing. It is an excellent example of the problems that may
arise" when legislators pass legislation ahead of professional knowledge.
Although the New South Wales provision does specifically deal with
assumption of risk, the section fails to deal adequately with question of what
should be encompassed within an informed consent.
Unlike the original Queensland legislation, section SON of the New
South Wales Act, focuses specifically on sexual intercourse as a mode of
transmission, to the exclusion of any other mode. For example, an IV drug
user infecting another through the use of shared needles would not be
covered by the legislation. This may lend weight to the argument that this
legislation, like that in Queensland, was aimed primarily at homosexual
activity, although the section would clearly penalise heterosexual intercourse
also. Acts of injecting another with an infected syringe may be the least
problematic in terms of proof. This is especially so where the victim has no
other high-risk practices, the act is deliberate and there are witnesses to the
act. This lacuna in public health legislation may be one reason why a
prosecution under criminal legislation for attempted murder was laid in the
case involving a prison warder in a New South Wales prison who was
wounded by an inmate with a syringe containing HIVcontaminated blood. 67
Under r. 34D Public Health Regulations (1960)(N.S.W.) as amended in 1985 a
'proclaimed disease' to which the section formerly referred included AIDS, Lymphadenopathy
syndrome or the condition of having, or having antibodies to, the AIDS virus.
The authors are outlined in note 61.
'AIDS jab may bring murder attempt count'. The Mercury. July 23 1990, p. 1 and 'AIDS
stabbing case in court'. The Mercury, August 7 1990. See also chapter three, footnote 115.
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VICTORIA
In May 1990 the Health (General Amendment) Act (1988) came
into operation amending the Health Act 958) and providing penalties for
recklessly transmitting infectious diseases (including HIV/AIDS). The
legislation is prefaced with a set of principles that 'apply for the purposes of
the application, operation and interpretation of the legislation'. 68 jhe main
thrust behind the principles is that-
[T]he spread of infectious diseases should be prevented or
limited without imposing unnecessary restrictions on personal
liberty or privacy. 6^
Under section 120(1) of the Act it is an offence punishable by a
fine of $20,000 (200 penalty units) for a person to knowingly or recklessly
infect another person with an infectious disease. Section 120(2) provides a
defence where 'the person infected with the infectious disease knew of and
voluntarily accepted the risk of being infected with that infectious disease'.
Again, this section punishes only upon proof of infection. The section raises
the issue of the level of risk required for recklessness to be established. If
decided in accordance with the criminal law then only significant risks would
be covered, In addition, when read in conjunction with section 119(c) which
imposes a duty on a person who suspects that he or she is infected to
ascertain whether or not he or she is infected, it might be questioned whether
wilful blindness as to the possibility of being HIV-positive would constitute
recklessness in the public health sphere. With careful jury direction, this
should not occur given that recklessness applies to the resulting injury rather
than to a collateral factor.
SOUTH AUSTRALIA
In South Australia, under section 37(1) of the Public and
Environmental Health Act (1987), a person suffering from a 'controlled
notifiable disease' shall take all reasonable measures to prevent transmission
of the disease to others. A controlled notifiable disease initially included AIDS
68s. 119(a)-(e).
88s. 119(a). 'Victoria's New AIDS Legislation' (1988) National AIDS Bulletin, April, 6-7.
^8as set out in chapter three.
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and AIDS Related Complex but since 1993 It Includes AIDS and HIV only.
The maximum penalty for transmission Is $30,000 or seven years
Imprisonment. No guidelines are provided to assist In Interpreting the term
reasonable measures and whether persons who unknowingly transmit HIV
would be penalised. There Is also no guidance on matters of consent.
However, this may be the only provision of the four debated that draws a
differentiation between the use of safe and unsafe sexual practices, by
Inclusion of the phrase 'reasonable measures'.
It may also be argued that, unlike the Queensland, New South
Wales and Victorian provisions, the South Australian provision sets up either
an absolute or strict liability offence where mens rea Is either Irrelevant or
only partially relevant to the charge. However, given the severity of the
penalty to be Imposed It Is submitted that at the very least this Is the type of
statute that would allow either evidence of honest and reasonable mistake to
be pleaded, or the presumption of mens rea will apply, requiring some mental
state on behalf of A to be proven.
TASMANIA
In 1993 after a period of long parliamentary and community
debate^^ the HIV/AIDS Preventative Measures Act was proclaimed. The
Tasmanlan legislature had ample time to consider carefully the appropriate
tenor of the provisions that It was drafting. The State legislature Is to be
commended for focusing legislative Intervention specifically for transmission
only In the public health sphere. Two of the other jurisdictions (New South
Wales and Victoria) have overlapping criminal law and public health
provisions. It Is questionable whether such a specific and lengthy document
dealing solely with HIV/AIDS was necessary In a State where Infections are
reportedly low. In fact. It can be queried whether It should Include other
sexually transmitted diseases, although these are arguably covered under
transmission provisions relating to venereal diseases In the 1962 Public
Health Act.
Section 20(1) of the 1993 Act which focuses on transmission of
HIV begins by setting out an educative provision. It specified that a person
In the Schedule to the Public and Environmental Health (Review) Amendment Act{^993).
The HIV/AIDS Preventative treasures Bill was drafted in 1990 and introduced into
Parliament the same year. It was rejected by the Upper House, the Tasmanian Legislative
Assembly and had to be reformulated and re-introduced during 1992.
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who is aware of being infected with HIV must '(a) take all reasonable
measures and precautions to prevent the transmission of HIV to others; and
(b) inform in advance any sexual contact or person with whom needles are
shared of that fact', (underlining emphasis added). This double requirement
(as underlined) imposed on the infected person marks a divergence from the
draft provision set out in this chapter (at p.153) where it was suggested that
one requirement was sufficient. Section 20(2) specifies that such a person
must not knowingly or recklessly place another person at risk of becoming
infected with HIV unless that other person knew that fact and voluntarily
accepted the risk of being infected. Although the inclusion of mental states
has been criticised in this thesis, the provision at least does not include
negligence. From the layout of the section it is clear that the educative
aspects are foremost rather than the penalty. This view is supported by
section 21 (2)(a) which clearly establishes that a person will only be subject to
a penalty if counselling and restrictions on lifestyle such as isolation fail to
produce a more responsible attitude towards engaging in behaviour that might
place others at risk of transmission of HIV.
Sub-section (3) of section 20 ensures that a person receives:
(a) adequate information and education about the
transmission of HIV; and,
(b) adequate counselling under s. 15; and,
(c) appropriate medical and psychological assessment; and,
(d) a letter from the Secretary warning that criminal liability
attaches to behaviour which may constitute an offence under
subsection (2).
it is unclear what the legal effect might be if the accused has not received this
information. Does it mean that the accused has a possible defence when
engaging in conduct prohibited by section 20(2) when he or she is not
provided with the information? By the inclusion of this provision, the
legislature appears to be sharing the onus of responsibility for transmission of
the disease on health professionals, the public health department and the
infected person. This is a novel approach to curbing the spread of the
epidemic. Such an approach would appear to be at odds with the 1993-6
National HIV/AIDS Strategy ^3 which suggests that each person must accept
responsibility for preventing themselves from becoming infected. The present
writer views the focus on individual responsibility in the Strategy as
Commonwealth of Australia, 1993-4 -1995-6 National HIV/AIDS Strategy, Canberra,
Australian Government Publishing Service, 1993, at p. 10.
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misguided. The socio-economic and environmental forces which have
shaped this disease means that taking responsibility for preventing the spread
of the disease without assistance from authorities is difficult for some
members of society. Although the Tasmanian provision represents a move
toward a more enlightened policy in this regard, it must be noted that the
educative aspects of the Tasmanian legislation may be impeded by two facts.
The first being that homosexual activity is still illegal in that State and second,
that the HIV/IAIDS Preventative Measures Act prevents the promotion of
same sex conduct including the promotion of safe-sexual measures.
SUMMARY OF POST-AIDS TRANSMISSION STATUTES
The fact that most of the transmission offences under public health
legislation are technically not HIV-specific (with the exception of Tasmania),
means that the causation and evidential problems that were considered when
focusing on the application of traditional criminal law principles may arise
again. However, specificity may not necessarily eradicate this problem. For
example, all the public health statutes including the Tasmariian provision do
not address how it could be conclusively proven that A passed the virus to
Many questions could arise with respect to consent. For example, would
a victim be permitted to consent to HIV infection under these public health
statutes given that under criminal law principles a victim cannot consent to
death? in Tasmania it is apparent that provided a person has been
informed of HIV infection in the partner then his or her consent is valid. In
most of the other public health provisions it appears that the issue is side
stepped by allov/ing V to consent to the 'risk of infection and not death. But,
it may be unrealistic to think of consenting to a risk of infection when in reality,
given the fatal nature of AIDS one is really consenting to the risk of death. On
the other hand, if consent were not a defence then an infected party has less
of an incentive to disclose his or her condition.
There are also questions with respect to A's knowledge. Would
A be guilty if, suspecting he or she had HIV/AIDS, undertook an antibody test,
received a false negative or was tested during the 'window period' and
In chapter two at footnote 6 reference was made to the fact that procedures are being
developed which will permit a particular strain of the virus to be identified thus removing some
doubts over establishing causation in HIV related criminal cases (Pantaleo, G., Graziosi, C.,
Fauci, A.S., 'The Immunopathogenesis of HIV infection' New Eng J Med, (1993) 328:327-
335).
This issue was discussed in chapter three, footnote 49 and text.
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engaged in sexual intercourse on the faith of that false negative test result?
As a matter of evidence the answer should surely be no. But, as this testing
period is notoriously unreliable, there is arguably a duty on A to be retested or
at least to abstain from any high-risk activity until his or her antibody negative
status can be confirmed. The Tasmanian legislation does not address this
fully merely by limiting liability for transmission to any person 'who is and is
aware of being infected with HIV or is carrying and is aware of carrying HIV
antibodies ...' (s. 20 (1)(2)). Under that provision, it may be questioned
whether the term 'aware of incorporates 'suspicion'? If 'aware of only equals
knowledge then if A receives an antibody negative result this would clearly be
evidence A could rely on. However, if 'aware of includes 'suspicion', then if A
has engaged in activity that A knows has placed him or her at high-risk for
being infected with the virus then A could be subject to liability irrespective of
the false negative result. Suspicion rather than knowledge would render an
increased number of the population open to prosecution for what they should
have known rather than for what they did know.
However, the Queensland, New South Wales, Victorian and
Tasmanian provisions specifically require knowledge as a form of mens rea.
This factor could lead to the additional problem where an individual
deliberately refrains from obtaining a test result on the ground that, once he or
she does so, his or her antibody status will be known and he or she will be
more likely to be convicted under the provision. As stated above, where
knowledge is a requirement to be proven, the fact that a person was a
member of a high risk group might be evidence frorn which a Jury might infer
that he or she knew they might communicate HIV. Whether this point is valid
may depend on whether a form of constructive knowledge rather than actual
knowledge would be sufficient for liability under provisions where the
terminology is used. This concern might be why the Victorian provision also
penalises reckless transmission. However, by including recklessness the
legislation casts a very wide net. It is more likely that HIV will be transmitted in
circumstances of recklessness than conscious desire. But, the existence of a
penalty for reckless transmission may make people more responsible in the
conduct of sexual or needle-sharing activity.
Overall, despite some criticisms, the theme underlying the
Queensland, New South Wales, Victorian and South Australian and especially
the Tasmanian public health transmission legislation is in accord with
twentieth century society. First, the legislation does not endorse a 'total-
abstinence' policy. It is likely that such a policy would fail as it has in the past
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with respect to prostitution, homosexuality and drug use. Conversely, it does
not support a 'totally-permissive' approach leaving the decision whether or not
to engage in conduct that will spread the virus to the relevant parties.
Instead, the legislatures have attempted to provide incentives for sexual
partners and IV needle sharers to honestly disclose their condition and to use
precautions. Public health departments are now entrusted with the task of
developing a culture of responsibility. There is room for improvement in the
drafting of such obligations in some of the States. The statutes reveal an
attempt to educate. At the same time they also communicate to society that
the legislatures condemn the knowing spread of infectious diseases and thus
the statutes may have some deterrent value if that is considered necessary.
It is arguably sound legislative practice to avoid specificity in imposing
penalties, leaving it to the courts to develop precedents and relying on their
adherence to the maxim that penal provisions are construed narrowly,
The passage of the AIDS-related public health legislation reveals
that politics is very important in public health. It is in fact its cornerstone. To
view it as apolitical that would be to mask the play of social forces
appropriately called forth in the making of decisions affecting the communal
welfare.
The debates culminating in the Tasmanian legislation highlights
the difficulty of policy formation concurring sexuality in a complex society. The
reason why the passage of the legislation took so long in Tasmania was that
even as the government supported what was widely seen as a repressive
measure, it had to specifically to exclude information about AIDS from its
provision. The new policy assumed the need to promote sex education as
the only way of halting the threatened epidemic. Implicitly, that meant the co
operation and involvement of the community most at risk, the gay community,
a policy that was anathema to the ideologies behind the conservative project
in Tasmania. It is significant that the legislation contains section 22 which
penalises the promotion of certain sexual activities (implying homosexual
conduct). Apart from this provision the thrust of the legislation is as its title
suggests - preventative rather than punitive. The simple reason is that the
However, courts feeling bound by a separation of powers have not always illustrated a
willingness to be creative judicially so as to effect a change in the law. The whole issue of
passive versus active law-making in the courts is beyond the scope of this thesis. It is
possible to point to at least one instance in the criminal law where Judges have stated that it
is for Parliament to effect changes to the law if it felt it were necessary rather than courts. In
Tasmania, see for example. Cox J in Palmer an unreported judgment of the Supreme Court
of Tasmania 1985, at p. 3 and more recently in Brown v DPP [1993] 2 WLR 556 per Mustill
LJ (at p. 600) and Slynn LJ (at p. 608).
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legislature knew that there was no practical alternative that would achieve
widespread acceptability. The boundaries between acceptable and
unacceptable sexual behaviour remained fluid and indeterminate and
homosexuality remained ambiguously on the margins of social life, its
acceptability still in doubt. There is no doubt that the Tasmanian government
has been constrained by its moral agenda and overall this may operate to
reduce the overall effectiveness of the provision.
6. CONCLUSION
Public health offences occupy a territory between full crirhinal
status and civil proceedings. The intervention of public health to control
disease is long-standing and in general, except for instances of discrimination
in earlier periods, has a respectable history. The criminalisation of medical
problems is problematic insofar as it is based on a control model that seeks to
individualise social problems. Placing HIV/AIDS in the public health sphere
should reduce the individualisation of the problem and render it one which
requires community responsibility.
The foregoing analysis of public health provisions reveals that like
criminal penalty provisions they do not fit the circumstances of HIV/AIDS
infection neatly. Admittedly, some of these provisions were developed in a
different era of infectious diseases, those characterised by acute periods of
transmissibility. Hence they are generally inappropriate to AIDS, especially
when they impose periods of detention until 'free from infection'. The
legislation carry very light penalties for what is, in reality, the transmission of a
deadly virus and rarely contain provisions preventing breaches of
confidentiality during prosecutions. Although there have been some
amendments, provisions in public health statutes in Australia also contain
inherent evidentiary and causation concerns which are problematic when
applied to HIV-infection.
Post-AIDS public health amendments have attempted to modify
the law taking into account these basic deficiencies but uniformity between
Australian jurisdictions is lacking. The legislation, with the exception of
Tasmania, does not specify whether an infected person prosecuted for a
transmission offence might be isolated and if so where. Provision for
reasonable treatment, detention and counselling of such persons must be
available if public health departments are to have responsibility for this
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disease. In addition, all legislatures need to address concerns such as the
possibility of vexatious complaints.
Although piecemeal amendments have been made to existing
public health legislation, with the advent of so many vocal community groups,
further refinements are likely to be a cumbersome process involving
community debate.. The long debates culminating in the delayed passage of
parts of the Tasmanian HIV/AIDS Preventative Measures Act (1993) would
support this viewpoint. The creation of a comprehensive HIV-specific public
health transmission offence is preferable as it may remedy these deficiencies,
but such a provision should oply seek to penalise highly dangerous
behaviour. A draft offence was formulated in this chapter. It carried forward
the theme of seeking to change the behaviour of people who are infected
with HIV by requiring them to give certain information and take certain
precautions before engaging in well-defined dangerous activities. To gain
public support and respect such a provision must be drafted in a tone that
least interferes with personal lives. It must also be recognised that a provision
such as that drafted in this chapter would be unlikely to find favour vyith the
vast number of lobby groups. For example, church groups might be opposed
to the inclusion of any defence based on condom use given their stand on
contraception. Others might object to the implicit recognition of drug use
which is illegal. Rather than debate the terms of such a comprehensive and
specific offence, legislatures (especially those in Western Australia and the
Northern Territory where amendments are long overdue) would be wiser to
spend time remedying some of the defects of pre-existing public health
legislation. The aim should be to repeal archaic provisions and enact ones
that would apply equally to other life-threatening diseases.
The theme behind curbing the spread of HIV/AIDS should be the
prevention of the risk of infection. Therefore, responsibility for imposing
penalties upon individuals who place others at risk of infection by their
behaviour should primarily lie with the public health instrumentalities. Public
health departments are provided with widely based powers which enable
officials and their agents to detain and isolate persons suspected of
transmitting communicable diseases or exposing others to risk of infection.
These powers warrant examination in Order to finally conclude whether
locating responsibility for transmission of HIV within the public health sphere
is a meaningful choice from the point of view of an HIV-infected person and
society. These powers and public health procedures will be analysed in the
next chapter.
171
CHAPTER 5
PUBLIC HEALTH OFFICIALS' POWERS IN
CONTROLLING THE SPREAD OF AIDS
INTRODUCTION
This thesis has argued that control of individuals with respect to
the transmission of HIV should primarily be a public health concern. Criminal
sanctions or pre-existing criminal laws should be used for prosecuting only
that behaviour with appropriately high culpability. Statutes grant to public
health officials jurisdiction over individuals who exhibit or may be likely to
engage in conduct that might facilitate transmission of a communicable
disease to another or place others at risk of such transmission. Public health
departments are more appropriately placed that criminal law agencies to
ascertain risk levels astheir ethos is prospective rather than retrospective.
Irrespective of the arguments for and against the use of the
criminal law in the context of AIDS, it- is primarily in the area of public health
that legal measures have been introduced. The detention of aprostitute in a
Sydney hospital in August 1989 under section 32A of the Public Health Act
(1902) (N.S.W.)"', brought to the forefront the difficulties confronting Australian
public health departments in implementing either AIDS-specific legislation or
existing legislation relevant to communicable diseases. The prostitute, who
publicly admitted she continued to 'work the streets' for at least three years
after contracting HIV, was detained for six days in a hospital in that State
under section 32A as a last resort procedure, after persistent attempts to
persuade the prostitute to behave responsibly had been ignored. 2
1'Prostitute with AIDS detained'. The Age , August ^ f P.
from prison'. The Age , August 21989, at p. 3. The Public Health was replaced
in oart bv the Public Health Act (1991) which was proclaimed mNovernber 1991. This
leqislation continued the changes made by the Public Health (Proclaimed Diseases
Amendment) Act (1989) proclaimed in May 1990 which in fact addressed many of
grievances with respect tosection 32A case.
2 Fditorial' AIDS and Civil Rights', The Age , August 5-6 1989. Charlene has reportedly re-
otfenS in (TV^how, new arrest in AIDS Prostitute Saga'. Irt/esI Auslraton,
March 28 1991, at p. 27).
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Under Section 32A(1)
A medical officer of health or a legally qualified medical
practitioner... may... direct that [a] person ... (being a person
suffering from an infectious disease) be removed to the
hospital named in [an] order (being a hospital available for
the reception and treatment of persons suffering from the
infectious disease)...
Section 32A(2)(a) of the Public Health Act (which is now repealed) also
enabled health authorities to make such an order in respect of a person
suffering from an infectious disease in the interests of public health.
The case of the Sydney prostitute received widespread media
coverage and provoked much criticism. This was the first reported occasion
in Australia of a person infected with HIV being forcibly detained in a hospital
under that Act, although the provision existed before the advent of the 'AIDS
crisis'. Civil Liberties groups argued that the detention was a fundamental
breach of civil liberties as the detainee had no right of appeal under the
legislation and no means of testing the department's decision through an
independent tribunal. ^
The case is important because it highlighted a central dilemma in
the AIDS debate: how to balance the claim of the community to be protected
against the disease and the claim of the individual not to be unfairly
restricted. Public health legislation that enables officials to apply coercive
measures that restrict the lives of persons suffering from infectious diseases
was drawn to the public's attention by the media. Such legislation is in force
in each State or Territory and means that the detention such as that which
occurred in New South Wales could conceivably occur in any other Australian
jurisdiction, s The legislation in New South Wales has been amended
primarily in response to the case ® but similar unamended provisions are still
applicable in some Australian jurisdictions.
3 'Prostitute with AIDS detained', TheAge , August 1 1989, at p. 3.
^ These provisions will be dealt with in moredetail later in this chapter.
5 Since the section 32A case detention has been threatened or implemented by public
health departments in other States. In 1991 in Perth an HIV-infected person was placed
under house arrest after threatening others with infection of HIV (Personal correspondence,
Health Department, Perth WA). The Victorian Health Department warned that the last stage
before isolation is a warning letter from the general manager of the Health Department. ('Vic
Threat to isolate 11 AIDS carriers'. The Age, September 11 1989.)
6 Perkins, R., Lovejoy, P., and Marina, 'Protecting the community prostitutes and public
health legislation in the age of AIDS', 990)CriminologyAustralia, October/November, 6-8.
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Interesting questions are raised by the detention of the Sydney
prostitute. For example, what is the content of the power that public health
departments have, to protect members of the community from infectious
diseases? What measures can be used to protect the community from HIV-
infected persons who admit or imply they have knowingly infected others?
Does the implementation of such measures restrict the liberty and privacy of
HIV-infected persons? Are such restrictions justified in the interests of
community health? Will such restrictions result in long-term behavioural
changes?
This chapter will review and analyse public health legislation
currently in force in Australian States and Territories, discuss the potential for
coercive strategies to be applied to AIDS sufferers and persons who are or
who are presumed to be antibody-positive, and examine if, and if so how, the
powers of the public health official or public health departments have been
adapted in light of the emergence of HIV.
2. THE CONTENT OF COERCIVE POWERS OF PUBLIC HEALTH
DEPARTMENTS
Over the years public health authorities have been given certain
powers to control communicable diseases. Nineteenth and twentieth century
public health policies have included quarantine and/or isolation, compulsory
vaccination, notification, orders for treatment and x-rays.
An examination of the efficacy of measures implemented to control
the spread of communicable diseases in the past will be invaluable in the
drafting of legislation and guidelines with a view to controlling the spread of
HIV in the 1990s. There may be much that can be learnt about the ideology
and politics of particular governments towards disease control from their use
of coercive measures. The historical use of such measures will be examined
together, where available, with the incidence of the imposition of penalties for
a failure to heed orders issued under such legislation.
REQUIREMENT OF NOTIFICATION
Early public health legislation in all States of Australia required the
notification of the epidemic type diseases. Sexually transmitted diseases
(STDs) were also notifiable under venereal disease legislation. This policy of
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notification has continued into the twentieth century. For example, plague,
cholera, yellow fever and tuberculosis (TB) are still notifiable under State and
Territory legislation in Australia. ^With the exception of NSW, South Australia
and Victoria, smallpox is still a notifiable disease. ® Syphilis, hepatitis B and
herpes ^ are some of the STDs that are notifiable diseases in Australia.
In the past, the sexually transmitted diseases have been provided
for in legislation relating solely to venereal diseases. However, because
these STDs were notifiable, persons suffering from them could be subjected
to a number of legal restrictions contained in public health legislation. Such
provisions potentially allowed officials to order persons to present for
examination, to undergo treatment, to name contacts and imposed penalties
on the failure to abide by orders. 10 Following the advent of HIV, many
venereal disease statutes were repealed and STD's are now covered under
general communicable diseases legislation.
In each Australian State and Territory, legislation exists which
includes HIV infection in various stages up to and including AIDS as a
notifiable disease. Medical practitioners are required to notify Health
Departments of the identity of persons carrying HIV or reasonably suspected
of carrying it. The legal classification of the conditions requiring notification
differ in the various States and Territories, resulting in a lack of consistency
and medical accuracy. For example, in South Australia although AIDS was
notifiable from 1987, HIV infection was not notifiable until September 1991
whereas in Tasmania since 1989 the legislation has stated that 'all stages of
AIDS' (which technically includes HIV) are notifiable.
^ Department of Heaithi, Housing and Community Semces Communicable Diseases
Intelligence Bulletin , 1992, 1: at p. 18 provides lists of currently notifiable diseases in
Australia. Plague is not notifiable in Tasfnania.
®Smallpox is not listed as a notifiable medical condition under s. 14 and Schedule 1 of the
Public Health Act (1991)(N.S.W.) nor under the Schedules to the Public and Environmental
Health (Review) Amendment Act (1993)(S.A.), nor as a notifiable disease under the Health
(Infectious Diseases) Regulations 0 990)(Vic.).
9 Communicable Diseases Intelligence Bulletin ,1992, 1:18 per syphilis and hepatitis B.
Herpes is not notifiable in every State.
"•O The provisions will be discussed in depth later in this chapter.
•"I NSW: In 1986, the Public Health Regulations (1960) were amended by the insertion of
regulation 340 "Proclaimed Diseases". Under this regulation and for the purposes of section
50H of the Public Health (Proclaimed Diseases) Amendment (1985)(N.S.W.), medical
practitioners must notify cases of AIDS or lymphadenopathy syndrome or the condition of
having, or of having antibodies to, the AIDS virus as soon as practicable after they become
aware or acquire reasonable grounds for believing a patient is suffering from any of these
conditions. However, section 14 of the Public Health Act (1991) set out that category 5
'medical conditions' (defined in Schedule 1 to include AIDSand HIV infection), are notifiable.
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Penalties may be imposed with a view to coercing doctors into
notifying health departments of known or suspected cases of HIV infection in
the community. Some States and Territories extend the requirement of
notification. For example, under both the Notifiable Diseases Act
(1981)(N.T.) and the Health Act Amendment Act (1988) (Qld.), persons other
than doctors who fail to provide information about another person from whom
VIC: Under the Diseases Notification Regulations 984) AIDS, ARC and lymphadenopathy
syndrome were notifiable if a medical practitioner became aware the person was suffering
from those diseases (r. 3). Under the Health (Infectious Diseases) Regulations (1990)(Vic.)
AIDS (defined in accordance with the Centre for Disease Control surveillance 'case definition'
of 1987) is notifiable under reg. 7 if a medical practitioner becomes aware that a person
shows evidence of, has died of, or is a carrier of, the disease.
QLD: In July 1983, the Queensland Government Gazette 76 declared AIDS to be a notifiable
disease under the Health Act (1937). AIDS is now referred to as a controlled notifiable
disease following the proclamation of the Health Act Amendment Act (1988)(Qld.). Section
32 of the Act requires medical practitioners to notify the Director-General of Health if they
believe a patient to be suffering from or to have symptoms of AIDS. HIV infection does not
appear to be notifiable under this Act.
WA: Under an Order in Council of 1983, AIDS was declared a dangerous and infectious
disease for which medical practitioners must notify the Health Department. Under the Health-
Dangerous Infectious Diseases Order (1985)(W.A.) ARC, lymphadenopathy syndrome and
HTLV-III infection are infectious and dangerous diseases for which medical practitioners must
notify the Health Department. In February 1993 AIDS and HIV were added to the list of
infectious diseases under the Health Infectious Diseases Order. S. 276(1 )(c) of the Health
Act (1911) states if a doctor suspects a person is suffering from an infectious disease Health
Authorities must be notified.
S.A: Under the Public and Environmental Health Act (1987)(S.A.) AIDS and ARC are
notifiable diseases under Schedule 1. Section 30 requires medical practitioners aware that a
person is suffering from a notifiable disease to report the existence of the disease to the
Health Commission. HIV infection simpliciter became notifiable in September 1991 following
an amendment to the Public and Environmental Health (Notifiable Diseases) Regulations
(1989)(S.A.).
IAS: Under the Public Health Act (1962)(Tas.) AIDS was proclaimed an infectious and
notifiable disease by Statutory Rule 151/1983. Statutory Rule 152/1983 added AIDS to the
list of notifiable disease in Part 11 of Schedule 3 to the Public Health (Notifiable Diseases)
Regulations (1967). Regulation 3(2) provides that a medical practitioner who is a
superintendent or in charge of a hospital or other institution must notify the Director of Health
of AIDS cases. In 1989, 'all stages of HIV infection' were added to the list of infectious and
notifiable diseases in the Regulations for which a private practitioner must notify the Director
of when he or she becomes aware or suspects a person is infected (Public Health (Notifiable
Diseases) Regulations (1989) r. 4( 1).
ACT: The Public Health (Infectious and Notifiable Diseases) Regulations (1980)(A.C.T.)
were amended by Regulation 10/1983 adding AIDS to the list of notifiable diseases and
requiring notification where a medical practitioner has reason to believe that a person may be
suffering from a notifiable disease (reg. 4). In 1992 HIV was added to the list of notifiable
diseases.
N.T: Under the Notifiable Diseases Act (1981)(N.T.) AIDS has been a notifiable disease
since July 1983 (Schedule 3). S. 8 requires medical practitioners to notify authorities of
persons who are infected or suspected or being infected. In 1988 HIV mfection Groups 1-4
were declared notifiable diseases.
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the disease may be contracted may also be liable to a penalty. In the
Northern Territory a person has a statutory obligation to consider his or her
HIV antibody status. Section 7 of the Notifiable Diseases Act states that a
person must consult a doctor if he or she has reasonable grounds to believe
that he or she is infected.
A historical analysis of IB notifications reveals that penalties have
been imposed for failures to notify cases to authorities. Compulsory
notification for IB in Australia began as early as 1909 in Tasmania. ""2 in
1912 in that State two convictions were recorded for non-notification, ""s By
1913 Purdy, Secretary for Public Health reported that the increase in
notifications was due to fines being imposed. However, failure to notify has
been most marked with respect to the STDs although there is little evidence
that penalties have been implemented with respect to STDs.
Compulsory notification legislation has not been challenged in
Australia, although it has been in the United States in pre-AIDS cases. The
case of Whalen v Roe 1® is authority in that country for the principle that
legislation mandating notification is constitutional if the information obtained is
reasonably related to a valid public health purpose; the information is limited
to public health departments; and adequate statutory confidentiality
protections are in place. A similar view could be taken by a court in Australia
if the matter arose, although the lack of constitutional protections would
2^ Public Health Annual Reports, Hobart,- Health Department of Tasmania, 1909.
^3 Public Health Annual Reports, 1912, per Purdy, Secretary for Public Health, at p. 4.
"•4 Public Health Annual Reports, 1913, at p. 4. Comstock, G. W., Tuberculosis', in Last, J.
M. (ed). Public Health and Preventive Medicine, 12th ed, Connecticut, Appelton-Century-
Crofts, 1986, 222-233.
Chase, A., The Truth About STD's, New York, Quill, 1983, at p. 20-24. Forsyth, J. R. L.,
and Connors, J., 'A survey of Sexually Transmitted Disease Presenting to General
Practitioners in Victoria', Abstract of Public Lecture presented at Combined Australian and
New Zealand Scientific Conference on the Sexually Transmitted Diseases, August 1988 and
reported in (1988) Venereology, 1:27. Communicable Diseases Section, Community Health
and Services, 'Notifications of Sexually Transmitted Diseases in Victoria Annual Report 1988'
Communicable Diseases Intelligence Bulletin, 1989, 25: 6-13.
429 US 589 (1977). Prior to Whalen, there may have been cause to question whether
legislation mandating notification was constitutional given that it may have contradicted the
right of privacy and liberty provisions of the US Constitution. Although not explicity
enumerated in the Bill of Rights, the right of privacy is thought to arise from the penumbra of
the first, ninth and fourteenth amendments. It is said in the United States that this gives in
effect a 'right' of privacy but only against State and individuals acting "on behalf of the state -
not against individuals or non-government entities. The case of Roe v Wade had expressed
the view that the 'right of privacy' was founded in the 14th amendment 'concept of personal
liberty and restrictions upon state action' or in the '9th amendment reservation of rights to the
people' (93 S Ct. 705, 35 L Ed. 2d. 147 (1973) at pp. 152-153).
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preclude any decision from focusing on the constitutionality of the issue. The
issue of divulging confidential information in the interests of public health is
considered later in this chapter.
COMPULSORY EXAMINATION. ISOLATION AND QUARANTINE ORDERS
Pre-existing public health legislation in the various Australian
States and Territories empowers offic'ials to require infectious persons to
undergo medical examinations and be the subjects of isolation and quarantine
orders. These measures are the most coercive available. South Australia,
New South Wales, Victoria, Queensland and Tasmania have passed specific
legislation applying this form of control to HIV-infected persons. In the
remaining States and Territories, existing and antiquated public health and
venereal disease legislation traditionally applying to infectious sexually and
non-sexually transmitted diseases will, following the extension of the terms
'infectious' or 'notifiable' to include AIDS or HIV, apply to HIV-infected
persons. These particular measures and the legislation implementing such
measures warrant examination.
(i) Compulsory Examination and Testing
Compulsory examination and testing legislation has been enacted
to curb the spread of communicable diseases in Australian States. It was
most commonly applied to TB sufferers. For example, a Federally-funded, but
State-managed campaign of compulsory chest x-rays has been a feature of
controlling the incidence of TB in all Australian jurisdictions, "i®
In Tasmania, for example, chest clinics were established in Hobart
in 1936. Other Australian States followed suit. In 1938, in Tasmania, 31
orders were served on persons failing to present for treatment after receiving
a positive x-ray. By 1942, the Tasmanian Public Health Department
The relevant legislation is: Public Health (Proclaimed Diseases)Amendment Act
(1985)(N.S.W.) which was followed by the Public Health Act (1991)(N.S.W.); Public and
Environmental Health Act (1987)(S.A.); Health (General Amendment) (Amendment) Act
(1989)(Vic.); Health Act Amendment Act (1988)(Qld.), HIV/AIDS Preventative Measures Act
(1993).
Dawson, D., Tuberculosis in Australia: an unfinished fight' MedJAust., 1991,154:75-76,
at p. 75
Brothers, C., Medical Superintendent, Public Health Annual Reports, 1938.
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began considering the implementation of mass x-rays on the population. 20
Mass x-rays commenced in 1945. By 1947 the value of mass x-rays in
detecting cases was already being heralded. The Public Health Reports at
that time called for the compulsory examination of all persons over fourteen
years of age. 21
Annual compulsory chest x-rays applicable to certain age-groups
began in 1949 following the passage of the Tuberculosis Act (1949)(Tas.) and
continued until 1977 when Federal funding was withdrawn and States carried
on their own programmes dependent on need. 22Failure to present for the x-
rays carried the threat of the imposition of a fine or a period of imprisonment.
Both the 1950 and 1956 Annual Public Health Reports state that it was
believed that the efficacy of continuous screening was responsible for a drop
in TB cases. 23The Annual Report for Health (Cth) for 1959-60 identified that
whereas deaths from TB amounted to 29.6% of all deaths recorded for 1947,
the death-rate from TB infection had dropped to 5.48% of all deaths in 1959.24
The very existence of mass screening for TB has lead at least one
commentator to advocate the introduction of compulsory HIV antibody testing
to curb the spread of HIV. 25 However, the efficacy of mass chest x-rays for
TB has been questioned. 26 jhe problem areas included the difficulty of
distinguishing between active and inactive TB, distinguishing TB from other
diseases of a similar nature and the possibility of reading errors. This factor,
combined with high administrative costs, may have been the reason why
20 Public Health Annual Reports, 1942, at p. 5.
21 Public Health Annual Reports, 1947, at p. 17perDirector of TB, Goddard, T. H.
22 Tasmanian Government Gazette, Vois. 1949-1977. The power to order compulsory
radiological examinations of persons over fourteen years was in accordance with section 5 of
the Tuberculosis Act {^949){Jas) (and as amended 1963). See also Dawson, supra note 18,
at p. 75.
23 Goddard, T. H., Secretaryof Health, Public Health Annual Reports, 1950, at p. 31 and
Tremayne, Director of TB, in Public Health Annual Reports ,1956, at p. 40.
24 Report ofDirector-General of Health, Commonwealth Department of Health, 1959-1960,
at p. 7.
25 As exemplified from the speech of Wilson Tuckey to delegates of Third National
Conference on AIDS, in The Politics of AIDS: Wilson Tuckey's Address' (1988) 2/8 National
AIDS Bulletin, 45-47.
25 See Locks, M. O. in 'Tuberculosis', inWherle, P.P., and Top, F. H., (eds). Communicable
and Infectious Diseases, 9th ed, St Louis, C.V. Mosby Company, 1981, 670-730, at pp. 686-
688 and Comstock, G. W., Tuberculosis', in Last, supra note 14, 222-233, at pp. 227-228.
But, a contrary view is provided by Burnet, M. and White, D.O., Natural History of Infectious
Diseases, 4th ed, London, Cambridge University Press, 1972, at pp. 222-223.
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compulsory chest x-rays were phased out In the late 1970s in Australia.
Alternatively mass screening may have been phased out because it had
successfully controlled the incidence of TB by that time. Certainly statistics
from Tasmania would support the latter hypothesis. For example by 1965
there were only 81 cases of TB notified. The year before there had been 105.
27
It is also arguable that improvements in sanitation and the
development of sanatoria for the treatment of infected persons rather than
compulsory chest x-rays may have significantly reduced TB rates in
Australia. Sanatoria were set up in Australia between 1900-1910 but, as
Lewis states, the coincidence in the emergence of sanatoria and the fall in the
death-rate from TB should be noted but not overstated. 28 Further, it is
possible that declines were due in large part to a general improvement in the
economic and social welfare of countries. Researchers into the resurgence of
TB in the United States in the 1990s have found sufferers in general to be a
product of homelessness and poverty which directly supports the economic
and social cause thesis. 29 The use of drug chemotherapy programmes was
also influential. Therefore, restrictive measures such as compulsory chest
x-rays may not have been necessary to deal with the spread of TB. When
viewed together, these factors reveal that there is no conclusive precedent.in
Australia set for compulsory HIV antibody testing as the means to curb the
spread of HIV infection.
In Australia, prosecutions have been laid for failing to comply with
treatment orders with respect to TB. In Tasmania, for example, in 1954, two
persons were prosecuted for failing to comply with section 6 of the
Tuberculosis Act. (1949). S"" This section provided that the Minister could
order a person to undergo, within a certain period, a radiological/medical
examination. Section 11 prescribed a penalty for failure to comply with the
order. At that time Tremayne, the Director of TB, noted that it was difficult to
27 Public Health Annual Reports, 1965, at p. 25.
28 Lewis, M., (ed.) Health and Disease in Australia: A History, Canberra, Australian
Government Publishing Service, 1989, at p. 289.
29 CDC, Tuberculosis Control Laws- United States, 1993', MMWR, 199342(No. RR-15):1
at p. 1.
20 Porter, J.D.H., McAdam, K.P.W.J., (eds). Tuberculosis: Back to the Future, Chichester,
Wiley and Sons, 1994, at p. 19-20.
81 Public Health Annual Reports, 1954, at p. 41.
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apply the compulsory provisions of the Act in the case of persons who were
suspected of having TB. He urged amendments be made to the Act to
strengthen the hand of the Director. This was not achieved. 32 Again in 1955
concern was expressed that a person had escaped prosecution for failing to
comply with an order in 1954, because the Crown had not proved wilful
disobedience. 33 it was felt that further prosecutions could be hampered if an
amendment were not made to the Act. 34 no amendments in that respect
were made.
In 1963 in Tasmania a new Tuberculosis Act was passed. Both
the 1949 and 1963 Acts provide in section 10 (s. 11; 1963) that the person
against whom a detention or treatment order or decision is made has the right
to appeal to a Judge in chambers against the order or decision. This
legislation is more progressive than the Public Health Act (1962) in Tasmania
of the preceding year, under which there is no right of appeal for persons
who are the subjects of compulsory detention or examination orders and are
suffering from diseases other than TB.
Many of the compulsory testing or examination provisions in public
health legislation have their roots in the early 19th century and focused on
venereal diseases. For example, during the 1870s prostitutes were singled
out for compulsory treatment for venereal disease. Two Australian colonies
now known as Queensland and Tasmania introduced Contagious Diseases
legislation that was applied purely to prostitutes. The Acts were repealed in
1911 and 1903 respectively due to opposition from the population notably
females because officials failed to detect a sufficient number of cases and
when they did so often many women were found to be non-infectious. 35
There was also no centre where women could be detained and treated free of
charge.
Compulsory treatment provisions for persons suffering from
venereal diseases resurfaced in each State during the period from 1915 -
32 Public Health Annual Reports, 1954, at p. 41.
33 fremayne vCook [1955] Tas SR 100. Thecourt held that the prosecution needed to show
'not only that the direction to appear was disobeyed in fact but that the failure to obey was a
deliberate and intentional act of a culpable nature' (at p. 102). A failure to appear due to
oversight, honest mistake or circumstances preventing his appearance is not wilful and not
an offence. His Honour believed that where no explanation was forthcoming from a
defendant the jury could draw an inference of intent, but the inference must be safely drawn.
34 Public Health Annual Reports, 1955, at p. 42.
33 Daniels, K., So Much HardWork, Sydney, Fontana,1984, 64-68.
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1937 under specific venereal disease legislation. By World War 1 venereal
disease was rife among Australian soldiers. Fuelled by a request from the
Commonwealth government, Western Australia began the move by passing
the Health Act Amendment Act (1915) compelling treatment of all infected
citizens. 3® Failure to submit resulted in the imposition of either a fine or
imprisonitient. When schemes were found to have little influence on the rates
the Commonwealth Government passed the National Security (Venereal
Disease and Contraceptive) Regulations (1946) which gave the power to the
Commissioner of Venereal Diseases to detain for treatment anyone
suspected of suffering from venereal disease, sphere is no clear record of
prosecutions under either the State or Commonwealth legislation during either
of these periods. Flowever, in the late 1950s and early 1960s an intense
prosecutorial policy was mounted in New South Wales, in particular, against
treatment defaulters. In 1957, 484 prosecutions were laid which increased to
642 in 1962.38 There is no statistical breakdown available of the status of the
individuals. This would be fairly useful given that the impetus for increased
prosecutions appears to have been instigated following the receipt of a
commissioned report which indicated that four groups were to blame for the
increases: adolescents, immigrants, prostitutes and homosexuals. 39
Public health officials in States and Territories without AIDS-
specific legislation could rely on pre-existing public health provisions which
apply to infectious or venereal diseases, if AIDS or HIV has been added to
that list, to require persons suspected to be infected vyith HIV to undergo
medical examinations. For example, in Western Australia, section 251(5) of
the Health Act (1911) provides that once a person is suffering from an
infectious disease he or she can be ordered to submit to a medical
examination and the taking of medical samples. In the Australian Capital
Territory, regulation 5 of the Public Health (Infectious and Notifiable
Diseases) Regulations (1980) authorises the medical examination of a
person suffering from a notifiable disease. Likewise, section 18 of the
36Lewis, supra note 28, at p. 263. Other coloniesfollowed suitwith legislation being
introduced in Victoria (1916), Tasmania and Queensland (1917), New ^uth Wales, (1918)
and South Australia (1920).
37Lewis, Ibid, at p. 270.
36Report of the Director General of Public Health, NSW, 1953-1957, 1963-1967.
36 Lewis, M., 'From Blue Light Clinic to Nightingale Centre: ABrief History of the Sydney
STD Centre and its Forerunners. Part 2: From the Postwar Years to the Present',
Venereology, 1988, 1/2:45-49 at p. 45.
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Notifiable Diseases Act (1981) in the Northern Territory allows persons
suffering from notifiable diseases to be medically examined.
Amendments motivated by HIV/AIDS have been made in many
States. In New South Wales, section 22 of the Public Health Act (1991)
(formerly s. SOP of the Public Health (Proclaimed Diseases) Amendment
(1985)) empower the Chief Health Officer of the Health Department to order
compulsory medical examinations where he or she reasonably believes a
person to be suffering from a category 5 'medical condition', which includes
HIV/AIDS.
Likewise section 31 of the South Australian Public and
Environmental Health Act (1987) grants the South Australian Health
Commission the power to require a person reasonably suspected to be
suffering from a notifiable disease (defined as AIDS or HIV) to present himself
or herself for a medical examination (s. 31). Failure to comply with the notice
renders a person liable to arrest upon the issue of a warrant from a
Magistrate. Section 31(4) prohibits the detention of a person for more than
forty-eight hours for the purpose of examination.
Under section 36(1) of the Health Act Amendment Act (1988)(Qld.)
a person suffering from a 'controlled notifiable disease', who refuses to submit
to any reasonable examination, test or treatment, may be removed to a public
hospital or temporary isolation place and detained there until necessary
examinations are conducted. Section 36(5) allows persons in charge of a
public hospital or temporary isolation place to exercise such force as is
reasonably necessary for the purpose of performing the examinations. A
detained person who resists or obstructs any reasonable procedure being
carried out commits an offence against the Act for which a summary penalty
could be imposed.
None of the provisions considered above define the term 'medical
examination' or describe what would be included in the term 'medical sample'.
More than likely a 'medical examination' would include those procedures that
were considered part of reasonable public health practice. However, there are
no reported cases in which such legislation has been directly considered. It is
unlikely that HIV testing would be included in that term unless it is specifically
included, given the potential legal ramifications of such testing, including
actionable breaches of confidentiality. The doctrine of informed consent to
medical treatment would be relevant to this debate as recognised in the
The doctrine and the issue of what is encompassed by the phrase 'medical examination'
is considered in more detail in chapter six, pp. 242-245.
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National HIV/AIDS Strategy 1993-1996. The Strategy clearly states that
'specific informed consent is to be obtained before any test is performed to
diagnose a person's HIV infection status'.It needs to be recognised
however, that the strategy is merely a collection of guidelines which do not
have the force of law.
Under section 121 (1) of the Victorian Health (General Amendment)
(Amendment) Act (1989), if the Chief General Manager of the Health
Department reasonably believes that a person has an infectious disease
including AIDS, and is likely to transmit that to a person who does not
voluntarily accept the risk of being infected, he or she may require that the
person be examined and tested for the disease or undergo counselling.
Section 121(12) entitles an enforcement officer to arrest the subject of an
order who will not comply. This would authorise the police to act on behalf of
the Health Department by arresting and detaining an HIV-infected person.
Section 121 (1) also grants a specific power to test for HIV which is not
granted in the other State and Territory provisions.
The Tasmanian HIV/AIDS Preventative Measures Act proclaimed
in June 1993 is the only legislation to be enacted in Australia which
comprehensively provides for the public health administration of HIV/AIDS
and could be said to be truly AIDS-specific. The 1993 legislation is
supplemental to the Public Health Act (1962) in that State. Under section
17(1)(e) of the Public Health Act (1962) the Minister of Health could make an
order that a person suffering from an infectious disease should 'submit
themselves for a medical examination ...' Again that phrase was not defined
and it is significant that the 1993iegislation (which is more likely to override
the 1962 Act when an HIV-infected person is the subject of any compulsory
order) specifies when an HIV test may be ordered. The fact that this
legislation does make specific provision for HIV testing in another section of
the Act is grounds for arguing in Tasmania, at least, that the term 'medical
examination' does not include taking HIV tests as of right.
The Act authorises HIV testing in circumstances where the
Secretary of Health has reasonable grounds to believe that an HIV-infected
person is behaving in such a way as to place other persons at risk of being
infected and is likely to continue to behave in such a way (s. 10(3)). The
legislation may be criticised because it does not provide any guidance on how
the 'risk' is to be determined. The only protection against abuse is provided if
Commonwealth of Australia, National HIV/AIDS Strategy 1993-1994, 1995-1996,
Canberra, Australian Government Publishing Service, 1993, at p. 10.
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by chance the infected person refuses to submit to testing and an application
for testing is made under s. 11 of the Act to a Magistrate. In such an
application the Secretary of Health must satisfy the requirement that there is
evidence that 'other persons are or have been exposed to the possibility of
transmission of HIV (s. 11(3)(a)) and 'that it is in the interests of public health
to make the order' (11(4)). Both the Victorian and Tasmanian legislation
indicate that 1990s legislatures are aware that pre-existing legislation which
contains broadly based terminology such as 'medical examination' would not
be likely to hold up to a judicial challenge if someone is tested for HIV without
his or her consent.
(ii) Isolation or Quarantine
Public health legislation usually distinguishes between quarantine
and isolation in provisions which grant powers to public health officials.
Modern legislation tends to focus on using the terms isolation or detention
rather than quarantine, a trend which may have developed to counter the
stigma and fear historically attached to the latter practice. Quarantine is
reserved as a general federal power under the Constitution (1900)(Cth)
whereas the power to isolate is vested in public health officials under State
public health legislation. While both concepts generally involve the
segregation and separation of infected persons or things from the rest of the
community their application is to different periods of the disease cycle.
Quarantine usually refers to holding the person at a certain time because
although he or she has been exposed to a disease it is unknown whether he
or she is infected. It therefore covers the 'incubation period' of an illness which
is problematic when considering HIV infection where the length of the
incubation period is uncertain. Isolation usually refers to the practice of
holding persons who are known to be infected until they can no longer infect
others. Isolating an HIV-infected person in this manner would be draconian
because once the virus has been transmitted he or she will never pass into a
non-infectious stage.
General legislation concerning quarantine of persons suffering
from communicable diseases was first enacted in two Australian colonies
during the smallpox epidemic of 1881-1882. *^3 In 1908, the Commonwealth
Most of the modern legislation places a time limit on isolation. In the context of AIDS, for
example, in s. 21(2)(c) of the HIV/AIDS Preventative Measures Act (^993){Jas.) the time
limit is 28 days.
'^ 3 New South Wales QuarantineAct (1832) and Tasmanian Quarantine Act (1881).
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government also passed a Quarantine Act under which a 'quarantlnable
disease' was defined to include, smallpox, plague, cholera, yellow fever or
any disease declared to be a 'quarantlnable disease'. This meant both
federal and State governments had concurrent powers over quarantine. In
practice, federal powers were used in general to control shipping or in
conjunction with immigration legislation. It was also applicable in those States
were there was no legislation dealing with quarantine per se. There were
never any challenges to the federal exercise of the power by the States.
Federal quarantine officers at all ports of entry have since the enactment of
the legislation exercised powers to detect cases of disease on entry to
Australia. Responsibility for local cases and outbreaks have been handled
initially by State public health departments.
The period marked by the smallpox epidemic in the late 1880s is
regarded as one of the worst in Australian history in terms of suspending civil
rights in the interests of public health. Persons were either detained in their
homes or forcibly removed to quarantine stations. The Chinese, were rarely
given the choice of staying in their home and bore the brunt of xenophobia
and discriminatory action from authorities. Both the Tasmanian and Western
Australian governments declared all Chinese ports infected areas and
quarantined all ships arriving from those ports,
Many persons quarantined were incorrectly diagnosed as suffering
from smallpox when in reality they suffered from chicken-pox. Lack of
knowledge of the epidemiology of smallpox led to persons being quarantined
who were suspected of having made contact with an infected person. This in
turn led to a witch hunt and false reporting. Panic was said to be fuelled by
'the primitive nature of colonial administrative structures and procedures for
protecting community health.' In fact, the outbreak of smallpox in Sydney
occurred at a time when the colony of New South Wales had no general
Health Act, no public health policy and no infectious diseases hospital. Other
s. 5. In 1984 the Quarantine Amendment (Cth) (1984) omitted smallpox as a
'quarantlnable disease' under the Act. Quarantine may still be imposed on persons infected
with TB who refuse to undergo a medical examination to detect the presence of pulmonary
TB (s. 35AA Quarantine Acf (1908)).
These measures were implemented following the passage of the Chinese Restriction Act
(1882)(Tas.). The Western Australian legislation is contained in Act for the Restriction of
Chinese Immigration (1899).
fyfayne. A., 'The dreadful scourge: responses to smallpox in Sydney and l\/1elbourne, 1881-
2', in McCleod, R., and Lewis, M. (eds). Disease, Medicine and Empire, London, Routledge,
1988, 219-241, at p. 224.
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colonies were in a similar position. Wisdom was drawn from overseas
experience. The fact that smallpox was seen as a disease of the poor or one
of filth may be a reason why public health legislation in the 1980s and 1990s
carried over from earlier times focuses heavily on sanitation and inspection of
premises.
The cholera epidemic illustrated that quarantine was ineffective,
because of the ability of asymptomatic or mildly infectious carriers to enter
and subsist in a population. As a result, during the cholera epidemic
quarantine did not appear to have any significant effect on curbing the spread
of disease. As cholera is not spread by human contact it is questionable
that human quarantine should have ever been imposed.
Although quarantine orders were reportedly not challenged in
Australia, in the United States quarantines imposed for diseases such as
smallpox, TB and cholera were, in general, upheld as valid, In Crayton v
Larrabie the court revealed the overwhelming view at that time that the
object of preservation of public health was all important. The court stated '...
powers conferred for so greatly needed and most useful purposes, should
receive a liberal construction for the advancement of the ends for which they
were bestowed', in another example, the court suggested that 'neither the
right to liberty nor right of property extend to the use of liberty or property to
the injury of others'. 5i uS courts generally refused to prevent arbitrary or
unreasonable conduct of health officers in detaining persons. The courts
upheld quarantine orders when the individual was not yet contagious on the
basis that they need not wait until a carrier had made someone ill. For
example, in Crayton v Larrabie the individual who was quarantined merely
lived next door to someone with smallpox. This procedure was followed again
during World War II when prostitutes were detained until they could be
examined for venereal disease.
Benenson, A. S., Control of Communicable Diseases in Man, 14th ed, Washington,
American Public Health Association, 1985, at pp. 78-82.
Smallpox: Crayton v Larrabie 220 N.Y. 493; 116 N.E. 355 (1917). TB: Greene v Edwards
263 S.E. 2d 661, 663 (1980). Cholera: Hurst Warner 102 Mich. 238 (1984).
49220 N.Y. 493; 116N.E. 355(1917).
50at pp. 501-503, (at p. 358).
51 Kirk vWyman 83S.C. 372, at p. 378; 65 S.E. 387 (1939), at p. 389.
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However, the indiscriminate use of quarantine was successfully
.challenged in the United States even in 1900. In Jew Ho v Williamson 52 an
ordinance quarantining twelve blocks in San Francisco, where 9 people had
died from plague, was challenged on the ground that it was discriminatory.
Authorities had specifically exempted non-Asian homes from the quarantine.
Although the court made it clear it would uphold any reasonable health
regulation that protected the public from epidemics of a contagious diseases,
the court found the quarantine 'overly broad'. The object of health regulations
was to confine the disease to the smallest number of people. The quarantine
imposed failed to do this, (effectively restricting 10,000 persons) and was
therefore a subterfuge for discrimination and unreasonable. 53
This case, illustrates the US courts' intolerance of overly broad
restrictions on personal liberty in the early 1900s. However, Merrit argues
that this marked a change from the position prior to this period where courts
'... showed little concern for the extent to which [a health measure] might
infringe on individual rights'. 54 The economic viability of some measures was
a high priority in labelling them as reasonable or unreasonable. For example,
in the case of Hazen v Strong 55 the Supreme Court of Vermont held that
vaccination for smallpox 'had eminent utility in saving expense. If members of
a community submitted to inoculation, they could attend to their usual
vocations, instead of being confined with a loathsome disease, ... '. 56 The
status of the subject was also relevant. Courts appeared to take sides with
members of the public whom they considered respectable individuals. For
example, in Kirk v Wyman 57 a quarantine order was not upheld because the
subject was an old respected member of the community. The courts did not
apply such a liberal view to prostitutes.
In the post War years in the United States, many challenges to
quarantine orders applying to persons suffering from TB were successful. 58
52 103F. 10(C.N.D. Cal. 1900), at p. 22.
53 Ibid, at p. 23.
54 Merrit, p.. The Constitutional Balance Between Health and Liberty' (1986) 16/2 Hastings
Centre Report, 2-8, at p. 4.
55 2 yt. 427(1830)
56cited in Merrit, supra note 54, at p. 5
5783 S.C. 372; 65 S.E. 387 (1939).
56 See for details Parmet, W .E., 'AIDS and Quarantine: The Revival of an Archaic Doctrine',
(1985) 14 Hofstra Law Review, 53-90, and'more particularly Baleras v Pitchess, Civil No.
188
As the principle of reasonableness was derived from the common law the
same principle could be applied in Australia by analogy. However, in most
public health legislation in Australia there were no due process procedural
protections built in leaving the subject without a remedy apart from habeas
corpus. The development of the body of administrative law would now provide
the subject with the remedy of judicial review of a decision of a government
instrumentality such as a public health department The ground of review may
include a denial of natural justice and a consideration of whether the decision
was unreasonable and whether irrelevant factors were taken into account. ^9
If the decision results in an oppressive interference with rights the lifestyle of
an HIV-infected person, he or she rnay have a remedy. For example, if the
terms of a public health order directed a person to abstain from sexual
activities involving penetration with or without a condom, this may be
regarded as oppressive interference with rights and unnecessary to protect
the public interest. Such an order would also be contradictory to provisions in
some public health legislation which suggest that persons should use
reasonable measures or precautions to prevent the spread of HIV.
In Australia, in addition to the Chinese, other groups were
targeted by detention type legislation. Prostitutes thought to be infected with
venereal disease were isolated under the ill-fated contagious diseases
legislation of Queensland and Tasmania. The legislation permitted the
detention of prostitutes until they could be examined for venereal disease, s""
In New South Wales in 1908 section 9 was inserted into the Prisoners
Detention Act which allowed the detention of prisoners infected with venereal
disease for a period of up to nine months until free from infection.
CA 00617; Superior court LA Co Ca (1980) where the unnecessary confinement of a
suspected active TB case led to the award of a large out-of-court settlement.
Hotop, 8., Principles of Australian Adminstrative Law, 6th ed, Sydney, Law Book
Company, 1985, chs. 7 and 8. This discretionary form of review may be available whether or
not a right of appeal against a detention order is provided in a statute (Hotop, at pp. 319-320).
60 Act for the Suppression ofContagious Diseases(1868)(Qld.) and Contagious Diseases
Act (1879) (Tas.) referred to in Daniels, supra note 35, at pp. 64-68.
6^ This was also a feature of legislation in New South Wales where legislation relating to
venereal disease was contained in a separate Act Venereal Disease Act (1918) which
remained in force until 1988 when it was repealed by the Summary Offences Act
(1988)(N.S.W.). Tasmanian public health legislation currently has a.separate section dealing
with venereal diseases (ss. 34-53 Public Health Act (1962)) as does Western Australia (ss.
297-316 Health Act (1911)).
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Similarly, during World War I the United States introduced
quarantine of prostitutes in order to control the spread of venereal disease.
The application of the procedure to prostitutes illustrated how governments
were capable of applying procedures in a discriminatory manner against a
particular group of persons who were not the only ones suffering from the
disease. When challenged in the early 1900s, the courts held that quarantine
was a reasonable and proper means of preventing the spread of such a
disease. The politics of keeping the army free from disease was an
overriding aim of such decisions. Courts decided if health officials had
reasonable grounds for believing that a woman was a prostitute they could
rely upon their experience to conclude that it was reasonably probable that
she was infected. 64This provided health officials with the power to decide
who was or was not a prostitute. Although the courts established a precedent
of requiring more than a mere suspicion of infection in order to detain a
prostitute ^5, they tended to treat them, as a group, differently from other
persons who contracted disease merely by engaging sexual intercourse on a
promiscuous basis, However, it was the use of quarantine during this
period that'... ultimately forced courts to recognise that quarantine was not
always in the best interests of the individual'. At approximately the same
period, in both Australia and the United States quarantine or isolation
legislation became a complement to police work. Venereal disease legislation
or quarantine statutes were used to hold women longer than sentences for
prostitution would allow. 68 jhe remnants of this period of association
between the criminal law and public health law is still seen in the delegation of
powers to police to detain persons who are the subject of public health orders.
Full details of American precedent are contained in Parmet, supra note 58. Brandt, A.M.,
states that during World War I 30,000 prostitutes were quarantined to protect men from
venereal disease ('AIDS: From Social History to Social Policy' (1986) 14/5-6 Law, Medicine
and Health Care, 231-242, at p. 233).
63 ExParteMason {^9^9) 22 Ohio NPNS21, 30; Re Fisher(1925) 74 Cal. App. 225, 239 P.
1100; State ex re. Kennedy v Heat 185 S.W. 2d 530 (1945); Ex parte Martin , 83 Cal App
2d 164,188 P.2d 287 (1948); Ex parte McGee, 185 P. 14 (Kan. 1919).
64 ExparteMartin, 83CalApp 2d 164, 188 P.2d 287(1948).
65 ReMilstead (1919) 44 Cal.App. 239, 186 P. 170.
66 which can be seen from the decision in Ex Parte Dillon 44 Cal App239, 186 P. 170
(1944) where the presumption of infection did not apply to non-prostitutes.
67Parmet, supra note 58, at p. 67, footnotes 85-103.
68 Parmet, Ibid, at p. 67; Daniels, supra note 35 , at p. 68.
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The term 'quarantinable disease' under the Quarantine Act
(1908)(Cth) has not been amended to include AIDS or HIV. The responsibility
in this regard has fallen on State Public Health Departments, and legislation in
some Australian States specifically permits the isolation, detention and
quarantine of HIV-infected persons. For example, section 32 of the Public and
Environmental Health Act (1987)(S.A.) empowers the Commission in the
interests of public health, upon certification that a person is suffering from the
specified disease, to request a Magistrate to issue a warrant for the detention
of the person at a suitable place of quarantine, for a period not exceeding six
months in total. Under section 33 the Commission may direct a person
suffering from a notifiable disease to reside at a particular place, refrain from
spreading the disease and from performing work, and submit himself or
herself to regular examination. Unlike the now amended section 32A
provision of the New South Wales legislation, section 33(3) of the South
Australian Act enables a detainee to apply to a Magistrate for review of the
decision, and section 34(1) provides a right of appeal to a single Judge of the
Supreme Court against the Magistrate's decision.
Under the Victorian Health (General Amendment) Act (1988)
power is given to the Governor in Council to proclaim an emergency for the
purpose of stopping, limiting or preventing the spread of an infectious
disease. Once an area has been proclaimed, persons of a specified class
may be prevented from entering or leaving that area and may be detained
within it. In addition, provision is made in section 146 for a number of
regulations to be passed relating to the examination, testing, counselling,
isolation, quarantine, restriction or immunisation of persons, the tracing of
persons having contact with infected persons, and the restriction of school
attendance because of an infectious disease.
Further, under section 121 of the Victorian Health (General
Amendment) (Amendment) Act (1989) a person may be detained and
isolated if he or she is thought to be infected, is likely to infect others, is a
serious risk to public health, has a positive HIV antibody test result and
counselling has not successfully achieved 'appropriate and responsible
behaviour change'. Like the South Australian legislation the Act provides
69 S.I23(1).
^9 as inserted by the Health (Amendment) Act (1990).
71 s. 121(1)-(4).
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for an appeal to the Supreme Court with respect to an isolation order and lists
the matters a court must consider in determining such an appeal. These
include: the method by which the disease is transmitted, the seriousness of
the risk to others, the past behaviour and likely conduct of the person
identified in the order, and the extent of the restriction imposed on the person
identified in the order. ^2
In the Northern Territory, section 13 of the Notifiable Diseases Act
(1981) which applies to HIV-infected persons only allows an infectious person
to be removed to hospital when he or she has failed to comply with a
direction to adopt such measures necessary for the treatment of or prevention
of the spread of that disease. Such a direction must be served personally on
the infected person and the Act gives them the right to appeal to a Magistrate
who may confirm, vary or revoke the direction. ^3
The legal position in New South Wales when the section 32A case
concerning the Sydney prostitute arose was in breach of fundamental
liberties. There were no due process clauses in the New South Wales
legislation which allowed for a right of appeal. The procedure to be adopted
when an infected person was to be detained was not clear. The Public Health
Act (1991) rernedied this situation. 74
The Public Health (Proclaimed Diseases) Amendment Act
(1989)(N.S.W.) also redressed some of the grievances that were aired at the
time of the detention of the Sydney prostitute. Mariy of its provisions have
been included in the Public Health Act (1991). The legislation details the
procedure to be adopted when determining what conduct will lead to
detention under a 'public hdalth order'. It is a medical officer who makes the
decision using his or her discretion. 75 jhe legislation uses phrases such as
'endangering or likely to endanger life' but gives no guidance on how these
might be interpreted. The public health order may contain directions that a
person undergo counselling, refrain from specified conduct, undergo
treatment, submit to supervision and/or be detained at a specific place. 76
72 s. 122(6).
73 s. 11-12.
74 by providing for an appeal to the District Court (s. 41).
73 s. 23(1)(a)(b) of the Public Health Act (1991) refers to an HIV-infected person who is
behaving in a way that is endangering, or likely to endanger, the public health.
76s. 23(3).
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The legislation then specifies that a public health order can be for a period of
28 days. The New South Wales legislation, unlike the Victorian legislation,
does not specify that counselling is a pre-condition of an order for detention in
that State.
A New South Wales public health order containing a detention
direction gives police the power to apprehend and assist in taking the person
to the place specified in the order and similar powers if the public health
order is later contravened. This would reduce the potential for police to
arrest any prostitute or homosexual on any dubious public health ground.
Although a warrant is unnecessary, police could only arrest the specific
subjects of the public health orders. A person contravening a public health
order is guilty of an offence punishable by $5,000 or 6 months imprisonment
or both. Prosecutions can be brought by the police under section 28(1). It
seems unnecessary that this should be required. By providing police with
prosecutorial and as a corollary, investigatory powers, technically the Act
authorises the police to step up surveillance of minority groups such as
prostitutes and homosexuals. It may be that police could in time provide the
medical officer with information about certain persons of specified classes and
then he or she would make a public health order. It is preferable, despite their
historical association, that these two arms of preventative detention remain
separate.
In Tasmania, under the HIV/AIDS Preventative Measures Bill an
HIV-infected person may be restricted (s. 21(2)(b)) or be isolated and
detained (s. 21(2)(c)) for a maximum of 28 days if he or she, fails to take all
reasonablei measures and precautions to prevent transmission and fails to
inform any sexual contact or person with whom needles are shared, of that
fact or, if he or she knowingly or recklessly places another person at risk of
becoming infected with HIV and is likely to continue that behaviour (s.
21(1)(a-c)). An order will only be made after an application to a Magistrate
who has a duty to consider a number of criteria sset out in section 21(3)
including whether, and by what method HIV was transmitted, the seriousness
of the risk of the person infecting other persons and the past behaviour and
likely future behaviour of the infected person. There is however, no chance to
review or appeal the isolation order. Neither is there any right of appeal
77s. 23(2)(c).
78 s. 29(1).
79 s. 29(2).
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contained In the Public Health Act (1962) which is supplemental to the
HIV/AIDS specific legislation. The concern raised with the New South Wales
legislation with respect to police powers to detain members of minority groups
would be unlikely to arise with the Tasmanian legislation because police are
not granted an investigatory power. They only have the power to act when it
becomes necessary to enforce an isolation order that has been granted by a
Magistrate. In addition, in order to arrest the subject of the order the police
must have in their possession a warrant of arrest that has been obtained by
the Secretary of Health from a Magistrate (s. 23(1)).
In Western Australia, Queensland and the Australian Capital
Territory existing public health legislation applicable to a wide range of
communicable diseases provides for the detention in, or removal of persons
to, hospital 80and allows for regulations to be passed prescribing the
conditions and circumstances under which carriers or contacts of infectious
diseases may be isolated. Most of the sections specifically grant these
powers in the interests of public health. In each of these jurisdictions there is
no avenue of appeal against compulsory orders provided for in the legislation.
On closer inspection of the State provisions an interesting trend
has developed.. In those States with the greatest number of cases - States
that are typically more populous, more cosmopolitan, more politically liberal,
and with better organised gay communities, such as New South Wales,
Victoria and South Australia, the political context of public health policy has
militated against the use of traditional public health measures. This has in turn
fostered an effort to reconceive the strategy of disease prevention to reflect a
greater appreciation of the rights of the individual and of the superiority of
persuasive measures over restrictive interventions. It is in these States that
the more enlightened AIDS legislation is found. By contrast, in those States
with fewer cases such as Western Australia, Queensland and Tasmania (until
1993) where the threat of AIDS is relatively less significant 8^ but where the
political climate is also more conservative (especially in Tasmania reflected by
the fact that homosexual conduct is still illegal despite widespread community
88 ss. 251(6) (isolation), 251(8)(forbidden to leave jurisdiction), 263 (removal to hospital)
Health Act (1911)(W.A.); s. 36 (removal and detention on application to a justice) Health Act
Amendment Act (1988) (Qld.); r. 4(7) (isolation if refuses to submit to a medical examination),
r. 5(8) (detained for such period to ensure 'not a source of infection') Public Health (Infectious
and Notifiable Diseases) Regulations (1980)(A.C.T.).
8^ as depicted in Table 2.1 National Centre in HIV Epidemiology and Clinical Research,
Australian HIV Surveillance Report, 1994 10/2:10.
194
support and international criticism82) recourse to a traditional public health
response to epidemic disease has been more typical. This response is
manifested by the failure to repeal or amend archaic public health legislation
in a manner which would limit the potential for rights abuses to occur. For
example, in these States if detention occurs, there is no right of appeal.
Tasmania is an aberration to this theory following the passage of the
HIV/AIDS Preventative Measures Act in 1993. It is the present writer's view
that this detailed enactment resulted not because the transmission of HIV is a
threat in that jurisdiction but because the legislature was trying to placate the
homosexual lobby in that State that had placed intense pressure on the
government to repeal existing proscriptions against homosexual activity. 83
Instead of decriminalising homosexual conduct in that State the government
attempted instead to build procedural protections into public health legislation
and clearly define the circumstances in which HIV testing and isolation would
occur so that the at risk groups would have a clear indication of what conduct
would not be tolerated.
3. BALANCING INDIVIDUAL AND COMMUNITY INTERESTS IN THE
CONTROL OF HIV/AIDS
In general, the history of epidemics of infectious diseases from the
United States shows that the restriction of individual rights has been justified
on the grounds of protection of public order, public health or morals or the
rights and freedoms of others. 84 Although there is no case law on which to
draw a direct correlation in Australia, analysis of public health reports and
historians anecdotal evidence 85would support the view that a similar stance
has historically been adopted in Australia prior to the advent of the HIV/AIDS
epidemic. The apathy in pursuing an action against public health
82 The United Nations Human Rights Committee in 1994 has held that Tasmania is in
breach of Australia's Human Rights obligations by its continued criminalisation of homosexual
activity (Toonen v Australia CCPR/C/50/D/488/1992).
83 This matterwas considered in detail in chapter two, footnote 115.
Jacobson v Massachusetts 197 US 11 (1905), which gave the 'green light' to compulsory
vaccinations during smallpox and Jew Ho v Williamson 103 F. 10 (C.N.D. C al. 1900), where
the court made it clear it would uphold any reasonable health regulation that protected the
public from contagious diseases. See generally, Parmet, supra note 58, 53-90.
85 For example, that of Lewis, supra note28;McCleod and Lewis, supra note46; Daniels,
supra note 35; Cumpston, J.H.L., The Health of the People, Canberra, Roebuck Books,
1978, at p. 8.
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departments is by and large a product of the lack of constitutional safeguards.
It is arguable that the imposition of laws designed to elevate and protect the
interests of the community above those of the individual, during the 'AIDS
crisis' could well be justified from the standpoint of history alone.
The liberty and privacy of HIV-infected persons is threatened by
coercive provisions and there is potential for restrictive measures to be aimed
at them, including compulsory testing, isolation and quarantine orders.
Minority groups such as homosexuals, IV drug users, prostitutes and
prisoners are targets for the imposition of public health laws and policies that
may be both restrictive and wrongfully discriminatory.
Legislators have been conscious of this and have enacted general
provisions to safeguard individual liberties. For example, section 39 of the
Victorian Health (General Amendment) Act (1988), provided for an
amendment to made to the Equal Opportunity Act (1984)(Vic.) to protect
against discrimination on the basis of the presence of a disease-causing
organism in the body. Section 4(aa) of the latter Act states that it is unlawful
to discriminate on that ground 'unless the discrimination is reasonably
necessary to protect public health'. This provision is a modern example of
legislation attempting to strike a balance between individual and community
interests.
In addition, section 119 of the Victorian Health (General
Amendment) Amendment Act (1989) lists a number of principles to be
considered when applying various provisions of the Health Act (1958)(Vic.) to
communicable diseases. The principles endorse the right of an individual
who is suffering from an infectious disease to be protected from unlawful
discrimination, to have his or her privacy respected, to receive information
about the medical and social consequences of the disease and to have
access to available treatments. However, to these principles a proviso is
added; individual rights should not infringe on the well-being of others (s.
119(e)).
It hais been seen that compulsory notification, testing, examination
and isolation and quarantine are public health measures where there is
possible conflict between individual and community interests in the
enforcement of the measures. These practices will be examined in the context
of AIDS to see if enforcement of such measures to the detriment of individual
rights is justified in the interests of community health.
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COMPULSORY NOTIFICATION
Notification involves the obtaining and dissemination of
information. This could invoke a claim of a breach of privacy. Privacy involves
more than what Alan Westin has called, 'the claim of individuals, groups, or
institutions to determine for themselves when, how, and to what extent
information about them is communicated to others.' It is easy to see a
conflict arising between the individual's claim to privacy and the public health,
safety and welfare. One cannot realistically talk in terms of a total right to
privacy: "[m]an is not only a solitary animal, he is a creature of the herd as
well". 87 It is significant to note that Australian courts have, as early as 1937,
refused to hold that there is a general right to privacy in Australia. 88 Even in
the United States, where the right is generally seen as more entrenched, it is
not absolute in the context of contagious disease transmission. In this area,
public policy demands that the individual's rights give way to the overriding
concern for the general public's health and safety. 89
Notification provisions appearing in public health statutes would
seem at first glance to encourage a breach of privacy. Such provisions were
previously intended to cover diseases that were easily diagnosed, highly
infectious and curable, for example, plague, smallpox, yellow fever. For those
reasons, public health laws conferred very wide powers on doctors and public
health administrators. This was supposedly justified, not only on the grounds
of protection of the community, but also because treatment could be offered.
Although there is no cure for AIDS, counselling and education are
important to the individual suffering from the virus. This is necessary to
promote a responsible attitude towards curbing the spread of the disease.
Although counselling would need to be undertaken voluntarily to be effective,
notification would allow practitioners to make contact with HIV-infected
persons in the community and guide those persons towards counselling.
Generally notification is least harmful to an HIV-infected person as it tends to
place more duties on doctors. Notification gives public health departments
Westin, A., Privacy & Freedom, New York, Atheneum, 1968, at p. 7.
8^ Madwick, D., and Smythe, T., The Invasion ofPrivacy , London, Pitman, 1974, at p.3.
88 Victoria Park Racing and Recreation Grounds Co. Ltd. v Taylor and Ors (1937) 58 CLR
479 per Evatt J (a dissenting judgment, but not on the point of privacy.)
89 Kathleen KvRobert S 150 Cal. App. 3d 992 at 994 (1984) where the court noted that
where public health and safety are threatened an individual's right to privacy is not absolute.
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some information on the prevalence of AIDS in the community. These
reasons alone may justify invasions of privacy. Interference is not 'arbitrary',
but in the interests of community health.
However, notification by way of reporting ^oprovides only a rough
guide as to the prevalence of AIDS in the community as many people may not
know they are HIV-infected or may not present themselves for testing to
ascertain their status. In addition, notification technically involves a breach of
confidentiality and such a breach could have detrimental consequences for an
HIV-infected person. The fact that doctors have always expressed a
reluctance to notify public health authorities, especially with respect to STDs,
may indicate their concerns about respecting the privacy and confidentialityof
their patients.
Disclosure of personal information relating to HIV status raises the
conflict between the duty of confidentiality and the duty to protect third parties
against foreseeable transmission of HIV. Except in extreme cases where it is
clear that a third party is in foreseeable danger of contracting the virus, the
release of sensitive information beyond the scope of the individual's consent
abrogates the right to control information about oneself. Possible
consequences of such disclosure include discrimination in the workplace,
stigmatisation and ostracism. 92
Pre-existing public health statutes in Australian States and
Territories failed to impose any statutory safeguards on the usage of
information gained in the course of examining or testing persons suffering
from infectious diseases. This is in direct contrast to the position in the US
where public health statutes do contain confidentiality clauses. This may be
due in large part to the fact that US States are constitutionally required to
safeguard the confidentiality of information reported to public health
departments. However, the advent of the AIDS epidemic has led some
90 The distinction that is often drawn between notification for epidemiological purposes and
for reporting purposes is not being debated here although arguably the former is less
justifiable on the grounds of being a direct benefit to a particular community's health.
91 Lewis, M., 'From Blue Light Clinic to Nightingale Centre: A brief History of the Sydney
SID Centre and its Forerunners: Part 1: V.D. in Europe from Colonization to 1945',
Venereology, 1988, 1/1:3-9, at p. 6 for details of reluctance of doctors to notify venereal
diseases in Australia and in the US. See also Chase, supra note 15, at p. 20-22.
92 Tiiiet, G., 'The Resolution of AIDS-Related Disputes' (1990) 1 Australian Dispute
Resolution Journal, 12-17; Godwin, J., 'AIDS Legal Workshop Legal Advocacy and
HIV/AIDS Casework' (1990) National AIDS Bulletin, July, 12-17.
93 Wha/en VRoe 429 US 589 (1977).
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Australian State legislatures to attempt to provide protection for HIV-infected
persons in the face of notification requirements.
Legislation in some States and Territories has been enacted which
provides for procedures to be adopted in cases of disclosure by doctors and
health officials of information relevant to both HIV-infected persons and health
departments. All States and Territories require that the information about HIV
infection status to be referred to the Health Departments in coded formats.
Legislation also imposes duties to maintain confidentiality and records. For
example, section 42 of the Public and Environmental Health Act, (1987)(S.A)
requires that information obtained in the course of official duties relating to
another person not be intentionally disclosed unless the disclosure is made in
the course of such duties, with the consent of the person concerned, or is
required by a court or legal tribunal. Similar provisions are contained in
section 37 of the Public Health Act (1991)(N.S.W.) and section 19 HIV/AIDS
Preventative Measures Act (1993)(Tas.). In 1989 the New South Wales
legislature placed restrictions on reporting proceedings. The Victorian,
Queensland and Tasmanian legislation states that the privacy of persons to
be tested must be maintained. 95 jhe availability of suppression orders to
prevent the publication of information to identify an HIV-infected person is
covered in some public health and evidence legislation. The matter will be
covered in more detail in chapter six.
As to confidentiality of medical records, section 130(5) of the
Victorian Act requires maintenance of records relating to the incidence of HIV
by restricting a medical practitioner from divulging the identity of the person
whose blood is tested to either a blood facility or the blood tester. Section 36
of the Public Health Act (1991)(N.S.W.) and s. 18 of the HIV/AIDS
Preventative Measures Act (1993)(Tas.) also contain directions relating to the
inspection of medical records. Health Departments in several States and
The restriction may only be implemented on application by a party if the Judge does not
act on his own volition (s. 50oK Public Health (Proclaimed Diseases Amendment) Act (1989)
which was amended as s. 35(3) of the Public Health Act (1991). A similar restriction is
contained in the Tasmanian legislation under section 21(6) ot HIV/AIDS Preventative
Measures Act (1993) except it is not dependent on a judge for implementation but is as of
right.
s. 128 of the Victorian Health (General Amendment) Act (1988), s. 48 Health Act
•Amendment Act (1988) (Old.) and s. ^7(3) HIV/AIDS Preventative Measures Act (Tas.) are
HIV-specific.
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Territories have issued policy directives on the confidentiality of health
records,
These provisions do not specifically permit police to have access
to this confidential information. In fact, the Western Australian Police
defended their establishment of an AIDS List in 1990 on the ground that the
Western Australian Health Department refused to supply them with names of
HIV-infected persons, thus requiring the police to draft their own list for their
protection. 9^ jhe practice of establishing an AIDS List had been revealed
during a Parliamentary Committee Inquiry into Police Practices in general. 98
There have been reports that Victorian police check the HIV status
of people being questioned or in custody. 99 The practice was defended by
Chief Inspector Denis Cairns as necessary to protect the safety and welfare of
police officers. New South Wales police have been issued with a specific
circular pertaining to this issue and the confidentiality of HIV-infected suspects
and accused persons, '•oo An earlier circular allowed police to record
notes which identified people suffering from HIV or AIDS. Circular 89/144
notes that 'it is the offender's behaviour that should be recorded, not whether
they have HIV or not'.
The keeping of a list of unconfirmed HIV-infected persons is
discriminatory. Labelling a person as infected with HIV without a confirmatory
AIDS test is prejudicial since it is open to breaches of confidentiality in the
absence of any procedural safeguards. The effect that such breaches of
confidentiality may have on an accused's life and family is not justified on the
ground of protecting the police or the public in general. Selective enforcement
could be detrimental to established programmes. The US Joint Sub-
Health Commission of NSW Circulars 82/369 and 84/82; Queensland Privacy Guidelines
for Hospitals, Department Standing Committee on Privacy and Health and Medical Records.
April 1986; Western Australia Health Department Guidelines for Release/Access to Health
Records 1986; South Australian Health Department Guidelines Regarding the Release of
Information. (Information obtained as a result of personal correspondence with respective
Health Departments.)
97 Meertens, G., 'Police keep record of AIDS suspects'. West Australian, July 3 1990, p. 1.
98 WA Legislative Assembly, Report of the Select Committee Appointed to Inquire Into the
NationalHiV/AIDS Strategy White Paper, Perth, June, 1990.
99 'Police Database of HIV Positive People', (1991) 2/3National HIV/AIDS Legal Link
Newsletter, 1-2.
100 Police Circular 89/144. NSW.
101 Police Circular 89/142. NSW.
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Committee on AIDS in the Criminal Justice System, in their report into AIDS
and the criminal justice system, were strongly of the view, that
no individual should be identified directly or indirectly as
having AIDS unless and until the accuracy of such information
is confirmed. Procedures to ensure such accuracy must be
put in place,
Improvements need be made in the control of police use of
computers including greater supervision, more careful logging in of
information and controls on who has access to the information. Police need
to be advised of the necessity of treating any statement made by an accused
person or the subject of a detention order about his or her infected status as
confidential. This must be adhered to until the accuracy of such information is
confirmed and afterwards unless there is clear justification for disclosure.
In addition, legislation needs to define in what circumstances other
parties such as parole officers, emergency personnel and educational
establishments need to know the status of an HIV-infected person or his or
her test results. Legislation should also establish some procedure where
parties can make a claim that they need to know. It is suggested that Health
Departments continue to refuse to give information generally to police about
the HIV status of persons.
The issue of privacy in relation to HIV/AIDS has also been
considered by Australian courts. For example, in May 1989 the Supreme
Court of Western Australia granted an injunction preventing news
organisations publishing details of an HIV-infected person who possibly
infected a prominent woman who had since died from the disease. It was
argued by the defendant news organisation that it was in the public interest
that people with AIDS who were active in the community be named. The
court was urged by the Department of Health and the AIDS Council of that
State to maintain the confidentiality of the relevant parties in the interests of
promoting testing of HIV-infected persons, The court ruled that the
community interest is best served by maintaining the privacy of HIV-infected
^02 Joint Sub-Committee on AIDS in the Criminal Justice System of the Committee on
Corrections and the Committee on Criminal Justice Operations and Budget, 'AIDS and the
Criminal Justice System; A Preliminary Report and Recommendations' (1987) 42/7The
Recxjrd of the BarAssociation of New York, 901 -923, at p. 916.
103 XVSattlerand Ors. Unreported judgment of the Supreme Court ofWestern Australia,
No. 1783/1989, Kennedy J. The issues of privacy and confidentiality relevant to HIV-infected
persons will be covered in chapter six.
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persons in the hope that other infected persons will come forward for testing
and counselling, thus serving to curb the spread of the virus.
COMPULSORY EXAMINATION AND HIV TESTING
Compulsory examination and testing under public health laws
interfere with an individual's claim to privacy. Broadly speaking, preventing
the transmission of HIV is at present the only effective strategy to control the
HIV epidemic. HIV testing can be useful in helping to prevent HIV
transmission where information obtained by testing contributes to the control
of HIV transmission. It is necessary to consider the types of HIV testing and
the overall utility of such testing in order to determine whether interferences
with privacy can be justified on the basis that protection of community health
is achieved.
Testing may be of four types, namely voluntary, routine, mandatory
or compulsory.
Voluntary testing is only performed with the informed consent of
the individual. This form of testing is presently available in most countries to
all persons and is actively encouraged. It can generally only be offered if
counselling programmes are in operation and confidentiality of results is
ensured. The procedure to be followed when voluntary testing is engaged in
has been endorsed by the National HIV/AIDS Strategy as necessary 105 but
has been legislatively prescribed in public health legislation in Victoria and
Tasmania only, ""o®
Routine testing is normally performed unless an individual has a
specific, cogent and bona-fide objection. This type of testing can be
anonymous in the public health context where it is used to ascertain
prevalence. However it is open to criticism because it is often performed
without consent or even the knowledge of the person tested. Where testing is
anonymous it is unlikely to result in confidentiality problems, but, if its net
worth is minimal in terms of combating the spread of the virus, then
anonymous or routine testing should not be encouraged.
•>04 Somerville, M. A., and Gilmore, N., HIV Antibody Testingin Canada, unpublished paper,
McGIII Centre for Medicine, Ethics and the Law, Montreal, Canada 1988, at p. 12-13.
105 Commonwealth of Australia, National HIV/AIDS Strategy: a policy information paper,
Canberra, Australian Government Publishing Service, 1989 at para. 5.2.5 which suggests
that voluntary testing be encouraged and proceduresset in place to facilitate such an aim.
"<06 s. 127(1)(2) Health (General Amendment) Act (1988) (Vic.) and ss. 6-7 HIV/AIDS
Preventative Measures Act. (1993)(Tas.).
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The term routine may also be used to refer to testing of specific
groups where it is a standard practice. Individuals have the right to decline
such testing unless required to undergo it by law. An example of routine
testing required by law is blood alcohol testing following a road accident,
Such testing could also be labelled compulsory. In fact section 47(i) of the
South Australian Road Traffic Act (1961) uses the terminology 'compulsory'
in setting up the power to take blood from a person involved in a road
accident. Under this legislation informed consent does not need to be
obtained whereas under the common law it would be.
Mandatory testing covers the situation where testing is a pre
requisite for a person to obtain a specified status, benefit, service or access to
a given service. For example, many health insurance policies require an
antibody test to be undertaken as a pre-condition for insurance cover.
Mandatory testing is also applied to blood and tissue donations.
Compulsory testing involves testing which is required by law or
policy. The individual has no choice to refuse testing and cannot avoid it.
Presently compulsory HiV testing is undertaken in the defence forces and
in some Australian prisons, However, some countries, for example,
Germany and the United States, in addition to testing prisoners, have made
provision to compulsory test prostitutes, sex offenders and drug addicts.
as is the case under s. 56 Road SafetyAct 0 986) (Vic)with or without the consent of the
person and s. 8H of the Traffic Act (1949-1987) N.T.). In South Australia, s. 47(i) of the
Road TrafficAct {^96^) is much more stringent in its application and covers concerns about
procedure and protection of the samples obtained. It particularly states the sample should not
be taken if it would be injurious to the medical condition of the patient to do so (s. 47(i)(2)).
The common law doctrine of informed consent is based on patient autonomy and
requires that patients understand and approve of therapy or procedure that they are about to
undergo. The doctrine is considered in its application to HIV in chapter six, pp. 245-246.
^b9 Neave, Ivl., 'Anti-discrimination Laws and Insurance: The Problem of AIDS' (1988) 1
Insurance Law Journal, 10-23 This area has been regulated by the development of a Ckxie
of Practice for Insurers.
jhe instructions for testing are contained in (General) Amendment I PERS 16-6 'ADF
Policy for the Detection, Prevention and Administrative Management of Human
Immunodeficiency Virus (HIV) Infection', 1989 and issued pursuant to s. 9A of the Defence
Act (1903)(Cth). Tests were being conducted from 1985. Since that date 107,243 tests in
27,483 entrants and serving members have been undertaken (Flynn, M. J., 'HIV in the
Australian Defence Force 1985 -1993', Australian HIV Surveillance Report, 1993, 9/2:1-5).
^^^ The testing policies in Australian prisons are covered in more detail in chapter seven.
^ 'Mandatory AIDS tests on basis "of slight suspicion" in Bavaria', Nature, 1988 333:585. In
the United States, as of 1990 17 US States had added mandatory testing requirements for
certain groups such as prostitutes, sexual offenders and drug users in addition to prisoners
((1990)3 Intergovernmental AIDS Report, May-June, 1-3); Burris, S. Dalton, H., Miller, J. L.
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Statutes permitting such testing may be overinclusive. There is a move in
Australia to test elective surgery patierits and to test in certain
circumstances, for example, where an individual is charged with a sexual
offence.
Instances of compulsory testing provided for in public health
legislation have already been covered in this chapter Compulsory testing
under the guise of a medical examination is conceivably provided for in every
State and Territory. One specific instance of compulsory testing is provided
for in section 121 of the Health Act (1958)(Vic.). which outlines the
circumstances when HIV testing may be ordered. A 1991 amendment by the
Health (Infectious Diseases) Act (1991)(Vic.) contains some inherent
contradictions with the earlier provision. Under the 1991 legislation, where a
care-giver or custodian (including health care worker, police officer or prison
officer) could have been exposed and the person suspected of the 'exposure'
refuses to submit to an antibody test, he or she will be subject to a penalty.
Surprisingly, the legislation received little debate and considerably widens the
powers set down in section 121.
To take blood from a person in a compulsory manner is technically
an assault because it qualifies as a non-consensual deliberate and intentional
touching of another, •'"'s With the exception of voluntary testing, the
remaining classes are prima-facie unlawful in that a person is deprived of a
free consent, or his or her degree of freedom to withhold consent is reduced.
and the Yale Law Project, (eds) AIDSLaw Today: A New Guide for the Public, 2nd ed. New
Haven, Yale University, 1993, at p. 81.
^^3 Compulsory testing for all surgical patients began in NSW public hospitals from 1.1.91 in
direct conflict with the Federal Government National HIV/AIDS Strategy, supra note 105,
para. 5.2.12). 'NSW begins compulsory testing in hospitals' (1990) National AIDSBulletin,
November, 3. There is no legal basis for such testing. However, in Tasmania from June 1993
under the HIV/AIDS Preventative Measures Act (1993) in non-emergency cases a medical
practitioner, nurse, or dentist may require a person to undergo an HIV test before carryingout
a surgical or dental procedure (s. 12(4)). If a person refuses to undergo the test, the
legislation does not authorise the health care vyorker to refuse to treat the patient but requires
that they either carry out the procedure or refer the patient to someone who will (s.
12(6)(a)(b)). , .
Such a policy has also been recommended in the National HIV/AIDS Strategy, supra
note 105, para. 5.2.14 and is covered in Tasmania under the HIVAIDS Preventative
Measures Act (s. 10(1)) and s. 464 of the Crimes (Amendment Act) (1993)(Vic.). This effect
of this legislation will be considered in chapter six, pp. 231 -232.
^^3 jhe elements of Assault as an offence under the Codes and at common law was
covered in chapter three. Generally the act of taking of blood is consented to. It is the
subsequent use or testing to which that blood is subjected that is of concern. It is arguable
whether at the point when the blood is actually tested there is no consent mainly if the person
has not been informed of the purpose for which the blood is being tested. This matter is
covered in detail in chapter six, pp. 245-257.
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As compulsory testing or screening has been a public health measure used to
control communicable diseases in the past (e g compulsory chest x-rays
during TB) it is necessary to examine the arguments for and against HIV
antibody testing and in particular compulsory schemes in the context of HIV.
This is particularly important also to the criminal law where there are already
instances of compulsory blood testing within the criminal justice system, both
in the context of AIDS (in prisons) and in other contexts (blood alcohol
testing).
The Utility of HIV Testing
Testing for HIV has many advantages. First, there is ample
testimony that the testing of donors of blood, semen and tissue since 1985
has contributed to the safety of supplies of nations implementing such a
policy. 116 The fact there was no test available prior to that date has resulted
in a fair,proportion of HIV haemophiliac and HIV-acquired transfusion cases.
With universal screening and selective donor interviewing, the incidence of
transfusion-associated or blood product HIV infection appears to be extremely
low. 117
Second, it is accepted that early intervention and treatment can
delay the progression of HIV to AIDS, n® Hence there is general agreement
11® As suggested in the National HIV/AIDS Strategy, supra note 105, at para. 1.4.1.
Australia was the first country to introduce the compulsory screening of ail blood donations
(Penington, D. G., The AIDS Epidemic - Where are we going?' Mod J Aust, 1987, 147:265-
266).
11^ The writer has searchedmedical journals for reported incidents. It appears that the risk
of anti-negative blood being transfused remains an issue even in developed countries.
However, a 1992 US study which followed-up 158 cases previously attributed to transfusion-
associated infection since screening measures were put in place in 1985, found that only 15
could be substantiatpd (Conley, L.J., and Holmberg, S. •., Transmission of AIDS from Blood
Screened Negative to the Human Immunodeficiency Virus', N Eng J Med 1992, 326: 1499-
1500).
11® Following clinical trials ofAzidothymidine (AZT), iri a number of countries in the United
States and in Australia, it was found that this drug suppresses viral replication, and reduces
the number of 'opportunistic' infections in both AIDS and ARC patients. It was thought that
AZT prolongs the lives of AIDS infected persons. A study, conducted in Paris, concluded
benefits of AZT are limited to a few months, six for ARC and AIDS patients and then only for
some patients (Dournon, E., Rosenbaum, W., Michon, C., et al , 'Effects of Zidovudine in
365 Consecutive Patients with AIDS or ARC, Lancet, 1988, 2: 1297-1302). This adverse
finding was supported by the Concorde Trials in 1992 described in detail in footnote 166
chapter one. Tfierefore, the correctness of the initial view that AZT slowed progression is
now questionable. However, new prophylactic therapy for PCP have been shown to result in
a decrease in the number of cases (Sattler, F. R., 'Pulmonary manifestations of AIDS: special
emphasis on pneumocystosis', Wyngaarden, J. B., Smith, LJ., Bennett, J. C., (eds) Cecil
Textbook of Medicine, 19th ed, Philadelphia, W. B. Saunders, 1992, 1932-1942).
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within the medical community that people at risk should be encouraged to
undergo a test which will reveal to them their antibody status. This will enable
the appropriate counselling procedures to be set in place. After the antibody
status has been ascertained, the person may be placed on a drug programme
to slow the progression of the disease. The coincidence of counselling when
conveying test results has been legislatively endorsed in three Australian
jurisdictions. ''•'9 While it is imperative that testing occur with such counselling
and it would be against general HIVmedical practice guidelines if it did not, in
the absence of legislative coercion in some jurisdictions it is possible that
testing without counselling may occur. 120
The third point arises from the foregoing. Following testing, an
antibody positive person may be encouraged to refrain from engaging in
behaviour that places others at risk of acquiring the virus, thus reducing the
spread of the virus through the community. There is some evidence from
public health departments in Australia that behavioural changes of this type
have been successfully implemented, The difficulty is in maintaining such
a change over an indefinite period.
Finally, information from HIV testing, can help direct public health
programmes. The population of HIV-infected persons in any given community
may dictate different needs in the development of policy. In addition, the
information obtained from the test can lead to improved understanding of the
infection. This may involve the participation of infected persons in drug trials
which may assist, at best, in the development of a cure, and at worst in the
furtherance of expertise in the area.
Against the perceived utility of the antibody test in these general
terms must be weighed its shortcomings.
First, the current.antibody tests do not provide a 100% accurate
picture. While testing for HIV antibodies is highly reliable - with a sensitivity of
"119 s. 127(1)(2) /-/ea/f/7 (General Amendment) Act (1988) (Vic.) (pre- and post-test
counselling); s. 10 Notifiable Diseases Act (1981)(N.T.) (post-test counselling only).
HIV/AIDS Preventative Measures Act (1993)(Tas.) provides for both pre and post-test
counselling of both positive and negative test results (ss.14(1), 15(2)(3)with the exception of
blood donors).
•>20 In fact, from reading the State reports in the Commonwealth Government, National
HIV/AIDS Evaluation 1991-1992 State Stories Report, Canberra, Australian Government
Publishing Service, 1993, it is clear that counselling procedures are far from routine at testing
sites across Australia (at p. 127).
^21 Personal correspondence received from WA Health Department in 1992 and Tasmanian
Department of Health in 1993.
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93.4%-99.6% and a specificity of 98.6-99.9% 122 depending on the
experience of the laboratory personnel in reading the results ^23. a number of
false positives and false negative results have been returned. A false negative
can be received if a person has been tested during the 'window period';
before sufficient time has elapsed for antibody production between the onset
of HIV infection and the time of testing. '•24 This time can be between four
weeks to three months 125 but may be longer. This situation results in the
need for repeat testing, often conducted three months after the first, and then
with the same frequency or more depending on a person's behavioural
patterns. In addition, the tests cannot predict whether an individual will go on
to develop AIDS.
Testing also generates data potentially available to a wide range of
persons. Breaches of confidentiality may be a source of personal stress for
the infected person and/or his or her family. Indeed the testing itself and
conveyance of the results may lead to psychosocial stress, social isolation
and stigmatisation of the persons concerned. There is some evidence that
this situation is occurring. 126
The third major shortcoming of testing is that the rate of
behavioural changes occurring amongst high-risk groups following antibody
testing or even mere knowledge of the disease appears from present studies
^22 Weiss, S. H., Goedert, J. J., Sarngardharan M. G., et al 'Screening for HTLV-11(AIDS
agent) antibodies: specificity, sensitivity and applications', JAMA, 1985, 253: 221-225. In the
1990s it is thought that the tests are far more reliable than they used to be (Sloand, E. M.,
Pitt, E., Chiarello, R. f^.. Nemo, G. J., 'HIVTesting, State of the art', JAMA, 1991, 266:2861 -
2866). Dax suggests that as a supplemental test to distinguish true from false positive
screening results, the Western Blot, with the application of strict interpretation criteria, is
highly specific and 'still the stalwart in anti-HIV testing stategies' (Dax, E., 'HIV Western Blot
test' [letter] MedJAust 1994,160:808).
"123 Saag , M. S., states that in last few years novel techniques have been developed that
detect viral protection products or amplify minutefragments of viral RNA and DMA to void the
pitfalls of antibody testing and the dangers and expense of live virus culture. Instead the
main problem he perceives, is finding a clinician who can interpret results correctly ('AIDS
Testing, Now and in the Future' in Sande, M.A., and Volberding, P.A., (eds) Viral and
Immunologic Factors in HIV Infection, 3rd ed, Philadelphia, W.B. Saunders, 1992, 30-54, at
p. 33).
^24 'Seriologic Testing for Antibody to Human Immunodeficiency Virus (HIV) - Update - USA',
Communicable Diseases Intelligence Bulletin, 1988,3:2-12. Frank, J.W., Goel, V., ef a/, in
'A Critical Look at HIV-Antibody Tests: 1. How Accurate are They?' Can Fam Phys, 1987,
33:2005-2011, have identified the risk of a false-positive result of HIV antibody testing to be
probably less than 1 in 10,000.
"125 as set out in chapter one, at pp. 31-32.
"•26 Tillet, G., Frost, G., 'Social, Occupational and Legal Issues' in TheAIDS Manual, 2nd
ed, Sydney, Albion Street (AIDS) Centre, 1989, p. 75.
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to be minimal. ^27 Prevention does not of itself require testing. People can be
encouraged to behave safely and avoid engaging in high-risk activities. A
coercive effort to promote behavioural change has not been successful in the
past in preventing the spread of communicable diseases.
Finally, there are some economic costs as a result of
implementing testing programmes. The administrative costs of a compulsory
scheme have the potential to be overwhelming. ^29
Persons who endorse compulsory testing schemes generally
acknowledge the high cost to the community and then limit its application to
specific groups. They argue that this is not discriminatory because only those
groups at high-risk for transmission are targeted for testing. However, even if
such limitations are acceptable, compulsory testing becomes both expensive
and discriminatory, and even unreliable, because there is a need to retest
individuals. Many people do not clearly fall within a high-risk category group
and are therefore hard to monitor (for example, occasional IV drug users
devoid of detection in a given community). Testing all members of these
groups implies they are likely to engage in behaviour that is risky for HIV
transmission. Since HIV is also heterosexually spread, as a matter of logic
the entire population engaging in sexual intercourse should be tested.
Proponents argue that irrespective of all these concerns to
individual interests, the community benefits outweigh individual costs. This is
often based on the tenuous ground that if testing becomes compulsory then it
may foster its general acceptance. This may in turn reduce the reluctance of
at-risk persons to be tested, resulting in a overall benefit to the community
when such persons eventually come forward.
A further argument in favour of compulsory testing is premised on
history. Advocates of testing most often rely on the compulsory mass chest x-
ray schemes initiated during the TB era (late 1940s to early 1970s in
Australia). It is true that compulsory chest x-rays not only gave some
^27 Becker, M. H., Joseph J. G., 'AIDS and behavioural change to reduce risk: a review'. Am
J Pub Health, 1988, 78:394-410. Guinan, J. J., Kronenberg, C., Gold J., et al, 'Sexual
behavioural change in partners of homosexual men infected with HIV, [letter] Mod J Aust.,
1988, 149:162. Frazer I. J., McCamish, M., Hay, I., North P., 'Influence of HIV antibody
testing on sexual behaviour in a "high risk" population in a "low risk" city'. Mod J Aust.,
1988, 149:363-365.
^28 jhis argument wasdiscussed in chapter two and earlier in this chapter.
^29 For example, the US Centre for Disease Control study found thattesting and counselling
cost on average US$45.G0 per person: New York Times, June 3rd 1987, B8.
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indication of prevalence but also facilitated treatment of the infected person
and reduced the spread of TB through the population. As stated earlier, the
opposing view has been advanced that improvements in hygiene, and the
emergence of sanatoria may have been responsible for the decline in
statistics rather than compulsory testing schemes.
Those who argue in favour of compulsory testing may also turn to
the criminal law for support. An example is the compulsory random-breath
testing policies aimed at curbing fatalities from drink driving. In' 1976,
members of the Australian Law Reform Commission were not convinced
at that time that random testing would have a deterrent effect. There is now
evidence from a number of studies conducted that there is a link between the
implementation of such testing and the penalty provided for breach, and the
decline in the statistics. However, it has not been conclusively determined
whether the deterrent effect is..merely temporary or permanent.
Deterrence theory would suggest that people with prior drink driving offences
would be more sensitive to the threat of sanction. But reconviction studies
appear to contradict this or do riot provide a conclusive finding on the point.
••32 Hence a compulsory HIV testing scheme may not modify an individual's
behavioural patterns either. History does not provide a strong argument for
implementation of compulsory schemes.
Compulsory testing is also open to a number of criticisms.
The practical'argument against such a scheme is its potential to be
discriminatory in application and the possibility of hidden costs including the
provision of counsellors and the maintenance of confidential data banks.
Further, if results are used in a discriminatory manner, by virtue of a process
devised by the government then the government may have to provide for
those who suffer such discrimination. Thus to compulsorily test a large
population may in the^end create another class of welfare recipients.
130 Australian Lavy Reform Commission, Alcohol, Drugs and Driving, Canberra, Australian
Government Publishing Service, Report No. 4, 1976, para. 258.
-131 Studies providing graphs and statistics on the decline in fatal crashes following RBT
introduction in New South Wales, Queensland and Victoria appear in Homel, R., Policing the
Drinking Driver, Random Breath Testing and the Process of Deterrence, Canberra, Federal
Office of Road Safety, February, 1986, pp. 18-21 and figures 1.3, 1.4. The deterrence theory
is a topic which has been amply written on and covered well in Homel, R., Ibid, chapter 2, 'A
Model of the Deterrence Process', 22-44.
132 In fact, the studies by Homel, R., 'Penalties and the drink driver; A study of one
thousand offenders' (1981) 14 Australian and New Zealand Journal of Criminology, 225-241
and.Tittle, C. R., Sanctions and social deviance: The question of deterrence. New York,
Praeger, 1980, illustrate how difficult it is to apply a universal test to determine whether a
legal process is having a deterrent effect.
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The second argument flows on from the first. Compulsory schemes
may also drive the disease underground: High-risk groups already have the
status of 'discriminated against minority groups' in society. Their behavioural
changes alone are critical to stemming the spread of HIV. Public health
analysts are in unanimous agreement that compulsory testing is guaranteed
to discourage these people coming forward and obtaining what limited
treatment is available, and more importantly receiving counselling and being
encouraged to adopt safer practices.
The third argument relates to the current unreliability of the HIV
antibody tests, a point covered in this chapter. Thus widespread compulsory
testing would not likely lead to the detection of all or even all but very few
cases of AIDS. There is also some merit in the view that whole populations
ought not be tested fpr a disease for which there is no cure. Past experience
with compulsory testing is instructive. The success rate of Western countries
in curbing the incidence of sexually transmitted diseases is not favourable.
For example compulsory pre-marital testing for syphilis in the United States
was found to be of limited value generally in curbing the spread of syphilis in
that country. "'3'^ The Wasserman test itself was found to be oversensitive, but
many people had suffered the social ramifications of assuming that they were
infected.135 in Australia, studies conducted on congenital syphilis before and
after the advent of legislation would suggest that there had been no
improvement in statistics since the introduction of legislation which
prohibited marriage between infected persons 136. and provided for
compulsory notification i37, and compulsory treatment. i38
133 As exemplified bythe arguments ofCounsel for the Health Department ofWA in X v
Sattler and Ors. Unreported judgment of the Supreme Court of Western Australia, No.
1783/1989, Kennedy J. See aiso Buchanan, D., 'AIDS Legal Workshop HIV Testing;
principles and policy' (1990) National AIDS Bulletin, July, 25-29; and Gostin, L., The Politics
of AIDS: Compulsory State Powers, Public Health, and Civil Liberties' (1989) 49 Ohio State
Law Journal, 1017-1058, at pp. 1021-1030.
134 Brandt, A. M., 'AIDS in historical perspective: four lessons from the history of sexually
transmitted disease' Am J of Pub Health, 1988, 78:367-371.
135 Cutler, J. C., and Arnold, R. C., 'VenerealDisease Control by Health Departments inthe
Past: Lessons for the Present', Am J Pub Health, 1988, 78/4:372-376, at p. 372.
136 Lewis, supra note 28,. at p. 270; and also Venereal Disease Acf (1918) (Vic.); Venereal
Disease Act (1918)(N.S.W.); Health Acf (1911 )(W.A.); Health Acf (1937)(Qld.).
137 see theTable in Lewis, Ibid, on p. 263.
138 For example, the Western Australian Health Act Amendment Act (1915) required the
treatment of all infected persons. Other colonies followed suit with legislation being
introduced in Victoria (1916), Tasmania and Queensland (1917), New South Wales, (1918)
and South Australia (1920).
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The final argument against compulsory testing for HIV relates to
the changing perspectives on the rights of individuals. Since the period
marked by compulsory chest x-rays for IB and compulsory pre-marital testing
for syphilis, two events have shaped public health. First, Australia like many
other developed countries has entered an age where civil liberties groups are
more instrumental in effecting change to legislation and policies. '•39 Second,
there has been a movement away from elevating the rights of the community
over those of the individual in the area of public health. There is now a trend
in the area of ,public health towards balancing competing individual and
community interests and moving away from restrictive public health
measures. The theme of the 'least restrictive intervention' has gained
currency and developed from the reformation of mental health theory and
practice. Recent legislative initiatives analysed in this chapter confirm this.
Overall, the implementation of a testing scheme gives rise to legal
and ethical debates which revolve around issues of consent, discrimination,
obligations of confidentiality and rights to privacy. This concern is endorsed
by the World Health Organisation in a communication statement:
whilst screening for HIV may appear a relatively simple
approach to some of the complex problems associated with
AIDS and HIV infection, in fact screening for HIV is
extraordinarily complex from an epidemiological, economic,
legal, logistic, political and ethical perspective,
These concerns arise in the application of the criminal law and public health
law as in any other body of law. One might first suggest that only small
contained groups of persons clearly at risk for infection should be
compulsorily tested and there must be some clearly defined aim to be
achieved by such testing. However, this would be to suggest that all
individuals within these groups posed a risk individually to the community, a
view that would likely be unjustified. In addition, how would the exact
parameters of the groups be determined. For example, if drug users were to
be tested, a decision would need to be made whether to focus just on current
users or anyone with a history of drug use. It has been suggested that the
^39 This was exemplified during 1989 with the detention of the Sydney prostitute under
section 32A of the Public Health Act (1902) (N.S.W.) and illustrated by media releases as set
out supra notes 1-3 of this chapter.
WHO, Communication Statement from the Director-General of the WHO, Ret: CLB
1987, April 7 1987, Geneva.
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following question should be asked before embarking on a policy of
compulsory testing:
Will the testing result in a sufficiently significant reduction in
the incidence of HIV infection to justify the 'cost, the
adverse impact on relations between the groups to be
tested and health authorities, and the adverse impact on the
individuals to be tested?
However, this particular statement does not assist in developing criteria for
determining which particular societal groups should be tested and who will
have the responsibility for such a decision. By contrast, the National HIV/AIDS
Strategy illustrates a more enlightened approach in proposing that
compulsory testing applies not to particular groups but to a particular
circumstance, that is to say, to a
person suspected on reasonable grounds to be HIV-positive,
who persistently behaves in such a way as to place other
persons at risk of infection, and there.is clear indication that
the person is likely to continue to behave in such a way.
This circumstance invokes the due process clause in paragraph 5.2.14 of
the Strategy. This paragraph requires that a compulsory testing order be a
last resort procedure and such an order must be obtained from a Judge in a
closed court. A judge may only issue such an order where he or she has
been satisfied on the balance of probabilities that it is necessary
and/or in the interests of public health to make such an order,
and where the Court is satisfied that either HIV transmission has
previously occurred or that others have been exposed to the
possibility of transmission wilfully or recklessly.
However, only Victoria and Tasmania provide for court authorised
compulsory testing in the manner recommended by the National HIV/AIDS
Strategy.
Buchanan, supra note 133, at p. 26.
supra note 105, para. 5.2.14.
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ISOLATION AND QUARANTINE ORDERS
As already stated quarantine and Isolation policies have been
methods used In the past to control the Incidence of communicable diseases.
The question that arises Is whether the application of such measures to HIV-
Infected persons Is justifiable In the Interests of protecting the public health.
There are a number of arguments against the application of such
measures to HIV-lnfected persons. Experience with the use of quarantine and
Isolation measures In venereal disease control In the United States show that
they can be Ineffective, discriminatory, and Invidious. Isolation and
quarantine are antiquated notions of control originating In an era of very
different Infectious diseases. They are serious forms of deprivation of liberty -
a form of preventatlve confinement based on what the person may do rather
than what he or she has done.
Everyone Infected with HIV Is a chronic carrier even If he or she
remains asymptomatic. HIV Infection Is unlike Infection with yellow fever,
smallpox or cholera, where the Incubation period Is capable of finite
Identification, and hence specific time periods have been detailed In the
legislation mandating the quarantine of persons Infected with such diseases.
Quarantine for an HIV carrier would be a life sentence with no possibility
of 'parole' until the medical community develops a cure. Coercive measures
are difficult to justify when there Is no hope that enforced Isolation and
treatment will result In a cure.
Additionally, the sheer number of people capable of transmitting
the virus would make a general quarantine or Isolation prohibitively expensive
and wholly unmanageable. Justice KIrby recognised this when he stated '...
with so many millions affected, there Is just no place to go for the Infected.
There Is not enough barbed wire. Not enough guards.'
The fact that HIV Is not easily transmitted also means that Isolation
or quarantine are not appropriate responses to AIDS except perhaps In the
rare case where HIV-lnfected persons continue to engage In high-risk
Brandt, A. M., No Magic Bullet: A Social History of Venereal Disease in the United
States since 1880, New York, Oxford University Press, 1987, 156-160.
The Quarantine (General) Regulations (Cth) as amended in 1988 specify certain time
periods forwhich an individual may be quarantined. For example, plague: 6 days (reg. 63),
yellowfever: 6 days (reg. 74) and cholera: 5 days (reg. 63).
Kirby, M., 'The Ten Paradoxes of AIDS - Summing Up the Conference' (1988) National
AIDS Bulletin , May, 27-30, at p. 28.
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activities. Suggestions that HIV-infected persons be subjected to isolation
and quarantine orders pose serious threats to individual rights through the
invasion of privacy and liberty. Nevertheless, there will be cases where an
individual disregards the health of unsuspecting partners or other members of
society requiring the intervention of public health authorities.
Although Australian public health statutes specify who may decide
to order isolation or quarantine, they do not describe a procedure for
gathering information and making fair and correct decisions. There are few
procedural safeguards clearly set out prior to the exercise of such powers.
Few of the post-AIDS public health provisions provide for a right of appeal by
an infected person who is to be detained under a public health order,
These omissions represent a serious lacuna in the legislation especially since
the source of the information may be anonymous or that the infected person
does not have the right to cross-examine the source. There is no guidance
on how public health officials will determine the 'risk' level of a particular
individual. The civil confinement of persons shown to be dangerous in the
area of mental health has been condoned for centuries. However, the
analogy with mental health has also shown that for the same period
psychiatrists have been unable to predict dangerous behaviour with accuracy
resulting in at best mismanagement of cases or at worst, abuse of cases. As
it is unlikely that any case will be brought by public health officials when the
diagnosis is in doubt, the primary issues will be the danger the patient
presents to others and the existence of less restrictive alternatives to
confinement that might protect the public equally well. Allowing decision
makers to predict who will engage in dangerous conduct without any criteria
for guidance is one criticism that can be levelled at the 1991 New South
Wales public health legislation.
Legislation that has not been specifically enacted to deal with HIV
is defective in these respects and must be remedied to prevent detention
occurring on the basis of status, such as being infected or being a prostitute.
The jurisdictions are New South Wales: Public Health Act (1902) as amended, by the
Public Health Act (1991), s. 41; Victoria: Health /Act (1958) as amended, s. 122(3); South
Australia: Public and Environmental Health Act (1987) s. 34; and the Northern Territory:
Notifiable Diseases Act (1981), s. 12. At first glance it may appear that further redress may
be obtained by other legislation (for example, Administrative Law Act (1978)(Vic.)).
Decisions or orders made under public health legislation are subject to review under
administrative law principles in order to determine ifpublic officials have acted unreasonably.
The Concept of t^entaf Illness in the Mental Health Act 1986 , Law Reform Commission
Report (Vic.), No. 31, April 1990, para. 29.
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homosexual or drug user, rather than on the basis of high-risk behaviour. The
basis upon which HIV-infected persons could be isolated, quarantined or
removed to hospital would need to be considered. It is possible to devise a
justifiable model of isolation or quarantine. This is discussed below.
Is There a Justifiable Model of Isolation of HIV-lnfected Persons?
Quarantine or isolation policies must avoid particular groups being
targeted. HIV-infected persons should be quarantined purely on the basis of
their infected status, not on the basis that they are homosexuals, IV drug
users, haemophiliacs or pregnant women. To do otherwise would provpke
disrespect for the law. However, if quarantine were applied universally,
certain groups, including children, would be held indefinitely. Isolation on the
basis of confirmed infection status or on the basis of social status are possibly
the only two practical bases for the implementation of such a measure,
although the latter has the potential to be discriminatory and therefore should
not be encouraged.
Isolation should be based on behaviour, not infection-status.
Detention was based on behaviour in the section 32A Sydney prostitute case.
The theory behind the detention was a sound one. It was the implementation
of the theory that commanded criticism given that it resulted from a lack of
understanding of how to both individually and publicly deal with a disease
phenomenon such as HIV/AIDS. Isolation according to behaviour has some
commendable points. It would most likely apply only to a few persons; would
result in less of a drain on housing resources; be less expensive; and,
discriminate where appropriate although there is the danger that those singled
out will be members of the most politically vulnerable groups. The effect on
the remainder of the community would need to be examined should such a
scheme be imposed. If other members of the community are discouraged
from seeking testing or treatment, then the cost of preventing a few cases of
HIV transmission through isolation orders may be to undermine public health
efforts for broad population changes in behaviour.
Assuming that isolation is to apply to those who consistently refuse
to modify their behaviour it should be a remedy of last resort as it was in the
section 32A case. It must be used where an infected person proves him or
herself to be recalcitrant following counselling sessions. Before a public
health department imposes isolation on an individual, it must be able to
provide access for individuals to appropriate services, including drug abuse
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treatment, peer support and professional counselling - all designed to foster
behavioural change. It needs to be remembered that often the person who is
recalcitrant is typically alienated because of infection, may not identify with
any group, may have a personality disorder and aggressive outbursts. The
public health action should be to monitor the person's continued behaviour, to
contact the SID clinic to carry out partner notification, and to support the
person when they are ill.
It has been suggested that coercive measures such as 'cease and
desist' 148 orders, temporary isolation or any compulsory public health order
that is unreasonable because it is too wide or because it carries the threat of
a penalty for non-compliance will not achieve the desired behavioural change.
Illingworth believes that many health programmes in the area of AIDS seek to
change behaviour by manipulating conduct through infringing on autonomy.
149 The same result could transpire through legislative controls. Illingworth's
argument proceeds on the basis that if people do not freely come to the
conclusion to change their behaviour they will not change it. This is a theory
borrowed from Dworkin who has argued that autonomy is central to the moral
sphere.150 However, one might suggest that violating autonomy in this way is
justifiable if there are other more important competing values at stake. It is
true that even if public health should override individual autonomy as a value,
that the general public health may not be served in the long run by legislation
that aims to change by manipulation rather than by allowing conscious
thought processes. As the 1990s theme in Australia behind curbing the
spread of the disease is to 'sustain behaviour change over the long-term' i5i,
if such legislative provisions merely manipulate compliance for the short-term
rather than the long-term then arguably the public health is not being served.
It is the present writer's view however, that manipulation is not incompatible
with autonomy so long as people agree to change their behaviour by being
manipulated. Therefore, counselling as part of legislation may be regarded as
a legitimate instigator of behavioural change. Public health legislation such as
148 A term used In US public health HIV/AIDS stategies.
149 illingworth. P., AIDS and the GoodSociety, London, Routledge &Kegan Paul, 1990, 22-
60.
180 Dworkin, R., The Theory and Practice ofAutonomy, Cambridge, Cambridge University
Press, 1988: 'the idea of autonomy ... includes ... some ability both to alter one's actions and,
indeed to make them effective because one has reflected upon them and adopted them as
one's own' (at p. 17).
181 Commonwealth ofAustralia, National HIV/AIDS Strategy 1993- 1994, 1995-1996, supra
note 41, at p. 10.
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that in Victoria and Tasmania which require counselling prior to intervention is
realistic and enlightened.
Those who must forgo their individual rights for the community
good should receive the best possible care and conditions. This raises the
additional dilemma of where to care for persons who test positive or are
convicted of knowingly transmitting the disease. The problem of placement of
HIV-infected persons may be why charges were not laid under the AIDS-
specific public health provisions that make knowing or reckless transmission
of HIV an offence in the section 32A case. Using criminal or mental health
provisions ^52 instead to avoid the problem of setting up special facilities
merely shifts responsibility for infected persons to prison authorities or mental
health facilities possibly turning a public health concern into one for the
criminal law. As will be seen from chapter seven, prison health facilities are
inadequately equipped to deal with HIV-infected persons.
4. CONCLUSION
HIV-infected persons who fall foul of either criminal law or public
health law may be subject to detention and other restrictive orders initiated by
public health officials. This chapter considered the public health official's
powers in this respect. Such powers are quite wide ranging based as they
are on the traditional view that the protection of the individual is secondary to
the protection of the society. Existing public health legislation that has its roots
"•52 There is evidence from New South Wales and in Tasmania of persons being detained
under powers found in other legislation. In New South Wales, mental health legislation was
used to detain a developmentally disabled person in a locked ward on the basis of the belief
that the person had HIV (reported in Godwin, J., 'Detention of people with HIV/AIDS'
{^989)National AIDS Bulletin, September, 30-33, at p. 30). Every State in Australia has
legislation that would permit and HIV-infected person who exhibited a mental illness or
dysfunction, psychopathic disorder, severe subnormality or subnormality and engages in
behaviour which threatens the welfare of community members (s. 4, s. 18 Mental Health Act
(1963)(Tas.); s. 25 Mental Health Services Act (^974-^988) (Old.); s. 29, 32 Mental Health
Act (1962-1979)(W.A.)) or there is a substantial risk of bodily harm to others and self (s. 21
Mental Health Act (1983)(A.C.T.); under s. 7(1) of the Mental Health Act (1980)(N.T.); s.
^4(^) Mental Health Act (1977)(S.A.); s. 8 Menfa/Hea/fh Acf (1986)(Vic.)).
In Tasmania, the Alcohol and Drug Dependency Act (1968) was used to detain a
person with HIV who also chronically abused alcohol. In this instance the fact the personwas
infected with HIV was not listed as the primary reason for detention. However the legislation
would enable the detention of HIV-infected persons who were also alcoholics under the
justification of alcohol dependency (personal correspondence with Department of Mental
Health, Hobart, Tas. 1990). Gostin reports that civil committment for drug abuse is used to
hold HIV-infected drug addicts and impose a course of treatment on them has been fairly
common in a number of US States, ('Selected Issues in AIDS and DrugAbuse: Prevention,
Treatment and Criminal Justice', in Gostin, L., and Porter, L., (eds). International law and
AIDS: International Response, Current Issues, and Future Directions, New York American
Bar Association, 1992, 211-248).
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in an era of highly contagious infectious diseases may allow coercive
measures to be imposed on HIV-infected persons. History reveals that
treatment, education and behavioural change have been more instrumental in
curbing the spread of communicable and sexually transmitted diseases than
restrictive measures such as compulsory mass testing, quarantine and
isolation.
There is anecdotal evidence that prior contagious diseases
legislation in Australia as in the United States has been used by public health
officials as an instrument of government oppression of certain societal groups.
The older statutes which are still applicable in Australia establish the broad
outlines of disease control programmes leaving the specifics to the discretion
of the health officer. Such practices have the potential to be discriminatory
and although courts have failed to recognise an absolute right to privacy and
liberty, such legislation would be incompatible with an individual's claim to
privacy and liberty. The aftermath of the section 32A case was the relevation
of just how piecemeal and patchwork Australian policies on privacy and liberty
of individuals in the area of public health was in the mid-to-late 1980s.
However, Australian State and Territory governments.have
generally acknowledged that the AIDS epidemic has brought to the forefront
issues of individual versus community interests. Accordingly, governments
have attempted to strike a balance between these competing interests by
recognising that past public health legislation cannot realistically be applied to
AIDS. Legal analysis is being dominated by the metaphor of 'balancing', by
the elusive problem of deciding what is 'reasonable' and the problem of
defining 'rights'. This realisation has led to the drafting of AIDS-specific public
health legislation which for the first time appears to consider that individuals
have interests that need to be considered and cannot be ignored unless there
is convincing evidence. Some Australian governments have been most
progressive in perceiving the need to protect the liberty of detained persons
by providing avenues of appeal against isolation orders and detailing those
factors to be taken into consideration by courts even before the isolation order
is granted. Thus the public official's wide discretion has been tempered by
signposts.
Throughout this period of change, public health departments and
courts must endeavour to protect the interests of community health and those
of the infected or at-risk individual. Law makers must decide whether they
want provisions to apply only to those with symptomatic AIDS or all those who
test positive for HIV-infection. If the former are unlikely to engage in activities
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that may infect others after entering the debilitating final stages of AIDS
infection, governments should perhaps be directing their attentions to the
latter group who have the potential to infect others while they remain
asymptomatic.
Public health statutes should not be cumbersome, with complex
and over-lengthy due process provisions resulting in the likelihood that
restrictive measures may be applied through the criminal law instead.
However, in drafting public health legislation that imposes restrictive
measures on HIV-infected persons, law makers should consider if the
invasion of basic human rights, the financial cost or the practical burdens of a
policy are wholly disproportionate to its benefits. If so, then it should not be
adopted. Legislation must make clear what options HIV-infected persons
have before they may be detained. The section 32A case involving the
Sydney prostitute provides an excellent example of a public health
department giving every chance to an HIV-infected person to achieve
behavioural change. The Western Australian privacy case illustrates that
courts recognise that top strident a line on public health will prevent those at
risk coming forward.
As the powers of public health officials have been refined, the
scope for abuse has been limited. This means that from a procedural point of
view an HIV-infected person has more protections in the area of public health
than he or she would have done, in the period prior to the advent of the
epidemic. With increasing numbers of legislators aware of individual rights
and enacting legislation with this in mind then there is solid ground for
concluding that the control of the transmission of HIV should remain the
domain of public health departments. It is likely that other States will follow the
lead of Tasmania and enact more comprehensive HIV/AIDS legislation that
adequately sets out the powers of public health officials in this area.
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CHAPTER 6
AIDS AND THE CRIMINAL PROCESS
1. INTRODUCTION
Many HlV-infected persons have passed or will pass through the
criminal justice system. They may be charged for an offence involving the
transmission of HIV or charged for an offence unconnected with their HIV
infection status. The theme of this chapter is to consider how flexible the
current system of pre-trial processes and trial procedure including sentencing
is in coping with a disease such as HIV infection. However, only those
procedural rules and processes that assume importance for an HlV-infected
accused person and his or. her victim will be addressed. The chapter has
been oriented towards considering first the system from the .defendant's
perspective and the procedures that effect the defendant primarily and then
second, by considering the system from the victim's perspective. In some
instances matters will assume relevance for both parties, for example, the
maintenance of privacy and concerns about HIV antibody testing. On those
occasions the issues that concern both parties will be interrelated.
The paramount concerns of an accused person suffering from HIV
infection would include being able to negotiate bail rather than being
remanded in custody, to expedite the trial hearing and to receive some
mitigation of sentence on the grounds of illness, if appropriate. The victim, by
contrast, would be concerned to establish if he or she had become infected
and whether compensation could be obtained. This analysis of the
effectiveness of the current system in light of HIV/AIDS also includes some
proposals for change to existing practice and procedure where changes are
required.
2. PRE-TRIAL PROCEDURES AND THE DEFENDANT
This section covers those procedures that generally occur after
formal charging and prior to the trial phase. There may be applications made
on behalf of the accused to Judges or Magistrates relating to the conduct of
the proceedings. These may include applications for bail where the Crown
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applies for special conditions to be attached reflecting the HIV status of the
accused. There may also be applications made on behalf of the victim, or the
police, for HIV antibody testing of the accused. Such procedures warrant
consideration in the context of AIDS.
APPLICATIONS FOR BAIL
Typically, the first stage at which the defendant's HIV status is
likely to present a problem, is at the bail hearing. After the initial stage of
gathering evidence has passed and formal charges have been laid then the
accused may be bailed by the police - 'police bail' ^ or appear in court to be
bailed by a judicial officer - 'court bail'. The law with respect to bail has been
codified in Victoria {Bail Act (1977)), New South Wales {Bail Act (1978)),
Queensland {Bail Act {1980)), Western Australia {BailAct {1982-88)), South
Australia (Sa/V Act (1985)) and the Northern Territory {BailAct {1990)), all as
amended. In the remaining jurisdictions, the common law relevant to bail
must be applied.
Legislative provisions in those jurisdictions with either specific Bail
Acts or legislation pertaining to the grant of court bail create a prima facie
right to bail. 2 In some States there exists a presumption in favour of bail for
certain offences ^ or there is a discretion to admit the accused to bail. ^ in
Victoria and Queensland the presumption in favour of bail to the accused is
reversed where the accused has committed a further indictable offence while
waiting to be tried for another. ^ in Queensland under section 16(3) of the
Bail Act where a person is charged with an indictable offence involving the
use or threatened use of an'offensive weapon', the [^resumption in favour of
bail is reversed. The term 'offensive weapon' may require some clarification
in the future if an HIV-infected syringe is used. Further, in both Queensland ®
^ This power is granted in most States and Territories, for example, s. 34(1)(c)(d) Justices
Act (1959)(Tas.); s. 17 Bail Act (1978)(N.S.W.); s. 6 Baii Act (W.A.); s. 16 Bail Act
(1990)(N.T.); s.7 BailAct (1980) (Old.).
2 Bishop, J., Criminal Procedure, Sydney, Butterworths, 1982, at pp. 94-103.
^ s. 9 BailAct {N.S.V\l.y, s. 8 Bail Act (1990) (N.T.) except murder and treason.
s. 13 ea/7Ac/(N.S.W.).
5 s. 4(4) Bail Act (1977)(Vic.); s. 16(3) Bail Act (1980-89)(Qld.).
®s. 45 Drugs Misuse Act (1986-7) with qualification where the offence is one triable
summarily under section 13 of the Bail Act (as amended in 1988).
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and New South Wales ^ there is a presumption against bail for certain drug
offences. This means an HIV-infected IV drug user charged with drug
offences would have to argue against the presumption. A presumption
against bail in such circumstances is short-sighted, given the incidence of IV
drug use and homosexual rapes in the prison environment. 8
The decision whether to withhold or to grant bail should not be
made lightly in the case of an HIV-infected person. The disadvantages and
advantages of remanding the accused in custody need to be weighed in the
circumstances. There are a number of criteria that need to be considered in
deciding whether or not to award bail to an HIV-infected person.
(i) Bail Criteria
In those States and Territories with Bail Acts, the legislation has
stated that where there is a discretion to grant bail the court must take into
consideration only the criteria specified in the relevant Bail Act. These Acts
are a codification of the common law principles with respect to bail, which will
continue to apply in those States and Territories without bail legislation. 9
Generally the criteria fall into three broad categories: (i) the probability of
whether the accused will appear in court; (ii) the interests of the accused; and
(iii) the protection and welfare of the community, lo
In addition to the general criteria, there are also a number of
specific criteria that have been considered in non-AIDS related cases. These
will be discussed after the general criteria. There has been no clear direction
as to the precise weight to be given to one specific criterion over another. This
fact has led critics to state that there is no systematic guide to determinations
on bail which has resulted in disparities in bail decisions. Under the
present scheme all relevant factors should be considered as a whole.
^ Bail (Amendment) Act (1988), offences under sections 23-28 of the Drug Misuse and
Trafficking Act (1985)(N.S.W.).
®Details ofstudies confirming thiscomment are covered in chapter seven.
9 f? VHughes [1983] 1QdR92.
••0 s. 32(1) ea/7 Act (1978)(N.S.W.); s. 4 Sa/ZAcf (1977) (Vic.); s. 16(1) Sa//Act (1980-1989)
(Qld ); s. 13 and Part C of Schedule to the Act, Bail Act (1982-88)(W.A.); s. 10 Bail Act
(1985)(S.A.); s. 24 Bail Act (1990)(N.T.).
^^Bishop, supra note2, at p. 119.
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There are a number of factors which would be pertinent to a bail
application made by or on behalf of an HIV-infected person. These warrant
examination. There is no doubt that the three general criteria listed above are
important in this context.
The first general criterion involves the need to ensure appearance
of the accused in court. It would seem unlikely that a HIV-infected person
suffering the debilitating effects of the virus would abscond as he or she may
require constant medical treatment in the jurisdiction. It is the asymptomatic
person that poses the greatest risk in this regard. The same comment could
be made with respect to the third general criterion which focused on the need
to protect the community. It is unlikely that a person suffering from AIDS
would actively engage in behaviour capable of spreading the virus to others
whereas the asymptomatic person might do so through ignorance and would
then pose a threat to the health and safety of the community. However, there
would have to be some evidence of an express statement on behalf of the
accused or implication from other conduct that he or she would engage in
activities which pose a high risk of passing virus to others. Even if an accused
has been charged for a HIV transmission type offence this does not
automatically mean he or she will engage in risky conduct.
The health of an HIV-infected person would also be relevant to the
second criterion: the interests of the accused. The fact an accused has
serious health problems and may need constant medical attention has been a
ground for bail in prior cases. 12 However, as stated in chapter one, a person
infected with HIV may remain asymptomatic for many years and therefore it is
only those persons suffering from AIDS that could successfully rely on this
criterion for a grant of bail. It could be argued by those opposing bail in this
context that the prison system could provide all the treatment and counselling
required.
A number of the specific criteria would also be relevant in
considering a bail application from an HIV-infected person.
The first criterion relates to the delay in hearing a case. A New
South Wales court has held in the non-AIDS context that if the delay will be
substantial then the grounds for allowing bail must be strong. However
•>2 Rv Manning [1936] ALR 171; R vKennedy [1941] QWN 49; Rv Street [1944] QWN 24;
R VSouthgate [1960] NSWLR 477. In Chiamberiain y R (1983) 72 FLR 1, the fact mother had
given birth and needed to breast feed her baby was an 'exceptional circumstance' leading to
a grant of bail. In fact the health of the accused is a factor to be considered in some bail
legislation, for example, s. 10 Bail Act (1985)(S.A.) specifically, or under s. 32(1 )(b) Bail Act
(1978)(N.S.W.) which would allow this when considering the term 'interests of the accused'.
13 RvPett (1958) 74WN (N.S.W.) 431 perWalsh J at 434.
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Other cases reveal that generally there must be additional factors in the
favour of the accused apart from the delay to give rise to a grant of bail.
The HIV-infected accused's right to a speedy trial will be discussed later in
this chapter.
The second specific criterion that may be relevant is the probability
of a conviction of A. The seriousness and number of charges may also be
relevant to this point. as discussed in chapter three, prosecutions for
transmission of HIV are unlikely to be successful in most cases due to the
problems of proof surrounding HIV infection. If a person is charged with an
offence the prosecution face the prospect that the court will, as it has done in
other non AIDS-related cases, grant bail where the evidence appears weak
and a conviction improbable.
A third criterion to be considered is the incidence of prior
convictions. If, for example, an HIV-infected accused has prior convictions
for assault and has been charged with assault for conduct which did not
involve the transmission of HIV infection, the court would be placed in a
difficult position as to whether or not to grant bail. The fact that an accused
has prior convictions for a similar offence is related to the probability of his or
her appearance at the trial given that he or she could be facing a more severe
sentence as a reason of those convictions. But the fact that an accused has
already committed two assaults might give rise to the concern that a further
assault may be perpetrated. This raises the general criterion of the need to
protect the health and safety of the public. If the accused commits a further
assault it may be one which transmits the virus to another person. The
consideration of prior convictions could be criticised as conflicting with the
golden thread of the criminal law, 'a person is innocent until proven guilty'.
Further their introduction into the decision whether or not to grant bail .also
requires arbitrary predictions or speculations as to behaviour to be drawn.
Nevertheless, the existence of prior convictions has assumed some
importance in non-AIDS related bail applications in Australia.
Rv Southgate supra note 12.
•> 5 WCVB VR [1989] WAR 279 per Ipp J.
"I® Bishop, supra note 2, at p. 114and fn 35. Indeed Warner, K., 'Some issues relating to
organised protest and bail', in Sornarajah, M. (ed.). The South West Dam Dispute, University
of Tasmania, Tasmania 1984, 132-143, at p. 136, states that the protection of the community
from the commission of a further offences by denying bail has had a varied reception in
Australia (except where current charges were allegedly committed whilst on bail and then bail
is almost unanimously denied). In 1990, the New South Wales Bail Act was amended to add
that when the criterion of protection of the community is being considered in the context of a
bail application, the court must have regard to the seriousness and nature of the offence. If it
224
The criteria involved in bail applications where the accused has
been charged for murder raises different considerations. The general rule
that emerges from both bail legislation and the common law itself is that an
accused charged with murder will be admitted to bail in 'exceptional
circumstances'. in Rv Street the accused's ill-health was considered an
'exceptional circumstance'. It has been held that the grant of bail is a matter
of discretion but that the exceptional circumstances which may be required
should not be regarded as a closed list. Therefore, both the HIV-infected
status of an accused and the fact that medical treatment is necessary would
be relevant to the determination as to bail for murder charges. Presumably if
the accused is not suffering the debilitating consequences of HIV infection
and is presently asymptomatic then the HIV status may not be considered.
The accused bears the onus of showing that in the circumstances he or she
should be released on bail. 20
In WCVB V 21 Justice Ipp held that there should be no difference
between the court's approach in cases of murder and cases of 'extremely
serious' offences. 22 in that case the accused was charged for 96 offences
which included a number of 'extremely serious' offences. The accused's
statement to the court conveyed to the judge that A might continue to engage
in unlawful activity if granted bail and this appeared to be a weighty factor in
the court's refusal to do so. It is possible that a court might find the deliberate
infliction of HIV in circumstances amounting to either attempted murder or
serious assault to be an 'extremely serious' offence. In that situation, the court
might not be persuaded that the HIV-infected accused will not desist from
engaging in conduct that may endanger the health and welfare of other
persons. This view may result in bail being denied.
is an offence involving sexual assault or violence this is an imprint factor is the effect on the
community and the victim (s. 32(c)).
Urn VGregson [1989] WAR 1. Although this is not followed in South Australia, where
Farquar v Fleet (1989) 50 SASR 490 held that 'exceptional grounds' are not required for bail
for murder.
Rv Street [1944] QWN 24.
^®Urn VGregson supra note 17.
20Urn VGregson , Ibid, has confirmed that the accused bears the onus per fvlalcolm CJ, at
p. 14 and Kennedy J, at p. 34 and confirmed by WCVB v R supra note 15.
2"' WCVB VR, supra note 15.
22 at p. 283 and supported by thecourt in Urn vGregson supra note 17; and, by l\/lansfield
SPJ in Rv Lythgoe [1950] QSR 5.
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(ii) Bail Conditions
If bail is awarded, the police may apply for or the court may add
some general or special bail conditions. The general conditions usually
involve the deposit of money as security for appearance. The special
conditions are designed to ensure the defendants attendance on the date to
which he or she has been remanded over until. The conditions may also
ensure that while released on bail a person does not commit a further offence,
endanger the safety or welfare of members of the public, interfere with
witnesses or otherwise obstruct the course of justice. ^3
In the context of a person suffering from and being charged for an
HIV transmission type offence, a condition for release might be that the
accused report for treatment or undergo an antibody test. In any event,
however, it may not be necessary to use this provision to ensure the accused
is tested for HIV because, legislation relating to the search of the person may
allow such tests to be conducted earlier in the investigatory phase and before
a bail application is being considered.
In some States there is scope for further conditionsto be applied to
an HIV-infected person. For example, in setting down bail conditions in South
Australia, the court is directed to give special consideration to any submission
made by the Crown on behalf of the victim of the alleged offence, 24 Hence
orders for HIV testing or treatment could conceivably be included as bail
conditions in that State. However, the purpose for which testing is required
would need to be specified. Testing the Accused to Reassure the Victim is
covered in the next section.
In both Western Australia and Queensland bail could be awarded
subject to a coridition that the defendant undergo a medical examination
which could focus on both the physical and mental condition of the accused.
In Western Australia, there is provision in the bail conditions set out in the Bail
Act (Schedule D, 2(3)) for the judicial officer to make an order under section
36 (1)(a) of the Mental HealthAct (1962) to ensure the accused undergoes a
medical examination as a condition of bail. It is possible that this general
provision will be used to ensure that an HIV-infected person suffering some
mental infirmity could be tested for HIV. In Queensland, section 11(3) of the
23 Part D, Bail Act (1982)(W..A.); s. 11 (b)(i)(ii) Bail Act (1980-1986)(Qld.): s. 36 Bail Act
(1978) (N.S.W.); s. 11 Bail Act (1985)(S.A.); s. 27 Bail Act (1990)(N.T.): s. 5 Bail Act
(1977)(Vic.).
24 s. 11(2)(a) BailAct (1985)(S.A.).
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Bail Act allows the imposition of a bail condition that requires a medical
examination of A. The term 'medical examination' has been stated to bear the
same meaning under the Queensland Bail Act as in section 259 of the
Criminal Code of that State. 25 in the latter context, medical examination has
been defined to include the taking of blood and hair samples. 26 However,
taking blood and then subjecting that specimen to a test for HIV antibodies is
another matter raising complex issues concerning consent and informed
consent. 27 Similar concerns would arise under the Western Australian Bail
Act. Given these comments, imposing an HIV antibody test under the guise of
a medical examination as a condition of bail may not fall within the specific
conditions outlined in the legislation. Courts may hold it to be an abuse of
discretion to impose a bail condition of a negative antibody test result where
this is not a statutory condition.28
There is a further condition in Part D (2(4)) of the Bail Act (W.A.)
that is more likely to be read liberally in the context of AIDS. This Part allows
a judicial officer when dealing with a drug user to impose conditions to ensure
care and treatment in a specified institution. Such a condition could be used
to ensure that an HIV-infected drug user manifesting an intention to infect
other persons with a contaminated syringe could have their liberty
circumscribed under the head of treatment at an institution.
In Tasmania, section 35(3) of the Justices Act (1959) which sets
out bail conditions, has been read as not being limited to the making of orders
designed simply to secure attendance in court. In Levy v Strickland 29 the
applicants argued that the bail conditions that had been imposed were
objectionable because they went further than ensuring appearance on the
remand date by purporting to restrict the lifestyle of the applicants pending the
hearing of the charges against them. Cox J held that restrictions on lifestyle
25Carter, R., Carter'sCriminalLaw ofQueensland, 7thed, Sydney, Butterworths, 1988, at p.
241. This question of whether HIV testing is encompassed in the term 'medical examination'
is discussed infra, pp. 241-245.
26 s. 259(4).
2^ The issue of consent and informed consent to HIV antibody testing is discussed in detail
infra : 'Testing to Obtain Evidence to Substantiate the Charge'.
26 This has already been held by a court in the United States (People v fvfcGreevy, 514
N.Y.S. 2d 622(1987)).
29Unreported judgment, Supreme Court of Victoria, 8/1983.
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were not necessarily outside the ambit of section 35(3). In addition, the
Judge also supported the right of a magistrate to consider the necessity or
desirability of conditions to guard against the probability of further offences
being committed. However, His Honour did concede that the need for the
condition must be balanced against any disadvantage to the applicant.
Therefore, it is conceivable that bail conditions could be applied in
the case of HIV-infected accused persons which might have the effect of
restricting their lifestyle'for the purpose of protecting the public welfare and
safety. Such conditions may not be designed to simply ensure attendance in
court. In fact, a reading of the bail legislation in other Australian States
suggests that conditions can be laid down that serve purposes other than
merely ensuring appearance on the due date. 32 However, a blanket
judgement that every accused person suffering from HIV constitutes a public
health risk, without questioning if a particular individual is aware of and willing
to abide by risk-reduction guidelines, would be misguided.
It is possible that an HIV-infected person could be released on bail
under a home-detention order. In 1990, Western Australia was the first
Australian State to amend bail legislation to permit home detention as a
condition of bail (Schedule D 3(1)). Two decisions have been reported in
connection with the grant of home-detention in non-AIDS related cases. In
Evereff 33_ although the accused was charged with serious offences, including
kidnapping. Justice Ipp held that he was entitled to home detention because
the evidence on which he could be found guilty was at best circumstantial. 34
Such an application was denied by the same Judge in Quartermaine 35
where he held that A's long history of offences, thirty in all, indicated a
predisposition towards violence, rendering him unsuitable for home detention.
Home-detention is a preferable scheme for an HIV-infected person to being
held in the prison.
30Warner, K., 'Some issues relating to organised protest and bail', in Sornarajah, supra note
16, at pp. 132-144.
31 For this point he relied onthe decision of Sholl J in F? vLight[^954] VLR 152, at p. 158.
32 s. 11(2)(b) Bail Act (1980)(Qld.); and s. 5(2)(b)(c) Bail Act (1977)(Vic.).
33 unreported judgment Supreme Court of WA, 9010/1991.
34 It must be noted however, that the accused escaped while on home detention and there
have been few recorded instances of this scheme being used in Western Australia since.
33 unreported judgment Supreme Court of WA, 8981/1991.
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Bail conditions could also serve another useful purpose in the
AIDS context. As the criminal justice system selects large numbers of
persons at high risk of infection and transmission of infection to other persons,
it has the unique ability to educate accused persons through the use of bail
conditions. As noted in chapter two, property crime is rife among IV drug
users. Many IV drug users that could be at risk for HIV-infection will pass
through the criminal justice system. Bail conditions have been imposed in the
past on drug users which have included attendance at a treatment clinic. In a
similar manner, conditions could be imposed on an HIV-infected person to
attend for counselling and education. While this would be an extension of the
present purpose of bail conditions it is arguably a useful extension from the
standpoint of the accused person and the community. Leaving aside the issue
of whether coercive attempts at behavioural change will be successful in the
long-term, the case for the imposition of such conditions is arguably justified
where the individual has acted in a manner which has placed others at risk of
acquiring HIV.
(iii) Bail Applications Concerning HlV-lnfected Persons
Few reported cases have come before the courts where an HIV-
infected person has applied for bail. In Tasmania, bail was originally opposed
by the police in a case of an HIV-infected person on an assault charge by
spitting, on the ground that releasing the defendant was not in the public's
interest. 36 jhe prosecution put to the court that where a person was infected
with HIV an act of spitting at another was 'the kiss of death'. Bail was denied
on the basis that the Magistrate had no confidence that the defendant would
not commit further offences while on bail. If this was the sole reason for the
decision it would be in accordance with the general bail criteria outlined earlier
in this chapter. However, the Magistrate also made the comment that
protection of the public interest was one of the primary functions of bail. Given
that the offence of assault would, in absence of prior convictions or a previous
failure to surrender to custody, normally give rise to a grant of bail, it is
arguable that this Magistrate remanded this defendant in custody because
the defendant was HIV-infected. Alternatively, the defendant may have been
remanded because suitable conditions for bail were not put before the court.
Bail was later granted after the defendant had been in custody for four days.
36 The case is reported in Browne, R., 'Equal Before the Law?' (1990) ^5l2)Legal Service
Bulletin. 87-88.
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following an application to the Supreme Court under section 304(1) of the
Criminal Code. This provision allows the Supreme Court to admit a person to
bail where it has previously been refused. The conditions attached to the
grant of bail in this case were that the defendant not approach the
complainant or venture within a specified distance of the complainant's
business where the original incident occurred.
Relying on the arguments advanced by the police in the
Tasmanian example, where a person is infected with HIV and appears to
pose a threat to the public then they should be remanded in custody. What is
not clear from the Tasmanian decision is whether the police will be likely to
argue in a later case that being infected with HIV itself is a threat to the public
welfare. It appears that a later court will have to rule on what constitutes a
'threat to the public'. The trend seems to favour an interpretation of 'threat to
the public' restrictively in the context of HIV cases. 37
Presumably the sensible approach in this situation would be to
consider whether the accused is charged for a HIV transmission offence or is
in court on charges unrelated to his or her infected status. In the latter
situation, it is hard to see how the accused could be considered a threat
unless he or she has a pre-disposition towards violent behaviour. Where the
accused has been charged with a HIV transmission type offence, other
circumstances must be considered before the court can simply declare that
the accused would pose a threat if released. In such a situation, the court will
have to weigh the likelihood of threat to the public with other factors including
the accused's state of health.
There have been other reported incidences where bail has been
denied to an accused in the context of HIV infection. In 1991, a Victorian
Magistrate imposed a 'no sex' order on a hnale prostitute infected with HIV as
a condition of bail. He had been charged for the offence of conduct
endangering life under section 22 of the Crimes Act (1958) (Vic.) after
allegedly running a brothel from his home while knowing he was HIV
positive.38 This provision requires recklessness as to the mental element,
and intentional endangering of life is not required by the provision. This case
would have been an appropriate one for imposing a bail condition on the
defendant that he attend counselling if he was not already doing so.
3^ It has been reported that in New South Wales a Magistrate denied bail to an accused for
10 days because she was reportedly infected with HIV and hence a threat to the community
(Godwin, J., 'AIDS Legal Workshop, Legal Advocacy and HIV/AIDS Casework' (1990)
National AIDS Bulletin, 12-17, at p. 14).
38 'No sex order on AIDS man', l/Vesf Australian, June 15 1991, p. 41.
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These examples indicate that judicial officers and other court
personnel may not be fully aware of the characteristics of HIV infection. In
addition, they are not fully cognisant of the range of bail conditions that they
have at their disposal which would serve to both educate the public and the
accused and protect the community against the spread of HIV.
APPLICATIONS FOR HIV ANTIBODY TESTING
During the period of detention the police may need to conduct
some investigatory procedures. These may focus on searching the person
and obtaining bodily samples from him or her, seizing physical evidence
including weapons such as needles, and subjecting physical evidence to
scientific or forensic procedures. Apart from the normal requirements of
searching for weapons and obtaining fingerprints and samples from clothing
and skin, of more concern and controversy is the need to obtain blood
samples from the suspect. This is particularly so where the detainee is
suspected of committing a sexual offence involving sexual intercourse, or
where offences aimed at transmitting, attempting to or threatening to transmit
the virus to another person are alleged.
There are other instances arising in the criminal process where
knowledge of an accused's antibody status might be required. There may be
requests for HIV testing as a condition of bail and during the sentencing
process. Testing might be considered for purposes of court security. Finally,
a testing application from the victim might be considered in circumstances
where the true knowledge of the accused's antibody status may be helpful in
determining the nature of the medical care needed for the victim, if any. One
question that emerges is whether there is currently any legal basis for the
compulsory testing of an accused person in any of these situations. The
arguments for and against compulsory HIV antibody testing in the public
health arena have been covered in chapter five. Testing for the purposes of
court security, at the request of the victim (which could occur as a pre
condition of bail) and by the police for evidential purposes, are considered
below.
(i) Testing for purposes of court security
In Australia there have not yet been any requests for testing of
accused persons to determine if any special courtroom procedures are
required when dealing with an HIV-infected accused. The procedures that
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have been adopted in the United States for these purposes have included the
wearing of surgical gowns and gloves by court personnel and restricting the
movement of the accused in the courtroom by wearing leg irons or prohibiting
the accused from actually being present in court. Upon legal challenge, such
procedures have been held to be a violation of due process. 3^ There has
been one reported instance of an Australian Magistrate imposing a physical
restriction on an HIV-infected person's appearance, Testing the accused
on the ground of the need to maintain court security would not be justified in
the absence of any scientific basis to substantiate that HIV can be transmitted
through casual social contact.
Rather than subject an HIV-infected accused to an HIV test, if a
defendant exhibits unruly behaviour the Judge with a concomitant duty to
protect court personnel, counsel, jurors and spectators might have to consider
cautioning the accused and then removing him or her from the court-room. In
the alternative, judges might consider advising the accused at the outset that
so long as his or her behaviour is non-violent then no outward precautions to
prevent the spread of disease will be taken. The problem is no different from
that encountered in a courtroom where a person with a long history of
violence is being tried.
(ii) Testing the Accused to Reassure the Victim
Paragraph 5.2.14 of the National HIV/AIDS Strategy suggests
that compulsory testing be considered in the case of persons charged for a
sexual offence or on the request of the victim (or his or her guardian) of the
39 Wiggins vMaryland 315 Md. 232, 554 A.2d 356 (1989) where the court reversed a
murder conviction and held that the wearing of gloves unfairly prejudiced the jury against the
defendant. Although the court did not state this point, it is also significant that visible
precautions may amount to a breach of confidentiality because they reveal the accused's HIV
status. In addition, they are likely to predispose observers to the view that the accused will
act in a manner at risk for transmitting the virus when that might riot be substantiated. The
issue of confidentiality in the courtroom is discussed infra under ttie heading 'Privacy in the
Courtroom'.
There was a newspaper report that, in New South Wales, police escorted a person
suspected of being HIV-infected into a courtroom in protective clothing and the Magistrate
warned the prisoner that he may have difficulty obtaining legal representation because of his
suspected HIV infection. The Magistrate was subsequently reprimanded ( Sydney Morning
Herald, May 6 1987, p. 1).
Commonwealth of Australia, National HIV/AIDS Strategy: a policy information paper,
Canberra, Australian Government Publishing Service, 1989.
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alleged offence>2 There Is only one State in Australia where legislation has
been passed which specifically provides for the HIV antibody testing of one
person for the benefit of another. Under the Tasmanian HIV/AIDS
Preventative Measures Act (1993) testing can be conducted where it is
'necessary to determine the medical treatment of another person who may be
at risk of becoming infected with HIV and whose condition, or suspected
condition, in the opinion of a medical practitioner, is directly or indirectly
caused by the person required to undergo the HIV test' (s. 10(2)). It is the
Secretary of Health who has the authority to apply for the test and not the
police. It is not stated in the Act that the police can request such testing or
that they can apply to the Secretary. Nor is it clear whether the'victim can
initiate the application. The terms of section 10(2) would clearly cover a police
officer who suffered some injury at the hands of an accused which might have
involved transmission of HIV. The Tasrhanian legislation permits such testing
directly or where the accused person refuses to consent on application to a
Magistrate by the Secretary of Health (s. 11). This legislation is considerably
wider than that envisaged by the Strategy. For example, whereas the
Strategy limits such testing to victims of sexual offences, section 10(2) of the
HIV/AIDS Preventative Measures Act (1993) implies that the victim need not
be a victim of a sexual assault, but, that the provision will apply to a person
who in a situation where HIV might be transmitted.
Victoria has public health legislation allowing testing of one person
for the benefit of another in certain circumstances although it is not HIV-
specific. Section 120A of the Health Act (1958) as inserted by the Health
(Infectious Diseases) Act (1991)(Vic.) provides for a Magistrate to order a
person who may have transmitted a specified infectious disease, including
HIV (and any form of Hepatitis), to a care-giver or legal custodian, to be
tested. Section 118(c) defines a care-giver or legal custodian in a manner
which would include police and prison officers. Therefore, an application for
testing could be made in circumstances where a person resisted arrest by
biting a police officer.
The Health (Infectious Diseases) Act extends the compulsory
testing provisions set out in section 121 of the Health Acf (1958)(Vic.), which
"^2 Ibid, The Strategy also suggests that testing only be conducted as a last resort following
an order ot a court proceeding en camera and with appropriate procedural safeguards. In
issuing the order the Judge must be 'satisfied on the balance of probabilities that it is
necessary and/or in the interests of public health to make such an order, and where the court
is satisfied that either HIV transmission has previously occurred or that others have been
exposed to the possibility of transmission wilfully or recklessly' (para. 5.2.14).
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were covered in chapter five. Under section 121, there has to be a
reasonable belief that the person being tested had the disease and that he or
she posed a 'serious threat to public health'. This phrase is not defined in the
legislation. One instance of biting a police officer is not conclusive evidence
that the person concerned is a serious threat to the public health. However,
section 120A(1)(a) of the Health (Infectious Diseases) Act would allow testing
to be conducted as long as a Magistrate reasonably believes an incident has
occurred where the disease could have been, transmitted. The Tasmanian
provision is wider than the Victorian provision in that the former allows an
accused person to be tested where the victim of a crime is not only a legal
custodian or caregiver but, for example, a victim of rape or sexual assault It is
significant that the Tasmanian legislature has placed a provision which allows
HIV testing of a person charged with a sexual assault in legislation that is
primarily orientated towards health rather than crime. It is perhaps an
indication that the Tasmanian legislature believes that HIV transmission is a
public health matter rather than one for the criminal law sphere. ^*3
As this analysis reveals, in Australia, there has been a slow move
towards enacting legislation that would authorise the testing of persons
charged or convicted of committing sexual assaults. Tasmania is the only
State which specifically provides for HIV testing of an accused person
charged with a sexual offence either by consent of by way of court order. ^4
By contrast, by 1990 in the United States, eleven States had passed
legislation which authorises officials to screen persons charged for or
convicted of sexual offences and assaults. The impetus behind the
enactment of such provisions in the US is reported to have been to allow
victims to be assured that they have not been infected with HIV. But a number
^3 There is in Victoria provision under the CrimesAct (1958) as amended in 1993 to allow
blood samples to be taken of persons charged for (s. 464R) and convicted of (s. 464 ZF)
sexual offences (to be discussed infra). However it is not HIV specific.
s. 10(1) and s. 11(3) respectively of the HiV/AiDS Preventative Measures Act
(1993)(Tas.). See also supra note 43.
45 Gostin, L., 'Public Health Strategies for Confronting AIDS: Legislative and Regulatory
Policy in the United States', JAMA 1989, 1261:621-1630, at pp. 1625-1626 and 1630, fn 90-
93 and Blumberg, M., AIDS: The Impact on the CriminalJustice System, Merrill, Columbus,
1990, at pp. 71-72, report that eleven US States have such statutes. The Joint Sub
committee on AIDS in the Criminal Justice System of the Committee on Corrections and the
Committee on Criminal Justice Operations and Budget, 'AIDS and the Criminal justice
System: A Preliminary Report and Recommendations' (1987) 42(7) The Record of the Bar
Association of New York, 901-923, concluded that defendants and sentenced persons should
not be required to submit to antibody tests to detect the presence of the virus at the request
of any personnel at any stage of the process. Further, they concluded that testing should be
prohibited unless the offender consents and court-ordered testing is 'unwise' (at p. 917).
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of questions arise relating to the justification of such legislation. The first is
whether victims of sexual and non-sexual assaults face a serious risk of HIV
infection. The second is whether testing provides such persons with useful
information in order to justify the testing. As these issues are relevant to
Australia also, they need to be considered in turn.
Information from the United States prior to the advent of HIV/AIDS
provides evidence that most women who are the subject of rape or sexual
assault, are vaginally assaulted. In chapter one it was stated that the risk
of transmission from this mode of activity following one contact with the
infective agent was minimal. These factors together would suggest that there
is a small likelihood of female rape or sexual assault victims becoming
infected. Admittedly, traumatic vaginal sex is a risk factor for acquiring HIV
infection and the risk of transmission increases for women anally raped or
repeatedly raped. The US statutes only appear to focus on female rape and
vaginal intercourse. Hence they ignore the fact that males can experience
rape also. The risk of transmission increases where anal intercourse is a
feature of male-to-male rape,
Admittedly, this quantification of risk is sketchy since there are no
recorded statistics either in the United States or in Australia on the risk of
transmission of HIV or any other sexual transmitted disease through rape or
sexual assault. However, US statutes that allow for compulsory testing of
alleged rapists are overinclusive, given the lack of conclusive statistics which
suggest that female rape victims are at high-risk for acquiring the virus
through that violent episode. Such statutes are also underinclusive, where
they ignore male anal rape, an activity which is more likely to result in HIV
transmission.
The risk of infection from non-sexual assaults should also be
considered. These assaults commonly occur in the context where police or
prison officers are engaged in arresting or restraining suspects or prisoners.
The incidents of concern involve being bitten or spat on, or being wounded in
the course of a fight. ^9 in chapter one it was stated that in all these types of
Holmstrom, L. L., and Burgess, A. W., 'Sexual Behavior of Assailants During Reported
Rapes' (1980) 9 Archives of Sexual Behavior, 427-439; Estrich, 8., RealRape, Cambridge,
Harvard University Press, 1987.
Bouvet, E., De Vincenzi, I., Ancell, R., etal 'Defloration as risk factor for heterosexual HIV
transmission' Lancef, 1989, 1:615.
see chapter one, pp. 25-26.
Examples of incidents are contained in chapter three, footnote 114.
235
incidents transmission of HIV is particularly remote. Bites appear as the
most dangerous because there may be a blood to blood connection upon
breach of skin surfaces. It is true that intramuscular needlestick injuries are
high risk for transmission. The degree of risk is dependent on how much
contaminated blood is injected into the victim through the needle. Given the
fact that the risk of transmission of HIV during sexual and needlestick
incidents, at least, can be equated, it is questionable why only the former and
not the latter are singled out for HIV testing. The Tasmanian legislation (s.
10(1)) can be criticised for focusing only on sexual crimes. This fact
together with the concerns that have been raised in relation to the US statutes
give rise to the question whether the degree of risk should be the sole or
major basis for HIV testing of offenders or whether other factors are to
assume more importance.
The perceived benefit in HIV testing for the victim therefore needs
to be examined. There is no doubt that violent sexual assaults will produce
anxiety for the victim, given the incidence of HIV infection in the community
generally. The issue is whether legislation requiring compulsory testing
serves the victim's interests and whether this factor alone should be of great
significance. The fact that the HIV antibody tests are not 100% reliable may
increase the victim's anxiety about the antibody status of the defendant if the
victim is informed of a false positive or false negative test result, where the
assailant has been tested before the 'window period' has passed. In addition,
the fact that the offender tests positive does not mean the victim will have
acquired HIV. Hence the test itself may elevate the trauma of the actual
assault or rape because the victim would have to be re-tested over a period of
several months, a period which would be marked by uncertainty.
Court orders in the United States have been reversed on appeal
on the ground that the usefulness of testing in the circumstances of the
particular case was questionable, so However, with the advent of AZT slowing
progression of the virus, early treatment could be an incentive for the court to
order testing si although the usefulness of AZT in this respect was questioned
in 1993.52
50Barlow vSuperior Court, 190 C.A. 3d 1652 (1987). However in Johnetta J. vMunicipal Ct
of San Francisco, 267 Cat. Rptr. 666 (Cal Ct. App. 1990) the court found the very fact of the
uncertain state of medical knowledge of HIV transmission through saliva to be a strong
ground justifying the accused person undergoing an HIV test (at 671).
51 Blumberg, M., and Langston, D., 'f^andatory HIV testing in criminal justice settings'
(1991) 37(1 )Cr;me and Delinquency, 5-18, at p. 8.
52 see chapter one, footnote 166.
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In the alternative, victims could ascertain their own antibody status
and commence treatment. In any event, if the accused is found to be antibody
positive the victim will need to be tested. Requiring the accused to undergo
such a test is merely delaying the inevitable as far as the victim is concerned.
Evidence reveals that police officers who feel they may have been infected by
an accused's behaviour have accepted it as their responsibility to undergo
HIVtesting to reassure themselves that they have not been infected. ^3
The court must weigh the accused's privacy interests against the
government's interest in assisting the victim towards appropriate medical
treatment. For the following reasons, is not clear that there are benefits to the
victim that would outweigh the harm to an accused undergoing a compulsory
HIV test. First, such testing does not provide survivors with timely and
reliable information about the risks of contracting HIV. It may also signal to the
populace that these activities are high risk for infection when in reality both
statistical and medical evidence does not support such a hypothesis. Second,
testing of the accused fails to address the real needs of rape victims. It directs
responsibility away from providing more victim-based services such as follow-
up counselling and treatment programmes administered by community health
where referrals from the criminal justice agencies are received. Third, it
perpetuates the dangerous misconception that information about rapists HIV
status is critical to survivors health. There is no evidence to suggest that
testing of the offender as opposed to testing per se facilitates a survivor's
psychological recovery. Fourth, it sets a dangerous precedent for extending
mandatory testing to other groups such as prostitutes. In addition, it gives rise
to the query whether the accused should be tested for other sexually
transmitted diseases that are more contagious such as syphilis, herpes and
hepatitis B. Fifth, currently perpetrators of sexual assaults are singled out for
such testing whereas those who commit non-sexual assaults accompanied by
similar risk levels escape testing procedures. Finally, if these sorts of
provisions are included in criminal statutes, like laws against transmission in
the criminal sphere they allow the whole matter of HIV transmission to
become a criminal law matter rather than a public health concern. The
In addition. Police Departments have pamphlets which encourage this course of conduct.
For example, in Western Australia, the f^olice Department has a booklet on 'AIDS
Information; Exacts for Police Officers'. Also 'Needle and Syringe Disposal/Needlestick Injury
Information' to be read in conjunction with the notice appearing in Police Gazette No. 44/87
and Routine Order 4.9.10. The Australian prison warden who was stabbed with an HIV
contaminated syringe by a prisoner in Long Bay Jail in 1990 underwent an HIV test
immediately and was prescribed AZT on the same day. He seroconverted and has now
progressed to AIDS (see for details chapter seven).
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Tasmanian legislation by contrast has attempted to focus this issue as a
health matter by incorporating testing into public health legislation and
providing that orders for testing can only, be initiated by the Secretary of
health. . -
In the present writer's view, before any further legislation is passed
allowing for the compulsory testing of charged and convicted sexual offenders
or perpetrators of non-sexual assaults, a study should be undertaken to
ascertain the frequency vyith which both sexual assault and other assault
victims ask for an HIV test. A decision will also need to be made as to
whether voluntary submission to such testing should be regarded as a
mitigating factor in sentencing. Further, the law should also provide that no
further criminal chairges or enhanced sentences will result from the
information gleaned from the test.
Legislators also need to consider whether a distinction should be
drawn for the purposes of testing between a person who is charged and a
person who. has been convicted of a sexual offence. In the United States,
legislation varies in its application to either suspects or convicted persons or
both. 54 The Tasmanian legislation focuses only on the person charged with
the offence. Legislation that allows a suspect to be tested contradicts the
presumption of innocence. An accused should not be forced to provide
evidence against himself or herself which would offend the rule against self-
incrimination. 55 However, from the point of view of the victim post-conviction
testing increases anxiety about the antibody status of the defendant.
The issue of HIV testing of offenders also brings to the forefront
the adequacy of current victinri services within the criminal justice systern.
Procedures whereby counselling is offered after rape should include
counselling regarding the need to obtain an HIV test. The victim should not
delay these procedures merely because he or she is waiting to establish
whether the accused is infected. Compensation should be paid to the victim
for his or her testing expenses. The, victim and the offender should receive
follow-up counselling which could be achieved by referral to community-based
5^^ For example, legislation authorising testing of sexual offenders in Colorado and Texas
applies to pre-conviction whereas legislation in Illinois, West Virginia, Washington and
Indiana only applies post-conviction (McGuire, K., 'AIDS and the Sexual.Offender: The
Epidemic Now Poses New Threat to the Victim and the Criminal Justice System' (1991) 96
Dickinson Law Review, 95-123 at pp. 117-119).
Originally developed to prevent accused answering.questions that might subject him or
her to a penalty and extended the furnishing of evidence against his or her interests (Byrne,
D. M., Heydon, J. D. (eds). Cross on Evidence, 3rd Australian edition, Sydney, Butterworths,
1986, at p. 624).
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services. The US legislation generally fails to incorporate pre- and post-test
counselling which is an important health objective in HIV prevention. The
Tasmanian HIV/AIDS Preventative Measures Act does provide for
counselling, but, it is contained in a provision unrelated to compulsory HIV
testing. ^6
When turning to consider the position from the standpoint of the
accused one can see why the victim should be tested immediately in order to
ascertain whether the victim was already infected prior to the criminal act
taking place. This would be of significance where the accused is charged with
a transmission offence, for example, with reckless endangerment under
section 22 of Crimes Act {V\c.). Current Tasmanian legislation does not make
it clear that an- accused should be told of his or her right to refuse to undergo
such testing. This is a significant fact given that the Secretary of Health only
has to substantiate the procedure adopted when the accused refuses to
consent. One can imagine situations arising where an accused is advised that
it is merely an informality for him or her to undergo a test. The procedural
safeguards contained in the Police and Criminal Evidence Act (1984)(UK) to
ensure that a subject has been informed of his or her rights during intimate
searches, ^7 jn the criminal law sphere has no counterpart in Australian
criminal law or public health law, with the exception of Victoria, por
example, the accused should be advised what use may be made of the
results of blood sampling. ^9
(iii) Testing to Obtain Evidence to Substantiate the Charge
The National HIV/AIDS Strategy does not provide for testing for
HIV the purpose of obtaining evidence to substantiate a charge against A. 6o
sections14, 15 appear applicable to section 10(1).
contained in s. 62 and Code C of the Codes of Practice annexed to the Act.
The 1993 amendments to the Victorian Crimes Act by the Crimes (Amendment)Act
(1993)(Vic.) sets out that informed consent is required. Informed Consent is defined in terms
that would require for the accused to be advised of the purpose of such testing (s. 464S). By
contrast, the Tasmanian provision does not set down such a requirement.
Ibid. s. 62(7)(8) of Police and Criminal Evidence Act and see s. 464S Crimes Act
(1958)(Vic.) which sets down this requirement.
supra note 41. The text of 5.2.14 reads as follows: There are other situations where the
welfare of others in the community depends on the testing of an individual, and where
compulsory testing for HIV may have a place. The only such situations are: ... testing of a
person charged with a sexual offence, where an HIV test is requested by the victim of the
alleged offence or, if the victim is not competent, by his or her guardian;..."
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The terms of paragraph 5.2.14 of the Strategy may allow the police to apply
to a court for a compulsory testing order to allow them to obtain information
to substantiate a sexual offence. But, the substance of this paragraph
appears to be to limit the testing to situations where it is being done for the
victim or for the welfare of others. It is doubtful whether the gathering of
evidence is directly for the welfare of others. Similarly, the whole tenor of the
HIV/AIDS Preventative Measures Act (1993)(Tas.) is directed at the victim's
welfare or society in general and not to assist the police in proving elements
of the crime. Further, section 11 of the Act which allows an application to be
made to a Magistrate for a compulsory testing order, does not direct the
Magistrate to consider whether testing may afford evidence to substantiate
the charge. 61
The police may argue that having this power to authorise testing is
very important to their ability to detect and prosecute crime. This was
exemplified in the outcome of the US case of Barlow v Superior Court. 62 in
this case, the Defendant had bitten two police officers during a parade. He
was charged with attempted murder but the charge was thwarted by the lack
of evidence which arose because of the court's refusal to permit testing of the
defendant's blood. There is evidence to suggest that HIV testing has been
conducted in Australia in some circumstances under police authority 63 This is
occurring either because accused persons are told they have to undergo such
a test, or because the police are obtaining their consent to general testing.
Such testing has also been conducted to ascertain whether police might haye
been infected as a result of some confrontation involving an accused
suspected of being infected with the virus. 64
61 In fact the provision states:
'V\/hen determining whether to make an order under this section, a magistrate shall
consider the following matters:-
(a) whether other person are or have been exposed to the possibility of transmission
of HIV;
(b) the right to information of a person at risk of infection;
(c) the availability of a proven treatment in relation to HIV.'
62 236Cal. Rptr. 134(1987).
63 An individual has been allegedly tested in Victoria following a traffic offence (Note, 'Police
Database of HIV Positive People' (1991) 2(3) National HIV/AIDS Legal Link Newsletter, 1-2,
at p. 2). In Tasmania, in Palmer Complaint No. 10282/87 Supreme Court of Tasmania,
August 1987 (the full facts were discussed in chapter three: text and fn 117) the forensic
reports attached to the court transcripts is testimony of the fact that testing was conducted. It
is unclear whether Palmer consented or not.
64 Note 'Police Database of HIV Positive People', Ibid, at p. 2. See supra note 53.
240
There are common law and statutory limits on the powers of police
to secure samples from suspects. These limitations and the legality of police
procedures for applying HIV tests to a blood sample obtained from an
accused person will be considered. This issue is an important one because
the securing of evidence in breach of the law will not automatically render that
evidence inadmissible as the courts have a duty to consider whether the
balance of public interest requires them to exercise a discretion to exclude
evidence so obtained.
In order to fully explore this area the powers of the police in the
legal process need to be clarified. Police have both an investigative function
(including the detection of crime and collection of evidence) and also a
prosecutorial function (pursuing, arresting and bringing persons to court).
Police are invested with distinct powers for each of these purposes and the
functions applicable to one are not to be used in the furtherance of the other
function. 65 jhe collection of blood for forensic purposes falls within the
investigative function.
Taking Samples with Consent
The common law does not allow pre-arrest searches to be
conducted without the co-operation and consent 66 of the person being
searched. 67 in this respect a suspect has the same rights prima facie as a
person not involved in the criminal process. This rule derives from the fact
that a touching without consent constitutes a battery. The basic right to
protect one's bodily integrity from unauthorised intrusions forms the basis for
the justification for battery liability. 68 However, if an accused person agrees
to provide blood then the case of Carr v P 69 would support the view that
there is nothing unlawful in the request.
Once a person is 'under arrest' or 'in custody' the collection of
evidence from that person even with consent may become subject to statutory
65 as the decision in Williams vR{1986) 161 CLR 278 reveals.
66 the difference between consent and informed consent isdiscussed infra, pp. 245-246.
6^Bishop, supra note 2, at p. 64.
66 Faden R., and Beauchamp, T., AHistory and Theory ofInformed Consent, New York,
Oxford University Press, 1986 at p. 121.
69 (1973) 127CLR 662 at p 663 per Menzies J.
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conditions designed to regulate the collection of such evidence7o For
example, in Fullerton y Commissioner of f^oiice, ^''Lee J held that section
353A of the Crimes Act (1900) (NSW) was 'the sole source of authority ... the
section will have application ... irrespective of whether the person in custody
consents or does not consent to giving such particulars'.^2 in some
jurisdictions, the statutes imply onerous requirements on the police. For
example, in the Northern Territory consent to a medical examination is only
lawful if the consent is in writing.
Taking Samples without consent
The taking of blood or other material from a person before his or
her arrest without consent is a battery unless authorised by law. There are
limited examples where police can as of right demand that a person provide a
sample to them. For example, legislation dealing with drink driving offences
has been enacted in all States and Territories and empowers police to stop
motorists suspected of driving under the influence or over prescribed alcohol
limits. Such legislation empowers police to take breath and blood samples
without consent (with the exception of Tasmania where they must be taken
with consent).
After arrest the common law gives the police the authority to
search the person of someone in order to obtain relevant evidence. However,
Generally in all States and Territories of Australia legislation permits but regulates the
collection of photographs, fingerprints and other bodily samples including, blood from a
suspect or an accused person 'in custody' (8. 464 CrimesAct (1958)(Vic.); s. 353ACrimes
Act (1900)(N.S.W.); s. 3-8 Criminal Process (identification and Search Procedures) Act
(1976)(Tas.): s. 144-146 Police Administration Act (1978)(N.T.); s. 259 Criminal Code (^899)
(Q\d.y, s. 236 Criminal Code (1913)(W.A.); s. 81 Summary Offences Act (1953)(S.A.)
(formerly the Police Offences Act {^953)). These are general provisions which do not limit the
taking of blood samples, for example, merely to criminal conduct involving alcohol or drugs.
71[1984 1 NSWLR 159.
^2 Ibid, at p. 163.
^2 s. 145(a) PoliceAdministration Act(^976){NT).
Victorian legislation appears to authorise blood testing whether a person is in custody or
not (Cr/mesAcf s. 464A).
s. 63-66 (breath and blood) Road TrafficAct 974--\982) (W.A.); s. 7(breath), 10-13
(Blood) Road Safety (Alcohol and Drugs)Act (1970)(Tas.); s. 16A (breath and blood) Traffic
Act (1949-1985) (Qld ); s. 53-55 (breath and blood) Road Safety Ac/(1986)(Vic.); s. 47e
(breath), 47(i) (blood) Road Traffic Act (1961 )(S.A.); s. 4E2A-15, Road Traffic Act
(1909)'(N.S.W.); s. 8D(breath), s. 8G (blood) Traffic Act (1949-1987)(N.T.); s. 9, 10, 15(4),
20(2) tdotor Traffic (Alcohol and Drugs) Act (1977)(A.C.T.). Under these provisions there is
no specific mention of the tests to which the blood taken may be subjected to.
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as this power was based on the need to preserve evidence that Is In danger
of loss of destructlon^e it is not easy to see how blood Is In such danger and
accordingly It Is arguable that the common law power to search to provide
evidence does or should not apply to blood. Hence, the common law does
not provide a solid foundation for police to take blood from an accused person
for the purpose of obtaining evidence to substantiate an HIV transmission
offence.
There Is another way by which police could obtain such evidence.
Police are empowered by statute to arrange for persons in custody to be
examined by a medical practitioner. jhe only restriction on their power In
this regard, Is that the police must believe that the examination Is reasonably
likely to reveal relevant evidence. This term 'medical examination' has also
appeared in public health legislation. It has been stated In chapter five of this
thesis that when the term 'medical examination' appears in legislation It Is
usually undefined. It Is arguable that these words were Intended to authorise
no more than the physical observation of the condition of the detained jDerson
or subjecting the person to normal processes to determine his or her physical
condition. This argument Is supported by the fact that while it Is part of normal
medical practice to take a subject's blood pressure. It Is not a normal medical
procedure to take blood from an Individual. The term Itself does not on Its
face permit the removal of bodily material from a person. In only two States
does the legislation specifically allow blood to be taken during a medical
examination. "7®
The limited case-law In this area would support the view that the
term 'medical examination' is to be given a wider Interpretation than argued
for above. Both R v Harrison ^9 a Tasmanlan case and R v Franklin 8° a
7® Clarke vBailey{1933) 33 SR (NSW) 3.03 at p. 310.
S. 464R Crimes Act (1958)(Vic.); s. 353A(2) Cr/mes Act (1900)(N.S.W.): s.6 Criminal
Process (identification and Search Procedures) Act (1976)(Tas.): s. 145 Police
Administration Act (1978)(N.T.); s. 259 Criminal Code (1899) (Qld.); s. 236 Criminal Code
{1913){\N.A.y,s. 81 {2)SummaryOffences Act (1953)(S.A.).
^8 In Queensland, s. 259(3) of the Criminal Code and in Tas. s. 6(5) of the Criminal
Processfldentification and Search Procedures) Act (1976). The Northern Territory legislation
refers to a specirhen being taken during an examination and having that specimen analysed
(s. 145(3) Police Administration Act). Although it is not stated this could include blood. In
1990, section 145 was held to empower a N/lagistrate to order the taking of a blood sample if
he or she is satisfied that the police have a reasonable belief that it might afford evidence
relating to the offence Galvin v R (1983) 24 NTR 22. The Victorian provisions would also
allow blood (an 'intimate sample' (s. 464(2)) to be taken as part of a 'forensic procedure' (s.
464(2)).
79(1915) Tas SR 140.
243
South Australian.case established that taking blood is an 'examination'. Wells
J held as to the meaning of 'medical examination':
it would in my opinion, be a mistake to suppose that it is
confined to macroscopical or microscopical surveillance; the
word is not so confined even in spheres of applied science
outside medicine ... s. 81 contemplates ... the ascertainment
of acts which may afford evidence relevant to the charge in
question.
Irrespective of these cases and the particular statutory provisions
the question that needs to be answered is whether present legislation giving
police the power to take bodily samples or subjecting a person to a medical
examination, is wide enough to allow police and prosecutorial agencies to not
only take blood from an accused person, but, then to arrange for that blood to
be tested for HIV. There is no legislative provision which specifically provides
that police are entitled to test blood samples taken from an accused for HIV
antibodies. Therefore, there is at least, a rebuttable presumption that the test
itself cannot be undertaken without consent of the accused and that police
cannot authorise such tests.
It has been argued earlier in this thesis, in chapters four and five,
that the phrase 'medical examination' when contained in public health
legislation would be unlikely to be held by a court to cover HIV testing. The
accuracy of that view can now be considered in the context of the criminal
process. In Franklin, the accused tried to argue that the forensic tests applied
to a collection of blood and hair samples should not have been performed and
that as a result evidence had been incorrectly admitted at his trial. The
accused's argument was that the legislation required a doctor to conduct an
examination and the laboratory technicians who applied tests to the blood
were not doctors hence the legislation had been unlawfully obtained in breach
of the procedural rules. In the context of deciding at what point a medical
examination ended, the court stated that if blood is lawfully taken it is beside
the point that it is analysed by another person and hence impliedly irrelevant
that certain forensic tests are applied. It was thought that the laboratory
testing was outside the protection of the section.
80 [1979) 1 A. Crim. R. 1.
8^ Ibid, at p. 5. King CJ and Leque J agreed with Wells J.
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The decision in Franklin could be problematic for an HIV-infected
person in South Australia who wants to prevent HIV tests being carried out on
his or her blood samples. The Tasmanian decision of Harrison also tends to
support the view in Franklin . However, both cases were decided before the
advent of HIV/AIDS. The tests conducted in both cases were not of the nature
of an HIV test. It is at least arguable that any precedent established would
need to take into account that HIV testing is a procedure that has
overwhelming social ramifications for the person tested. In the 1990 Northern
Territory non-AIDS case oi R v Galvin, 82 Muirhead J held that within the
discretion of a Magistrate to order blood testing 'lies the protection to the
individual from serious inroads into his physical well being'. 83 it could be
argued that Muirhead J would decline to order an accused to undergo a blood
test for HIV should the matter arise, given his statement in this case. In
Wells J's judgment in Franklin, there is some indication of a similar view:
the limits of reasonableness [of the tests] may vary markedly
and depend, upon such matters as the extent to which the
examination will invade the integrity of the body, the state of
health of the prisoner, the seriousness of the charge, and the
cogency of the evidence that there are reasonable grounds for
believing that the examination will afford. 84
In the absence of any case-law on the matter of HIV testing in the
criminal process in Australia the position in the United States can be
considered. The United States Supreme Court has held in general that the
removal of blood without consent is a search and seizure. 85 in order for the
search to be constitutional it must be reasonable. 86 Generally to be
82 (1983) 24 NTR 22. It .is significanthowever, that the Northern Territory legislation is the
only legislation whichcontains a provision (s. 145(3))which actuallysets out that a specimen
may be analysed. This could be relied on as providing the justification for an HIV test to be
applied to a specimen.
83 /b/d, atp. 26.
84 supra note 80, at p. 5
85 Schmerber VCalifornia, 384 US 757, 767 (1966).
88 This is provided by the Fourth amendment to the USConstitution:
the rightof the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers and
affects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be
violated, and not warrants shall issue , but upon probable cause
supported by oath or affirmation, and particularly describe the place to be
searched, and the person or things to be seized.
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reasonable a search warrant and probable cause are required. However,
where governmental interests present 'special needs [beyond those] of
normal law enforcement' 8^ a search may be reasonable in absence of these
requirements. There is no US authority which specifically separates up for
examination the issues of taking blood and then testing it. In Johnetta v
Municipal Court of California, 88the defendant challenged a California law that
required mandatory AIDS testing for criminal defendants in biting cases. The
court held that although the evidence of transmission from biting was low,
because medical evidence was not really conclusive on the point, this
uncertainty was enough to justify the search. 89 it is questionable whether
the US Supreme Court would have found the testing scheme reasonable if
this case had been appealed. It is likely that constitutional rights as to privacy
would have been an important issue in the decision. The lack of such rights
in Australia render comparison with the US of limited usefulness.
Therefore, it is instructive to turn to consider the issue of consent
to HIV testing in situations outside the criminal process, for example, in the
area of medical treatment. The application of these principles to the criminal
sphere can then be considered. The matter of consent to HIV testing in the
course of medical treatment has been debated at some length in the United
Kingdom in the late 1980s. Leading commentators in the area have held that
because of the nature of HIV testing and the ramifications that ensue
following a positive result that consent to take blood does not extend to
consent for that blood to be subjected to an HIV test. 9° This view, it is
argued is supported by the principle of self-determination or autonomy as it is
applied to medical treatment.
It appears that the issue of consent is inextricably connected to the
cause of action that one is seeking to establish; whether a person wishes to
sue for a battery or in negligence. Legal authority supports the view if a
87 from Skinner vRailway Labor Executives Association 489 US 602 (1989).
88267 Cal. Rptr. 666 (Cal. Ct. App. 1990).
89 Ibid, at p. 692.
99 Kennedy and Grubb argue that the failure to obtain such consent gives rise to a valid
claim both in battery and in negligence (Testing for HIV infection: the legal framework' (1989)
LawSociety Gazette, 30 at p. 34-35). InAustralia, Hamblin has stated that it is unlikely that a
general consent to testing will cover HIV testing because of the nature of the HIV test
(Hamblin, J., 'Health Care Rights and Responsibilities' (1992) LawSociety Journal, 66-70 at
p. 67).
9^ Faden andBeauchamp, supranote 68.
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doctor fails to tell a patient of the broad nature of the treatment to be imposed
he or she commits a battery for which he or she is liable to the patient in
damages. Liability arises irrespective of the fact that the treatment
performed by the doctor is medically justified, proficiently performed and
beneficial to the patient. 93 In the case of HIV and blood testing where a
person consents to general blood testing, if the blood was tested for HIV
without the specific consent of the individual concerned, an action in battery
would not lie. However, where the action is in negligence, it is not sufficient if
a person is told in broad terms what the treatment will entail. The person's
consent must be an 'informed' one. In 1992, the High Court of Australia in
Rogers v Whitaker 9^ handed down an instructive judgment on what is
encompassed by this term 'informed consent'. 96 jhe court held
that the doctor has a duty to warn a patient of a 'material risk'
inherent in the proposed treatment. A risk is material if, in the
circumstances of the particular case, a reasonable person in
. the patient's position, if warned of the risk, would be likely to
attach significant to it or if the medical practitioner is or should
reasonably be aware that a particular patient, if warned of the
risk, would be likely to attach significance to it. 97
92 Chatterton v Gerson [1981] 1 All ER 257 and confirmed in Australia by the High Court in
Rogers v Whitaker {^ 992) 109 ALR 625, at p. 633 per l\/iason CJ, Brennan, Dawson, Toohey,
fylcHugh and Gaudron JJ concurring.
93 as shown in Murray vMcCurchy [1949] 2 DLR 442.
A detailed examination of informed consent to medical procedures is beyond the scope of
this thesis, but is covered in detail in Australia in fyianderson, D., 'Following Doctors' Orders:
Informed Consent in Australia', Australian Law Journal, Vol. 62, 1990, 430-440; Ivlonks, S.,
The concept of Informed Consent in the United States, Canada, England and Australia; A
Comparative Analysis' (1993) 17 University of Queensland Law Journal, 222-233.; and in
Canada by: Somerville, M., 'Structuring the Issues in Informed Consent' (1980) 26 McGill
Law Journal, 1980, 738-808; Robertson, G., 'Informed Consent: ten years later; the impact of
Riebl VHughes' (1991) 70 Canadian Bar Review 423, 433.
95 supra note 92.
96 The phrase was 'born' in Salgo v Leiand Stanford University Board of Trustees (1957)
317 P 2d 170. The court in Rogers v Whitaker {supra note 92), was fairly scathing of this
American and somewhat 'amorphous phrase' 'informed consent' (at p.633).
supra note 92 at p. 633-634. The court also held that the questions of informed consent
do not depend solely on medical standards or practices. This marked a fundamental
departure from the decision in Bolam v Friern.Hospital Management Committee [1957] 2 All
ER 118 where it was held that the test to be imposed was whether a doctor acted in
accordance with a practice accepted as proper by a responsible body of medical practitioners
skill in that particular art. The requirement that 'material risks' be disclosed is in accordance
with US {Canterbury v Spence 464 F.2d 772 (D.C. 1972) at p. 784 and Canadian {ReibI v
Hughes (1980) 114DLR(3d) 1, at p. 13 per Laskin CJC) authority.
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This test can be translated to the issue of HIV testing. Although there is no
case law on the issue, in Australian rnedical practice it is generally recognised
that the HIV test should not be administered without the patient being advised
of the social and medical ramifications of the test. The question is whether
this is a merely an ethical and thus non-legally binding rule or whether it is a
standard practice adopted by the profession. The latter may be relevant for
purposes of a negligence claim. A person who is about to be tested for HIV
would wish to know the medical and social and, in some circumstances, the
legal effect of a positive result. Therefore, for the patient the outcome is
significant in deciding whether or not to undergo the test.
As present pre-trial criminal procedure legislation in Australia does
not specifically allow police to subject an accused's blood to HIV testing
without his or her consent it is necessary to consider the application of
general principles regarding consent and informed consent to this process.
The principles will be considered in their application to certain factual
situations involving testing which may occur during the pre-trial criminal
processes. These situations may present themselves to a court in the future
when the evidence obtained is'challenged as being inadmissible. As an aside,
these principles may also establish whether an accused person has grounds
for a claim against police authorities in battery or negligence. ^8 jhe six
situations considered below raise three major issues; consent and capacity to
consent; informed consent; and, fraud as to consent.
The first situation involves the police arranging for blood to be
taken from A contrary to A's consent where there is no clear nexus between
the need to obtain such information, and the offence for which A is charged.
For example, A has been charged for stealing rather than for resisting arrest
by biting. The result is that the test is unlawful, the information unlawfully
obtained and the doctor has committed an assault or battery which the police
have instigated the.doctor to commit. The unlawfulness may also be provided
by the fact that there is a breach of a statutory provision. This would occur in
the Northern Territory, for example, where legislation specifies that the written
consent of the accused is required and in other States where legislation
98 Causation and remoteness ofdamage would also need to be proved. These matters are
not considered in this thesis since the resolution of whether an accused person should sue
police is not the main thrust of this section.
sA45{b) Police Administration Act {^978){N.J.).
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directs that upon refusal by the suspect a court order must be obtained to
even take blood samples from the suspect, loo
The second factual scenario, is where the doctor at the request of
a police officer takes blood from A without A's consent while A is unconscious,
and tests it for HIV infection. A falls into the category of an temporary
incompetent patient. If testing is done for the purpose of providing police with
some evidence then this is a non-therapeutic intervention. To carry out a such
an intervention full disclosure is required. 101 The legality of the procedure will
depend upon whether it is reasonable to obtain the sample and test it for HIV
in the circumstances of the offence charged. The principle of necessity is an
exception to the requirement to obtain consent and it applies in emergency
situations. 102 as HIVstatus is not something capable of being destroyed over
time an argument based on the necessity to prevent the destruction of
evidence would not succeed. Even if there is a nexus, for exarrlple, that A has
been charged for biting a police officer, if the testing could have been delayed
until A could be advised that testing that was to take place and given a
chance to consent to both the blood being drawn; the test being taken and to
receive counselling, the taking of blood from an unconscious accused would
not be justified.
The third factual situation is where the police ask A for a blood
sample and A consents, but police then subject that blood to an HIV antibody
test. Although in this example A has not been told his or her blood would be
tested it may be argued that the testing for HIV antibodies is a mere extension
of A's general consent. Further, it has been argued by one commentator that
once the blood is taken from a person proprietary rights over the samples
cease.ios The English case of Chatterton v Gerson provides a legal basis
•"OO This requirement is only specified under the Victorian S. 464T Crimes Act (1958)(Vic.)
and s. 145(1)(b) Police Administration Act (1978)(N.T.); s. 259(4)(b) Criminal Code (1899)
(Qld.) with 259(6) setting down the requirements police have to prove in order for a
magistrate to make the order required. The other States do not set out that consent is
required and allow samples to be taken by reasonable force: s. 353A Crimes Act
(1900)(N.S.W.); ss. 6(5)(6) Criminal Process (identification and Search Procedures) Act
(1976)(Tas.); s. 236 Criminal Code (1913)(W.A.); s. 81(2) Summary Offences Act
(1953)(S.A.).
''0^ Somerville, supra note 94 at p. 765.
Monks, supra note 94, at p. 2.
Langley QC for the f\/ledical Defence Union, in MDU, 'AIDS Medico-Legai Advice
London, MDU, 1988, 4-5.
"•04 [1931] QB 432 and followed in Australia in Rogers vWhitaker supra note 92 at p. 633.
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for implying consent for testing for HIV from a general consent for the blood to
be taken so as to negative a battery. The cases of Harr/son and Franklin
support the view that there is no restriction on the tests which can be
conducted on that blood sample. In the finaf analysis, it may depend on
whether the matter is being seen from the perspective of an action in battery
or in negligence
If the circumstances are changed slightly to the situation where
police have told the accused that they were going to subject his blood to
routine tests, arguably the same issues just addressed arise. It has been
argued that testing for HIV is seldom seen as routine, It has been
suggested that given the uniqueness of the ramifications of HIV testing
perhaps it is of prime importance to consider whether A has, in fact,
consented to a blood test for HIV infection. For example, Kennedy and Grubb
107 suggest that a court may believe it is contrary to public policy to regard
consent to testing as including consent to a test which could have detrimental
family and employment consequences for the accused. Only a full informed
consent will render A's assent a valid consent. These authors would be
correct in general terms if the cause of action being considered was
negligence rather than a battery. The requirement of disclosing 'material
risks' would mean that where HIV testing is conducted in the criminal process
that the suspect must be told what use will be made of the test in future
proceedings.
The fourth scenario involves circumstances where A consents to
a blood test because he or she is told by police that such testing is routine for
all suspects in order to ensure they are not HIV-infected. Although A has
consented here and has been told that his or her blood will be tested for HIV,
the consent given may. be deemed invalid because police have led A to
believe the testing is routine and A may therefore consent because he or she
perceives it to be necessary. There is a subtle form of duress involved in this
example which could render the consent one that was not freely and
voluntarily given. Such involuntariness might also arise in a situation where a
person was incapable of consenting because he or she was intoxicated and
105 supra notes 79-81
106 Sherrand, M., 'Human Immunodeficiency virus antibody testing' BMJ 1984, 295:910 at
p. 911 -912 although it appears that such a view is insupportable by any established authority.
It has also been held in the US: Gostin, L., 'Hospitals, Health Care Professionals, and AIDS:
The Public's Perspective', New Eng J Med, 1988, 339: 9-43).
107 supra note 90, at p. 35.
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unable to make a rational decision. This situation would likely result in the
evidence being regarded as unlawfully obtained, jhe consent may also be
ineffective because the assumption can be made that the blood is being
tested for the protection of persons other than the accused. This raises the
debate about the consent required for therapeutic versus non-therapeutic
interventions. In Australia guidelines are in place that prevent surgeons from
conducting HIV tests on prospective surgery patients merely for the doctor's
protection, Similarly, in Tasmania and Victoria, the legislature has seen fit
to specifically provide for the circumstances under which an HIV test can be
carried out one person for the benefit of another,
The fifth situation is where the police advise A that his blood is
being taken to test it for Hepatitis B. The blood is tested for HIV and this was
the intention of the police from the beginning. Here the police officer has
acted in a fraudulent manner and the cause of action lies in battery. I"''' Even
if the doctor tests for Hepatitis B as well, this should not excuse the original
fraudulent inducement. It is a positive deception calculated to obtain consent.
The evidence would also be regarded as improperly obtained. However, in
Australia following the High Court decision of Papadimitropoulos v R 112
confirmed in 1991 by Mobilio v R as long as A knows the nature and
character of the act he of she is consenting to, for example, an application of
force, then the inducing cause (testing for Hepatitis B) is irrelevant. Although
these are criminal assault cases, the rules governing consent in criminal law
and in tort or battery are 'directly comparable', As argued in chapter three
Under section 145(11) of the Police Administration Act (1978)(N.T.). it is stated that
'nothing in this section shall ... affect the power of a court to exclude evidence obtained
through force or inhumane treatment.' Hence the evidence could be rendered inadmissible.
^0® For example, although in 1991 the Australian f^edical Association recommended pre-
surgical testing, this has not been accepted in the A.C.T. (Commonwealth of Australia,
National HIV/AIDS Evaluation 1991-1992 State Stories Report, Canberra, Australian
Government Publishing Service, 1993, at p. 124). See alsofn 111 chapter five.
f10 as discussed supra under section headedTesting theAccused to Reassure theVictim'.
^'''' This is the difference between actions in battery and negligence in this area. The former
are accompanied by intention whereas the latter are not (ReibI v Hughes (1980) 114 DLR
(3d.)1).
^^2 jhis case wascovered in somedetail in chapter three, pp. 118-122.
"""O Mobilio vR (1990) 50 A. Crim. R. 170 (Vic. CCA) and (1990) 24 Leg. Rep. 14-15 (HC
special leave applic.)
Somerville, M., supra note 94, at p. 743. However, it must be noted that the law
relating to fraud as to consent as it has evolved in the criminal law in Australia is not the
same as the law in Canada on the same topic (see chapter three, where this point is debated
at length, at footnote 131).
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of this thesis this rule which currently encourages deceptive practices
requires re-consideration in light of HIV. The common-law interpretation of
fraud is likely to be relevant to the interpretation of the term in statutes which
allow evidence obtained by fraud to be excluded,
However, if police extracted consent to testing on the condition that
it was for Hepatitis B only then it is arguably outside the scope of A's consent
for the police to test the blood for anything else. Any other intervention not
covered by express consent or implied by conduct would be unlawful unless
justified on some other basis such as necessity. 1jhis example can be more
readily explained by considering the situation where A is detained for drink
driving following a positive breath test and elects to have a blood test. If while
subjecting that blood to a test for alcohol content the doctor at the request of
the police also tests the accused's blood for HIV antibodies, this would be
unlawful. A has not specifically consented to have his or her blood tested for
HIV. In fact, A has elected to have his or her blood tested for alcohol
content, so it could be argued that A has only one specific purpose in mind
which is directly connected to what A is charged for; consent is conditional on
the police perforrning the test he or she has contemplated. Any other test
including an HIV test conducted in these circumstances is unlawful and the
evidence would be unlawfully obtained. Somerville has suggested that
'certain matters require express consent'. "'"'9 In the future, courts may regard
HIV testing as such a matter. In resolving the dilemma, the purpose for which
the test is taken would be significant. If the test is done for the benefit of the
victim it would be unlikely to be regarded as justified. One ground that might
be considered by a court in coming to this decision, is the fact that the
legislature in two States of Australia has seen fit to specifically provide for
circumstances where testing may be conducted for the benefit of another.
However, if testing is for the purpose of obtaining evidence then the principles
relevant to the discretion to exclude evidence would be relevant. These will
be discussed in the next section.
Chapter three, pp. 118-122.
116 Provisions such as s. 145(11)ofthe Police Administration Act (1978)(N.T.), supra note
108.
"I Teff, H., 'Consent toMedical Procedures: Paternalism, Self-determination or therapeutic
Alliance?' (1985) 101 Law Quarterly Review, 433 at p. 439.
Somerville, supra note 94, at p. 788.
119 /b/d, at p. 789.
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The final situation involves a set of facts where the police tell A
they want to take a blood sample from him or her and subject it to an HIV test
which may in turn provide evidence capable of substantiating the charge
against A. Where A is advised of the ramifications of a positive test result
including the purpose for which the procedure is required; the nature of the
procedure sought to be conducted; the offence for which the person is
suspect of having committed or with which the person has been charged; that
the procedure could produce evidence to be used in a court; and, that the
person may refuse to undergo the procedure then informed consent has
taken place and the consent to the test would be valid, The evidence
would be held to be lawfully obtained: It could be queried whether the other
risks associated with a positive HIV antibody test result, such as social
ostracism, breakdown of personal relationships and possible loss of
employment, would need to be disclosed before the consent would be
regarded as being fully 'informed'. It may be preferable for police to obtain
written consent prior to testing which would indicate that the accused had
been informed of the social, legal and ethical ramifications of testing.
Overall these scenarios involve two issues relating to testing within
the criminal process. The first, is the issue of obtaining consent to take
blood. A person must consent to that procedure or where the person refuses
to consent, in some jurisdictions a court order must be obtained. ^21 The
second issue, whether specific consent is then needed to test that blood for
HIV, is fraught with uncertainty and the resolution of the matter is dependent
upon a consideration of the whole circumstances under which such testing is
conducted. The general rules relating to consent and informed consent to
medical interventions will be-applicable to HIV testing of persons in custody
unless exceptions are provided by statute. The common law and statutes
relating to blood sampling merely allow blood to be taken. When it is to be
taken without consent some statutes dictate that a court order is to be
obtained. None of these statutes authorise that such blood samples can be
subjected to any test. Arguably there is not much point in legislation
authorising the mere collection of blood. Where a court order is required for
^20 Such are the examples of what is required for informed consent in the Victorian
legislation, s. 464S of the Crimes Act as amended in 1993.
••21 In those where it is not, it appears that the test could be taken by 'reasonable force' (s.
236 Criminal Code (1913)(WA); s. 81(2); Summary Offences Act (1953)(S.A.); s. 6(6)
Criminal Process (Identification and Search Procedures) Act(1976)(Tas.). Under s. 145(4) of
the Police AdministrationAct (1978)(N.T.) reasonable force may be used to obtain a sample
after the taking of the sample has been authorised by a fvlagistrate under s. 145(1)(b).
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the initial blood sample to be taken, HIV testing could be specifically
requested at that time. Unless the purpose of testing is for the benefit of
another person rather than the prosecution of crime, it is difficult to see how
such testing could be denied unless the ramifications of HIV tests as opposed
to any other test are seen to override the interests of the police being able to
solve crime. If procedural safeguards are in place which mandate counselling
and information to be provided to the accused about the likely use of the test
results (whether it be any test), then HIV testing may be rnore acceptable.
The diversity of the views on the point, in the medical arena provide strong
grounds for the matter to be legislated on specifically in the criminal law
sphere.
Before concluding, however, it is useful to have recourse to the
legal situation of DNA testing in Australia. This form of testing, also known as
genetic fingerprinting, has been found to be of value in establishing paternity,
indicating a family linkage and more recently in identifying the perpetrators of
crime. '"22 jhe results of DNA testing have been admitted into evidence in
trials in some Australian States. 123 jhis is significant because DNA testing
does not have the same level of accuracy and reliability as HIV testing. 124 it
is also relevant that there is no specific legislation authorising such tests to be
done. In fact, in Tran i25aithough the evidence was not admitted, there was
no discussion as to whether police should have permitted the blood samples
to be tested for DNA. It seems to be assumed by the Judge that the
procedure was an accepted one.
The Victorian Crimes Act (1958) was amended in 1990 and refined
further in 1993 by inserting a new section 464, which was enacted to provide
"•22 White, R. M., and Greenwood, J. J. D., 'DNA Fingerprinting and the Law' (1988) 51
t^odern Law Review, 145.
"•23 In Rv Joseph and Kelly unreported judgment of the Supreme Court ofW. A., Wallace J
in admitting results as evidence acknowledged the validity of the process (Personal
correspondence, G. Tannin, Crown Prosecutor, W.A. DPP). The evidence was also admitted
in R VGreen unreported judgment of the NewSouth Wales Supreme Court, March 26 1993.
Other cases where the matter was debated but the evidence was not admitted include: R v
Van Hung Tran (1990) 50 A. Crim. R. 233 per Mclnerney J and R vLucas unreported case
70154/89 Vic. Supreme Court per Hunt J.
^24 The unreliability of the expert evidence in relation to DNA matching was instrumental in
the decision in Tran, Ibid. Procedures involved in matching bands have not been accepted
by a clear majority in the medical community. There is no consensus on the procedures to
preserve the integrity of the testing and no consensus on the statistical exposition that can be
derived from matching DNA samples (Brodsky, G., 'DNA: the Technology of the Future is
Here' (1993) Criminal Law Quarterly, 10-39, at p.1, 36).
125 Ibid.
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for (DeoxyriboNucleic Acid) DNA testing 126 although such a purpose is not
clearly set out in the provisions. The procedural safeguards ^27 jp place in the
statute are very detailed and if they are followed in any given situation then
any loss of individual rights will be far outweighed by the advantages of either
identifying the suspect as being involved in the commission of an offence or
eliminating that suspect from suspicion at an early stage. For example, a
person's consent to having a forensic procedure performed on him or her is
not valid unless the consent is fully informed. Informed consent is defined in
section 464S. "'28 The Act also sets down a detailed procedure for application
to a Magistrate where a person refuses to provide intimate samples (including
blood). It has been argued that the terminology in the Victorian legislation
could by extension authorise HIV testing in the future. "'29 However, the fact
that Victoria has recently enacted specific legislation empowering tests to be
conducted where a custodian could have been exposed to HIV infection as a
result of an incident occurring '3° would indicate that the matter requires
specific legislative intention.
In conclusion, the analysis of the hypothetical situations raised in
this chapter reveal that there is an uncertainty with respect to the legality of
testing persons in custody for HIV. It is timely for the legislature to bring some
certainty to the law and consistently between jurisdictions. As an example of
the latter point, in Victoria, by virtue of the 1993 amendments to the Crimes
Act, if blood is subjected to an HIV test and the suspect was not informed of
the purpose to which the results of such a test might be put, then such
evidence might be regarded as unlawfully obtained. In addition, where a
refusal to consent was not followed up by a court-order then the evidence
may also be rendered inadmissible in any subsequent trial. By contrast, the
"'26 Freckleton, I.,'DNA Profiling: ForensicScience under theMicroscope' (1990) 14 Criminal
Law Journal, 23-41.
"•27 Section 464 allows police to request a person (over 17years) suspected of committing
an indictable offence which would include murder, manslaughter, sexual offence and assault,
to provide a sample of blood. Under section 464(R) there must be reasonable grounds to
believe that the taking of a sample would tend to confirm or disprove the involvement of the
suspect in the indictable offence. If a person refuses to give consent to testing, an application
can be made to a Magistrate under section 464(T) for an order to obtain a blood sample.
'28 and was outlined earlier, supra note 120.
"129 See commentary on legislation in Freckleton, supra note126.
'30 under the Health (Infectious Diseases) Act (1991). The provisions of this Act were
considered supra: 'Testing the Accused to Reassure the Victim'.
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Tasmanian HIV/AIDS Preventative Measures Act may permit blood that is
taken from an accused with consent or without consent (where a court order
is obtained) to be tested for HIV. There is no mention of the accused's
informed consent being obtained. In other jurisdictions there is no reference
to the necessity to obtain a court orders for even blood to be taken let alone a
HIV test being conducted. In fact, the statutes authorise such samples to be
taken by reasonable force. '•32 in these circumstances, the only protection left
is for the court to render the evidence inadmissible because the prejudicial
effect outweighs the probative value. This issue requires examination.
Will unlawfully or unfairly obtained evidence be admissible in court?
Even if the evidence is unlawfully or unfairly obtained in the
manner described in one of the scenarios discussed above or through a
failure to adhere to the legislative procedure for taking samples it may still be
held to be admissible evidence at the accused's trial. The English view prior
to the enactment of the Police and Criminal Evidence Act (1984) was to admit
all relevant evidence irrespective of how it has been obtained, jp Australia
where the law is based on the common law of England the courts, while not
adopting a view as liberal as England, have not been as rigid as United
States courts, which adhere to the exclusionary rule of evidence from illegal
searches. The leading precedent in Australia \s R v Ireland which
concerned a suspect who had been subjected to a medical examination while
in police custody under section 81 of the Police Offences Act (1953)(S.A.)
without being told of his right to have a doctor of his choice present. Ireland
131 Section 14(1) of the HIV/AIDS PreventativeMeasures Act (1993)(Tas.) in fact refers to
the need for pre-test counselling during which a person should be advised of the 'medical and
social consequences of being tested'. As this provision will be relevant to the HIV testing a
suspect of a sexual offence under s. 10(1), section 14(1) should be amended to read
'medical, social and legal consequences of being tested'.
132 supra note ICQ.
133 ff v Sang [1980] AC 402. Zander provides convincing evidence that the position in
England has changed markedly since the introduction of the legislation. There are many
cases where evidence has been excluded on the basis of a failure to comply with provisions
of either the Act or the Codes of Practice annexed to the Act (Zander, M., The Police and
Criminal Evidence Act 1984, 2nd ed, London, Sweet and Maxwell, 1990, at pp. 202-208).
134 MappvOhio 367US 643, at p. 656 (1961).
135 (1970) 126CLR 321.
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established a discretion in the Judge whether to admit or reject the evidence.
Berwick CJ's judgment in Ireland clearly puts the terms of this discretion.
Evidence of relevant facts or things ascertained or procured
by means of unlawful or unfair acts is not, for that reason
alone, inadmissible. This is so, in my opinion, whether the
unlawfulness derives from the common law or from statute.
But it may be that acts in breach of a statute would more
readily warrant the rejection of the evidence as a matter of
discretion: or the statute may on its proper construction itself
impliedly forbid the use of facts or things obtained or procured
in breach of its terms. On the other hand evidence of facts or
things so ascertained or procured is not necessarily to be
admitted, ignoring the unlawful or unfair quality of the acts by
which the facts sought to be evidenced were ascertained or
procured. Whenever such unlawfulness or unfairness
appears, the judge has a discretion to reject the evidence. He
must consider its exercise. In the exercise of it, the
competing public requirements must be considered and
weighed against each other. On the one hand there is the
public need to bring to conviction those who commit criminal
offences. On the other hand there is the public interest in the
protection of the individual .from unlawful and unfair treatment.
Convictions obtained by the aid of unlawful or unfair acts may
be obtained at too high a price. Hence the judicial discretion.
136
In Ireland Berwick CJ considered that section 81 imposed specific conditions
on police for making suspects submit to medical examinations. Such
provisions he thought were obviously enacted for the protection of the person
arrested. As these conditions were not observed in the case the discretion
was to be exercised by rejecting the evidence.
In the later case of Banning v Gross the High Court held that
this passage of the Chief Justice represented the law in Australia. In this
case the court had to decide whether to exclude evidence obtained in a
breathalyser test which had been administered in contravention of the
statutory requirements. It spelt out the guidelines for judicial exercise of the
discretion laid down in Ireland. The evidence was admitted on the ground
that the unlawful conduct of the patrolmen had been a mistake and not a
^36 per Barwick CJ in R v' Ireland , Ibid at p. 355 a passage quoted in Bunning v Cross
(1978) 141 CLR 54 (at p. 72) as representing the law in Australia and later held to apply to
confessional evidence in C/e/and vR (1982) 151 CLR 1.
Ibid, alp. 344.
•>38 (1978) 141 CLR 54.
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deliberate or reckless disregard of the law. From the judgment of the court it
can be seen that unfairness to the accused is not an overriding consideration
in the exercise of the discretion. It involves a weighing of the necessity of
bringing a wrongdoer to trial with the need to prevent the unlawful conduct of
those who enforce the law. The discretion will only come into operation when
the evidence is the product of unfair or unlawful conduct on behalf of those
who enforce the law. 139 The authorities on the admissibility of real evidence
procured in consequence of an illegal search tend to be in favour of its
admission. 1^0 Many of the cases were decided before Banning vCross and
hence the Ireland discretion would now need to be'Considered by a court.
The matter of unfairly or unlawfully obtained evidence could well
arise in the context where the HIV status of the accused is directly relevant to
the offence and police have sought to obtain evidence to substantiate the
charge through a blood test, without the consent of the accused. It is unclear
whether courts will be moved to exclude the evidence of HIV on the basis of
breaches in the procedures for the extraction of samples from detainees, for
example, where a court order to obtain blood was not applied for. However,
factors which mayweigh in favour of exclusion could be that the offence in
question is a minor one, and. that improper police conduct was serious (rather
than technical), intentional (rather than made in good faith i^n) and common
practice (rather than an isolated matter not calling for deterrent intervention by
the courts. i'i2 Where the legislation is unclear as to whether blood samples
may be tested for HIV, the police could rely on mistake. Unless their conduct
'involves an overt act of defiance of the will of the legislature' i'i3 then the
evidence will not be excluded. The court would have to weigh the competing
public requirements that may require that persons suspected of or suffering
from HIV in the community be identified. As concepts of fairness have little
priority in this discretion, the fact that an accused might argue it is unfair that
139 Banning vCross Ibid per Stephen and Aickin JJ, at pp. 74, 75. Their Honours judgment
has been followed in the 1990s, for example, Brain vFroude (1992) 63 A. Grim. R. 9; Foster
V R (1993) AUR 550.
140 Byrne and Heydon, supra note 55 at p. 700.
141 pqc example, cases have supported theview that where evidence isobtained by threats,
false representations, tricks or bribes that the discretion will be exercised in favour of the
defence (R VHaas[1972] NSWLR 589at p. 593; R vCarr[1972] 1 NSWLR 608 at p. 611).
142 jhese factors were referred to in the non-AIDS related case of Cleland v R supra note
136, at 16-17 and 34-35.
143 Bunning vCross, supra note 138 per Stephen andAickin JJ, at p. 78.
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his or her HIV test result is admitted into evidence may be of little relevance if
the evidence has strong probative value and the competing public policy
requirements favour its introduction.
The question that might arise is what would be the effect of
paragraph 5.2.14 of the National HIV/AIDS Strategy on the relevant court.
The Strategy has expressly set out the situations in which an accused person
should be tested. These situations include, where a person is charged with a
sexual offence where the test is requested by the victim of the alleged offence
or his or her guardian. It is suggested that an order must be obtained from the
court before police can proceed. The Strategy contains guidelines which
have no binding force. However, if police abided by this guideline there would
be no unlawfully obtained evidence. If the guideline is given statutory effect,
then in Berwick CJ's view, if the police fail to obtain a testing order, the statute
has been contravened and this would more readily warrant the rejection of the
evidence as a matter of discretion. This would not tie the hands of the
judiciary to act in A's favour because of the existence of the discretion. In
order for police and courts to act with any degree of certainty and for the
accused not to be subjected to unnecessary procedures, any future provision
relating to HIV testing in the area of criminal pre-trial processes should, like
the Victorian legislation, set out the procedure to be adopted in such cases.
3. TRIAL PROCEDURES: THE DEFENDANT AND THE VICTIM
APPLICATION FOR A SPEEDY TRIAL
There are a number of procedures that might be implemented
either at the request of the accused or the victim during the trial phase that
have specific relevance to an HIV-infected person. These include a
application a for speedy trial, an application to maintain the confidentiality of
the accused and/or the victim. There is also another feature of the trial
process that requires consideration in.the context of an HIV-infected
convicted person. The traditional goals of sentencing and their application to
an HIV-infected person warrant examination.
Delays may be experienced' in AIDSrrelated litigation because of
the nature of HIV-infection. The long incubation period and the length of the
'window period' between the time of infection and the emergence of
antibodies to the virus have the potential to delay the investigative process
being set in motion. Technically, for more serious offences there is no
limitation period within which charges should be laid. Leaving aside the
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practical problems of proof, a person could be charged with attempted murder
ten years after the period when the conduct transmitting the disease was
inflicted. It is possible that it may take as-long as ten years for the victim to
become symptomatic. The concern of HIV-infected persons being able to
withstand trial has already surfaced in one civil action in New South Wales. In
that case, the Supreme Court granted an expedited hearing on the basis that
continued delay might negate any benefit to which the HIV-infected plaintiff
may be entitled. This followed evidence from the plaintiff's doctor that his or
her patient might not be able to withstand cross-examination in due course.
144 Where the case is known to be a sensitive one and the victim may be in
a distressed or vulnerable state, the case should wherever possible be given
a fixed date for hearing.
Any delay in the commencement of criminal processes may result
in unfair trials. Witnesses' memories fade, offenders may abscond or re-
offend and relevant evidence may become lost. In the AIDS context the
situation is more perilous since either the victim or the accused could have
died. Further, the relevant evidence is likely to be testimonial and forensic
rather than documentary. Documentary evidence can still maintain its
reliability after long periods of delay but forensic and testimonial evidence
cannot.
The issue of delay in criminal proceedings was most recently
considered by the High Court in Jago v District Court 145 a non-AIDS case,
but one in which the principle to be gleaned from the decision is of relevance
to any HIV-related matter. Jago had committed offences between 1976 and
1979, was arrested in 1981, and committed for trial in 1982. But the case was
not heard until February 1987. He had not suffered any particular prejudice; in
fact, he had acquiesced in the delay. The court rejected his application for a
stay of proceedings. The issue of a right to a speedy trial was also
considered. The court decided that although a common law right to a speedy
trial had been recognised, 146 the right had not been recognised in any
Australian or English case or held to be enforceable through a stay of
144 Patterson, D., Anderson, A., Hirsch, D., 'Fast-track hearing for AIDS plaintiff (1991)
National AIDS Bulletin, 36.
145 (1989) 63ALJR 640.
145 citing iVlcHugh J. Ain Herron vMcGregor (1986) 6 NSWLR 246.
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proceedings. ^47 Further, their Honours believed that they had no common
law power to terminate proceedings on indictment.
However, their Honours did hold that courts have a general power
to prevent unfairness to the accused and that the right to receive a fair trial
was an entrenched right in the Australian legal system. It may be that the
issue of delay could be considered as a ground of unfairness in this manner.
All members of the High Court believed that a Judge could make an order
expediting the trial. The majority agreed that only in an exceptional case
should proceedings be brought to a permanent halt. Mason CJ expressed the
view that there should be a balancing process which allows for both the
interests of the accused and those of the community in bringing criminals to
justice to be taken into account. 149
The case reveals that a stay is not the only response to
unreasonable delay and any delay which undermines the accused's right to a
fair trial warrants some form of action by the judiciary. The Court also set
down the factors to be considered when deciding if the delay warrants a stay.
These include, the length of the delay, the reason for the delay, 150 the extent
of the accused's assertion of hisor her right to a speedy trial, the prejudice to
the accused and the public's interest in the outcome of the case. The court in
Jago held that the accused must be able to point to proof of actual
disadvantage, not just an inference or presumption of prejudice. Death of
witnesses has been held to be prejudicial for an accused as has the length
of pre-trial incarceration. 152
147 per Mason CJ. at p. 644. Article 14(3)(c) of the International Covenant on Civil and
Political Rights (1975) provides for the right of an accused 'to be tried without undue delay'.
Although ratified by Australia the terms of the covenant have no effect until accepted into
domestic law by a statute. Further, in the United States the Sixth amendment to the US
Constitution promises that 'in all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a
speedy and public trial.' Victoria is the one Australian State with speedy trial legislation.
Under this legislation a trial must take place within eighteen months of the accused being
directed to stand following a committal proceeding. Extensions of time can be granted
Jho^h the Crimes Act (1958)(Vic.) s. 353(2)(3), and Crimes (Procedures) Regulations
148 supra note 145, per Mason CJ, Toohey, J and Gaudron J and Deane J (if continuation
would be oppressive).
149 supra note 145, p. 642-3 and 644 respectively.
150 Normal court delays due to backlog of cases, over-use of courts would not be aground
on its own for delay. In this respect the Supreme Court of Western Australia has recently
indicated that there is no undue delay in obtaining dates for criminal trials and that priority is
given to the iisting of criminal trials where the accused is in custody. (Correspondence:
'Reasons for court delays'. West Australian, May 16 1991, p. 51.) In many instances delay
can be due to both administrative processes and the defendant.
151 Carver vAttorney General (N.S. W.) (1987) 29 A. Crim. R. 456, at p. 463.
261
In the context of an HIV-infected person, the prejudice can be
more readily shown. There are numerous studies that indicate the deleterious
effects of incarceration on the health of an HIV-infected person, ""ss a delay
prior to the commencement of the trial for an HIV-infected person could be
catastrophic for the prosecution given that any HIV-infected witnesses might
have died, isaas the delay continues there may be heightened problems of
proving that A in fact infected B in a transmission type offence charge. A
prosecution relating to HIV transmission made a long time after the
commission of the crime and allegedly for reasons of public pressure may
also be scrutinised by the court and a stay awarded. Again in the instance of
an HIV-infected person the health and fitness of the accused to stand trial
after this time period would have to be weighed against the community's
interest in seeing justice done.
The High Court has held that if the original delay was not actuated
by the bad faith of the prosecution, the psychological and sociological effects
on the accused cannot be asserted as alone warranting a stay. These factors
might only warrant other remedies, for example, an expedited trial. The High
Court has expressed the view that the level of actual prejudice must be
substantial so that'... nothing that a trial judge can do in the conduct of the
trial can relieve against its unfair consequences', Hence in the context of
an HIV-infected person health reasons alone may not be a sufficient ground
for a Stay being awarded. It has been argued by Fox that the Jago decision
is a conservative one, and that in the past a sensitivity to unfairness had been
growing, so that in many jurisdictions trials did not proceed on the grounds of
delay simpliciter.
Some statutory amendments have been introduced to public health
legislation in recognition of the fact that delays could be serious to an HIV-
152 Barker v Wingo 407 US514 (1972).
^53 These studies are considered in chapter seven, footnote 117 and text.
^54 This matter has clearly been problematic in practice in Australia, for example, the
attempted murder charge in relation to the stabbing of a prison warder at Long Bay Jail which
was dropped when the prisoner died (chapter three, footnote 114) and in Canada, see for
example, the Ssenyonga case (chapter three, footnote 139).
^55 perWilson J in Sarfon vR (1980) 147CLR 75, at p. 111.
"•56 Fox, R. G., 'Criminal Delay as Abuse of Process' (1990) 16(1) Monash University Law
Review, 64-90, at p. 89.
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infected person. This legislation in New South Wales and Victoria allows for
urgent appeals on detention orders,
THE MAINTENANCE OF PRIVACY IN THE COURTROOM
There are a number of ways in which both the accused's and the
victim's privacy, particularly in relation to his or her HIV-infected status, can be
protected within the courtroom. These will be considered.
(i) Divulging Confidential Information in Court
If the accused's HIV status is not directly relevant to establishing
his or her criminal liability then there is no reason for it to be revealed in court.
It may be that the HIV-infected status of A will be relevant to sentencing
proceedings. This issue is addressed later in this chapter. An HiV-infected
person who divulges confidential information to his or her doctor or a public
health official is not protected against such information being later revealed by
these persons in criminal proceedings. Although doctors are under a general
ethical and legal obligation not to reyeal confidential medical information ^58
they are not obliged to maintain confidences in the face of a court order '•59 or
legislation requiring disclosure. There are provisions which require doctors to
notify cases of AIDS or HIV to public health authorities. Such legislation does
not mandate disclosures in other proceedings, iso In addition, a public
interest exception has also developed,
••57 s. 122(5) Health Act (1958) (Vic.); s. 25 Public Health Act (1991)(N.S.W.).
the duty is maintained by the Hippocratic Oath contained in Australian Medical
Association, Code of Medical Ethics (1989) 6.1.1, 6.2.1 is supported by the law of contract (l/V
VEdgell [1990] 2 WLR 471 and in tort Furniss v Fitchett (1958) NZLR 396). It is also
protected by the equitable duty to maintain confidences: AG v Guardian Newspapers (No. 2)
[1988)3 WLR 776.
the Medical Defence Union lists this as a recognised exception to the duty of
confidentiality: Lilienthal, 0., 'Medical Confidentiality' (1994) 8(1) Journal of the Medical
Defence Union, 6-7.
^60 Such as compulsory notification provisions relating to disease which are discussed in
chapter five, fn 11.
This exception is discussed infra.
263
The common law does not recognise an evidentiary privilege
between doctor and patient. ^62 in Tasmania, Victoria and the Northern
Territory confidential information about an HIV-infected person may be
protected under the doctor-patient privilege principles developed by statute.
163 These privilege principles prevent persons in confidential relationships
from releasing information. The privilege is based on the premise that the
confidential relationship between these parties outweighs the litigants' and the
judicial system's needs and rights. However the legislation only protects
parties to civil proceedings in this manner. In a .1991 Western Australian Law
Reform Commission report on the privilege, no suggestion is made for it to be
extended to criminal cases. 164
Therefore, doctors may have to give evidence as requested in the
criminal court even if it results in an infected person being identified. Further,
a doctor may not rely on confidentiality as the ground for failing to report an
offence that comes to his pr her attention. In Brown v Brookes the New
South Wales Supreme Court held that it was contrary to public policy to
enforce a right of confidentiality that would impede the investigation of crime.
Hence a doctor who is taken in to the confidence of a person who admits or
the doctor reasonably believes is acting in a manner which may place the
community at risk for transmission of HIV, the doctor should disclose this
information to public health authorities at least. 166
In 1992 the issue of whether a medical witness could divulge
information that would serve to identify an HIV-infected person in court was
contested in the civil case of PQ v Australian Red Cross Society. i67 The
question turned on the scope of section 141 of the Health Services Act
(1988)(Vic.). McGarvie J held that section 141 precluded a witness from
giving any information acquired by reason of his being an employee doctor of
Duchess of Kingston's Trial (1776) 20 How St T. 573.
s. 28(2)(3)(4)(5) Evidence Act (1958)(Vic.); s. 96(2)(3) EwVence Acf (1910)(Tas.); s. 12
Evidence Act (1939)(N.T.). However, where the matter which is being heard arises out of
Commonwealth law, the privilege under State legislation cannot be relied on: Hill v Minister
for Health and Community Services (1991) 30 FOR 272.
164 WALRC, Professional Privilege for Confidential Communications, Project No. 90, Perth,
WA, December 1991.
166 unreported judgment ofSupremeCourt ofNew South Wales, August 18 1988.
166 the duty towarn which also arises in thiscontext iscovered in detail in chapterseven,
pp. 332-334.
[1992] 1 VR 19.
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a hospital, if a patient could be identified by the information. He decided that
he would not give section 141 a wide construction in order to assist with the
conduct of litigation. He said the section 'reflects an important social policy
which the legislature has adopted to preserve confidentiality', jhjs
indicates that irrespective of the absence of privilege protections other
legislation may contain safeguards against breaches of confidentiality by
health personnel. This of course will only serve to protect HIV-infected
persons in Victoria. In addition, the case did not concern a criminal
prosecution, ""ss and other public interest requirements may have overriding
roles.
Australian jurisdictions may need to consider instituting rules of
evidence that protect against confidential information that passes between
doctors and public health officials and their patients being presented in
criminal proceedings. However, the W.A. Law Reform Commission Report
states that the Commission is 'unaware of any relevant studies into the extent
to which preservation of doctor-patient confidentiality affects the willingness of
individuals to seek medical help or to provide certain personal or sensitive
information to doctors.' If that is correct, until such information is
forthcoming a privilege applied to the relationship between a doctor and his or
her patient in the context of HIV/AIDS is unlikely to be considered. In that
event, while the theory behind preventing the protection of such
communications is that privileges deprive courts of material evidence, there is
a need to consider other ways in which such evidence might be tendered
which will not result in harm ensuing to the accused, the victim and their
respective families; Different rules apply to the situation where the accused
has discussed his or her HIV infection with legal counsel in the context of the
pending case. In this situation the information is protected by legal
professional privilege which is recognised in all Australian States and
territories by virtue of the common law rule laid down in Grant v Downs
"168/(j/cf, at p. 25.
This matter arose directly for consideration under the same legislation in Royal
Melbourne Hospital v Matthews and Ors (1993) 1 VR 665. Here the court held that the
hospital had to deliver up medical records relevant to an HIV-infected person who had been
charged under the criminal provision relating to reckless endangerment under s. 22 of the
Crimes Act, pursuant to a police warrant issued in accordance with s. 465 of the Crimes Act.
The police power overrode the confidentiality protection contained in s 141.
"•70 supra note 164, at para. 5.16, at p. 70.
(1979) 135 CLR 674.
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A's lawyer may not be called to give evidence of Information pertaining to A's
Infected status If It was communicated to the lawyer for the purpose of
obtaining advice for pending or contemplated litigation. However the privilege
does not prevent the disclosure of facts: It only applies to communications.
There Is a need to consider the manner In which Information could
be brought to the attention of a judge when relevant to the proceedings,
without It being stated In open court. Handing up a medical report which refers
to the Illness rather than announcing It to a crowded court room would be
preferable. Pre-trial rules In a number of States already make provision for
certain matters to be regarded as proven prior to the proceedings to obviate
the need to present the material In court. 172 similar Issues arise when It Is
the victim who has to admit his or her HIV status. Victim Impact statements
are already part of some State court processes. 173 information regarding the
victim's confirmed HIV status could be Included In such a statement.
Arguments concerning the accuracy of material In such a report could result In
a need to cross-examine the victim. In that case the court could be closed.
Indeed, Instead of preventing a suspect, accused or witness from
revealing Information that might Identify an HIV-lnfected person to "their
detriment, judges could order that courts be closed and Issue suppression
orders. These procedures will be considered.
(II) Closed Courts
Under New South Wales Public Health legislation proceedings for
transmission offences are to be heard In the absence of the public. 174
172 Rule 11 District Criminal Court Rules (1986)(S.A) allows for a pre-trial Conference.
Under Rule 13 the matters that may be discussed at such a meeting include the estimated of
length of time of the trial and ensuring the matter will be conducted in an expeditious and fair
manner. Rule 14 sets out that parties can come to an agreement that a specified fact may
be proved in a specified manner, a specified fact may be treated as established without proof
or specified evidence may be read or a statement tendered without a witness being called
The Supreme Court Rt//es(1981 )(S.A.) has similar terms. The District Court Rules
(1973)(N.S.W.) also provide for similar matters to be discussed in pre-trial applications (r. 10).
Section 5 of the Crimes (Criminal Trials) Act (1993)(Vic.) states that 'courts may determine
certain matters about the form of giving evidence'.
173 s. 301 Criminal Law Consolidation Act (1935)(S.A.) which was repealed in 1988 and
replaced as s. 7 in the Criminal Law (Sentencing) Act(^988). This procedure is also available
in New South Wales under s. 4470 of the Crimes Act (1900).
174 s. 37 Public Health Act (1991)(N.S.W.). In AIDS-specific public health amendments in
1988 in Queensland section 48 of the Health Act Amendment Act which penalised knowing
transmission of HIV/AIDS, contained sub-section 48(3) which mandated that proceedings for
transmission offences 'shall be heard in camera'. Section 21(7) of the Tasmanian HIV/AIDS
Preventative Measures Act also requires that proceedings under the section (which deal with
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Proceedings involving the application for a public health order on grounds that
an infected person is endangering or likely to endanger the health of the
public are to be open unless an objection is made on behalf of a party to
those proceedings. jhe person appealing against the provisions of the
public health order has the onus of overturning the requirement that
proceedings be heard in public. Under section 77A of the Crimes Act
(1900)(N.S.W.), proceedings can be held in camera. This provision could be
used in an HIV-related criminal prosecution although it presently specifically
applies to certain sexual offences and child prostitution offences.
In Victoria, by comparison, the court has power to close
proceedings or restrict the audience if the social and economic consequences
are such that the disclosure of the evidence would have deleterious effects.
176 Under Victorian public health legislation protection of privacy is an
overriding concern. 177 ip 1994 the phrase social and economic
consequences was considered in relation to an HIV-infected prostitute
charged with loitering in Herald &Weekly Times v Braun and Ors . 178 jhe
Court concluded that social consequences could include the stigma that may
attach to a person if it became known that he or she is infected with HIV; the
stress or anxiety which may be caused to a person if the fact that he or she is
infected with HIV becomes known the public at large, the fact that death may
be hastened in the event that that occurs and the fact that a person infected
with HIV may be unlawfully discriminated against if it becomes public
knowledge that the or she is so infected.
In addition to powers under public health legislation, provision is
made in Evidence Acts in some jurisdictions for courts to be cleared or
closed. For example, section 69 of the South Australian Evidence Act (1929)
as amended enables a Judge to make an order clearing a court,
where ... [it is considered]... desirable in the interests of the
administration of justice or in order to prevent hardship or
embarrassment to any person. i79
orders for persons placing others at, risk for HIV transmission) 'are to be heard in a closed
court'.
175 s. 38 Public Health Act
176 s. 129(a) Health Act (1958).
177 s. 128 Hea/fh Act(1958).
178 Supreme Court of Victoria January 13 1994, No. 10350 of 1993 before Beach J at p. 10.
179 s. 69 Evidence Act (S.A.)(1929).
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Although not an HIV/AIDS specific provision, an application could be made for
court closure under the provision where a party is HIV-infected.
(iii) Suppression Orders
In the Northern Territory, New South Wales, Victoria, South
Australia, Queensland and the Australian Capital Territory, public health
legislation contains general secrecy provisions that would be applicable to
HIV-related information. isoThe New South Wales and Victorian legislation is
AIDS-specific. The value of such legislation is questionable since the
legislation places limitations on the protection where required as a matter of
public interest. Where the public interest so demands, the legislation allows
such information to be released in open courts.
Suppression orders can be irnposed under some State legislation.
Such orders can prohibit the publication of specified evidence, or of any
account or report of specified evidence, or the name of a party or witness or a
person alluded to in the course of proceedings before the court, or of any
other material tending to identify any such person, jhe question whether
prejudice and undue hardship would occur if the order were not made should
be accorded more weight. However, one provision notes that the public
interest in publication of certain information must be recognised as a
consideration of substantial weight. Section 71(a) of the Evidence Act
Amendment Act (1989)(S.A.) places restrictions upon reporting information
relating to sexual offences. Neither the identity of the accused nor the victim
should be reported until the trial.begins.
••80 s. 29 Notifiable Diseases Act s. 17 Public Health Act (1991)(N.S.W.); s.
128, 129(c) Health Act {^958){V^c.y. s. 141 Health Services Act (1988)(Vic.); s. 49(1) Health
Act Amendment Act (1988)(Qld.); Public and Environmental Health Act (1987)(S.A.); s. 56
Health Services Act (1990)(A.C.T); s. 19 HIV/AIDS Preventative Measures Act (1993)(Jas.).
Limits on protection are specified in the A.C.T., S.A., and Tas. under these same provisions
and in N.S.W under s. 17 Public Health Act (1991); under s. 48(4) Health Act Amendment
Ac/(1988) (Qld.).
s. 68(b)-69(a) Evidence Act Amendment Act (1989) (S.A). Under s. 35 of the Public
Health Act (1991)(N.S.W.) the court may make a 'no publication' order either of its own
volition or upon application by either party to the proceedings. It is an offence to breach a 'no
publication' order. Section 129(c) of the Health Act (1958)(Vic.) allows the court to make a
suppression order during proceedings concerning HIV-infected persons. Section 21(8) of the
Tasmanian HIV/AIDS Preventative Measures Act (1993) contains a complete restriction on
publishing details of an order heard under Division 3 of the Act relating to transmission of
HIV. The New South Wales, Victorian and Tasmanian provisions are HIV-specific.
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The issue of suppressing confidential information concerning
persons suffering from communicable diseases has come before the courts.
In two Western Australian cases an injunction has been granted to prevent
the release of information by news organisations that may serve to identify
persons infected with communicable diseases. In X v Sattler and Others
Kennedy J relied on the law of defamation to protect the identity of the person
with HIV from media publicity. It is important to note, however, that the
defendants did not plead either the defence of justification (truth) or qualified
privilege (need to know). If the defence of truth had been pleaded there would
have been very little an HIV-infected person could have been done to prevent
publication of his or her infected status. His Honour in Sattler indicated that
had the defendants' done so then a clash of competing interests would have
been inevitable and precedent would have favoured the refusal of the
injunction.
Defamation law currently varies between States particularly with
respect to the defences available to the media. jhjs has prompted calls
for unification of all Australian defamation legislation. Discussion Papers
released on defamation by three States, Queensland, New South Wales and
Victoria, have proposed that the defence of truth in defamation would not be
available where the material published related to the health, private
behaviour, home life or personal or family relationships of a person. There are
proposed exceptions where the public interest or personal safety of an
individual so demanded.
In contrast to Sattler, in the Western Australian case of V v TVW
Enterprises Wallwork J relied on the law of confidentiality in granting the
injunction preventing the publication of the identity of a Hepatitis B infected
health care worker. Wallwork J referred to the judgment of Rose J in the
English case ot X v Y and Others "i®® which concerned HIV-infected health
unreported judgment Supreme Court of WA, 1783 /1989.
•I®® For example, the truth alone of an imputation is a defence in Victoria, South Australia,
Western Australia and the Northern Territory. However, truth is a defence only if the
publication is for the public benefit in Queensland (s. 376 Criminal Code), Tasmania (s. 15
Defamation Act (1957)), or if in the'public interest' in New South Wales and the Australian
Capital Territory (s. 356 Defamation Act (1901)(N.S.W.) which still applies in the ACT).
184 Privacy move in Eastern States' (1991) 2(4)National HIV/AIDS Legal Link Newsletter,
4.
unreported judgment Supreme Court of WA, 1039/1990.
^86 (1988) 2 All ER 648 per Rose J, at p. 660-661.
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workers. \n X v Y the defendant argued that there was a public Interest In
knowing about persons suffering from HIV Infection. The court granted an
Injunction to prevent publication of the names of two HIV-lnfected doctors
practising In a hospital. Rose J held that the public Interest In respecting a
person's confidentiality outweighed the freedom of the press to make the
Identities of the two doctors known. Wallwork J In TVW also held that the
public Interest In the freedom of the press to Identify HIV/AIDS sufferers was
outweighed by other circumstances of the case. He cited with approval a
passage from the judgment of Rose J in X v V:
If the confidentiality of people with HIV/AIDS Is breached,
"patients will be reluctant to come forward and to continue
with treatment and In particular with counselling. If the
actual or apprehended breach Is to the press, that
reluctance is likely to be very great. If treatment Is not
provided or continued, the Individual will be deprived of Its
benefit and the public are likely to suffer from an Increase
In the rate of the spread of the disease. The preservation
of confidentiality Is therefore In the public Interest."
Both these cases Illustrate first that the media and not only the
medical profession have a duty to protect confidences because of the nature
of the communications Involved. Second, It Is clear that the law recognises a
public Interest In the protection of confidences. Third, there Is an exception to
confidentiality where disclosure Is required In the public Interest or for the
safety of the public but, fourth, the very width of such a expression upon
which minds may differ requires a court to balance carefully the competing
public Interests which support adherence to the confidence and exceptional
permission to breach It. Certainly the public interest In the publication of
certain Information must be recognised as a consideration of substantial
weight.
The decision \r\ XvY Is difficult to reconcile with the later decision
of the Court of Appeal m Wv Edgell. i®® Here the court held that a doctor
had not breached the confidence of a mental health patient by disclosing
contents of a report prepared at the patients request (which recommended
that he receive further treatment) for use In a transfer application (a transfer
from a hospital to a regional secure unit) to the hospital authorities. This was
supra note 183, perWallwork J citing from p. 656 of tfie judgment of Rose J\n XvY (at
p. 4).
^®® supra note 156.
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despite the fact that the solicitors for the patient had withdrawn the transfer
application. The Judge believed that the balancing test to be performed here
was to strike a balance between first, the public interest in maintaining
professional confidences and second, the public interest in protecting the
public against possible violence. He believed that the latter outweighed
the former.
However, it is difficult to understand why the Judge came to this
decision when there was no way the defendant was likely to be released
given that the transfer application had been withdrawn. The material
contained in this report if it was to be provided at all could have been made
available to authorities at a later date should the patient have made another
application. Alternatively, if the original material was accurate and still
applicable at a later date, no doubt a subsequent doctor would make the
same assessment. Rather than permit this breach of confidence the court
should have prevented it. By comparing this decision \o X v Y it can be
argued that maintaining the confidentiality of doctors with HIV infection is
seen as more worthy of protection in the public interest than maintaining the
confidentiality of a mental health patient. This decision arguably places an
HlV-infected person who has been charged with a transmission offence and
seeks to suppress his or her identity, in a precarious position in England.
In Australia, although courts will protect the identity of HlV-infected
plaintiffs in civil cases jt has been held that there is no authority to
Suppress the name of the defendant, 'i®'' In criminal matters pertaining to HIV
the court has taken a similar stance following conviction. For example, in
189 Ibid, at p. 852.
1®° TKVAustralian Red Cross Society (1985) 1 NSWLR ^: PO v Australian Red Cross
Society [1992] 1 VR 875; and Re a Proposed Proceeding Between TC as Plaintiff and
Australian Red Cross Society unreported judgment of the Victorian Supreme Court, August
4 1989 per Young J, where the plaintiffs were allowed to be referred to by pseudonyms.
1®1 In DMand DT unreported judgment of the NewSouth Wales Supreme Court February
4 1994, Cole J refused to suppress the defendant's identity (here the defendant was doctor
in a case regarding medicallyacquired AIDS). The parties finally agreed to settle out of court.
One may speculate that the refusal of the judge to protect the doctor's identity led to him
settle out of court.
1®2 During the trial, however, it has held that while there is no common law judicial power to
make an order forbidding publication by the media of the names of witnesses and other
material which would serve to identify them, courts have a power to order that witnesses at a
trial should be addressed and referred to in pseudonyms (per Hunt J in Sawas, Stevens
Peisley [1989] 40 A. Crim. R. 331, at p. 334 and 336). Again the court would have to weigh
the public interest in the freedom of the press against the public interest in due administration
of justice and the right of an accused person to a fair trial.
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Herald & Weekly Times Limited v Braun & Ors a suppression order
preventing publication of a male transvestite prostitute (SS) was lifted at the
conclusion of the trial upon application by the newspaper. SS had been
charged and found guilty of loitering with intent to engage in prostitution. The
defendant was infected with HIV and had continued to work as a prostitute
and share needles with other intravenous drug users despite the possibility
that he could infect others. Two Magistrates initially ordered that the identity
of SS be suppressed during the trial on the grounds that if his identity was
known it would lead to a deterioration in his condition and hasten his death. It
was suppressed under section 129 of the Health Act (1958). However,
section 119(e) of the Act only allows an HIV-infected person's rights to be
protected if those rights do not infringe on the well-being of others. This
section requires people infected with HIV to behave responsibly and not pass
the virus on to others. The question for the Supreme Court on appeal was
whether section 119 was paramount over section 129. The court held that as
88 was still likely to practise unsafe sex and share needles, he had forfeited
his right to privacy and could not avail himself of the protection of the Act.
Hence it was not his status per se but the manner in which he was
behaving that was relevant. Courts will be justified In lifting suppression
orders if is done to protect others from the risk of becoming infected. This
case can be regarded as a backward step for encouraging persons infected
with HIV to come forward and declaring their status in court for the purpose of
mitigating sentence. The Magistrate in this case in sentencing 88 had
imposed the requirement that he^abide by the directions of a doctor and not
enter a particular suburb of Melbourne. It rtiight have been apt to impose
treatment for drug rehabilitation on 88 as well. In light of these orders and
the fact that public health authorities could have monitored the defendant, it
was counterproductive and unnecessary to reveal the identity of this person to
the world at large through the media. In the present writers view if the
activities of this person were to pose a risk to the community at large then a
more incapacitating sentence should have meted out initially or the sentence
should have been appealed by the Crown. Allowing a person to be
harangued by the media is not a 'sentence' that is known to the law. Finally,
the decision allows the media to single out sex workers and prostitutes as a
193 Supreme Court of Victoria January 13 1994, No. 10350 of 1993 before Beacfi J.
Ibid, per Beach J at p. 14. Under the HIV/AIDS Preventative Measures Act {^993)(Jas.)
there is a complete prohibition on publication of any details relating to an s. 21 order imposed
on a person placing others at risk of transmission (s. 21(8)).
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group that is high-risk for transmission of HIV. It was stated in chapter two of
this thesis that this view is not supported by evidence.
SENTENCING AN HIV-INFECTED PERSON
The sentencing component of a criminal trial is of special
significance to an HIV-infected person who may if receiving a sentence of
imprisonment spend the remainder of his or life (shortened through
progression to AIDS) in prison. Before analysing the sentences that have
been meted out to HIV-infected persons for criminal activity it is essential to
examine the goals of sentencing. This will assist in deciding whether one can
justify the imposition of penalties where HIV-related activity or an HIV-infected
person is involved.
(i) General Sentencing Theory
Behind the process of sentencing are two main criteria. The first is
that the punishment must be linked to the crime, and the second is that the
punishment be just and of appropriate severity. Hence, it is generally
accepted that detention must not be arbitrary but appropriately applied in the
individual case; imposed humanely and not for merely punitive reasons; and,
must not defy accepted community standards or just sentencing principles.
There are other stated goals or objectives of sentencing which
underlie particular sentences. In chapter two it was noted that some writers
believe that the aims of the criminal law are general deterrence, retribution,
incapacitation and rehabilitation. It is more likely that they are the goals
behind sentencing. There are no statutory rules in relation to the priority
which should be accorded to the various purposes or goals of punishment. 196
195 wjikie, M., 'Crime (Serious and RepeatOffenders) Sentencing Act 1992:A Human Rights
Perspective' (1992) 22 University of Western Australia Law Review, 187-196.
196 Under s. 5 of the Senfenc/ngf Act(1991 )(Vic.) sentences mayonly be imposed:
'(a) to punish the offender to an extent and in a manner which is just in all the
circumstances; or
(b) to deter the offender or other persons from committing offences of the same or a
similar character; or
(c) to establish conditions within which it is considered by the court that rehabilitation
of the offender may be facilitated; or
(d) to manifest the denunciation by the court of the type of conduct in which the
offender engaged; or
(e) to protect the community form the offender; or
(f) a combination of two or more of those purposes'.
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However, many academics support the view that proportionality has emerged
as the guiding principle in sentencing for the 1990s.
It is thought that respect for the system of criminal justice is
maintained by. consistency in punishment across particular crimes and
offenders. In fact, the breadth of sentencing discretion tends to undermine
the principles of consistency and certainty, principles which are central to
criminal law. The sentencing process is one area where Judges have more
overtly acknowledged discretion than in many other respects of their formal
functions. As such. Judges have not only a substantial power to manipulate
public opinion but also an outlet for imposing their views and possibly their
unstated social prejudices about an accused's and the victim's conduct, In
sentencing decisions in those States where there are now sentencing statutes
there is still room for the exercise of discretion, in particular, the emphasis that
a particular Judge may place on the goals of sentencing. The goals require
examination in the context of sentencing an HIV-infected person.
General Deterrence
General deterrence relies on the infliction of punishment to inhibit
wrongful behaviour. The rationality behind deterrence is that people will
generally guide their behaviour by weighing the benefits and costs to be
derived from pursuing a course of action. The key to deterrence is. to instil
so great a fear of punishment in relation to breaking the law that potential
criminals will be deterred. However, deterrence ought not be thought of as
the overriding rationale of the criminal law, for many crimes cannot be
deterred. Some people will still commit crime out of dire need or because
they have no fear of sanction. The latter could occur where they are already
on a death sentence, for example, if dying from a terminal disease like AIDS.
The Victorian legislature does not seek to prioritise one purpose over another.
Von Hirsch, A., 'Proportionality in punishment' Tonry, M., and Morris, N., (1992) 16
Crime and Justice, 55-98. Ashworth, A., Principles of Sentencing, Oxford, Clarendon Press,
1992. A view also held by the judiciary: R v Knight (1988) VR 705; and at the High Court
level: Veen v The Queen [No. 2} (1988 )164 CLR 465 at p. 472 per Mason CJ, Brennan,
Dawson, Toohey JJ.
198 Wilson, B., and Carter, M., 'Rape, GoodWomen, Badwomen and Judges' (1992) 17(1)
Alternative Law Journal 6-9; Cass, D., 'Hakopian - Case and Comment' (1992) 16 Criminal
Law Journal, 200-204.
199 Levine, J. P., Musheno, M. C., Palumbo, D. J., Criminal Justice : a public policy
approach. New York, Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, 1980, at p. 355.
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Levine et al , state that for deterrence to work and crime to be
reduced, five conditions must be present. First, the threats must be
adequately communicated to the group. Many people are unaware of the
penalties for crime. Second, there must be a high degree of certainty that the
crime attempted to be committed will be punished. The third criterion is that
punishment must be sufficiently severe to invoke fear. Fourth, the criminal
population must have a rational aversion to legal threats that makes them
responsive to deterrence attempts. The final requirement is that the
punishment be administered swiftly. 200
There are practical problems to ensuring the viability of deterrence
as a rationale behind sentencing in the criminal process. These include
political unfeasibility, difficulties with implementation, economic costs and the
possible injustice in inflicting punishments that are too great and that may
lead to a loss of respect for the law. In order to be effective, deterrents must
often exceed the limits of what is morally acceptable and, since retributive and
humanitarian limits are often imposed on penalties, they may not be
deterrents. Walker states that the doubt behind deterrents actually deterring
was exemplified by the death penalty, which had no real effect on murder
rates in a number of jurisdictions studied. 201 The Australian Law Reform
Commission in its Report on Sentencing has endorsed this doubt by
rejecting general deterrence as a goal of sentencing and as a reason for
imprisonment as a sanction. 202
Although it has already been stated that the effectiveness of
deterrence in the situation where a person is already on a death sentence
from AIDS is questionable, it may be the most important goal of the criminal
law in the context of a disease epidemic. Perhaps the threat of the criminal
sanction and imprisonment will prevent some people from taking
unreasonable risks that may transmit the virus. In most cases, though,
conduct that spreads the disease will be spontaneous, driven by passion or
anguish and without motive or pre-thought, and hence undeterrable. As has
been argued consistently throughout this thesis, the law has to be careful in
the AIDS context not to be seen to impose purely symbolic statutory offences
200 Levine, Ibid at p. 358-373.
201 Walker, N., Punishment, Danger andStigma: The Morality ofCriminal Justice , Oxford,
Basil Blackwell, 1980, at p. 66-67.
Australian La\w Reform Commission, Sentencing, Report No. 44,Canberra, Australian
Government Publishing Service, 1988, para. 37, at p. 18.
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in the name of deterrence, which cannot be implemented. Such legislation
might impede educational efforts to curb the spread of HIV.
Retribution
This theory behind the criminal penalty is based on the premise
that the justification for inflicting a penalty is that the offender deserves it
because of his or her offence. Walker states that the pure retributivist
believes that the severity of the penalty should match the offender's culpability
and the limiting retributivist believes it should be only the minimum necessary
to achieve other aims such as deterrence. 203
However, if pure retributivism was followed in the punishment of an
HIV-infected person, it may be argued that he or she would in effect be
punished twice as the disease is not curable. However, disease has not been
regarded as punishment that can be aligned with other forms of punishment
that the law currently recognises. The principle of 'double punishment' is
generally raised where a sentencing court considers past offences when
sentencing current offences. It is true, as will be detailed, that courts are
taking into account the fact that HIV-infected persons have a short time to live
but this has been generally used to reduce penalties not increase them. 204 it
is doubtful that there would be support for retribution unless a person
intentionally used HIV as a weapon to kill others (which may be hard to prove
in the absence of an admission of guilt from the offender).
Incapacitation
Incapacitation can be defined as the right or duty of society to
incarcerate a dangerous individual to prevent him or her from doing harm, at
least while he or she is deprived of liberty. It is understandable that many
people may support the incapacitation of a person who engages in dangerous
behaviour until the danger has passed. However it is a preventative sentence
rather than one based on the crime being committed. The Australian Law
Reform Commission (ALRC) has argued against the elevation of this goal of
sentencing, as it conflicts with the aim that the punishment of the offender
203 Walker, supra note 201, at p. 25-26.
In Australia, see for example the cases oi R v 6a;7ey (N.S.W. CCA) 3.6.88, R v Smith
(1987) 44 SASR 587 and Linou v Hayes (1988) 47 SASR 172.
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should be linked to the crime. 205 jhjs principle has been accorded judicial
recognition in Chester y R 206 where the Full Court of the High Court held,
that 'the common law does not sanction preventative detention. The
fundamental principle of proportionality does not permit the increase of a
sentence of imprisonment beyond what is proportional to the crime merely for
the purpose of extending the protection of society from the recidivism of the
offender.'207
To incapacitate an HIV-infected person on the ground that he or
she may engage in criminal conduct that will spread the virus may involve a
lifelong incapacity given that there is no cure for AIDS. The incapacitation of
one person will not remove the disease from the community while cases
continue to increase. In addition, removing an HIV-infected person to a place
of isolation such.as a prison may only serve to set up a new group of potential
infectees, the healthy prison population. The presence of homosexuality,
rape, assault and drug use in prisons render it probable that the virus will be
transmitted in that setting. 208
Rehabilitation
Often incapacitation and rehabilitation are combined as rationales
behind penalties. Violent offenders need both incapacitation and
rehabilitation. Rehabilitation is defined as the 'restoration of a criminal to a
state of physical, mental, and moral health through treatment and training.' 209
The fact that the only treatment to be offered to an HIV-infected person is
counselling and care, given that a cure is absent, renders rehabilitation as a
rationale behind the introduction of the criminal law for HIV transmission
questionable. There are in fact some limitations on rehabilitation. Persons
who commit crime out of dire need may continue to do so for the same
reason. Treatment will have no effect on those criminals; only socially and
mentally defective persons have the potential for cure.
Imprisonment has been largely discredited as a means for
ALRC, supra note 202, para. 37, at p. 18.
206(1988) 165CLR611.
207 to/d, atp. 619.
These studies are discussed in chapter seven, pp. 297 - 300.
209 Levine , supra note 199, at p. 402.
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attaining this goal, 210 although rehabilitation itself as a means of reducing
crime should be encouraged. However, punishment should not be meted out
for reasons of rehabilitation but because the offender has broken the law.
(ii) Summary
These four rationales behind the sentencing process when viewed
separately would not appear to justify the introduction of the criminal sanction
such as imprisonment to penalise the transmission of HIV. However, by
incapacitating the HIV-lnfected person and providing rehabilitative care, such
as counselling and medical treatment for opportunistic infections, and drug
rehabilitation where relevant 211, he or she is prevented from engaging in
further dangerous conduct. At the same time, other HIV-infected persons in
the community may be deterred from engaging in conduct that would spread
the virus, and the rest of the community may be protected against infection.
Despite previous failures the Law Reform Commission has argued
that these goals should be aimed at 'where it is possible to achieve them
within the context of a just punishment'. 212 Further, the Report recommends
that imprisonment be the sanction applied only in the most serious of crimes
213 and that it should be viewed as a sanction of last resort. 214 jhis has been
followed in some non-AIDS related case law to date 215 and been statutorily
enacted in some jurisdictions. 216 jhe present writer believes that the
sentencing an HIV-infected person to imprisonment should be viewed in this
light. Court should consider alternatives to custody when dealing with HIV-
infected accused persons.
aLRC, supra note 202, para. 50, at p. 26.
211 where offered although the Australian Law Reform Commission says it is not offered
often. Ibid, para. 50, at p. 26.
212 iijj(j para. 48, at p. 24.
213 Ibid, para. 52, at p. 26.
214 Ibid, para. 55, at p. 28, a view endorsed byThe Report of the Royal Commission into
NSW Prisons, 1978, (the Nagle Report), Victorian Sentencing Committee Report,
Sentencing, 1988. -
213 for example, Duncan vR(1983) 47ALR 746.
213 Followed in s. 11 of Criminal Law (Sentencing) Act (^988){S.A.) but not in New South
Wales (Sentencing Act (1989)). In fact that legislation shows an increasing use of prison as a
punishment.
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The Commission's Report recommends generally that alternative-
to-custody sanctions such as bonds, conditional discharges and community
based corrections be available, especially given the negative aspects of
prison such as drug use and sexual assault. 217 a recent history of
sentencing theory and, to some extent, practice illustrates that there is a
tendency of moving away from imprisonment towards other community based
sanctions.
At the legislative level also, and following the spirit of the Report,
legislation has been passed focusing on the sentencing of fine defaulters who
have, and continue to. make up a sizeable percentage of Australian prisoners.
The Magistrates Court (Amendment) Ordinance (1989)(A.C.T.) specifies that
courts are no longer able to impose custodial sentences for non-payment of
parking fines. There is no sound reason for incarcerating such persons and
all it really does is provide a pool of persons who may be subjected to or who
may initiate homosexual activities in the prison that may result in transmission
of HIV. 218
However, this can be contrasted to the position in Queensland
where legislative amendments to the Drugs Misuse Act in 1986 have
operated to impose mandatory life sentences for possession of a First
Schedule drug (includes heroin, cocaine) greater than that specified in the
Fourth Schedule (heroin and cocaine over 200g). If a person is unable to
show that he or she is a drug dependent person then the sentence is
mandatory life. 219 The legislation clearly disregards the terms of the National
HIV/AIDS Strategy which suggests that persons convicted of minor drug use
offences 'should wherever practicable, receive non-custodial sentences
including orders for treatment, rehabilitation and counselling.' 220
Legislation has been passed adopting home detention and periodic
detention measures in some States and Territories. 221 Again these are
217 supra note 202, para. 57, at p. 29.
218 the potentialfor this conduct to take place in prisons is discussed in chapter seven, pp.
297-300.
219 s. 9(b)(ii)).
220 para. 5.7.14. There was a similar move to this kind of legislation inNew SouthWales in
1989. The Fine Enforcement Legislation (Ameridment) Bill (989) would have imposed
imprisonment on persons who defaulted on fine payments for prostitution offences
eradicating the former community services order penalty was rejected by the Upper House
during the final reading and has not been re-introduced by the Government.
221 Home detention has been available since 1986 in the Northern Territory as an alternative
to drunkdrivers receiving custodial sentences under s. 19A of the Criminal Law(Conditional
Release of Offenders)Act (1978)(N.T.), in Queensland generally under s. 86, Corrective
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measures that were considered prior to the advent of HIV infection but are of
special significance in the case of an individual convicted of an offence and
suffering from HIV or AIDS. In the latter case at least, home detention would
be appropriate but it should not resemble quarantine for an HIV-infected
person. Such detention has been used in the United States to keep HIV-
infected persons out of jail. 222 jhe advantages of home detention, are that it
is cost-effective and reduces the detrimental psychological effects of prison.
One instance of home detention had an unsuccessful result in Western
Australia when applied as a condition of bail in 1988. 223 Against this
background it remains to be analysed how courts have dealt with HIV-infected
persons and HIV-related behaviour in the sentencing process.
(iii) Case-Law Examples of Sentencing HIV-infected Persons
A number of factors will be taken into account when a court
imposes a sentence. In general courts will advert to aspects of the offence
and facts about the offender. They include prior convictions, the health of the
accused, the nature of the crime, whether or not A pleaded guilty and the
effect of the offence on the victim. Some of these factors have been laid down
by statute and others flow through from decisions in reported cases. They are
divided into two categories, mitigating and aggravating factors.
Mitigating factors have included provocation, youth or old age,
entrapment, personal circumstances such as ill health, hardship to the
offender, effect of intoxicants, previous good character, remorse, assisting law
enforcement agencies and seeking treatment voluntarily. 224 Circumstances
of aggravation have included whether the offence was pre-meditated, the use
of a weapon, harm to the victim, and knowledge that the victim is from a
vulnerable group (for example, a child, elderly or incapacitated mentally or
physically). 225
Services Act (1988) and South Australia from 1987 under s. 37, Correctional Services Act
(1982)(S.A.). Periodic Detention is available in New South Wales for sentences of less than
three months and offences against the Summary Offences Act (1988)(N.S.W.) as set out in s.
5A Periodic Detention of Prisoners (Amendment) Act (1992).
222 George, A., 'Home detention, the privatisation of corrections'. Legal Service Bulletin,
October 1988, 211-2-13.
223 See earlier in this chapter, supra notes 33-35.
224 Fox, R., and Freiberg, A., Sentencing: State and Federal Law in Victoria, Melbourne,
Oxford University Press, 1985, at para. 11.401-11.603. ^
225 Fox and Freiberg, Ibid, para. 11.301-11.314.
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Although the Australian Law Reform Commission report was
released in 1988 It makes no specific recommendation in relation to the health
of offenders or what factors are to be considered mitigating or aggravating in
sentencing an HIV-infected person. Therefore, current judicial officers must
rely on existing precedent or follow the legislative provisions. Sentencing
HIV-infected persons^ presents two problems. One issue is whether
diminished life expectancy should be a mitigating sentencing factor. The other
is the need for courts to consider whether intentional transfer of HIV is an
aggravating factor in a prosecution for. the underlying offence. All the
precedents have concerned a sentence of imprisonment. As such, there
have been few non-custodial sentences reported 226 and no judicial
pronouncements on whether non-custodial options should be a preferred
sentence meted out to an HIV-infected convicted person.
HIV-Infection as a Mitigating Factor
In general, where a prisoner's HIV-infected health status is
regarded as likely to impose a great burden on his or her health then this has
operated as a 'mitigating' factor and the original sentence has been reduced
(where appealed) or a.sentence at the lower end of the general range has
been imposed. The first reported precedent in this regard was R v Smith 227
which was followed in a number of other cases. 228 ip some cases it has
reduced a non-parole period from five years to fifteen months 229_ four years
to two years 230 and three years to nine months.231 Smith did not involve a
transmission related offence. The court noted that health as a factor in
226 There is one unreported judgmentfrom South Australia dated 27 November 1992 where
a defendant convicted of possession of heroin received a suspended sentence from
Millhouse J on grounds which included the fact that her husband was dying of AIDS, that the
accused had no prior convictions, that she was the breadwinner and had sole responsibility to
care for her children. It is unclear whether the AIDS status of the husband was a major factor
in awarding the suspension of the sentence or just one of a number of considerations.
227 supra note 204.
228 iinou vHayes supra note 204, R vMcDonald (1988) 38 A. Crim. R. 470, R vHarris
unreported judgment of the South Australian Supreme Court October 27 1990.
229 Harris, Ibid.
230 Linou vHayes supra note 204.
231 Smith , supra note 204.
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reducing sentence must be treated with caution. King CJ expressed the view
of the court;
III health cannot be allowed to become a licence to commit
crime, nor can offenders generally expect to escape
punishment because of the condition of their health. It is
the responsibility of the Correctional Services authorities to
provide appropriate care and treatment for sick prisoners.
Generally speaking ill health will be a factor tending to
mitigate punishment only when it appears that
imprisonment will be a greater burden on the offender by
reason of his state of health or when there is a serious risk
of imprisonment having a gravely adverse effect on the
offender's health. 232
From this judgment it is apparent that information put in evidence
by A's counsel pertaining to categories of infection and the rate of progression
through the various stages of HIV infection was instrumental to the decision.
In Bailey v DPP^^^, Lee J held that in consideration of all the facts
there was no ground for a reduction in sentence of the non-parole period. The
fact that Long Bay Jail had the Malabar Assessment Unit at the time, which
specifically housed HIV-infected prisoners, may have been important to the
judgment as His Honour.believed that prison authorities had attempted to
make HIV-infected prisoners as comfortable as possible. This point was later
disputed and recognised as a ground for reduction of the sentence and non-
parole period in f? v McDonald. 234 a similar view to that expressed in Bailey
as to the weight to be attached to HIV-infection was stated in R v Donald
235where the court held that the fact the appellant was HIV-infected was not
evidence that imprisonment would bear more heavily upon him 'until and
unless AIDS disease progresses'
In 1993 \n R VDowlett,^^^ the New South Wales Court of Criminal
Appeal confirmed that it is the T-cell ('CD4') level counts that is important in
an individual and not whether he or she could be categorised as either HIVi
232 supra note 204, at p. 598 per King CJ. The Victorian Court of Criminal Appeal in Eliasen
vR (1990) 53 A. Crim. R. 391 at 396 affirmed this principle.
233 (1938) 78 ALR 116(HC) and later returned to the NSW SC (1988) 35 A. Crim. R. 458at
p. 463 per Lee J.
234supra note 228, perRoden J, at p. 470.
235 unreported judgment South Australian Court of Criminal Appeal, July 171989.
236 unreported judgment of the New SouthWales Court ofCriminal Appeal, July 6 1993.
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infected or suffering from AIDS. Although they could have done and should
have, the court in Dowlett did not confirm that it is erroneous to consider that
a person is not suffering hardship because he or she is yet to develop an
AIDS defining condition.
By contrast, the risk of A contracting HIV in prison, given that she
was an IV drug user, was considered a relevant factor in rejecting an appeal
from the DPP against leniency of sentence in Bayliss. 237 However, the
respondent only had three weeks left to serve and was undergoing a
successful rehabilitation programme. In an instructive judgment, Roden J
held:
If there is firm evidence that imprisonment of heroin addicts
significantly increases the risk that they will contract AIDS
(with the consequent potential of great spread of the
disease through the general community) then the courts
and the community must look to the need to design criminal
sanctions, and to manage places of detention, in such a
manner as to minimise the risk and to avoid placing persons
who are in a high risk category in an even more dangerous
environment. ... if the problem is not addressed and
remedied, sentencing courts will be confronted by a
dilemma, which I venture to suggest many judges and
magistrates, will find presents a crisis of conscience, with
possible conflict between their duty and their humanity. 238
In 1993, in the case of R v Jones 239 the New South Wales court
firmly asserted that where the offences that are corrimitted by the defendant
are very serious in nature (here they were multiple sexual assaults committed
while on parole for similar offences) then a prisoner will be disentitled to the
'health factor' discount. Further, the court took the view that it is for the
Executive to grant early release not the judiciary. Such a view is firmly
endorsed by statute in that State. 240 a similar view was also stated in a 1992
237 unreported judgment of the New SouthWales Court of Criminal Appeal, November 3
1988.
238 per Roden J at p. 5.
239 unreported judgment of New South Wales Court ofCriminal Appeal, 15 December 1993,
reported in Anon, 'HIV Sentencing Goes Off the Rails' (1994) 5(1) National HIV/AIDS Legal
Link Newsletter, 10.
240 Royal Prerogative ofmercyand s. 25A SentencingAct {^989)(,NS\N)
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English case. 241 These cases reveal that the judiciary are placing checks on
their sentencing discretion and in the instance of HIV/AIDS could be said to
be engaged in a 'passing the buck' exercise. This is arguably evidenced by
the failure of the High Court to deal at all with the reasons why they denied
special leave to appeal to Jones in his 1994 application apart from stating 'in
the very special circumstances of this case, special leave is refused'. 242 it is
argued by Buchanan that the court was reluctant to entertain the application
because the nature of the offences were such that little could be done to
adjust the sentence in proportion to his remaining life. 243 Further, it is thought
that this case more than any other encountered under the spectre of
HIV/AIDS thus far, raised thorny questions about 'preventative custody' an
area that the High Court would have been reluctant to re-visit, especially in
the AIDS context. 244 Hence later courts may not be disposed to hold that
antibody status will necessarily result in a burden to A in the prison setting, a
burden which guarantees early release. In the final analysis, these cases
accord with the view of Perry J in Linou v Hayes where he stated that a hard
and fast rule should not be laid down wifh respect to the effect of HIV-infection
on sentencing and that each case should be considered on its own merits. 245
HIV-lnfection as an Aggravating Factor
In F? V Wright 246hiv was regarded as an aggravating factor. A
had, committed a number of sexual offences on young males whom he had
2'*'' R VStark[1992] Crim LR 384 on appeal to the House of Lords. In thiscase the accused
had developed AIDS and his life expectancy was estimated at between 12 months and 2
years. The court believed that it was not its province to manipulate a perfectly appropriate
sentence because the conditions in prisons made life particularly hard for the appellant.
The House of Lords decision can be compared to that in Moore (1990) 12 Cr App R 384
where the court took a different view. It is also significant that in Stark, the indictment had
been allowed to lie in court because of the accused's condition. When he was subsequently
arrested for possession of heroin again, the prior charge was activated. Although it is not
clear from the judgment, one could speculate that the court believed that the accused had
already been in receipt of lenient treatment prior to the trial.
242per Ivlason CJ, Deane and Toohey JJ.
243 Buchanan, D., 'High Court rejects sentencing appeal' (1994) 5(2) HIV/AIDS Legal Link
Newsletter, 12-13.
244 ii3j(j at p. 13. This matter was considered by the High Court in the non-AIDS related
case of R VChester supra note 206.
245 supranote 204, per Perry J, at p. 176.
unreported Tas SC September 27 1990.
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befriended. In passing sentence Cox J took Into consideration the fact that A
knew he had HIV at the time the offences were committed. His
Irresponsibility In not protecting his victims from Infection was viewed by the
Judge as an Important factor. 247
The decision has been criticised. 248 jhe first ground Is that the
decision contradicts the principle handed down In the High Court case of f? v
Simoni. 249 in Simoni, the High Court held that a person may only be
sentenced for the offence for which he or she was convicted. Hence
aggravating features should be part of the charge and cannot be taken Into
account In sentencing If such factors would have warranted a more serious
offence In the first place. Hence A should have been charged with aggravated
sexual assault, the HIV Infection being the circumstance of aggravation. A
could have appealed against his sentence on this ground.
The second criticism Is that the judgment Illustrates the Ignorance
that can be held by judges In relation to HIV Infection. In passing sentence
Cox J noted that oral sex was a 'risky' practice. However, there Is no
reported case where HIV has been transmitted by saliva or semen swallowed
through oral sex. Perhaps defence counsel did not place all the necessary
medical evidence before the court. In other cases such evidence has been
available. His Honour also made reference to haemophilia as an Innocent
mode of acquiring HIV. Use of such terms as 'Innocent' and 'guilty' with
respect to the modes of transmission of HIV have no place In the sentencing
process. The Australian Law Reform Commission In Its report on Sentencing
advocated that Judges receive ongoing legal training on sentencing practice.
250 Following Wright, one can add to that the requirement that some formal
AIDS education Is also necessary.
The final criticism Is that the judge stated that the possibility of
deterioration In A's physical condition was not an appropriate consideration for
the court. His Honour held that A's deteriorating condition did not override the
fact he acted both with knowledge of his status and that his activities could
247 known orassumed HIV statuswas regarded as an aggravating feature in England in Rv
Malcx}lm [1988] Crim. LR 189 and in the US in Cooper v State of Florida, 539 So 2d 508 (R
DCA, 1989).
248 Patterson, D., 'PLWA's and the criminal justice system' (1990) National AIDS Bulletin,
34.
249 (1981) 35 ALR 265, per Gibbs GJ, at pp. 268-269.
250 supra note 202, paras. 278-279, at pp. 152-153.
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transmit the virus. 251 Such a comment plainly disregarded the fact that there
were precedents to the contrary at the Supreme Court level in a number of
States 252 at the time the sentence was being considered.
Of similar concern is the case o1 R v Barry. 253 in this case A, an
aboriginal youth, had been convicted of an assault on a police officer. The
offending conduct was rubbing excrement into the police officer's face. Wylie
J in sentencing A referred to a trend of actual or threatened infliction of AIDS
in the commission of criminal offences and felt it was his duty to mark the
community's disapproval, and provide a deterrent, which outweighed the
personal circumstances of the defendant.
This decision can be criticised on a number of grounds. The first
ground upon which the decision can be criticised is that the question of
prevalence should not have been considered. Although the Australian Law
Reform Commission in its report on Sentencing was divided on the point, the
majority view was that the prevalence or increasing prevalence of a particular
offence should be irrelevant to sentencing. 254 jhe Commission
recommended that the penalty for an offence be amended to recognise the
increasing prevalence rather than impose societal concerns on a particular
offender through his or her sentence. The decision in Barry is also
reprehensible because there was no evidence submitted of the 'trend'. Third,
the length of sentence (three years) meant that Barry was likely to die before
it was completed as he was in the later stages of virus. Fourth, undue
emphasis was placed on the risk to police officers. There was no evidence
that they were at risk at all and there is no reported case of HIV being
transmitted through excrement. The decision in Barry illustrates a total lack
of consideration of all these facts, even on appeal, where the court also
ignored the established precedent in cases such as R v Smith and Bailey v
DPP. In addition, the case ignores the spirit of the Interim Report of the
Royal Commission into Aboriginal Deaths in Custody: 255 Muirhead J
recommended that Australian governments should legislate to enforce the.
This occurred also in f? v Howard NSW CCA 328/87 where ameliorating factors (HIV)
outweighed any grave aggravating factors in a charge of common assault.
252 such as the cases of R vSmith, Linou vHayes supra note 204.
253 unreported judgment 221/1990 September 171990 Qld CCA.
254 supra note 202, para. 177, at p. 95.
255 Canberra, Australian Government Publishing Service, 1988, at p. 18.
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principle that imprisonment is treated as a penalty of last resort for
Aboriginals. In January 1991 Barry committed suicide.
Wright and Barry can only reinforce the view that decisions
based on stereotypes and suspicions, unsubstantiated fears are not legally
adequate. Both these decisions are misguided, given that generally
Australian judges have taken an enlightened and educated approach to
sentencing HIV-infected persons. The Victorian Sentencing Act (1991) in Part
2 entitled 'Sentencing Guidance' provides that Full Court judges may lay
down guideline judgements which would bind judges and magistrates
imposing sentence. Such judgements could effectively be used to dispel
errors such as those which occurred in both Wright and Barry. Consistency
in the sentencing practice of HIV-infected persons could be achieved. This of
course would not remedy the inconsistencies between States and Territories.
There is no reported case where a non-custodial sanction has
been imposed taking into account A's HIV-infected status. ^56 Such a sanction
could have been imposed in the case of Linou v Hayes where the prisoner
was an IV drug user and as such had the potential to infect the healthy prison
population through infected needles. For example, a condition of probation
for a person who engages in high-risk behaviour such as IV drug use should
include that he or she should undergo AIDS preventative education.
The behaviour of the victim has been shown to be a relevant
consideration in sentencing. This issue warrants some consideration since
activities which transmit HIV are likely to be engaged in with consent. In a
1991 Victorian County Court decision R v Hakopian 257 q sentence for rape
was reduced on the basis of the fact that the complainant was a prostitute and
as such would feel less violated by rape than a person who was not.
Although the case is non-AIDS specific, it could have relevance where a
256 Although there are reports that thishas been the case in the United States where a man
was sentenced to sexual abstinence for five years and house arrest for six months for
knowingly spreading HIV through sexual activities (' "No sex" sentence for AIDS carrier'.
WestAustralian, October 31 1991). Reportedly, the court felt it ludicrous to put the convicted
man in prison when he was suffering a fatal illness.
257 County Court of Victoria, August 1991 per Jones J at pp. 7, 12. The decision was
appealed to the Supreme Court of Victoria: in R v Hakopian Victorian Court of Criminal
Appeal, 11th December 1991. Both the lower court and appellate court decisions were
criticised: 'Prostitutes take to the streets over rape'. Weekend Australian , January 11-12
1992. The issues are covered in some detail by Carter, M., and Wilson, B., 'Rape: good and
bad women and judges' (1992) 17(1) Alternative Law Journal, 6-9; Cass, D., 'Hakopian -
Case and Comment' (1992) 16 Criminal Law Journal, 200-204. See also text and footnote
198/nfra.
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homosexual or IV drug user was the complainant in an HIV transmission
offence.
The trial judge in Hakopian purportedly relied on the earlier case
of AG Harris 258 where the Victorian Court of Criminal Appeal held that the
fact that a victim of sexual assault was a prostitute is a relevant consideration
in sentencing. In Hakopian , Jones J suggested that the occupational status of
the complainant 'lessens the gravity of the offences'. 259 On appeal the
precise question of the accuracy of Harris was not debated and the Hakopian
appeal court implicitly seems to have accepted the case as good law although
the decision is not explicitly affirmed. 260 in contrast to both Hakopian and
Harris , in the 1982 New South Wales case of Marteene 261 Street CJ had
warned against this stance. He stated:
... The complainant undoubtedly did place herself at risk. But
this should not deny her the ordinary protection of the criminal
law ... There is not the slightest reason for the criminal law to
withhold from prostitutes a full measure of protection of their
right to determine when and in what circumstances they will
permit access to their bodies by men. 262
Marteene would require that sentencing courts not reduce
sentences where the complainant comes from a high-risk group on the basis
that their behaviour placed them at some known risk. Although the Court of
Criminal Appeal in Hakopian increased the sentence of the accused agreeing
that it was inadequate, the appeal ground that related to the trial judge's
assessment of the psychological impact on the victim in the case, given her
status as a prostitute, was dropped. Hence the principle that prostitutes (and
by extension possibly homosexual males or females) form a less vulnerable
class of victims was not overturned by the appeal court.
Therefore, a homosexual, prostitute or IV drug user who is the
victim of an HIV transmission offence may be regarded as a less vulnerable
victim because he or she might be said to consent to the risk of acquiring HIV
258 unreported judgmentof the Victorian CourtofCriminal Appeal, 11 August 1981, at p. 6.
259 supra note 257, at p. 8.
260 For example, Crockett J states 'regardless of whetherthe victim was a prostitute or not,
the question is as to whether the offences which were committed upon her were of such a
nature as to have caused fear and terror' {supra note 257, at p. 12).
261 Unreported judgment of the New South Wales Court ofCriminal Appeal, 8thJuly 1982.
262 ipj(j at p. 11.
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by placing himself or herself in a situation where transmission may occur. As
such, transmission of HIV in such circumstances may be seen as a self-
inflicted harm. Thus, if the court in Hakopian were faced with a fact pattern
where instead of the crime being rape and the victim being a female
prostitute, the crime was a transmission offence and the victim was either a
homosexual or an IV drug user, that same court would all factors being equal
have to reduce the sentence that might have been normally awarded to the
offender.
4. POST-TRIAL PROCEDURES AND THE VICTIM
In this section the procedure that has special reference to the
victims of criminal conduct warrants consideration. This covers the potential
for victims of criminal activity to obtain monetary compensation awards for
injuries received in HIV-related offences.
CRIMINAL INJURIES COMPENSATION AWARDS
In Victoria, in 1991 20 police received compensation under
Criminal Injuries Compensation legislation for pain and suffering associated
with the possible HIV infection following injury through work-related incidents.
The injuries were inflicted during stabbing and biting incidents when dealing
with suspects. None of the officers tested positive to the virus. 263 jhe
payments were to be expected given that restrictive interpretations of the
Criminal Injuries Compensation Act have been frowned upon at the High
Court level. 264 jhe High Court has held such legislation is a remedial
enactment and should not be interpreted restrictively. The same opinion may
be applied to other legislation in force in other Australian jurisdictions. 265
There is little uniformity in the monetary ceilings of the Criminal
Injuries Compensation Tribunals. 266 Under all legislation injury must result
263 'Police Defend payfor AIDS trauma', SundayAge, September 151991, p. 1.
264 Fagan vCrimes Compensation Tribunal (1982) 150CLR 666.
265 Criminal Injuries Compensation Act (1983)(Vic.); Criminal Injuries Compensation Act
(1976)(Tas.): Crimes Compensation Act (1982)(N.T.); Criminal Injuries Compensation Act
(1983)(A.C.T.); Criminal Injuries Compensation Act (1985)(W.A.); Victims Compensation Act
(i987)(N.S.W.); Criminal Injuries Compensation Act (1978)(S.A.) as amended in 1988; Part
LXVA Criminal Code (1899)(Qld.).
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from activity that can be classified as criminal. Under all the legislation the
term 'injury' includes mental illness, although the definitions are not uniform.
267 In South Australia, emotional distress and feanfollowing rape has been
held an injury for the purposes of the legislation. 268 jp section 2 of the
Australian Capital Territory legislation injury includes the contraction of a
disease. In Victoria, given the definition of the term 'victim' in section 3,
compensation will be awarded to a person who tries to arrest someone
committing a criminal act, prevent it occurring or aid or rescue a victim of a
criminal act. Hence the Victorian legislation would cover the transmission of
HIVthrough a wide-range of behaviour.
Presently guidelines have not been set in place on the medical
proof required for victim'scompensation with respect to AIDS-related matters.
Police antecedent reports, criminal records and statements that have been
made by witnesses are all tendered as evidence in Victorian Compensation
Tribunal hearings. There is the potential for information identifying the victim
or the accused as an infected person to be put before the court without any
safeguards imposed as to the use of that information. 269
One of the main impediments for a Successful award for the victim
is the victim's behaviour. It is provided in the legislation that an award may be
reduced having regard to the behaviour of an applicant which contributed to
the injury. 27o jhe Victims Compensation Tribunal in New South Wales in
1989 reduced a compensation award to take into account of the fact that the
victim was a gay man and, as such, must impliedly consent at least to the
possibility of a degree of violence in his sexual activities. 271 a similar view
has been taken by an Ontario, Canada, Criminal Injuries Compensation
Board in 1993. 272 in this case,, the Board declined to award the maximum
266 Tas., N.T., A.C.T., $25,000. W.A., Vic., N.S.W., S.A., $50,000) However the maximum
for pain and suffering (including mental or nervous shock) under most of the legislation is
$20,000 (Vic., Old.,).
267 s. 4 (N.T.); s. 4 (S.A.); s. 3,(Vic.); s. 2 (A.C.T.) ormental andnervous shock: s. 1 (W.A.);
s. 4 (S. A.); S.663A (Qld.); or injury to mental health: s. 2 (Tas.); s. 3 (N.S.W).
268 Sanders vRowden (1980) SASR547.
269 Bailey, J., 'Criminal Injuries Conipensation' (1991 )Law Institute Journal, 266-268.
270s. 20(1) (Vic.); s. 5(1) (Tas.); s. 9(a) (S.A.); s. 25 (W.A.); s. 663B(2) (Qld.);s. 10 (N.T.); s.
15 (A.C.T.);s. 20 (N.S.W).
271 Godwin, supra note 37, at p. 13.
272 This was the application made after the Ssenyonga trial was not completed (discussed
chapter three, footnote 140). The Board's finding is cited in Holland, W., 'AIDS and he
Criminal Law' (1994) 36 Criminal Law Quarterly, 279-316, at p. 268, fn 24.
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amount to three complainants who had sexual Intercourse with the deceased
without knowledge of his HIV-infected status. The Board declined on the
basis that it was not 'reasonable to entrust one's life to an almost complete
stranger ... a reasonable person would require a much longer period of trust-
building'. 273
Legislation that permits awards to be varied should further
deterioration in medical prognosis occur is most important with respect to
HIV-related injury. 274 Many compensation schemes require the initial
application to be lodged within twelve months, 275 two years, 276 or three
years 277 from the date of injury, in Tasmania and Queensland in the absence
of any statutory deadline such an application can be brought at any time.
Most jurisdictions require the victim to report the crime within a reasonable
time. However, by that stage the victim of a transmission offence who
subsequently becomes antibody positive may not have begun to suffer the
debilitating consequences that the various stages of HIV-infection bring.
Recognising this in one State in 1991, procedures were amended to allow for
fast track or expedited victim compensation hearings where a person was
seriously ill. 278
5. CONCLUSION
This chapter has revealed that there are few guidelines in the
criminal process for determining whether an infected accused will have any
special rights as a result of his or her infected status. Provisions that relate to
bail would have general application to such persons. Similarly, the health
discount factor that has always been relevant in sentencing theory would offer
guidance to judges. A body of sentencing precedent with respect to HIV-
infected persons has already developed. While such sentencing has
generally reflected an enlightened approach there are instances which reveal
273 Anon, 'Compensation for unsafe sex' (1994) 5(1) National HIV/AIDS Legal Link
Newsletter, 3.
274s. 5(6) (Tas.).
275 Victoria, Nortfiem Territory and Australian Capital Territory.
276 s. l7(2)(d)(N.S.W.).
277 Western Australia, South Australia.
278 Bailey, supra note 269, at p. 268.
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that the judiciary are not cognisant of current scientific information relating to
the progression of HIV infection. As sentencing is a discretionary function
Judges need to be aware of the standards and views that they are
communicating to society through their sentencing decisions.
Many courtroom procedures and applications will involve HIV-
infected persons in the future, either as the accused or the victim. The New
York Office of Court Administration guidelines are most instructive and sum
up the approach that should be taken by Australian courts where an HIV-
infected person appears in court.
The handling of a case involving a person afflicted with an
infectious disease, particularly a case involving an AIDS infected
person, calls for a proper balance between concern for the
safety of court personnel who have contact with an afflicted
person and the basic right of all people to appear in a courtroom
atmosphere of fairness and tranquillity that assures due process,
as well as freedom from bias and notoriety. 279
Many applications will relate to the treatment by the police of suspects being
detained in custody. They will involve applications for orders to be made
relating to the accused or applications made by the accused through his or
her counsel to have certain evidence rendered inadmissible. There is no
doubt that the emergence of HIV has resulted in the need to consider the
broad based powers of police. As public health officials can delegate their
powers of apprehension and detention to the police to act on their behalf the
scope for police to come into contact HIV-infected persons is extended. This
chapter has revealed that the major area requiring policy direction and
development by the legislature pertains to HIV testing. There is an uncertainty
about whether a general power to take blood samples should include the
power to subject samples to HIV testing. Neither public health legislation nor
criminal process legislation addresses this point adequately.
When focus is placed on the victim it can also be seen that apart
from criminal injuries compensation legislation which can be adapted to cover
HIV-related injuries, the special concerns of the victim with respect to HIV
testing are largely ignored by current legislation and practice. In particular,
legislatures need to consider whether testing of the accused should be
permitted for the purpose of reassuring the victim.
279 State of NewYork OfficeofCourt Adminstration, Guidelines for the HandiingofA Court
Appearance Involving a Person Afflictedwith an Infectious Disease, issued 1/88.
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The police and judicial arms of the criminal justice system must
aim to set in place clear guidelines which reflect a balance between civil
liberties and the due administration of justice. There is a need for Australian
States and Territories to establish some degree of certainty and uniformity
when processing HIV-infected accused persons through the police and court
phases of the criminal justice system.
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CHAPTER 7
AIDS AND PRISONS
1. INTRODUCTION
A moderate number of Australian prisoners are believed to be
infected with HIV. A study conducted at Yatala prison in 1989 revealed that
an average of 33% of prisoners were at some risk for the transmission of HIV
because they engaged in high-risk activities such as anal intercourse or drug
use. 1 Other studies have found that a significant number of prisoners were
incarcerated for offences relating to drug use ^ and/or were regular drug
users prior to arrest. 3 These details have led commentators to question
whether prisons might be 'incubators' for transmission of HIV and a bridge in
the transmission of HIV from the prison to the outside community. ^
This chapter examines the adequacy of prison policies in coping
with the AIDS epidemic. Analysis will be made of the incidence of activities
1 Douglas, R. M., Gaughwin, M. Davies, L. M., et al, 'Risk of transmission ofthe human
immunodeficiency virus in the prison setting', Med J Aust, 1989, 150:722; and Douglas, R.
M., Gaughwin, M. D., Davies, L. M., et al, 'Preventing Human Immunodeficiency virus
infection among prisoners: Prisoners' and Prison Officers' knowledge of HIV and their
Attitudes toOptions for Prevention' (1990) XIV (1) Community Health Studies, 61-64.
2 Johnson-Fitzpatrick, G., et al. An Evaluation of Programme Review Committees ,
Unpublished report. N.S.W. Department of Corrective Services, Research and Statistics
Division, 1988, found 32% of a sample of 104 prisoners reported that their offences were
related to drug use.
3 Dobinson, I., and Ward, P., Drugs and Crime, NSW Bureau of Crime Statistics and
Research, Research Study 2, Sydney, 1986. 40% ofa sample of225 prisonersconvicted of
property offences were classified as regular users prior to arrest. Astudy by Gorta, A.,
Estimates of Prior Drug Use by Prisoners in N.S.W. Gaols, unpublished report, N.S.W.
Department of Corrective Services, Research andStatistics Division, June, 1988, focuses on
women prisoners and found 65% of a sample of 90 women prisoners reported using heroin
prior to arrest. An analysis of 1993 literature reveals that one-third of persons sent to prison
in Australia are property offenders (Australian Prisoners, Canberra, Institute of Criminology,
1993). There is no breakdown in the figures which would allow a conclusion to be drawn as
the number of these offenders who are also drug users.
4 Strang, H., 'AIDS in Prisons' (1990) 4/6 National AIDS Bulletin, p. 42, Egger, 8., and
Heilpern, H., 'HIV Infection in Australian Prisons', Canberra, Australian Institute of
Criminology, 1990, p. 1 and Dwyer, J., 'Minimising the Spread of the Human
immunodeficiency Virus Within theAustralian Prison System', Conference on HIV/AIDS and
Prisons, 19-21 November 1990, Melbourne, reported in Norberry, J., Gaughwin, M., and
Gerull, S-A., No. 4 HIV in Prisons, Canberra, Australian Institute ofCriminology, 1991, 109-
114 at p. 109.
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that are high-risk for transmission of the virus within prisons, such as
consensual and non-consensual sexual activity and drug use. The present
policies relating to compulsory testing, segregation, confidentiality, medical
treatment and education, which have been developed to prevent the
transmission of HIV within the prison, will be critically examined. The
examination will involve an analysis of Australia's commitment to the
recommendations set down by the World Health Organisation after the 1987
consultation on the Prevention and Control of AIDS in Prisons. ^ Such an
analysis will consider how the policies developed to curb the spread of HIV in
prisons impact on HIV-infected prisoners and their custodians. Finally, the
chapter will consider the efficacy of other methods supported by law which
might be implemented to control the spread of HIV in prisons.
2. THE PREVALENCE OF HIV IN AUSTRALIAN PRISONS
Apart from a few reported cases on sentencing of HIV-infected
persons, it is generally difficult to identify how many AIDS or HIV-infected
persons are passing through the criminal justice system. Prisons are the only
institution where statistics have been recorded.
In 1989 it was estimated that 99 persons were infected with HIV
within Australian prisons. In that same year Heilpern and Egger, argued that
the figure was unreliable and observed that 'information on the presence of
AIDS and HIV seropositivity ... is not systematically reported in any one
source [across the jurisdictions]'. ® Heilpern and Egger further observed that
comparison of data across Australia was problematic because of the differing
policies in place from which case data could be obtained. For example, not
all prisons had testing policies and even in those that did, uniformity of
procedure was not achieved. There is no doubt that the figure of 99 would
have been unreliable because HIV testing was not compulsory in all prisons
^ WHO, 'Statement from the Consultation on Prevention and Control of AIDS in Prisons', 16-
18 November 1987 at the World Health Organisation Special Program on AIDS, Geneva.
Australia was a participant and part of a 'consensus statement' that was issued at the end of
this special programme. An outline of the 'consensus statement' is presented in Carr, A.,
'HIV in Prisons: Forewarned but not Forearmed' (1988) National AIDS Bulletin, 8-14,
Appendix, at p. 13-14.
6 Heilpern, H., and Egger, S., AIDS in Australian Prisons: Issues and Policy Options,
Canberra, Department of Community Health and Services, 1989, at p. 26.
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at that time and more importantly testing was not compulsory in NSW ^which
is the State with the largest prison population in Australia. ®
In 1990, the same researchers stated that the process of
information gathering seemed to have 'deteriorated' further. ®Asof November
1990, the number of HIV positive prisoners in Australian prisons was reported
to be 39 out of a total prison population of 13,319 with one case of AIDS.
In addition, a low rate of seroprevalence (the proportion of HIV positive
prisoners as a function of the number of prisoners tested) was found to be 0
to 0.4%.
The most recently recorded official figure for the number of HIV-
infected persons in Australian prisons, reported as at October 1991, was 206.
12 The statistics seem misleading because not all jurisdictions provide
information on the number of persons tested each year. The fact that, by 1990
there were 39 and not 99 (as in 1989) prisoners infected with HIV illustrates
the rapid turnover of prisoners. This is a characteristic of prison populations
and a factor which should serve to heighten the need to adopt uniform
policies 'inside' to prevent the spread of HIV on the 'outside' following the
release of prisoners.
An analysis of the official figure represented above would suggest
that HIV is not a significant problem in prisons. However, it is implied from the
research that the figures are a conservative estimate. Similar problems with
ascertaining prevalence have been encountered in other countries with many
researchers in agreement that official figures need to be treated with
scepticism. i3 In fact, a study of the figures from the United States and
^ it having only bocome compulsory in Novomber 1990 following passago of the Prisons
(Medical Tests) Amendment Act(N.S.W.)(1990).
®Australian Institute of Criminology, Prison Trends, No. 208, June 1993. This document
reports that the NSW prison population as of June 1993 is6,373 and the Victorian population
is 2,401.
9 Egger, 8., and Heilpern, H., "HIV Infection in Australian Prisons' Paper presented at
Conference on HIV/AIDS and Prisons, 19-21 November 1990, Melbourne, supra note 4, 65-
84 at p. 66.
19 (June 1990statistics). Table2, p. 21.
11 Egger and Heilpern, supra note4, at p. 67.
12 Norberry, J., 'HIV/AIDS, Prisons and the Law' (1991) 32 Trends and Issues, at p. 1. A
further study has been completed by Norberry but will not be released until end of 1994
(Personal Correspondence with Jennifer Norberry, Parliamentary Library, Canberra).
13 In England and Wales in 1989 it was confirmed that 63 current prisoners were HIV
positive and 174 had been released. Only three men had developed AIDS since 1985 (cited
in Thomas, P., 'HIV/AIDS in Prisons' (1990) 1 The Howard Journal, 1-13, at p. 2-3).
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Europe is Instructive as they may indicate the future course of the epidemic in
Australian prisons. For example, the prevalenceof HIV infection in prisons in
the United States and Europe ranges from less than 1% to greater than 25%
among all prisoners, and up to 60% in those prisons where IV drug users are
imprisoned. In the United States in 1986, the incidence rate of AIDS was
higher in the prison population than in the general population: 5.3 cases per
100,000 in the general population as compared to 5-215cases per 100,000 in
State and Federal correctional institutions. Given the incidence of HIV
infection in US prisons, Australian prisons could be on the brink of an
increase in HIV cases.
The official Australian figures presented should be given serious
consideration since it is well-documented that both consensual and non-
consensual activities capable of transmitting HIV take place in prisons. The
fact that the figures may really be much higher means that a more adequate
method ofobtaining statistical information must be developed. It is only on the
basis of reliable information that stringent policies can be sustained.
However, the Director of the Prison Medical Service estimates that the figures are more
accurately between 350-500 prisoners, hence between 3 and 10 times the official number
(Padel, U., HIV, AIDS and Prison. London, Prison Reform Trust, 1988, p. 5).
One United States commentator stated that as of October 1987, there were
1,964 AIDS cases among inmates in the 70 United States correctional institutions (including
the federal prison system, 50 state prison systems and a sample of 20 city/county jail
systems)(Hammett, T.M. AIDS in Correctional Facilities: Issues and Options, 3rd edition,
Washington D.C., US Department ofJustice, 1988). This same author believes that between
October 1987 and October 1988 there was a 60% increase, from 1,964 to 3,136 cases, of
AIDS (the 1988 figure incorporates 28 city/county jails) and by October 1989, a 72% increase
with 5,411 cases (the 1989 figure incorporates 32 city/county jail systems). In fact figures
provided show that the increase in cases in the prison population exceeded the increase in
the total AIDS cases for the US population at large, which was 50% (Hammett, T. M., and
Moini, S., 'HIV/AIDS in U.S. Prisons and Jails; Epidemiology, Policy and Programs' Paper
presented atConference on HIV/AIDS and Prisons, 19-21 November 1990, Melbourne, supra
note 4, 31-53, at p. 40, Table 1). More recent figures are unavailable.
Hammett, AIDS in correctional facilities: issues and options, and Kelley, P.W , Redfield,
R. R., Ward, D. L, etal, 'Prevalence and incidence of HTLV-111 in a prison', JAMA, 1986,
256:2198-2199. Details of AIDS in prisons in 1986 in the United States is covered in
Wormser, G. P., 'AIDS in Prisons', inWormser, G. P.. Stahl, R. A., and Bottone, E. J. (eds),
AIDS and Other Manifestations of HIV Infection, Noyes Publications, New Jersey, 1987,
chapter 26, at p. 48-66. For European figures in 1987: Harding, T. W., 'AIDS in prisons'
Lancet, 1987, 2:1260-1264 where details are provided of the incidence ofAIDS in prisons in
a number of European countries.
15 Gardner, K. J., 'Sentenced to Prison, Sentenced to AIDS: The EighthAmendment Right
to be Protected from Prison's Second Death Row' (1988) 92 Dickinson Law Review, 863-893,
at p. 870.
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3. RISK FACTORS IN PRISON
As the figures of AIDS and HIV infection within prisons could be
regarded as unreliable, it is more prudent to examine the incidence of risk
factors in prisons. There is evidence that high-risk activities capable of
transmitting HIV, such as non-consensual and consensual sexual activity,
drug use and assaults, take place in prisons. It is necessary to consider the
incidence of these activities in more detail.
SEXUAL ACTIVITY
Studies from as early as 1958 support the theory that homosexual
activity takes place in both male and female prisons in the United States. For
example, according to Clemmer 40% of prisoners studied had some form of
homosexual relationship. By the 1970s, Gagnon indicated a higher
figure of between 40-50%. Thomas established that after three years in a
maximum-security prison between 80-90% of prisoners were involved in
homosexual relationships.
There is little historical data to support the presence of
homosexuality within prisons in Australia. Consensual homosexual activity
constitutes an offence against prison discipline in Australian prisons
despite the fact that outside of prison such conduct is legal in all jurisdictions
(with the exception of Tasmania) when occurring in private between
consenting adults. There are at least two Australian reported judgements
16Clemmer, D., 'Some aspects ofsexual behavior in the prison community', (Proceedings of
the American Correctional Society) unpublished, 1958. But Sykes viewed the figure to be
approximately 35% (Sykes, J., The Society of Captives, USA, Princeton University press,
1958).
1^ Gagnon, reported in Buffum, P. C., Homosexuality in Prisons, Washington D.C., US
Department of Justice, 1972.
18 Thomas, H. E., 'Regressive maladaptive behavior in maximum security prisons',
(Conference on Prison Homosexuality), USA, unpublished, 1971.
18 Forexample, r. 20 Corrective ServicesAct Regulations (1998)(S.A.). As stated in chapter
two, unlike drug use very few persons are prosecuted and receive a custodial sentence for
homosexual conduct. A significantproportion of homosexual conduct taking place in prison is
generally thought to be 'situational' (Goldberg, G., 'Letting Sex out of Prison' (1991) 23/2
Australian Joumal of Forensic Sciences, 29-37).
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which provide evidence of sexual offences being committed within the prison
setting.
The occurrence of homosexual activities in prisons appears to be
based on factors such as accommodation arrangements (single-cell as
opposed to dormitory style and high or low security), the duration of sentence
and the extent to which conjugal visits are permitted. 21 The fact that power
and domination in the correctional setting are established through sexuality
will make homosexual activity difficult to eradicate. 22
In South Australia, a study, was conducted in 1989 at Yatala
Labour Prison to ascertain the prevalence of such activities. 23 jhe results
indicate the degree to which high-risk activities were engaged in at that time.
Approximately, thirty-four percent of prisoners admitted that they engaged in
occasional anal intercourse and 12% of of those prisoners reportedly
engaged in unprotected intercourse. The study also revealed that prisoners
were uneducated about the risks of acquiring HIV through engaging in high-
risk activities.
In addition, non-consensual homosexual conduct such as rape and
sexual assault is thought to be widely prevalent and under-reported in the
prison environment. 24 in the Yatala study, 19% of prisoners agreed that
condoms would be used in rapes. 25 This provides indirect evidence that
rapes do occur in that particular prison and hence it is at least arguable that
they occur in other Australian prisons. 26
The extent of non-consensual homosexual activity is better
documented in the United States, where one self report study found that 0.6%
20 RvHowie (1978) Qd R380wheresodomy was committed byone prisoner on another; R
VLukic, a case where one prisoner was forced to engage in oral sex on another (Qld CA
243/92, 29.9.92). In both cases the accused was found guilty as charged.
21 Hough, A., and Schwartz, D. M.,' AIDS and Prisons -Working Our Way Out of the ivlaze'.
Paper presented at Industrial issuesWorkshop, National Conference onAIDS, 1985.
22Thomas, supra note 18, at p. 4.
23Douglas, supra note 1, at pp 61 -64.
24Gardner, supra notelS, at p. 870, citing United States vBailey 444 US 394 (1980), at
pp. 597-598 of the judgment.
25Douglas, supra note 1, at p. 62.
26The point has been confirmed bythe decision in LvCommonwealth where the Northern
Territory authorities were found liable for failing to prevent a sexual assault where a prisoner
was placed in a cell with two others who were prone to violence (1977) 10ALR 269. See
also the cases, supra note 20.
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of prison inmates were forced to perform sexual acts with ariother inmate. 27
Another study found that 28% of inmates had been victims of aggressive
sexual encounters. 28 in United States v Bailey, 29 the US Supreme Court
recognised the presence of homosexual rape in prisons in this judgement of
the court:-
We do not live in an ideal world even in America, so far as jail
and prison conditions are concerned, the complaints that this
Court and every other American Appellate Court, receives
almost daily from prisoners about... homosexual rape ... are
not always the mouthings of the malcontent. The Court itself
acknowledges that the conditions these respondents
complained about do exist. 3°
In the absence of evidence to the contrary, there is no reason to
suggest that any Australian prison is immune from either consensual or non-
consensual homosexual conduct amongst its inmates. In fact, two features of
prisons, their overcrowded and understaffed nature, facilitate these activities
and hence the possible transmission of HIV. However, sexual activity is not
the only high-risk practice taking place in Australian prisons.
DRUG USE
IV drug users represent the major risk group for HIV infection in
prisons. A sizeable proportion of prisoners have been imprisoned for drug-
related offences, 3^ or property offences committed with a desire to obtain
drugs. 32 Further, the criminal careers of IV drug using prisoners tend to be
recidivistic. Hence there are good grounds for believing that, unless
27 Nacci, P. L., and Kane, T. R., 'Intimate Sexual Aggression: some Evolving propositions.
Empirical Findings and Mitigating Counterforces' in Gender Issues, Sex Offences and
CriminalJustice, Washington DC, Hayworth Press Inc., 1984
28 'Comment, Rape: The Unstated Sentence' (1984) 15 Pacific Law Journal, 899, citing
Lockwood, •., Prison Sexual Violence, 1980,6-7.
29 444 us 394 (1980).
30 Ibid, at p. 421-422.
31 Johnson-Fitzpatrick, supra note 2, found that 32% of a sample of 104 persons
imprisoned had committed offences related to drug use. See also Bell, J.. Fernandas, •.,
and Batey, R., 'Heroin users seeking methadone treatment', fJedJAust, 1990, 152:361-364.
32 Dobinson and Ward, supra note 3. 40%of a sample of225prisonerswere tested.
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rehabilitated, these pri^ners would use drugs within the prison system if
available.
It is indisputable that drugs are available in Australian prisons. This
has been proven by the occasional cases of criminal charges brought against
prison officers and prisoners. 33 Drugs enter the prisons through various
sources including contact visits, day release schemes and through prison
officers. 34
The South Australian study confirmed that drugs were available
and drug use was occurring within Yatala prison. For example, 37% of
prisoners reported their use of IV drugs in that prison. 35 This study also
reinforced the conclusion, drawn in previous United States studies, that
prisoners are using drugs in a manner which renders transmission of HIV
more likely, through shared needles. 36 in fact 93% of prisoners in the Yatala
study agreed that if clean needles were available the risk of transmission of
HIV would be reduced. 37 studies of both Western Australian and New South
Wales prisons have confirmed that a number of prisoners are regular IV drug
users whilst in prison. 38
33 Kirby, M., 'AIDS Strategies andAustralian Prisons', Unpublished Paper Presented toThe
South Australian Justice Administration Foundation, 1990, at p. 17.
34 Liew, C., 'On the Integrated management of Human Immunodeficiency Virus (HIV)
Infection in South Australian Prisons: The Medical Perspective', Paper presented at
Conference on HIV/AIDS and Prisons, 19-21 November 1990, Melbourne, supra riote 4,
143-154, at p. 147.
35 Douglas, et al, 'Risk of transmission of the human immunodeficiency virus in the prison
setting', supra note 1, at p. 722. Similar levels of needle sharing are confirmed by studies
conducted in the United Kingdom prisons (Kennedy, D., Nair, G., Elliot, L., Ditton, J., 'Drug
misuse and sharing of needles in Scottish prisons', BMJ, 1991, 302:1507).
36Gardner, supranote 15, provides details to indicate thata high proportion of US prisoners
are past drug users. In addition, she states that these individuals continue to engage in drug
use. whilst incarcerated (at p. 868). Hammett and Moini, supra note 13 report that 'IV drug
use is the predominant exposure category' in US prisons (at p. 33)).
37Douglas, supra note 1, at p. 62.
38 In Western Australia: Indermaur, D., and Upton, K., 'Alcohol and Drug Use Pattern of
Prisoners in Perth' (1988) 21 Australian and New Zealand Journal of Criminology, 144-167,
Miner, M and Gorta, A., 'Heroin Use in the Lives of Women Prisoners in Australia' (1987) 20
Australian andNew Zealand Journal ofCriminology, 3-15. In New South Wales: f^rape, G..
AIDS in Prisons , Sydney, NSW Dept. of Corrective Services, May, 1985. Frape estimated
that 80% of prisoners were using drugs in New South Wales prisons. A 1989 study of New
South Wales prisons supported by a Commonwealth AIDS Research Grant (CARG) found
that 155 of 209 respondent prisoners (74.2%) reported having injected drugs (of which 31%
were amphetamines and 77.4% heroin) at least once while in prison with 78% of those
persons stating they injected on five or less occasions per week. 75% of the 155 reported
sharing needles (in Wodak, A. D., Shaw, J. M., Gaughwin, M. D., Ross, M., Miller, M., and
Gold, J., 'Behind Bars: HIV: risk-taking behaviour of Sydney Male Drug injectors While in
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In 1994 a prisoner in an Australian prison was confirmed as the
first conclusive case where HIV had been acquired in the prison setting. 39
The mode of transmission is thought to be needle sharing and sexual
conduct. The prisoner had been incarcerated permanently between 1980 and
1990. He tested antibody negative in 1987 and then positive in 1989. It is
highly unlikely that the prisoner acquired the disease before 1980 given the
report of the first antibody test. Even accepting that the antibody test was not
as accurate in 1987 as it is in 1994 the lack of presence of HIV in the
Australian community in the late 1970s early 1980s would render it unlikely.
In addition, the prisoner reported no instance of overseas travel or history of
blood transfusion or haemophilia. The second test was taken after symptoms
of HIV infection became apparent. This example reveals that high-risk
behaviours do take place within prison. Further, the limited opportunities for
reducing risk in prisons increases the potential for HIV transmission,
NON-SEXUAL ASSAULTS
Prisoners are also at some risk of acquiring HIV as a result of non-
sexual assaults in prisons, involving fighting and biting. In New South
Wales, there were 125 reported assaults between prisoners and 47 assaults
by prisoners on prison officers from January to June 1988. However as
stated in chapter one. the percentage risk of transmission of HIV through
these activities is much less than for either sexual activity or IVdrug use.
Australian governments appear to recognise that high-risk
activities do take place in Australian prisons. In response, policies have been
implemented within Australian prisons to curb the spread of the virus. A
number of AIDS-specific guidelines pertaining to HIV in prisons have been set
Prison'. Paper presented at HIV/AIDS and Prisons Conference. 19-21 November 1990.
Melbourne, supra note 4. 239-245. at pp 240-241.) and also Wodak. A.. AIDS and
Intravenous Drug Users, Unpublished Proceedings of Seminars and of Scientific Sessions.
Department of Community Medicine. St. Vincents Hospital. Sydney. 1986.179-185.
39 Gerrard. J. G.. McGahan S. L.. Milliken J. S. et al, 'Australia's first Case of AIDS?' Med J
Aust 1994, 160:247-250.
'^ 3 A conclusive case of HIV transmission involving an IV drug user within a Scottish prison
has been documented (Christie. B.. 'HIV outbreak investigated in Scottish jail' BMJ 1991.
302: 880).
Scagliotti. L.. 'AIDS Education and the Prison System', Report of the Third National AIDS
Conference. Canberra, Australian Government Publishing Service. 1988. The prisoner
warder who was stabbed with a syringe in Long Bay Jail in 1990 provides evidence of the
risks posed to prison warders also (see chapter three and infra).
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byWHO and also by the Federal Government The need for the enactment of
such guidelines illustrates the precarious position of prisoners within the
prison system which came to be accentuated by the presence of HIV infection
within the system itself.
4. THE NEED FOR AIDS-SPECIFIC GUIDELINES PERTAINING TO
PRISONS
By 1987, world statistics indicated that many people suffering
from HIV or AIDS were passing through institutions of the criminal justice
system, particularly the prisons. Questions arose as to how such persons
should be treated within such institutions. Evidence of less than adequate
conditions for HIV-infected persons in Australia brought to the forefront the
question of whether prisoners and in particular HIV-infected prisoners have
any enforceable rights which would enable them to demand specific
conditions within prisons. Most liberal democratic countries including
Australia have domestic prison statutes which provide for general medical
treatment of prisoners. In Australia, this is only mandated in three States
(New South Wales, Victoria and Queensland) and then onlyVictoria couches
the provision of medical treatment, for example, as a 'right'.
DO PRISONERS HAVE RIGHTS?
This question of whether provisions-such as that contained in the
Victorian prison legislation create enforceable obligations raises the issue of
the existence and scope of prisoner's rights. The constitutional safeguards
which protect prisoners and which are derived in the United States from the
Bill of Rights, have no counterpart in Australia. Conditions in Australian
prisonsare governed by PrisonsActsand Regulations. With the exception of
the Victorian legislation, the language in the statutes is not couched in terms
of rights or entitlements. The legislation generally concentrates on
As was aired in Western Australia in the Report of the Select Committee Appointed to
Inquire into the National HIV/AIDS Strategy White Paper. Perth, Western Australian
Government Printer, 1990, at p. 57
43 s. 16(1) PrisonsAct (1952)(N.S.W.); s. 47(1 )(f) Correcf/ons Act(1986)(Vic.)'prisoners
have the right to have access to reasonable medical care and treatment necessary for the
preservation of health'; and s. 13(1) Corrective Services Act (1988)(Qld.) 'to provide such
medical services as are necessary for welfare'.
44 set out in note ^^3 infra.
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administrative, security and disciplinary matters. Although it has been
judicially stated in England 'that prisoners retain all civil rights which are not
taken away expressly or by necessary implication' Australian authority has
generally not been supportive of the proposition that relevant legislation,
where it does exist, confers justiciable rights on prisoners. The judiciary
appear to view their role as one of adjudication and disposition, rather than
supervision ofthe treatment of prisoners. It appears that a withdrawal of rights
is done in a spirit of 'mutual accommodation' Where rights are balanced
against needs and goals of prison authorities. However, if courts are
reluctant to intervene in prison administration then there is no objective body
to assess whether the balancing act is being performed fairly. The existence
of prison ombudsmen is not an adequate safeguard as their powers to
intervene on behalf of prisoners against prison authorities are limited. In the
United States it is apparent that HIV-infected persons have often been the
unsuccessful plaintiffs against prison authorities on matters ranging from
segregation to medical treatment: The overriding goal of the need to
preserve institutional security more often than not, seems to tip the scales in
their favour. ^8
There has been judicial recognition in Australia of the fact that
prison authorities owe a common lawduty of care to their inmates. Hence,
prisoners who are unprotected from sexual assault or even transmission of
disease could argue that prison authorities have breached their duty of care
towards them. There is no recorded case where the failure to provide
specific conditions has been relied on as a breach of the duty, Further, the
Norberry, supra note 12.
RaymondVHoney [^982] 1 All ER756 at p. 759 per Wilberforce LJ.
Flynnv The King0949) 79 CLR-\.
'^ 8 Vaid, L)., 'Prisons' in Dalton, S., and Yale Law Project' AIDS and the Law: A Newguide
for the Public, New Haven, Yale University Press, 212-225.
49 HowardVJarvis [1957] 98 CLR 177 where police held responsible for death of person in
police lock-up on basis had failed to exercise reasonable care for the safety of the prisoner
during the detention. In LvCommonwealth (1976) 10ALR 269, at p.285, see supra note 26,
the court held that the common law duty of care owed by prison authorities to prisoners held
in their custody included not putting the plaintiff in a cell with prisoners whom they knew or
ought to have known were prone to violence.
80 There is currently an application before the New South WalesSupreme Court against the
State of New South Wales over its refusal to permit prisoners to have access to condoms.
The prisoners in this case are seeking a mandatory injunction under the Felons (Civil
Proceedings) /tcf (1981)(N.S.W.)to force the government to reform its policies. The case is
discussed under 'Altemative Strategies' infra.
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existence of a duty owed is limited by some State legislation which limits legal
action against prison authorities. For example, Western Australian and New
South Wales and legislation provides that no action or claim for damages lies
against any person for things done or purported to be done under prison
legislation unless it is proved that the act was done 'maliciously and without
reasonable or probable cause'. ^2 jhe scope of such provisions has not been
adjudicated on ^3 but their existence may act as a barrier to potential litigants.
There may also be more subtle pressures preventing prisoners from
instigating such litigation. These include the limited access to legal aid and
widespread reluctance to involve themselves in disputes with their
custodians. Rather than alleging that prison authorities owe a duty to provide
certain conditions and the failure to do so amounts to a breach of a duty,
prisoners have tended to rely on equal opportunities legislation and argue that
as HIV-infected persons they are discriminated against in many areas of
prison life on the grounds of their status or 'impairment'. Such actions have
been successful in Western Australia.
• At an international level there are basic human rights documents,
such as the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (1948)('UD'), and
S"" S. 111 Prisons Act (1981)(W.A.): s. 46 Prisons Act (1952)(NSW); s. 62(1) Corrective
ServicesAct (1988)(Qld.). L vCommonwealth (siipra note 49) concerned Northern Territory
legislationwhich did not contain such a provision limiting common law claims.
52 s. 111 Prisons Act (1981)(W.A.): s. 46 Prisons Act 952)(NSW). Such legislation would
also prevent prison warders from taking action against prison authorities where HIV is
transmitted during employment. The Intergovernmental Committee on AIDS LegalWorking
Party in its report Employment Law and HIV/AIDS (1991) observed that: 'under both
common law and statutory workers' compensation schemes, a worker's access to
compensation for non-economic loss where they are infectedwith HIV but not symptomatic,
is restricted or non-existent' (at p. 18). Australia's only known case of HIV transmission
inflicted on a prison warder by a prisoner settled in September 1994 when the New South
Wales Department of Corrective Services agreed to settle the claim. It is not documented
whether the Department admitted liability or whether itwas a workers' compensation claimor
a daim forgeneral damages under a duty ofcare (Anon, 'Stabbed warder says HIV a bonus'.
WestAustralian. September 7 1994, p. 11). In this example, the duty of care could be held
not to be limited bys. 46 ofthe New South Wales PrisonsAct (1952)given that the injuiV was
done 'maliciously and without reasonable or probable cause'.
53 In A Complainant &Anor v The State of Western Australia unreported judgment Equal
Opportunities Tribunal, No. 7 of 1992 and No. 6 of 1993, 15th July 1994, the Tribunal
specifically stated that the prison authorities could not rely on section 111 of the PrisonAct
(1981 )(W.A.) to exempt them from liability under the Equal OpportunitiesAct (1984) in that
State because the latter Act was more specific and enacted later in time than the former.
54 Hoddy VExecutive DirectorDepartment of Corrective Services, unreported judgment
Equal Opportunity Tribunal, No. 8, December 18 1991; A Complainant &Anorv TheState of
WesternAustralia (supra note 53). Under such legislation it matters not that the party in
control of services and facilities may have been trying to protect the complainants from harm.
The question is whether authorities acted pursuant to an impermissible consideration,
namely, the presence of an impairment known as HIV. These cases are discussed later in the
chapter.
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Covenants such as the International Covenant of Civil and Political Rights
(1966)('ICCPR'). These documents contain provisions that, protect against
cruel and unusual punishment preserve a right to privacy s®, provide for
freedom from discrimination and provide for the right to medical treatment.
5® These human rights covenants have been incorporated into domestic
Australian law, however, only in relation to selected Commonwealth
legislation. Hence, the Human Rights Commission is only empowered to
investigate a complaint when itoriginates from a federal prisoner. This leaves
prisoners in State controlled prison systems unprotected until they have
exhausted all domestic remedies. At that point an application could be
made to international human rights bodies such as the United Nations Human
Rights Committee®® but the protracted nature of such proceedings would
unlikely find favour with an HIV-infected prisoner.
With respect to prisoners specifically there are the United Nations
Standard r\/linimum Rules for the Treatment of Prisoners (1973), which
provide standards of custody and medical care. In Australia, there are
Standard Guidelines for Corrections which were drafted in 1989 and are
based on the UN Standard Minimum Rules for the Treatment of Prisoners.
They protect against discrimination ®'' and preserve the rights of prisoners
55Art. 5. UD; Art. 7, ICCPR.
56Art. 17, ICCPR.
57 Art. 26, ICCPR.
58Art. 25, UD; Art. 10, ICCPR.
which would include any administrative remedies for judicial review. For example, if a
prisoner was chargedwith an offence against prison discipline and evidence for establishing
the offence was not collected in accordance with Prison Rules, a failure to follow mandatory
procedural protections in prison disciplinary schemes can render decisions susceptible to
judicial review, despite the lackof a general right of appeal. Hence the obligation to act in
accordance with such rules are enforceable (Bromley v Dawes (No. 1) (1983) 10 A Crim R
98). However, it is thought that there is a distinction between punitive decisions and
management decisions such as administrative segregation. The latter are thought to be
outside the range of judicial review remedies and are more likely to benefit from a judicial
acceptance of management justifications tendered by prison administrators (McEvoy v
Lobban [1990] 2 Qd R 235).
®® As was the procedure adopted in Toonen vAustralia CCPR/C/50/D/488/1992 where
Toonen challenged the validity of sections122-123 the Tasmanian Criminal Code which
prohibits sexual practices in private between consenting adults. TheCommission found that
Code provisions to be inbreachArticle 17(1) (which protects privacy including sexual privacy)
of the ICCPR and thus Australia's human rights obligations. The effective remedy would be
the repeal of sections 122-123 but the Tasmanian Government has refused to change the
law in response to the UN decision (Alexander, M., Tasmanian gay activist wins in the UN'
(1994) 5(2) HIV/AIDS Legal LinkNewsletter, 1, 9).
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isolated for health reasons. Neither of these documents create legal
obligations.
There are however some AIDS-specific guidelines which were
developed in the late 1980s. The World Health Organisation (WHO) has set
down guidelines for the treatment of HIV-infected prisoners within prisons.
The Australian Federal Government also responded to the pandemic by the
release of the National HIV/AIDS StrategyThe Strategy devotes a section
to the prevention of HIV within prisons. These guidelines warrant some
examination.
WORLD HEALTH ORGANISATION GUIDELINES
In 1987 WHO held a Consultation in Geneva on the 'Prevention
and Control of AIDS in Prisons'. This involved experts in wide ranging areas
from 26 countries. Following that Consultation, a 'consensus statement' was
issued. The statement recognises that HIV infection brings to the forefront
the notion that there is a need to improve the overall hygiene of prison
environments and notes that high-risk activities are currently taking place in
prisons in many countries. The statement makes it clear that policies applied
to the general community should apply equally to prisons. Prison guidelines
are to include the following concepts:
0. ...
2. Prisoners should be treated in a manner similar to other
members of the community with the same right of access to:
a. educational programs ... [relevant to HIV infection and
AIDS],
b. testing for HIV on prisoner request, with confidentiality
of results, timely pre- and post-test counselling, ...
c. medical, nursing, inpatient and outpatient services of
the same quality as those for AIDS patients in the community
at large;
d. information on treatment programs and the freedom to
refuse such treatment.
para. 1.80.
para. 5.70.
Commonwealth of Australia, National HIV/AIDS Strategy: a policy information paper,
Canberra, Australian Government Publishing Service, 1989.
^ reproduced in Carr, supra note 5, at pp.13-14.
307
3. In addition, prisoners with AIDS should be considered for
compassionate early release to die in dignity and freedom.
4. Prisoners should not be subjected to discriminatory
practices relating to HIV infection or AIDS such as
involuntary testing, segregation or isolation, except when
required for the prisoner's own well-being. ...
D. ... Careful consideration should be given to making
condoms available in the interests of disease prevention. It
is also recognised that, within some lower-security
correctional facilities, the practicability of making sterile
needles available is worthy of further study.
E. Decisions regarding testing and/or screening should be
considered in the context of informed consent, the ability to
maintain confidentiality and the provision of positive
assistance to affected individuals. ...
These guidelines, which although they are not legally binding, 65 do provide a
guide for State and Territory governments attempting to adopt uniform prison
policy in relation to HIV/AIDS. In the absence of judicially recognised rights
and the perceived difficulty in enforcing a common law duty of care against
prison authorities, the present writer believes that the spirit of such provisions
should be adhered to in policies set up to curb the spread of HIV in prisons
and to ensure that HIV-infected inmates are reasonably catered for. The
National HIV/AIDS Strategy also provides implicit recognition of the need for
establishing guidelines in this area.
NATIONAL HIV/AIDS STRATEGY
The Australian Federal Government has also attempted to guide
State and Territory governrrients by the production of the National HIV/AIDS
Strategy. The release of this document was the end stage of the work of a
number of intergovernmental working parties in the area of HIV/AIDS. The
final drafting of the document took into account submissions received in
response to an earlier document circulated for public comment entitled A
65 Although such guidelines do not create legally enforceable rights it is significant that the
provisions of the National HIV/AIDSstrategy (supra note 63), the WHO guidelines and the
conclusions of the Heilpern and Egger report (supra note 6) were recognised as policy
documents containing provisions that were to be considered in tandem with provisions of the
Prisons Act (1981)(W.A.) in the 1994 case before the Western Australian Equal Opportunity
Tribunal (A Complainant &Anor v The State of Westem Australia (supra note 53).
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time to care; A time to act; a strategy for all Australians. Given that the
Strategy is largely based on the opinions of representative public groups in
various areas, it was expected that governments would develop policies and
enact legislation according to the spirit and terms of the Strategy. In doing so
a uniform approach to curbing the spread of HIV and catering for its presence
within society, would be achieved. Given that the principles are general it is
acknowledged by the present writer that they may not apply in exceptional
circumstances. Such circumstances may arise within the prison system.
However, the National HIV/AIDS Strategy acknowledges the presence of
HlV-infected persons in the prison system and also accepts that high-risk
behaviours take place within Australian prisons. 67 in a 1994 Western
Australian decision, the Equal Opportunities Tribunal held that 'the National
Strategy has a bearing upon the standards of care to be observed by pri^n
authorities'. 68 Hence, while not legally binding these guidelines are
recognised as an important benchmark by which practices are to be
examined. Their existence allowed the complainants counsel to mount a
stronger case against the Prison Authorities. 69 The relevant provisions of the
Strategy will be focused on when examining both the policies developed to
curb the spread of HIV within prisons and the impact that those policies may
have on HlV-infected persons.
5. POLICIES WITHINAUSTRALIAN PRISONS TO REDUCE THE SPREAD
OF HIV
In response to evidence of the likelihood of the spread of HIV in
Australian prisons. States and Territories implemented a number of policies
to address the situation. This section reviews these policies and in particular
the impact such policies have on HlV-infected inmates.
The early response to curbing the spread of HIV within Australian
prisons was to identify the infected and then to isolate those persons suffering
from HIV. This task was performed haphazardly across the States and
66 Commonwealth of Australia, Canberra, Australian Government Publishing Service, 1988.
67supra note 63, para. 5.8.1.
68 in AComplainant &Anorv The State ofWestern Australia, supra note 53, at p. 62.
69 Here the complainants argued that segregation on the grounds of HIV status led to
discriminatory practices and was detrimental to their health. The fact that segregation was
not encouraged in the National HIV/AIDS Strategy was regarded as an important
consideration when considering the ambiguity of Rule3Q ofWA Prison Policy, the rulewhich
the respondents argued allowed segregation {Ibid, at pp. 62-64).
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Territories with little uniformity in policies. This lack of uniformity militated
against its success as a scheme designed to curb the spread of HIV within
prisons. The scheme was also accompanied by a failure to accept at an
official level that high-risk practices were taking place within prisons. The
identification process was achieved by testing, albeit in a piecemeal manner,
and isolation by segregation.
COMPULSORY TESTING
Compulsory testing of prisoners is a strategy being used to reduce
the incidence of HIV/AIDS in Australian prisons. As of 1994, all Australian
States and Territories have either passed legislation or have developed
policies which enable testing of prisoners. Compulsory programmes operate
in South Australia, Tasmania, Queensland, Northern Territory, Australian
Capital Territory and New South Wales. In Victoria and Western Australia
testing is voluntary, with an exception in the latter jurisdiction relating to high-
risk prisoners. In the States and Territories where testing is compulsory,
testing is initially conducted at reception with re-testing after three months. In
New South Wales re-testing is on exit. Only in Queensland is testing
comprehensive: in addition to the testing on entry and after three months,
prisoners are also re-tested at twelve month intervals and four - two weeks
prior to release. 70
The enactment.of legislation for compulsory testing, of prisoners
could be described as 'knee-jerk' legislation. Indeed, many States (with the
exception of New South Wales ^1) had passed such legislation before the
WHO Statement on the Prevention and Control of AIDS in Prisons was
released in July 1987 and before the release of the Federal Government's
National HIV/AIDS Strategy in 1989. Under the WHO recommendations
only voluntary testing of prisoners is supported. The Australian Strategy
argues that current circumstances warrant the testing of prisoners on exit but
that the consent of the prisoner should be sought and counselling should be
available. ^2 The implementation of testing strategies illustrate the politics
Commonwealth Government, National HIV/AIDS Evaluation 1991-1992 State Stories
Report, Canberra, Australian Government Publishing Service, 1993, at pp. 64-67.
NewSouth Wales passed legislation on compulsory testing in 1990, supra note 7.
supra note 63, para. 5.8.6.
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surrounding many debates that have arisen in the prison context. These
debates will be referred to in the course of this chapter where relevant.
The question that has been debated at some length, is whether
testing needs to be compulsory. In chapter five, arguments were presented
for and against compulsory testing. It was concluded that the compulsory
testing of a small population may be justified in some circumstances. The
dispute concerns whether the prison system is such a population. There are
some specific aspects of this issue which apply to prisoners and hence the
arguments for testing prisoners as a special population will be set down and
then evaluated.
First, it could be argued, given that high-risk practices are taking
place in prisons and prisoners enter a potentially infectious environment when
received into prison, that compulsory testing schemes may be justified in
terms of the protection of healthy inmates. Second, compulsory testing will
help to identify the prevalence of HIV within prisons. The third argument or
justification is that, by the introduction of such a scheme, infected persons
are identified, precautions can be taken, treatment can be administered and
special programmes of counselling can be directed at those prisoners. The
fourth justification for compulsory testing in prisons is that it will prevent HIV
spreading to the wider community in the future.
Some concerns may be raised as to the validity of the four points
above. It was argued in chapter five that testing for the protection of a person
other than the person being tested is never justifiable. This ground has led to
a virtual return to voluntary testing in the United States prisons systems. it
has been argued that mass screening should be avoided because its
coerciveness conflicts with the rights of the individuals not to be subjected to
medical procedures without their voluntary, informed consent and threatensto
deprive individuals of their rights to privacy. This factor has been regarded
as particularly acute in the prison setting. The New South Wales Privacy
Committee has in 1994 called upon the New South Wales government to
abandon its policy of forcibly testing prisoners for HIV primarily on privacy
grounds.
73 Hammett, and Moini, supra note 13, at p. 35.
74 Joint Sub-Committee on AIDS in the Criminal Justice System of the Committee on
Corrections and the Committee on Criminal Justice Operations and Budget, "AIDS and the
Criminal justice System: A Preliminary Report and Recommendations' (1987) 42/7 The
Record of the BarAssociation of New York, 901 -923, at p. 911.
75 New South Wales Privacy Committee, Private Lives and Public Health Privacy:
Guidelines for HIV Testing, Sydney, 1993.
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The merit in the second argument is also dubious. The present
difficulty of ascertaining prevalence of HIV in prisons across Australia due to
the alleged haphazard testing and re-testing policies leads one to question
whether a compulsory scheme would assist in obtaining that data. As noted in
chapter five, prevalence alone is not a justification for a compulsory testing
scheme generally. Prevalence data of HIV/AIDS infection in prisons is unlikely
to operate to curb the spread of the disease on its own without specific
measures being introduced. There needs to be more surveillance and/or
prevention of the activities that transmit the virus, such as non-consensual
rape.
As to the third point, on the use of precautions and the need for
identification and treatment of infected persons, it can only be stated that
precautions should always be taken, prevention being the only hope where
there is no cure for a disease. In addition, there is no special treatment which
could be provided to an HIV-infected person to warrant him or her being
identified in a compulsory manner.
Testing is not an end in itself and mere knowledge of antibody
status will not prevent the transmission of the virus and protect healthy
inmates. A study in Oregon concluded that there was no evidence that
compulsory testing of prisoners had an effect on behaviour change. In fact,
the study showed that there was mounting evidence that voluntary testing
combined with counselling does change behaviour. In Victoria, voluntary
testing in prisons attracts a 98% acceptance rate. If that is so, then it may
be possible to argue that if people wish to discover their antibody status then
they may also wish to alter their behaviour if a positive result is obtained, or
that they are at least more amenable to counselling towards behavioural
change than a person who is ordered to undergo a test.
^6 See studies listed in footnote 6.
Andrus, J., et al, 'HIV testing in Prisoners: is Mandatory Testing Mandatory?' Am J Pub
Health, 1989, 79:840, at p. 842.
Clunies-Ross, T., 'Management of HIV in Community Based Corrections', Paper
Presented at HIV/AIDS in Prison Conference, 19-21 November 1990, Melbourne, supra note
4, 273-280, at p. 297. The Victorian Office ofCorrections adopted a Correctional Philosophy.
This contained 8 guiding principles. One of these principles,
'Prisoners with HIV should not be further punished while in prison', could lie at the heart of the
voluntary system. The voluntary system established in 1985 is still maintained with a 98%
compliance rate (Commonwealth Government, State Stories,supra note 70, at p. 74).
In South Australia it is reported, that the voluntary system formerly in place
had a 70% compliance rate (SA Department of Health, South Australia's AIDS Strategy,
1987, at p. 10).
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It is only the fourth justification, i.e. preventing the spread of
disease within the community, that is readily defensible. If transmission of
HIV within prisons is probable because of the environmental conditions and
the presence of sexual assaults then there is a need to prevent transmission
to the wider community. However, testing alone will not achieve that end.
Other preventative measures such as counselling and education would need
to be adopted in combination with testing. There is some danger in basing a
testing policy on mere speculation that inmates infected with HIV will act in a
manner which may transmit the virus to others upon their release from prison.
As with testing in other circumstances, compulsory testing in
prisons has the potential to be highly costly as prisoners would have to be
repeatedly tested, especially since ne,w prisoners enter the system at a rapid
rate. Also, the tests are not 100% reliable. This may bring anxiety to the
person tested and also provide a misleading picture of the prevalence of HIV
within the prison community. In addition, the general concerns as to
breaches of confidentiality that were addressed when considering compulsory
testing in general also arise when considering testing of a specific population
such as prisoners. Safeguards against possible breaches would need to be
set in place. Policy makers would have to decide what uses would be made of
the tests and who would receive information regarding the results. Finally,
any testing scheme must have as a concomitant a well-devised plan for
housing persons who test positive.
It is necessary to examine whether testing schemes have been
mindful of alj these considerations. By focusing on State and Territory
legislation and policy, it will be examined whether these jurisdictions adhere
to the 1987 World Health Organisation guidelines. The examination will first
focus on pre-1987 testing procedures, and second post-1987 testing
procedures. Such an examination will also provide insights into the political
processes that have been instrumental in the development of legislation in
this arena.
(i) Pre-1987 Testing Policies
Northern Territory
Section 75(2) of the Prisons (Correctional Services) Amendment
Act (1985)(N.T.) introduced compulsory testing of blood and bodily secretions
as discussed in chapter five, at pp. 205-206.
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tor all prisoners on entry to prison. This legislation is still in force in the
Territory and does not.specifically relate to HIV infection. Section 75(3)
allows officers to use such force as is necessary to ensure that samples are
taken. An officer or person exercising such power is exempt from civil or
criminal action. The legislation makes no provision for possible breaches of
confidentiality by prisoners and prison staff and there is no reference to the
need for pre- and post-test counselling.
Queensland
Queensland implemented compulsory HIV testing for every
prisoner under the Prisons (Special Medical) Regulations (1986). Section 4
of the regulations allowed persons taking samples to use such force as is
reasonably necessary to ensure that the blood is taken. A prisoner who
refused to submit committed an offence against discipline. Section 7(2)
required that in the case of a positive result, notice be given to the
Superintendent of the prison, the Health Department and the prisoner. There
was no reference to what would be the fate of such a notice. This statute did
contain some confidentiality provisions and created an offence against
discipline for prisoners who gave information which may identify whether a
prisoner suffered from HIV. Prison wardens or other officials who divulged
confidential details about a prisoner's infected status were subject to a
penalty of $200.00.
Western Australia
Section 39 of the Prisons Act (1981)(W.A.) enabled medical
examinations to be performed with such 'force as is reasonably necessary for
the purpose'. Medical treatment could be imposed if the life or health of any
prisoner or other person (which could conceivably include staff, inmates and
visitors) would be likely to be endangered by the refusal of an inmate to
submit to treatment, so The term 'medical examination' is not defined. It is
doubtful whether it would be taken to include HIV testing. There is nothing in
the legislation specifically referring to confidentiality or counselling with
respect to test results, although medical officers are required to keep medical
so s. 45 and s. 39(b) authorise such testing on admission.
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records confidential. A policy of HIV testing for all prisoners "known or
suspected" of being homosexuals or drug users was introduced in 1985. it
is not clear upon what grounds or criteria a person becomes 'suspected' of
being a homosexual or drug user. The risk level is based on police and
medical records. ^3 if a person who is suspected to be high-risk refuses to
undergo testing they can be medically isolated in the prison. 8^ jhe policy
which exists in 1994, is potentially discriminatory, given that studies suggest
that many homosexual encounters in prison involve persons who normally are
heterosexual on the 'outside'. 85
Tasmania
In Tasmania, a 1987 amendment to section 17 of the Prison Act
(1977) by the Prison Amendment Act (1987) provided for the selective testing
of both long-term and remand prisoners where the life or health of the
prisoner, other prisoners or detainees, or a prison officer is 'likely to be
endangered or seriously prejudiced by the failure of the prisoner or detainee
to undergo medical treatment or medical tests'. 86 The term 'medical test' was
not defined as including HIV testing although it did include taking blood and
body secretion samples for the purpose of assessing the physical and mental
health of a person. 87
These testing provisions have been criticised because they do not
appear to provide adequate protection against possible breaches of
confidentiality with regard to test results. 8?The Act specifically allows officers
81 s. 39(c).
82Heilpern and Egger, supra note 6, at p. 32.
88Commonwealth Government, State Stories, supra note 70, at p. 45.
84 This is contained in Executive Directors Rule 3Q passed pursuant to section 35 of the
Pr/sonsAct (1981 )(W.A.).
85Thomas, supra note 18 and Goldberg, supra note 19.
86 s. 3(a)(b).
878.17(6).
88 Patmore, P., 'AIDS Tests for Tasmanian Prisoners: AManual for Discrimination?', (1987)
12/6 Legal Service Bulletin, 272-273. Patmore concluded that 'the Bill [now an Act] displays
a frightening lack of logic and understanding of the AIDS problem as it relates to prisoners. If
enacted, it will create more problems than it is supposed to solve by inevitably leading to
prejudicial treatment and stigmatisation of prisoners.' See also media releases, 'Opposition
slams compulsory AIDS tests for prisoners'. The Mercury, October 29 1988.
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to disclose such information for the purpose of performing official functions
but does not specify what official functions might require such disclosure.
Another ground for criticism has been that the Act does not provide, for the
immunity from legal liability for doctors who administer a test without the
prisoners consent. Further, the Act does not require that antibody positive
prisoners be notified of their HIV status. Also, noneof the provisions make
any reference to the need for counsellirig of prisoners prior to testing.
Victoria
In Victoria, section 29 of the Corrections Act (1986) provides for
testing of blood and bodily secretions as soon as a prisoner is received into
prison. This legislation is not AIDS-specific and appears to have a
discretionary tone in relation to testing. For example, 'the principal medical
officer may direct the prisoner to submit to medical tests.' Peter Harmsworth,
Director-General, Office of Corrections stresses that; 'our testing policy is
totally voluntary'. 91
The Victorian statute protects against breaches of confidentiality of
information relating to test results by prison officers. ^2
New South Wales and South Australia
New South Wales and South Australia both introduced a 'voluntary
testing' scheme in 1985. However, in New South Wales, high-risk
prisoners were reputed to be refusing blood tests because of harassment by
warders and the lack of confidentiality in the prison system. Further, the
consequences of a positive result meant that HIV-infected persons were
segregated and transferred to the Malabar Assessment Unit at Long Bay Jail
in New South Wales. The Unit has since been closed due to increasing
89S.I7(4).
99 Patmore, supra note 88.
91 Harmsworth, P., 'HIV/AIDS in the Victorian Prison System', Paper presented to
Conference on HIV/AIDS in Prison, 19-21 November 1990, Melbourne, supra note 4, 125-
132, at p. 128.
92s. 30(1 )(2).
93 Carr, supra note 5, at p. 10.
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speculation that breaches of confidentiality within the unit were detrimental to
the health of infected prisoners.
An analysis of the compulsory testing legislation enacted at the
beginning of the 'AIDS crisis' reveals that testing was not for the benefitof the
prisoner but for the purpose of identifying infected prisoners to staff and other
prisoners. It seems somewhat illogical to test prisoners and then not to
segregate HIV-infected prisoners from other prisoners as has occurred in
some State and Territory prison systems. However, segregation may not
have been appropriate for short-term prisoners. Notwithstanding this latter
point, the failure to segregate after testing arguably suggests that mere
identification was an overriding aim in the testing. The legislation may have
been implemented as a political measure perhaps to placate staff or the
various State Departments of Correction. But little was done to increase
knowledge about HIV infection. 95 Overall, early legislation, carried few
confidentiality provisions and did not impose counselling requirements now
medically encouraged as a prelude to testing and mandated under Australian
public health legislation. 96
An analysis of some of these State and Territory provisions and
policies would tend to confirm that the requirements of the WHO 'consensus
statement' with respect to testing were not observed by the pre-1987 testing
legislation. For example, any compulsory scheme such as that operating in
the Northern Territory, Queensland and Tasmania offend the basic tenet of
the statement which endorses voluntary and informed testing only. 97 in
addition. Paragraph E. of the 'statement' which reads 'Decisions regarding
testing and/or screening should be considered in the context... the ability to
maintain confidentiality ... ' was not adopted in those States and Territories,
such as Northern Territory and Tasmania, with compulsory testing schemes,
or those States with voluntary schemes, such as Western Australia and New
South Wales, where confidentiality of test results was not mandated.
These deviations from suggested policymight, be defended on the
ground that the provisions were set in place prior to 1987 when the WHO
Yabsley, M., 'Government Prisons Policy', written in 1988, but appearing in Civil Liberty,
No. 136, 1990, 3-8.
95Carr, supra note 5, at p. 9.
95 as covered in ctiapter five. Forexample, inVictoria, before detention orders are issued
for recalcitrant persons, counselling must have been attempted.
97paras. 0 2 (b).
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'consensus statement' was released. A number of the statutory provisions
considered above, namely, Queensland's and South Australia's were
amended during 1987 and early 1988. The Tasmanian legislation was
amended in 1993. The amended provisions will be set out below. As neither
the Northern Territory nor Western Australia have amended their legislation in
any significant effect these two jurisdictions will not be covered.
(ii) Post-1987 testing Policies
Queensland
In Queensland, the AIDS-specific legislation was repealed
following the passage of the Corrective Services Regulations (1989) under
the Corrective Services Act (1988). Under section 48(4) of this Act the
general manager of a prison may authorise a medical officer to take samples
of a prisoner's blood if he or she believes on reasonable grounds that the
sample may afford evidence of the commission of an offence. Under Section
50(2)(b), whenever a medical examination is carried out, a medical officer
may for the purpose of any examination or treatment 'take samples of a
prisoner's blood and any other bodily substance ...'. Qnly under section 48 is
it specifically stated that the results of any test will be furnished to the
prisoner. Hence, even though section 50 specifically pertains to testing on
entry it does not provide that a prisoner will receive his or her results. The
difference between these sections and the prior regulation is that they are no
longer AIDS-specific. It is significant though that the new amendments
contain no reference to counselling. The only provisions relating to
confidentiality apply to medical practitioners. However, the Corrective
Services (Administration) Act (1988) also forbids persons within prisons from
releasing information acquired in the course of official functions unless
required by legislation or a court of law.
The 1990 Stir Report, recommended that compulsory testing
should continue in Queensland, provided it is complemented by adequate
information, pre-and post-test counselling, training and resources for both
inmates and correctional staff. Inmates should be advised of their results
promptly irrespective of outcome and principles of confidentiality should be
98s. 50(5)(a).
99s. 61(1)
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strictly observed, loo Implementation of these recommendations has
commenced. For example, counselling is a requirement listed in Rule 34 of
the Queensland Corrective Services Commission. This rule was passed in
1991. 101 In 1994, Queensland has the most stringent testing policy of all
Australian jurisdictions given that testing occurs at admission, after three
months, yearly and prior to release. 102
South Australia
In 1987 a compulsory blood testing scheme for all persons in
custody for more than 7 days was introduced. io3 The policy requires pre- and
post-test counselling to be offered in conjunction with testing, In South
Australia in 1988, a special provision requiring the medical examination of
prisoners was inserted by amending the Corrective Services Act (1982).
Section 65(1) states that a Permanent Head can, for purposes of assessing
prisoners or preventing or containing the spread of disease within a
correctional facility, direct all prispners of a class, or particular prisoners, to
undergo such medical examinations or tests as specified. Section 65(2)
provides that prisoners must not hinder or obstruct a medical practitioner
carrying out such medical examinations or tests.
New South Wales
Prior to 1988 in New South Wales a number of testing schemes for
prisoners were considered. These included voluntary, anonymous and
compulsory testing programmes. NewSouth Wales testing proposals can be
tied to specific incidents involving either officer unrest or prisoner mis
behaviour. For example, the move towards a compulsory system in New
South Wales which was achieved in November 1990 was fuelled by the
100 Prisoner and Family Support Association, The StirReport: HlV Minimisation Strategies
for Queensland Correctional Centres, Prisoner and Family Support Association, Queensland,
1990, at p. 3.
i°i Commonwealth Government, State Stories, supra note 70, at p. 67.
i®2 Roughley, D., 'Queensland Prisons and the Transmission of HIV infection' Criminology
Australia, 1993, at p. 26.
103 Bloor, A., 'Managing HIV Prisoners in an Integrated Setting - Some Successes and
Failures', Paper presented at HIV/AIDS in Prison Conference 19-21 November 1990,
Melbourne, supra note 4,133-142, at p. 135.
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syringe attack on a prison officer at Long Bay jail by a prisoner in July 1990.
104 Tfie fact that the officer was later found to be seropositive as a result of
the attack added to the debate.
The New South Wales scheme of compulsory testing on discharge
is within the terms of the National HIV/AIDS Strategy, ""os Due to the
presence of the 'window period' in HIV infection, it will be necessary for
prisoners to submit to testing at any time, lo® However, this was not seen as
necessary in the National HIV/AIDS Strategy even though the Federal
Government must have been aware of this characteristic of HIV-infection.
Regulation 14A(1) of the Prisons (General) Regulation (1989) sets out to
whom information as to prisoner HIV antibody status will be made available.
However, the grounds upon which these persons might be informed is not
adequately dealt with by the wording of regulation 14A(2), which states that
test results must not be disclosed except for the purpose of exercising the
functions of that office. Far from guaranteeing confidentiality the Act as a
whole provides for disclosure. It does not lay down the need for counselling or
education to accompany such testing and ignores the fact that testing alone
achieves nothing. If testing was to have these backups it should have been
provided for in the legislation. This will ensure that such safeguards will be
implemented. The failure to guarantee confidentiality and provide for
counselling contradicts the WHO 'consensus statement'.
Tasmania
In 1993 the HIV/AIDS Preventative Measures Act was passed
which amended the Prison Act. This legislation provides for both pre- and
post-test counselling, Hence, the Tasmanian government is acting in
accordance with the National HIV/AIDS Strategy , which stresses that HIV
testing be carried out in the context of pre- and post-test counselling.
104 This case was detailed in chapter three, footnote 114. The prisoner died before criminal
charges of attempted murder could be heard. The warder has successfully obtained
compensation from the Department of Corrective Services (supra note 52). It is unclear
whether the Department admitted that it had failed in its duty to provide a safe system of
work
105 para. 5.8.6, supra note 63; Yabsley, l\/1., 'Compulsory Testing and Integration' (1991)
Criminology Australia, 17-18 and 22, at pp. 21-22.
106reg.34A1 Prisons (General) Regulations (1989).
107ss. 14, 15.
108 supra note 63, para. 5.2.17.
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However, the Tasmanian legislation assumes that the rights of prisoners and
detainees are limited with respect to the refusal of HIV testing. For example,
section 17A(3) states that 'if a prisoner or detainee refuses to undergo an HIV
test after being counselled, the Director may take such steps as are
necessary to ensure ... that the prisoner or detainee undergoes an HIV test;
... .' While it is arguable that prisoners do not have the same rights and claims
as the community in general because they are modified by the necessary
conditions of imprisonment it is not correct that a detainee or remand
prisoner, who may not yet be convicted of an offence, should have his or right
to refuse testing curtailed by statute. As Victoria and Tasmania have
specifically addressed the issue of HIV testing of suspected offenders and
mandated that a court order is necessary before carrying out any such test,
then there is an inconsistency in the Tasmanian legislation when applied to
detainees,
Victoria
While the voluntary testing scheme commenced in 1986 still
operates in Victoria, there has been a return to setting down policy through
legislation. Section 120A of the Health (Infectious Diseases) Act (1991)
provides for the compulsory testing of a person who may have transmitted a
specified infectious disease to a 'custodian' (which would include a prison
officer or police officer, by the definition set down in section 118(c)). A
prisoner who assaulted a prison officer could be subject to this provision.
However, the legislation only allows testing in these circumstances following
an application made to a Magistrate for a court order,
ACCOMMODATION POLICIES
Testing for HIV raises the question of placement of confirmed HIV-
infected persons. The issue is whether seropositive prisoners can be
realistically returned to the general prison population or segregated. The
accommodation policies adopted by Australia in prisons in response to the
AIDS epidemic will be addressed and discussed in this section.
109 ss 6-19 of the HIV/AIDS Preventative Measures Act are said to apply to prisoners and
detainees (s. 46).
110 This legislation has been covered in chapter six, pp. 231-233.
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(i) Segregation
Segregation is one of the ways to prevent transmission of HIV. It
is also designed to protect infected persons from violent episodes by other
prisoners, and the healthy inmate from the HIV-infected sexual predator. It
has been argued that all sexual predators should be segregated, m
Segregation policy seems to co-exist with compulsory testing schemes.
Segregation may amount to double punishment and may result in
a loss of privileges and breach of confidentiality. Experience from
Australia 112 and the United States has shown that the cost in both human and
financial terms has been high. US courts have, however, been divided as to
whether the failure to segregate is a violation of the Eighth Amendment to the
US Constitution, in that healthy inmates are not protected or that segregating
prisoners amounts to cruel and unusual punishment because a loss of
privileges results and prisoner's rights are violated under the First, Eighth and
Fourteenth Amendments, Segregation also undermines educational
programmes by suggesting to prisoners that HIV can be spread by social
contact.
The World Health Organisation recommended against segregation
in the 'consensus statement' except for the patient's benefit. The
Vald, U., 'Prisoners and AIDS: Facts, Myths and Problems', AIDS Law Sourcebook,
Yale, 1986.
112 For example inAComplainant &Anor v TheState of Western Australia (supra note 53)
medical evidence tendered revealed and was accepted by the Tribunal as a matter of fact,
that segregation of the complainants had caused stress and anxiety to them and injurious
effects on their health (at p. 64).
113 Equal protection requirements in the 14th Amendment ('No Stateshall make or enforce
any law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States, nor
shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty or property, without due process of law; nor
deny to any person, within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws') are met if all
members of a certain class (for example, HIV-infected persons) are treated equally without
any type of arbitrary classifications. Hence segregation was permissible because all HIV-
infected persons were segregated (Poweii v Dept of Corrections 647 F. Supp 9968 (N.D.
1986). In Cordero vCoughlin 607 F Supp (S.D.N.Y. 1984) it was held that inmates have no
constitutional right to freedom from segregation. If segregation was used to present
transmission to inmates and staff it was recognised as a legitimate institutional objective.
Eighth Amendment rights are not violated because prisoners with AIDS receive adequate
food, clothing shelter, sanitation, medical care and personal safety. Further, First Amendment
rights ('Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the
free exercise thereof; or abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press; or the right of the
people peaceably to assemble, and to petition the Government for a redress of grievances')
are not violated because the needs of the institution limit prisoners' rights to free expression
and free association.
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Australian National HIV/AIDS Strategy neither supported nor discouraged
segregation but recognised that some form of separate facilities may need to
be available to minimise the spread of HIV if requested by a prisoner or in his
or her interests. It is easy to see how the duty of care that is owed to
prisoners by prison authorities could lead to defensive practices being put in
place by authorities. Arguably the best way to both protect a patient and
discharge a duty of care may be to segregate a prisoner, The Western
Australian equal opportunity cases '•^6 reveal that prisoners should not by
virtue of segregation be denied privileges that other non HIV-infected
prisoners receive. For example, they should be able to undertake paid
renumeration commensurate with their health abilities. In addition, these
separate facilities should have special procedures, such as additional visits
from counsellors.
Prison legislation in all Australian States and Territories has
provisions allowing for general segregation for the purpose of security or good
order of the prison, us Hence, infected prisoners who spit or bite could be
segregated on the same basis as any other prisoners would normally be
when engaging in violent activities.
Although there are few specific provisions in Australian State or
Territory legislation for prisoners identified as HIV-infected to be physically
separated from other prisoners, the early trend was towards segregation.
For example, in 1988 several HIV-infected prisoners were being confined in
the prison hospital at Pentridge Gaol in Victoria. 120 Prior to 1990 HIV-
114 at para. C(4) 'Prisoners should not be subjected to discriminatory practices relating to
HIV infection or AIDS such as ... segregation or isolation, except when required for the
prisoners own well-being.'
11^ This issue about the duty of care owed to prisoners to protect them from harm was
considered under the section entitled 'Prisoners Rights' supra.
116discussed supra.
117 supranote 63, para. 5.8.7.
11® s. 39(1) Corrective Services Act (1988) (Old.); s. 36(3)(4) Corrective Services Act
(1982)(S.A.); reg. 33 Prisons Regulations (1985)(Tas.): reg. 53(1) Corrections Regulations
(1988)(Vic.); s. 60 Prisons (Correctional Services) Act (1985)(N.T.); r. 9(3) Remand Centres
Regulations (1976)(A.C.T.).
11® except New South Wales, where reg. 20 of the Prisons (Administration Regulations)
(1989) and Prisons (General) Regulation (1989) reg. 35 allows for separation of the prisoners
suffering from 'any infectious or contagious disease' from other prisoners to prevent the
spread of disease.
120 'Jika-Jika AIDS Unit Idea', The Mercury, February 6 1988.
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infected prisoners were incarcerated in an isolation section in Sydney's Long
Bay Prison known as the Malabar Assessment Unit (or the 'AIDS Unit' as it
came to be known). In Tasmania, all H|V inmates were housed in the prison
hospital. Section 43 of the Prisons Act (1981)(W.A.) and regulation 54(c) of
the Prisons Regulations (1982)(W.A.), later known as Rule 3Q relating to
separate confinement allows antibody positive prisoners to be medically
isolated within the prison hospital and HIV positive prisoners were placed in
the hospital in Fremantle maximum security prison until it ceased operation in
1991. 121 However,; this segregation policy has continued at other Western
Australian prisons. 122 Queensland and the Northern Territory also favoured
segregation. In Tasmania, Queensland, Western Australia and the Northern
Territory, where the numbers of infected prisoners are low, this segregation
policy has continued. 123
Confidentiality concerns stenriming from segregation results in a
breach of guideline 5.70 oi the Standard Guidelines for Corrections in
Australia, which reads:
Prisoners isolated for health reasons should be afforded all.
• rights and privileges which are accorded to other prisoners
so long as such rights and privileges do not jeopardise the
health of others.
In 1991, a Western Australian prisoner was awarded compensation from the
WA Equal Opportunities Tribunal on the basis that his segregation on
grounds of HIV infection.denied him the opportunity to undertake prison
employment and to take advantage of counselling and recreational benefits.
124 The court held that the Director of .Corrective Services was obliged under
section 95 of the Prisons Act (1981)(W.A.) to allow the complainant 'an
opportunity to earn renumeration and to take advantage of counselling
facilities and recreational benefits, such as the minimum security activities.'
The issue of segregation has been the source of a further successful
application to the Tribunal in that State. 125
121 ReportofSelect Committee, supra note 42, at p. 57.
122 Asconfirmed in AComplainant &Anor v The State of Western Australia (supranote 53),
at pp. 21-24.
123 See Commonwealtfi Government, State Stories, supra note 70, at pp. 62-63 for N.T.; p.
66 for Qld.; at pp. 70-72 for Tas; at pp. 79-81 for W.A.
124 Hoddy vExecutive Director Department ofCommunity Services, supra note 54.
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(ii) Integration
Integration involves the mixing of HlV-infected prisoners with the
general healthy prison population rather than confining them in particular cells
or prison hospitals. Integration has been considered by some prison
authorities as a useful policy in dealing with AIDS. For example, as a result of
mounting criticism about breaches of confidentiality, New South Wales have
changed from segregation to integration. 126 Although Section 22 of the
Prisons Act (1952)(N.S.W.) allows the separation of prisoners to 'prevent the
contamination arising from the association of prisoners', there is now in place
an active integration policy In New South Wales prisons following the release
of the compulsory testing model in 1990.
In Victoria, a special unit for HlV-infected prisoners has been
established in 'K' division at Pentridge. However this unit also houses non-
infected persons who volunteer for the unit. Although it is a special unit it also
has features of integration, given the presence of the healthy inmates. The
officers who work in the unit volunteered to do so and both staff and prisoners
believe the unit works well. Given that offenders convicted of a range of
offences are grouped together under this scheme such an arrangement may
prove difficult to maintain in the future. 127
South Australia has always had an integrated policy. An 1988
amendment to the South Australian Corrective Services Act (1982) allows for
the segregation of prisoners for a period of no more than 14 days in the
interests of their safety and welfare and of other prisoners or if they are likely
to injure or unduly harass another. 128 jhis provision could apply to an HlV-
infected prisoner, although it is not HIV-specific.
The South Australian experience shows that harassment of HlV-
infected prisoners has reduced since 1987 when the Department indicated its
strong commitment to an integrated policy. "'29 But the 1989 study at Yatala
125 supra note 53. In order to limit further applications to the Tribunal the Western
Australian Parliament passed the Equal Opportunity Act (Infectious Diseases) Regulations
(1994) which restrict the application of certain provisions of the Act to prisoners suffering from
a disease. This is exemption is specifically stated to be until January 31 1995 to enable the
Prison authorities in that State to adapt their present policies which have been shown to be
discriminatory.
126 Yabsley, M., 'Govemment Prisons Policy' (1990) 136 Civil Liberty, 3-8, at p. 5.
127 Harmsworth, supra note91, at p. 129.
128 s. 36. And see Commonwealth Government, State Stories, supra note 70, at pp. 27-28.
129 Bloor, supra note 103, at p. 139.
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Prison revealed that 66% of prisoners surveyed thought that HIV-infected
prisoners should be isolated. ^3°
Overall, segregation policies would not be detrimental to the
infected prisoner provided it does not become another form of punishment.
Dwyer suggests, based on his experience working within Long Bay Jail, that
discontent, violent behaviour and attacks on prison officers are far more likely
to occur in a segregated rather than an integrated situation. i3i There is no
need for security type classifications on the basis of merely being HIV-
infected. Sorne European countries have responded to this by having an
integrated system and treating any HIV-related offence similar to other prison
offences which may result in solitary confinement. 132 integration can work
with appropriate education of the general prison population. It is to this
educational policy that attention must now turn.
EDUCATION
The WHO 'consensus statement' urged that education was
foremost in dealing with the AIDS crisis. 133 jhjs is especially so since many
prisoners are socially deprived persons with lower than average education i34
and hence may not have been effectively educated in the general community
about the dangers of their high-risk practices. The National HIV/AIDS
Strategy has stressed the need for specific education programmes to be
available for new and existing prisoners and those about to be released, with
staff and inmates involved in presenting HIV education programmes.i35
Prison officers are required to undergo educational programmes as part of
their training.
130 Douglas, supra note 1, at p.62.
131 Dwyer, supra note 4, at p. 113.
132 Denmark, andThe Netherlands, reported in Harding, supranote 14, and confirmed as
still the position in 1990 by Directorate of Prison Medical Services, HM Prison Service
Headquarters London, in 'AIDS/HIV: Statement of Current Prison Service Policy', Paper
presented to HIV/AIDS and Prisons, 19-21 November 1990, supra note 4, Melbourne.
133 para. C (2)(a).
134 Conolly, L., and Potter, P., 'AIDS Education in Australian Prisons' (1990) 23 Australian
and New Zealand Journal of Criminology, 158-164, at p. 162.
135 supra note 63 paras. 5.8.2 and 5.8.3.
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Education programmes In Australian prison policies vary in
structure and regularity. Generally, they target two groups: staff and
inmates.
(i) Training for Prison Officers
New South Wales has the most comprehensive training
programmes available for prison officers. There are regular information
sessions and trauma counselling available. The other States have various
officer training schemes South Australia offers on-going voluntary education
programmes. Resource kits are reportedly available in almost all prisons. ^36
A number of problems have been encountered with officer training
programmes. There have been reports in New South Wales that officer
training has been thwarted by Superintendents in prisons who are concerned
about the financial resources and time commitments of staff. There is also
evidence of considerable peer pressure in avoiding use of certain protective
procedures. For example, junior officers were labelled by Senior officers
as 'sissies who should not be on the job' ^38 when they used rubber gloves for
cell searches and blood spills.
(ii) Prisoner Education
i
Prisoner education schemes include the provision of leaflets and
voluntary education in Western Australia, the provision of education
prograrnmes for all prisoners within 4 weeks of entering the system in
Tasmania, the education of prisoners prior to compulsory testing in
Queensland, peer education programmes which also focus on Aboriginals
and developmentally delayed prisoners in New South Wales, and education
at reception, throughout and immediately prior to release in Victoria. 139 The
Northern Territory correctional system has had no prisoner education
136 Llehne, P., and Williams, J., 'HIV/AIDS in Australian Prisons A Commonwealth
Perspective', Paper Presented to HIV/AIDSand Prisons Conference, 19-21 November 1990,
Melboume, T able 2.
137 Adamson, E. H., 'Prison AIDS Project Custodial Officer Education', Paper Presented to
the HIV/AIDS and Prisons Conference, 19-21 November 1990, Melbourne, supra note 4,
211-220, at p. 213.
138 Adamson, Ibid, at p. 213.
139 Liehne, supra note 136, atTable 3.
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campaigns since 1987 and in Queensland, there have been none since 1986.
140
The effectiveness of Australian prison HIV education has not been
studied well yet. But the Yatala study suggests that both prisoners and
officers of that prison did not think that AIDS education had resulted in a
substantial reduction in risky behaviour such as IVdrug use. The study also
revealed that educational programmes in 1989 were not getting the
information across to prisoners. A similar study in Western Australia
reveals that the majority of prisoners and officers claimed they would like
more information on AIDS. 1^2
AIDS educational programmes must meet certain refinements.
Use of small discussion groups with an external expert or doctor, then videos
and films or movies, has been found to be 'a good way' to educate prisoners.
143 Further, an AIDS Education Evaluation Programme which began in New
South Wales in 1987 and continued into late 1989 found that educational
messages did not fit AIDS prison policy. 144 For example, in the general
community people are encouraged to use condoms and not to share needles.
To cover this, availability of condoms and needles has increased. In
Australian prisons, condoms i45 and needles are not available, yet the AIDS
educators teach prisoners to use condoms and clean needles if they have to
share them. The policy and the education do not fit together.
Education is an important facet of HIV prevention which should be
legislatively mandated. This would illustrate and confirm that is a priority
public health objective that should apply both within and without prisons.
140 Norberry, J., andChappell, D.,' AIDS in Prisons' (1989) 21 Trends and Issues, at p. 4.
141 Douglas, supra note 1, at p. 63. The usefulness of AIDS Education in the Prison setting
is evidenced by the programme conducted at Worcester Country House of Corrections in the
United States, where there have been fewer episodes of violence and discrimination since
the programme began (Norton, R., 'AIDS Education in United States Prisons; What Needs to
be Done', Report of the Third National AIDS Conference, Canberra, Australian Government
Publishing Service, 1988, at p. 621).
142 Close, H., 'Perceptions of AIDS in Prisons: Relevance in Developing Educational
Strategies', Paper presented to HIV/AIDS and Prisons Conference, 19-21 November 1990,
Melbourne, supra note 4, 221-232, at 223.
143 Ibid, at p. 227.
144 Conolly and Potter, supra note 134, at p. 162.
145 with the exception of the A.C.T. where condoms have been available since December
1992 under a pilot scheme (Anon, 'Condoms in ACT prisons' (1993) 4/1 National HIV/AIDS
Legal Link Newsletter ,11).
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COUNSELLING
Counselling Is seen by many experts as a useful AIDS policy in
prisons. It normally involves the provision of support and information as to
the social, medical, legal and ethical ramifications of infection with HIV.
Counselling has been medically accepted as necessary prior to arid after
testing for HIV whatever mode of testing is implemented. Its necessity has
been mandated under some State public health legislation that provides for
testing of HIV. •<46
The need for pre-and post-test counselling in prisons irrespective
of antibody status has been recommended in Queensland in the Stir Report.
•"47 The Commonwealth Government Discussion paper on AIDS, A time to
Care; A time to Act; a strategy for all Australians stated that
Knowledge of whether or not one is infected may have some
effect on the speed and direction of behaviour change,
particularly if accompanied by professional pre-test and post-
test counselling. "'48
The WHO 'corisensus statennent' endorses pre- and post-test counselling 149
However, the subsequent National HIV/AIDS Strategy can be criticised on
this point for its vagueness. It simply states that counselling should be
available in all cases where prisoners are tested for HIV 1so but does not
detail what that counselling should entail and when it should be offered.
According to Norberry and Chappell, although a variety of
counselling policies exist in Australian prisons, none are satisfactory. isi
Only South Australia and Western Australia have comprehensive polices in
that there is pre- and post-test counselling irrespective of the outcome of the
result. The majority of the States have post-test counselling only of antibody
positive prisoners. Also, some pre-test counselling does not involve the use
146 detailed in chapterfive, footnote 119.
147 TheStir Report, supra note 100.
146 supra note66, at p. 71.
149 para. C. 2. b.
150 supra note 63, para. 5.8.6.
151 supra note 12, at p. 4.
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of professional counsellors and merely involves the prisoners reading
pamphlets. in 1993 it was specifically stated by the Commonwealth
Government that it is unclear to what extent lip service is paid to counselling
requirements in prison administration. 1^3
CONFIDENTIALITY
There have been developments in recent years elevating the
protection of confidentiality and privacy of individuals to legal rights. The duty
of confidence in a doctor and patient relationship is said to evolve from the
very nature of the matters being disclosed. Breach of confidence is a
recognised action in coritract, and in negligence if the failure to exercise due
care leads to injury, and also in equity, as prisoners do not lose all their
civil rights upon incarceration, the duty of confidence is, in general terms,
owed to prisoners as well as the community. However, as a general principle
applicable to both the public and prisoners, if confidentiality is breached by a
doctor in order to prevent harm occurring to a third party or the community
then the breach will be regarded as legitimate, However, in non-prison
cases concerning breaches of confidentiality relating to HIV status it has
been held that it is in the public interest that HIV status not be disclosed in
favour of encouraging persons to prevent for voluntary testing. Since
^52 Liehne andWilliams, supra note 136, at p. 10.
Commonwealth of Australia, State Stories, supra note 70, at p. 65.
154 Edgell [1990] 2 WLR 471; Duncan vMedical Practitioners Disciplinary Committee
(1958) 1 NZLR 513.
155 Furnissv Fitchett (1958) NZLR 396; Wv Edgell. Ibid, Argyle vArgyle (1967) Ch 302.
North, P. M., 'Breach of Confidence, Is there a NewTort?" (1972) 12 Journal of Society of
Public Teachers of Law, 149 and Ricketson, S.,' Confidential Information - a New Proprietary
Interest?' (1978) 11 Monash University Law Review, 289, at p. 296.
v\/vEdgell, supra note 154. Here the trial judge stated that the duty of confidence owed
to a patient in the position of the mental health prisoner in that case, was less extensive than
the duty that would be owed by psychiatrists to ordinary members of the public. This point
was not addressed on appeal. The present writer believes that the majority decision in the
Court of Appeal which upheld the doctors action of breaching confidentiality is unsound
because the court based its decision on the ground that the public interest in being protected
from violence weighed more heavily than the prisoner's right to confidence. As the prisoner
was not likely to be released in the near future and there was no transfer application or
appeal being lodged there was no chance that he was to become a threat to the public. See
also chapter six, pp. 267-272.
157 XvY and Ors (1988] 2 All ER 647.
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testing is compulsory in the majority of Australian prisons it is unlikely that the
same public interest exception would apply. However, the importance of
confidentiality as part of a compulsory testing scheme has been discussed
earlier in this chapter.
Public health statutes contain provisions directly contradictory of
the maintenance of privacy of individuals. For example, there are
responsibilities placed on doctors and, in some instances, on other persons to
notify public health authorities of cases of communicable diseases, including
AIDS. 158 Not all public health legislation protects against the unauthorised
release of HIV-specific information. The advent of the 'AIDS crisis' has seen
amendments made to legislation only in South Australia, New South Wales,
Queensland and Victoria to cover this deficiency. 159 Such provisions have
been regarded a legitimate exceptions to the rules regarding confidentiality.
Although a number of prison statutes i6o contain provisions that
aim to prevent the release of confidential information they do not address HIV
infection specifically. Only the New South Wales and Tasmanian legislation
satisfies this requirement. i5i It is unclear often what the role of the doctor is
with respect to information regarding the HIV status of a prisoner under his or
her care. It must be recognised that a prison doctor has functions that differ
from a doctor outside the prison. Not only does the doctor undertake to
provide for the care of sick persons but there are tasks to be performed
which support the prison system. For example, a prison doctor will often have
to provide advice as to what type of institution the prisoner is physically and
mentally suited and whether the prisoner is fit for work. Further, because of
the unique characteristics of the prison doctor's clientele, information may
come to his or her knowledge which is relevant to the security of the prison.
Such institutional considerations place different obligations on the prison
doctor unlike his or her counterpart working outside the prison. Balanced with
this is the fact that HIV status is confidential information and the release of
such information could result in dire consequences for a prisoner, such as
discrimination in both employment and accommodation and the possibility of
1^ The statutes are set out in chapter five, footnote 11.
159 Thetermsofthe legislation is covered in chapterfive, pp. 196-200.
160 s. 20(5), 30 Corrections Act 0936){V\c.)\ s. 50(5)(a) Corrective Se/v/ces Acf(1988)(Qld.)
and s. 61 Corrective Services (Administration) Act ('\988){Q\6.y, s. 39(c) and ss 98 and 102
Prisons Act (1981 )(W.A.).
161 reg 34A Prisons (Administration) Regulation (1989)(N.S.W.); s.19 HIV/AIDS Preventative
Measures Act (1993).
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violence for a prisoner, within the system and also upon release. Any
legislation that authorises testing must set down some strategy for the use
that will be made of the test results. In addition, the legislation must detail
who has a right to be advised of the antibody status of the prisoner.
Stringent guidelines or legislative provisions need to be enacted
focusing on who within the prison system should have access to information
about the antibody status of a prisoner. This aspect warrants examination by
considering the personnel in the prison environment.
(i) Medical Personnel
In all Australian Prisons the policy is that the Medical
Superintendent is informed of the antibody status of the prisoner. Public
health legislation casts a duty on medical practitioners to notify cases of AIDS
and in some instances HIV infection to public health departments. prison
medical officers would fall within that general inclusion and would have to
notify Health Departments when cases arose. This fact alone would justify
medical staff being apprised of the HIV antibody status of a prisoner.
(ii) Prison Administrators
In nearly all Australian prisons, both Prison Superintendents and
Department heads are provided information about the antibody status of
particular prisoners. it is doubtful that prison administrators 'need to know'
the identity of an HIV-infected prisoner if the reason is related merely to the
implementation of various strategies. All they would need to know is the
number of infected persons and their security classificationwithin the prison.
(iii) Prison Officers
Similarly, the instances in which a prison officer needs to have
information about the HIV antibody status of a prisoner are limited. Heilpern
and Egger reported in 1989 that some prisons notify all staff, There are
only two justifications for releasing such information to prison officers. The
see statutes set out in chapter five, footnote 11.
Heilpern and Egger, supra note 6 , at p. 72.
for example. Northern Territory.
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first is where an officer will come into contact with the specific prisoner and
would need to know the prisoner's antibody status in order to provide specific
care for the prisoner. In those prisons where officers are assigned to special
units, then, unless they are rotated, there is no reason that those officers who
do not have any day-to-day business in that section should be notified of the
antibody status of the prisoners. Uniform universal precautions set in place
would be sufficient protection for these officers. The other justification is
where a prisoner is aggressive to staff or engages in behaviour likely to place
other prisoners at risk and staff need to know the prisoner's HIV status in
order to take precautions to protect themselves from transmission.
However, once this information is provided to an officer, if he of she fails to
prevent an infected person engaging in behaviour that he or she knew or
should have known would occur then that officer may be liable if that other
person becomes infected. The officer may be said to have breached his or
her duty of care to the other prisoner.
It might be useful for Australian prison authorities to consider
placing infected persons under a viral infectivity restriction order which would
indicate to staff only that the prisoner had an infection. Such an order could
also apply to other diseases. In England, where this practice is adopted
restriction orders also apply to Hepatitis B carriers.
(iv) Partners of Infected Prisoners
The question whether the partner of an infected prisoner needs to
have access to his or her antibody status raises questions pertaining to the
duty to warn third parties. If a prison doctor revealed such information it
would be outside the notification requirements set down by statute. Also, a
doctor would breach his or her obligation of confidence to his or her patient.
Although there has been no chance for Australian courts to consider whether
there would be a duty to warn third parties of the infected status of a person,
US courts have considered it on a number of non-AIDS related occasions.
"•65 Heilpern and Egger, supra note 6, at p. 72.
166 Directorate of Prison Medical Services, London, at p. 5. However the practice has been
highly criticised in England as the source of breaches of confidentiality and discrimination
within the system (Padel, U., 'HIV and prisoners' rights' (1990) 12 Liverpool LawReview. 55-
68 and in the Wolff Report, Prison Disturbances: Report of Inquiry by the Rt Ron Lord
Justice Woolf (Parts 1 and II) and His HonourJudge Stephen Tumin (Part II), HomeOffice,
London, Cm 1456, 1991).
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The issue, however, mainly raises questions of tort liability. In Tarasoff y
Regents of the University of California a non-HIV case, a psychotherapist
was held to have a duty to effectively warn a woman that his patient was
contemplating killing her. Whether this case may persuade courts in Australia
and then be applied to informing partners of HIV-infected prisoners is
questionable. A later US case concerning hepatitis B has limited, the Tarasoff
principle to situations where, even if the risk of infection to the public is
foreseeable, the doctor's duty to warn a third party arises from a special
relationship between the doctor and the third party. 168
In Australia, unless there is a clear and imminent risk to a third
party, it is likely that the duty to maintain confidentiality will override the duty
to warn third parties. 169 if, for example, conjugal visits were permitted within
the prisons then there may be a duty to warn partners of infected prisoners.
Some prik)ns have taken their own affirmative action. For example, in South
Australia home detention or day leave will be declined where the prisoner
objects to a third party who is at risk of being infected being advised of his or
her antibody status, i^o.unless there is clear evidence that the prisoner may
act in a manner placing the partner at risk of transmission of HIV infection this
policy of South Australian prisons seems unjustified. In the absence of any
clear guiding policy the present writer believes that policy makers need to
decide whether the process of notification of third parties on behalf of prison
doctors and other adminiistrators should be discretionary or made mandatory.
Although there is some logic in the view that 'the objective of medical
confidentiality is perverted if It is used to facilitate the intentional transmission
of disease' 1^1 there is a danger that if notification becomes mandatory then
the doctor-patient relationship will be undermined. It may be sound policy to
enlist the assistance of public health departrrient personnel to try to convince
prisoners to notify partners. As it is a requirement in Australia for all doctors
including prison doctors to notify health departments of known cases of HIV
167 131 Cal. Rptr. 14, 551 P.2d 340.(1976);
166 Gammiil v United States (1984) 727 F2d 950(10th dr.).
169 In fact this question has been raised by Neave, M., 'AIDS, Confidentiality and the Duty to
Warn' (1987) University of Tasmania Law Review, 1 -27. Neave suggests that Tarasoff will
be unlikely to be followed because Australian courts are more conservative about extending
the duty of care (at p. 26).
170 Bloor, supra note 103, at p. 136.
171 Glenn, H. P., Gilmore, N., Somerville, M., Morisseppe, Y. M., HIV Infection, AIDS and
Privacy, Montreal, McGill Centre for Medicine, Ethics and Law, 1990, Working paper.
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infection then prison officers may place the responsibility for persuading
prisoners to notify partners at the hands of public health department
personnel who may have been trained in partner notification skills. This
may be a preferred solution as many prison doctors may not have the time to
undertake this role because the time involved may be viewed as prohibitive.
Until information is available that would confirm that non-consensual
notification to third parties placed at risk could discourage individuals from
seeking care or from speaking candidly to their doctors, policy will have to
made in the face of uncertainty.
(v) Probation or Parole Agencies
As with prison administrators and prison officers there should be
limits on parole or probation agencies having access to the HIV status of
particular prisoners. Such agencies would only need to be advised of the
antibody status of a prisoner if a prisoner is suffering from some debilitating
condition of HIV infection and this factor may affect where a probation officer
will place that prisoner on a work release programme. A prisoner's status
should not be used to determine eligibility for work release and parole unless
it is with that prisoner's consent. This is because in most cases a prisoner's
HIV status would have no rational relationship to the offence for which he or
she was convicted nor to any rehabilitation for that offence. However, it is
unlikely that prisoners could invoke the equal opportunities legislation if they
were denied parole placement because of the fact that the prisoner refused to
consent to his or her status being disclosed. This is because the equal
opportunities legislation requires discrimination in terms of the provision of a
service and parole does not fit within this category. In addition, parole is not
an entitlement but is discretionary.
Overall, it is suggested that notwithstanding that the duty of
confidentiality is subject to so many exceptions that as a concept it is almost
abandoned, the promise of confidentiality in a prison environment may be
essential for a prisoner to come forward for testing. It may be argued that
given that compulsory testing is mandated in nearly all Australian prisons that
this proposition is without justification. However, the need for confidentiality is
not lessened where compulsory testing is the norm. It is arguably more
important because the right to choose to take the test has been taken away
from subjects and the only way this can be justified is if procedural
"•^^This view Issupported by Neave, supra note 169 at p. 22.
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safeguards have been clearly set in place. In addition, there are other
circumstances that are not covered by existing legislation or policy. For
example, it could be questioned whether police should be notified of the HIV
status of a prisoner who flees the jurisdiction while on probation or parole.
Notwithstanding the fact that breaches of confidentiality might be legitimated
in some circumstances and protected under the law, Australian prison
authorities would be disregarding their responsibilities under the WHO
guidelines and the National HIV/AIDS Strategy if provisions for protecting
confidentiality are not put in place and adhered to.
MEDICAL CARE
The WHO 'consensus statement' stresses that medical care is to
be of the same quality for prisoners as for AIDS patients in the general
community, jhe National HIV/AIDS Strategy specifies that HIV positive
prisoners should have the best practicable medical services, including access
to counselling, treatment and nutrition appropriate for people with HIV. 1^4
There have been few studies of the adequacy of medical care available to
prisoners in Australian prison systems. Arguably if the person is detained for
punishment not as punishment then a prisoner has the right to care as good
in the prison hospital as on the outside. It has often been argued that medical
care is sub-standard within prison hospitals or that inadequate treatments are
available, ^^sfhe failure to treat adequately in prisons may be directly relevant
to the tension between the aims of retribution and rehabilitation in the criminal
justice system as a whole.
One issue that may arise in the prison is whether there is a duty on
the part of medical staff to treat infected persons. It is recognised under
general legal principles that a doctor only has a duty to treat in emergency
situations, Kennedy and Grubb suggest that an undertaking will not be
•<73 0 2(0).
^74 supranote63, para.5.8.8.
175 see the SelectCommittee Inquiry, supra note 42, at p. 57.
176 This is confirmed by the criminal law. For example, in the Western Australian Criminal
Code there are two duties: the duty to provide the necessaries of life (s. 262) and the duty to
do acts the omission to do which may be dangerous to human life or health apply to the
provision of medical treatment (s. 267). These provisions set up a duty to treat in emergency
situations where the patient is deprived of the capacity to consent. Where a competent
person does not consent to treatment a doctor does not have a duty to treat because any
336
held to exist in law merely because of the coincidence of an emergency and a
doctor nearby. The law, they suggest 'does not impose an obligation upon
a doctor to act as a good Samaritan', However, they later concede that if a
person came to a hospital and collapsed next to an off duty doctor 'arguably
the law would determine that the doctor was not entitled to ignore the call for
help'. 179. Similarly, if a patient came to a hospital expecting treatment the
common law would support the argument that the patient has a claim to be
treated and with due care and skill. 1®°
The matter of refusing treatment to a class of persons has been
covered by legislation in Australia. In 1989, the Victorian government
amended section 4(aa) and (f) of the Equal Opportunity Act (1984) (Vic.)
following a move to impose a ban on HIV-infected patients by the
Freemason's hospital in East Melbourne. This rendered illegal any
discrimination against anyone based on infection or perceived infection with a
disease causing organism. In effect, this legislation prohibits Victorian
hospitals from refusing to treat HIV-infected persons. Anti-discrimination
legislation has been passed in nearly all States and Territories which applies
to discrimination on the grounds of AIDS. However, the legislation which
would be raised to prevent discrimination in medical treatment due to
'asymptomatic' HIV infection status as opposed to 'symptomatic' HIV status
has been passed in only two States and the Territories. 1®1 The legislation
treatment would technically be amount to an assault. Similar provisions exist in the
Queensland and Tasmanian Codes.
177 Kennedy, I., and Grubb, R., Medical Law: Text and Materials, 2nd ed, London,
Butterworths, 1994, 79-80.
17® Ibid, at p. 79.
179 Ibid, a\ p. 80.
1®® This was the essence of Barnett v Chelsea and Kensington /-/MC[1968] 1 All ER 1068.
1®1 Although itmust be recognised that not all states have in place such legislation. In fact,
prior to 1991 only New South Wales (Anti-Discrimination Act (1977), Victoria (Equal
OpportunityAct (^984), South Australia (EqualOpportunityAct (1984) and Western Australia
(Equal Opportunity Act (1984) allow people with AIDS to complain of discrimination on the
grounds of physical impairment. Such a provision will not cover an asymptomatic HIV-
infected person (with the exception ofWestern Australia where the EOT in the1991 decision
in Hoddy v Executive Director Department of Corrective Services (supra note 54) has
extended the term 'impairment' in the legislation to cover HIV infection that has not
progressed to the symptomatic stages, but see new legislation supra note 125, which
exempts prisoners from that provision until 31.1.95). An HIV-infected person who was
refused entry to a hospital on the grounds of his antibody status received an out-of-court
settlement in New South Wales following a complaint to the Equal Opportunity Commission
(Patterson, 'Legal Issues; Refusal of treatment - complaint settled' (1991) NationalAIDS
Bulletin, May, 26). Recognising this inconsistency, two States (Victoria and Queensland)
and the Territories specifically provide that the term impairment includes the 'presence of
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operates to confirm what might have been unclear prior to the advent of the
AIDS epidemic, i.e. that a doctor has a duty to treat a person who may pose a
health risk to the doctor. A 1992 report from the New South Wales Anti-
Discrimination Board reveals that health providers have refused to treat
patients, jhe anti-discrimination legislation would apply to corrective
services medical personnel.
Correctional services legislation imposes a duty to provide medical
attendance and treatment at public expense. The problem that is likely to
arise in prisons is not so much a refusal to treat, but a refusal, or inability of
prison medical teams, to supply all the various treatments available. Such
treatments include pre- and post-test counselling, access to doctors
experienced with HIV/AIDS, access to AZT (Azidothymidine) which may
inhibit the spread of the disease, access to nutritional supplements and
dietary advice, peer support services and hospitalisation.
The estimated cost of AZT per person per year is $10,000 and it is
unlikely that public prisons would bear those costs. In the United States,
the failure to supply AZT has been listed as part of prisoner claims of cruel
and unusual punishment under the Eighth Amendment to the US Constitution.
185 While such a claim would not have the same standing in Australia
because of the lack of constitutional rights on this ground, even if the cost is
prohibitive any scheme involving administration of the drug in prisons must
match that implemented in the general community. Given that any lack of
choice of medical care for prisoners with HIV is unlikely to spawn successful
litigation in this country - in the absence of a constitutional list of rights against
organisms causing disease' (Equa/ Opportunity Act (1984)(Vic.); Anti-Discrimination Act
(1991)(Qid.): Discrimination Act (1991)(A.C.T.); Anti-Discrimination Act (1992)(N.T.)). The
Commonwealth has also legislated to cover this defect (Disability Discrimination Act
{1992)(ah).
182 New South Wales Anti-Discrimination Board, Discrimination - The Other Epidemic,
Sydney, 1992, at p. 46.
s. 16(1)of the NewSouth Wales Prisons Act (1952) sets out this duty. In Victoria, s. 47
of the Corrections Act (1986) makes provision for 'reasonable medical care' to be provided to
prisoners.
184 us Prison studies report that, given the costs of treating AIDS patients range from
$40,000 to $300,000 per year, strain will be placed on correctional agencies' budgets, in
Note, 'AIDS Cases Found Concentrated in Few Prisons, Study Finds', Criminal Justice
Newsletter, March 3 1986, p. 4-5. In Australia, the annual cost of AZT was reported to be
$10,000 in 1988 (Commonwealth of Australia, supra note 66, at p. 75).
185 Easley, P. R., The AIDS Crisis in Prison: A Need for Change' (1990) 6 Journal of
Conterpporary Health Law and Policy, 221-238, at p. 237.
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which violations can be measured, it is even more vital that the policies of
treatment and care of prisoners are satisfactory.
There is presently little information available on how Australian
prisons discharge their medical obligations with respect to HIV-infected
prisoners. In Victoria, management of HIV-infected persons is in close
association with Fairfield Hospital, the major AIDS hospital in Victoria. AZT is
available through the hospital, with prisoners assessed for AZT in the same
way as infected persons in the general community are. The practice in
other States is defective. For example, in New South Wales testing is carried
out without trained counsellors. In Western Australia, the Parliamentary
Select Committee on HIV/AIDS reported that the conditions for prisoners with
HIV at Fremantle prison are 'inadequate and completely inappropriate'. 1®^
The situation in other State prisons systems has not been documented. As
the complexity and array of symptoms associated with HIV infection and AIDS
intensify, they challenge the prison systems capacity to deal with prisoners
infected with the virus. On that ground it is questionable whether HIV-infected
persons progressing to AIDS should be sentenced to a term of imprisonment
or whether it might be a ground for early release. As the first point was
covered in chapter six the latter issue will now be considered.
Parole Eligibility and the Effect of HIV Status
In the United States it has been argued that HIV-infected prisoners
should be denied parole or probation because these pre-release or
community based optionscannot provide adequate medical care or minimise
the risk of HIV transmission as effectively as prisons. 1®® When assessing
whether a prisoner is eligible for parole the question is whether a persons HIV
status should alter sentences originally mandated. When determining
eligibility it is reasonable that a person's medical condition and the propensity
to which he or she might engage in violent or non-consensual acts which
could transmit HIV to others would be relevant. It would be inappropriate for
medical factors alone to warrant an extension of their imprisonment in the
face of the presence of good behaviour periods. However, it would be difficult
to ascertain whether such considerations have been paramount given that
Harmsworth, supra note 91, at p. 130.
Report of the Select Committee, supra note 42, at p. 50.
1®® Vaid, supra note 48, at p. 232.
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Parole Boards In Australian jurisdictions do not have to furnish reasons for
denying parole to the prisoner. In addition, decisions cannot be appealed.
In the United States, early release has been a option for some
prisons.•'90 However, in Australia, early release on the grounds of health
cannot be considered other than on humanitarian grounds. It must be based
on whether the individual has complied with the conditions of sentence,
whether his or her release would jeopardise public safety from criminal
behaviour (not from disease), and whether he or she is in need of continued
guidance though community services.
6. ALTERNATIVE MEASURES FOR CONTROLLING THE SPREAD OF
HIV WITHIN PRISONS
If an HIV-infected person has been sentenced to a term of
imprisonment because he or she has shown disregard for another then we
must accept that this behavioural pattern could continue while in prison. As
concluded in chapter six, where possible when courts are involved in
sentencing HIV-infected persons whether or not HIV status is relevant to the
crime committed, courts should where possible make use of alternatives to
prison. Given that there are circumstances when this is not possible, or that
persons may become infected while serving a term or imprisonment 191
resulting in a pool of HIV-infected persons in a prison population then prison
authorities must consider the use of particular measures for controlling the
incidence of HIV within prisons.
The WHO 'consensus statement' made reference to a number of
other methods that could be implemented to control the spread of HIVwithin
prisons. These included the distribution of condoms and needles to
prisoners. These methods are not yet available in Australian prisons 192_
although their possible use has been debated. Prisoners do not have the
same ability to protect themselves from participating in activities which may
••^9 For example, section 50 of the Offenders Probation and ParoteAct(1963)(W.A.)(sirice
1990 known as the Offenders Community Corrections Act states that the rights to natural
justice are denied.
^90 For example, in 1987 the New York State Division of Parole released fifty seriously ill
HIV-infected prisoners (Sullivan, R., 'NY State paroles 50 men sick with AIDS', New York
Times, July 3 1987, Section I, p. 1).
••91 supra notes 39-40.
••92 with the exceptionof the Australian CapitalTerritory where a pilot condomscheme was
set in place in 1993, supra note 145.
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spread HIV as do persons outside the prison environment. As a result it is
arguable that prisoners need access to harm reducing techniques more so
than the general population. There is currently an inconsistency in the
availability of condoms and syringes within prisons as opposed to the general
population. As prison authorities owe a duty of care to protect prisonersfrom
harm then it is arguable that the duty extends to the provision of HIV
protective devices such as the provision of condoms, syringes and bleach.
DISTRIBUTION OF CONDOMS
The WHO 'statement' suggested that careful consideration be
given to making condomsavailable in the interests of disease prevention. The
National HIV/AIDS Strategy advocated the availability of condoms to
prisoners, and not just as part as a pre-release package given to prisonerson
their discharge, as is the case, for example, in Victoria. From the late
1980s commentators have expressed support for the introduction of this
measure, However, in 1994 condoms are available in only one Australian
prison jurisdiction. 196 Despite this, governmental working parties
continue to recommend the introduction of this measure,
Although condoms are not 100% effective in preventing
transmission of HIV, there is no doubt that they can significantly reduce the
risk of transmission when used correctly. 198 in the prison environment this
would minimise the transmission of HIVthrough sexual activity.
193 supra note 63, para. 5.8.4.
194 Harmsworth, supra note 91 at pp. 129-130. Harmsworth does not suggest any change
to this model.
195 Dwyer, supra note 4, at p. 112, Stir Report, supra note ICQ, at p. 21, Kirby, supranote
33, at p. 14, Heilpern and Egger, supra note 6, at p. 88, Gostin, L., 'Public Health Strategies
for Confronting AIDS', JAMA, 1989, 261:1621-1630 at p. 1626. In 1990, more than 100
experts at the HIV/AIDS and Prisons Conference held in Melbourne reportedly called for
condoms and needles to be made available on a trial basis (AFAG, 'Experts call for needle
and condom trials in prisons' (1990) NationalAIDS Bulletin, December/January, 3).
i96Australian CapitalTerritory, supra note 145.
197 As clearly set out in New South Wales Ministerial Review HIV/AIDS Legal Working
Party, The Courage ofour Convictions - HiV/AiDS: The National Strategyand the Laws of
New South Wales,Sydney, New South Wales Government Printer, 1993.
198 Their effectiveness has been acclaimed in a number of studies: Rietmeijer, C., Drebs, J.,
Feorino, P., and Judson, F., 'Condoms as Physical and Chemical Barriers Against Human
Immunodeficiency Virus', JAMA, 1988, 259:1851-1853. Roumeliotou, A., Papautsakis, G.,
Kallinikos, G., and Papaevangelou, G., 'Effectiveness of Condom Use in Preventing HIV
Infection in Prostitutes', Lancet, 1988, 1:1249.
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There are major impediments to the introduction of condoms within
prison systems. First, there has been resistance from prison officers who
believe that condoms will be used to conceal contraband goods in body
cavities. 199 Second, homosexuality is still a crime in Tasmania and is illegal
in the prison systems of South Australia, Northern Territory, Queensland and
Tasmania. 200 it would be contradictory for prisons to issue condoms in
those circumstances as the provision of condoms in prisons would be seen as
condoning homosexuality.
The failure to distribute condoms does not offend the 'consensus
statement'. The statemerit only urges that 'careful consideration be given to
making condoms available in the interests of disease prevention'. If a
condom policy were to be established, those States that currently criminalise
consenting sexual activity, or indeed any sexual activity, would need to
amend the relevant legislative provisions. The Tasmanian Upper House is
still strongly resisting the decriminalisation of consensual homosexual activity.
Further, given that generally Australian legislation still renders homosexual'
activity taking place in public an offence, and that prisons might be
considered public places, that element must also be amended. This is
necessary for any educational policy encouraging use of condoms for safe
sexual practices to have any impetus:
It is arguable that prison authorities have a duty to enable sexual
activities to be practised safely by the use of condoms. It is worthwhile to
note that in the Yatala study, 42% of prisoners though that if condoms were
available anal sex would increase and 63% thought most prisoners would not
bother to use them if they were available. Hovyever, 80% of prisoners said
consenting partners would use condoms. 201 in light of this information, is not
surprising that the South Australian HIV/AIDS Strategy recommends that
condoms be available to all prisoners. 202 However because sexual conduct
between prisoners is illegal under the Corrective Services Act in that State,
the provision of condoms would be inconsistent with legislation.
^99 Kirby, supra note 33, at p. 14, and Lake, S., AIDS in Prison, Unpublistied Manuscript,
Sydney, School of Law, University of New South Wales, 1990.
200 R0g 20 Corrective Services Act Regulations (^985){S.A.), s. 122-123 of the Criminal
Code (1924)(Tas.) will apply to prisoners. Section 93 of the Corrective Services Act
(1988)(Qld.) penalises assault and could conceivably cover sexual assaults.
20"! Gaughwin, supra note 1, at p. 62.
202 See Commonwealth ofAustralia, State Stories, supra note 70, at pp. 27-28.
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As noted earlier in this chapter, it is a well established principle of
tort law that correctional authorities owe a duty of care to persons under their
care and control and a breach of this duty gives rise to a claim in negligence.
203 This duty has been held to extend to the taking of reasonable care to
prevent one prisoner harming another. 204 if one prisoner infects another with
HIV while in prison then as this is a demonstrable harm prison authorities may
be held responsible in negligence.
This is the substance of a 1993 action commenced against the
State of New South Wales by prisoners to restrain the government of that
State from refusing to permit prisoners to possess and use condoms In
prisons. 205 The tvyo grounds of relief are a claim for an injunction to restrain
the Crown from an alleged ongoing breach of its duty of care in preventing the
distribution of condoms in prison. Second, a declaration that the
Commissioner of Corrective Service's decision to withhold condoms is so
unreasonable that no reasonable person could have exercised the power and
that itwas exercised taking into account irrelevant considerations. The Crown
argued that an injunction was not the appropriate remedy to prevent a duty of
care and that there was no operational decision affecting a particular prisoner
capable of attracting an administrative law review by the court. The Crown
also asserts that a government policy is not justiciable. On this latter point
the prisoners have argued that the decision to withhold condoms is a general
operational decision affecting many prisoners and so it is a reviewable
administration law decision. The decision has been reserved. If the prisoners
are successful then similar actions may be commenced in other jurisdictions.
If condom distribution will not be permitted then other methods
must be found to limit or prevent sexual transmission in prisons. Such
methods include increasing conjugal visits so as to reduce homosexual
activity, the provision of single-cell accommodation, the close supervision or
isolation of sexual predators and educational campaigns that advocate 'no
sexual practices' in prisons. Such campaigns seem ludicrous when one
203 Ellis VHome Office [1953] 2 All ER 149, at p. 154, Howard vJarvis (1958) 98 CLR 177
and L v Commonweaith (1977) 10 ALR 269.
204 In Dixon v The State of Western Australia [1974] WAR 69 Western Australian prison
authoritieswere found negligent for failing to prevent a prisoner assaulting another where he
had a history of violent behaviour and authorities failed to isolate him. In the case of L v
Commonweaith the Northern Territory authorities were found liable for failing to prevent a
sexual assault where a prisoner was placed in a cell with two others who were prone to
violence: (1977) 10 ALR 269.
205 John Doe, Richard Roe and Others v State of New South Waies, reported in 'Prisoners
sue for the right to condoms' (1994) 5(1) NationaiHiV/AiDS Legai Link, 1,11.
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considers that prisoners will re-enter the community and as such will not be
educated as to the preventative practices existing in the general community
aimed at combating the spread of HIV.
DISTRIBUTION OF SYRINGES
Needle-exchange programmes have been widely promoted as a
strategy to curb the spread of HIV among IVdrug users. Australia has a well-
developed policy of needle-exchange programmes in the general community
in every State or Territory. 206 Legislation has also been amended to
decriminalise possession of syringes and their supply by pharmacists.207 jhe
success of needle-exchanges in reducing the spread of the virus has not yet
been tested, although there are some studies pointing to a decline in needle-
sharing 208 but not in drug use overall.
The WHO 'consensus statement' suggests that governments,
may wish to review their penal admission policies particularly
where drug abusers are concerned in the light of the AIDS
epidemic and its impact on prisons. 209
This supports the supply of needles within prisons. The Yatala prison survey
suggested that '93% of prisoners agreed that if clean needles were available
the risk of transmission of HIV would be reduced', hence indicating that they
would be used. However, few commentators who support the distribution of
condoms favour a distribution of needles. 210 instead it is has been
206 Shipway, S., 'Outlets for needle and syringe distribution and exchange in Australia'
National AIDS Bulletin, July 1989. The Tasmanian system was legalised with the
proclamation of the HIV/AIDS Preventative Measures Act (^993) and the Western Australian
exchanges with the proclamation of the Poisons Act Amendment Act (1992) in 1994.
207 The various State and Territory policies are detailed in Cuatt, L., Tasmanian
Pharmacists' attitudes and practices regarding the sale of needles and syringes to
intravenous drug users, Tasmanian AIDS Council, Hobart, February 1989, at pp. 7-10.
208 For example, in England, a central London study shows over a one year period return
rates (of needles) improved and needle-sharing declined; Hart, G., 'Needle exchange in
central London: one year follow-up'. University College, London, 1989.
209 Section (G). In 1994 a pilot needle-exchange programme commenced in a prison in
Switzerland. The results of this programme are not yet available (reported in 'Prisoners sue
for the right to condoms', supra note 203, at p. 12.
2^0 Gostin, supra note 193, at p. 1626 does not specifically endorse it. Neither does
Harding, supra note 14, at p. 1262 nor the Stir Report, supra note ICQ at p. 22. Yet Kirby
does, in qualified terms, supra note 33, at p. 15.
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suggested that active steps be taken to prevent illicit introduction of needles
in prison and the prisoners be given information about use of dirty injection
material. 211 in 1992 active steps were taken in New South Wales to prohibit
the introduction or supply of syringes. The Prisons (Syringe Prohibition)
Amendment (^99^) was a political move to calm prison officers in the wake of
the Long Bay Jail prison stabbing incident. Section 37A prohibits any form of
needle equipment from being introduced into the prison or supplied to a
prisoner. However the legislation is drafted in terms which would allow the
provision of needles should such a scheme become acceptable in the future.
It is not difficult to see why needle distribution within prisons is
resisted in Australia. The policy is clearly controversial when it is considered
that drug users are incarcerated for drug-related offences. A needle-
exchange policywithin a prison would be a contradiction in terms. If needles
will not be made available, then the argument that drug users should not be
incarcerated for drug-related crimes becomes more persuasive. If needles will
not be provided, the provision of bleach for cleaning syringes may be more
acceptable. As sharing is part of the culture of IV drug use, needle-sharing
may be hard to eradicate indefinitely in the prison environment. Even if
prisoners will not discontinue sharing, they may be more likely to use bleach if
it is available. Victoria and New South Wales are currently the only States
where bleach is reportedly available to prisoners.212
There are other methods which may be adopted to curb the spread
of HIV within prisons which were not covered in the WHO 'consensus
statement' or the National HIV/AIDS Strategy. The usefulness of these in
combating HIVwillbe examined briefly.
PROVISION OF SINGLE-CELL ACCOMMODATION
In Australian States and Territories there is a move towards
single-cell accommodation. This is already the case in Tasmania, South
Australia, Queensland and the Australian Capital Territory. 213 However,
211 supra note63, at para. 5.8.5.
212 See Commonwealth of Australia, State Stories, supra note 70, at p. 77. In New South
Wales though bleach is available specifically to clean cells (Bloom, 0., 'Bleach to be more
accessible in gaols' (1994) 5/2 HIV/AIDS Legal LinkNewsletter 13).
213 Behrens-Peters, 0.,'HIV Education Strategies Within Correctional Services - The South
Australian Experience.' Paper presented to HIV/AIDS and Prisons, 19-21 November 1990,
Melbourne, supra note 4, 199-210, at p. 200. All inmates in Tasmania and the Australian
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communal showering facilities are the norm for a majority of prisoners in all
States with the exception of South Australia where almost half the prison
population have separate shower facilities. 214 The provision of single-cell
accommodation would also decrease the likelihood of non-consensual risk
practices taking place, for example, homosexual rapes, which, if allowed to
occur, might result in transmission of the virus.
PROVISION OF TREATMENT FACILITIES
In addition to the provision of specific medical support services for
HIV-infected prisoners, other programmes need to be implementedwhich will
also back up educational programmes on drug use.
Prisoners addicted to IV drug use must be given the assistance
that would be available to them in the general community. This is especially
incumbent on prison systems that are not able to prevent the infiltration of
drugs into the system. It is recognised that relapse and recovery is the norm
for drug users, and therefore it is mandatory that drug users be afforded some
means to return to drug use without the deadly consequence of HIV infection.
The National HIV/AIDS Strategy urges that IV drug addicted
prisoners have access to methadone programmes while on remand and
during the course of their prison sentence. 215 Methadone is the only drug
that has been found to successfully control drug addiction. The Liehne study
reports that methadone programmes are available to varying degrees in
Australian prisons. 216 Methadone should be available to those addicted to IV
drug use but as part of a strategy designed to overcome their drug habits.
Peer support could be used as a supplement to such a strategy. HIV-infected
Capital Territory have single cells (See Commonwealth of Australia, State Stories, supra
note 70, at pp. 70 and 57 respectively).
214 Heilpern and Egger, supra note6, at pp. 89-91.
215 supra note 63, at para. 5.8.5.
216 It is not available in the Northern Territory or Tasmania (Commonwealth of Australia,
State Stories, supra note 70, at pp. 63 and 72 respectively) and is not available to long
serving prisoners in Western Australia (Commonwealth of Australia, State Stories, supra
note 70, at p. 45). It is available to remandees already on methadone on arrival in the
Australian Capital Territory and available to HIV prisoners and heroin abusing prisoners to a
maximum of 500 in NewSouth Wales prisons (Liehne, supra note 136, Table 2, at p. 11).
South Australia provides a limited programme to prisoners serving very short terms of
imprisonment (who wereon methadone prior to incarceration) to HIV-infected persons and
pregnant prisoners who are drug dependent (Bloor, supra note 103, at p. 137). The position
in New South Wales and South Australia is confirmed by Commonwealth of Australia, State
Stories, supra note 70, at pp. 60 and 27-28. respectively.
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persons should have access to such a programme as a priority in prisons
where funds are limited.
7. CONCLUSION
The presence of infected persons and persons engaging in high-
risk practices within prisons is well-documented and can no longer be
ignored. Prison administrators can expect an increased burden of caring for
and managing HIV-infected persons in the years to come.
As the advent of HIV has shown, there will be different views as to
what is the appropriate manner of prison administration in a particular
jurisdiction. Prisons usually reflect the prevailing philosophy but they have to
respond to shifts in community values and changes in knowledge about
various social issues including public health and punishment. The process of
rehabilitation is assisted if prisoners are kept in touch with reality unless
special circumstances of prison life preclude such an approach. Any policy
must involve the balancing of conflicting demands and rights - the protection
of prison officers and the wider cornmunity on the one hand, and the
protection of prisoners and their rights on the other. Hence there needs to be
a balance struck between the provision of a secure system of custody and
the welfare of prisoners so that in due course they can return to the general
community. In many jurisdictions the balance is not being struck in a manner
which reflects a reasonable attempt to balance these competing interests.
Current legislation still elevates the interests of the wider community health
over the interests of HIV-infected prisoners. For example, compulsory testing
legislation for prisons lacks provisions protecting confidentiality and fails to
mandate both pre- and post-test counselling. Further, prison officers have
through their unions had an influential hold over prison administration. They
have either strongly supported measures which are not beneficial to HIV-
infected prisoners such as segregation or have demanded legislatures to
enact various prohibitions to ensure their own protection, such as the syringe
prohibition and property confiscation legislation. These unions have been
very influential in prison administration. Prison authorities have been
concerned that if the union's required restrictive practices were not followed
there may be problems for the management of prisons, in the form of strike
action. 217
217 As documented in AComplainant &Anorv TheState ofWestern Australia, supra note
53, at p. 24
347
The refusal to supply condoms and needle cleaning equipment
within Australian prisons shows that Australia still seems to be struggling with
basic public policy issues relating to homosexuality, drug use and the
HIV/AIDS epidemic which is a kind of primitive homophobia or narcophobia.
A conflict is perceived between the urgent need to prevent the spread of HIV
and demands to suppress drug use. The supply of both condoms and
syringes need to be considered by prison administrators if the spread of HIV
is to curbed within prisons. Like testing these are not ends of their own but,
as part of an educational package, could have fornriidable results. If prisoners
are thought not to have justiciable rights they are rendered a relatively
powerless group. It is therefore, incumbent on prison authorities or
legislatures to develop legislation or policy which regulates testing and
requires structures to be set in place which ensure that education,
counselling, confidentiality and reasonable medical treatment are provided to
prisoners.
The prison system as part of the criminal justice system provides
an ideal vehicle for assessment of certain prevention programme strategies.
Prison administrators have the power to adopt substantive prevention policies
given the significant degree of legitimate control they have over prison
population. They have a unique opportunity, which is unavailable to other
community services, to combat the spread of HIV. They have the basis upon
which to develop a uniform national prison policy, thereby ensuring the
uniform treatment of prisoners across Australia.
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CHAPTER 8
GENERAL CONCLUSION
Throughout this thesis HIV/AIDS has been referred to as an
'epidemic' or a 'crisis'. The Chinese ideogram for crisis comprises two parts,
one denoting danger and the other denoting opportunity. In 1994 it is
apparent that in Australia, the rate of HIV infection across high-risk groups
has slowed. The danger appears to have abated. Despite this, figures
denoting HIV infection and AIDS will continue to increase. Many of these
cases were a predetermined facet of the early years of the epidemic in
Australia and control measures introduced in the middle to late 1980s would
have little impact on these cases. As a consequence of this fact and the
unavailability of a cure, the presence of this disease vyill continue to be felt
within the various arms of the Australian criminal justice system. The danger
to life and health from HIV also provides a rare opportunity to reappraise
existing practices in the public health sphere and the criminal justice system.
The introduction set out three main objectives to this thesis. The
conclusions to be drawn from each of these will be considered separately.
The first objective was to consider 'how the politics of AIDS and
of disease and social problems of the past (and present) directly or indirectly
influence the manner in which governments, courts and legislatures have
acted in response to AIDS' (at p. 5). Chapters four and five illustrated that the
governments response in Australia and elsewhere to previous encounters
with communicable diseases and most notably sexually transmitted diseases
was not a commendable one. Chapter two considered the legal response to
those practices which governments and writers prefer to label as 'social
problems'. These practices include prostitution, homosexual conduct and
drug use. Chapters two, four and five each illustrated that historically
scapegoating and stereotyping has been the method adopted by
governments, legislatures and police departments for controlling social
problems. One might readily defend these past practices on the ground that
they developed in an era which regarded the individual as responsible to
society and in this respect had to lx)w to governmental authority. However, in
chapter four examples were provided of early public health amendments
relating to HIV/AIDS which were directed at certain members of society.
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These mirrored the policy adopted during the two World Wars when
prostitutes were singled out for government and public health administration.
Evidence was provided in chapter five of discriminatory practices being
applied in many Australian States and Territories to members of high-risk
groups, particularly homosexual men. The increase in autonomy rights and
the development of anti-discrimination law in the second half of the nineteenth
century conflicts with these examples of governmental ill-considered action.
AIDS has become a political-legal, medico-moral crisis. This
was inevitable given that the group that was primarily affected by this
epidemic were an already maligned minority group which had a strong voice
in the more populous States of Australia. The voice of the gay movement in
Australia brought politics back into law. Their cohesiveness and forcefulness
operated to expedite the usually slow pace of legislative reform in many
areas where reform was needed. Indeed, politics has been the cornerstone
of the response to HIV as might be expected in a liberal democratic country.
However, the downside of politics needs to be considered as well.
Politics has been a feature behind the early attempts at HIV
specific legislative enactments which were covered in chapter four. It was
noted that defects in the legislation in terms of being either underinclusive or
overinclusive would mar the application of such provisions in any serious
case. These provisions represented 'knee-jerk' responses from elected
officials who were deluded into thinking that the war on AIDS could be won by
law alone. The desire to quell community cries for retribution of HIV-infected
persons was counterproductive. It cannot be estimated to what extent these
early amendments in New South Wales, in particular, drove HIV infected
persons 'underground'. The attempt by governments to satisfy competing
community demands is reflected in the Tasmanian HIV/AIDS Preventative
Measures Act which on the one hand attempts to encourage at-risk groups to
come forward for treatment and testing, but, on the other hand, declares that
the promotion of homosexuality is illegal and so alienates the very group it is
seeking to persuade.
Politics has also been witnessed in the confines of prison
administration since the advent of the crisis. At the level of operation it has
been marked by unionism. Examples were provided in chapter seven of the
)
history and politics surrounding the enactment of the Prisons (Syringe
Prohibition) Act in 1992 in New South Wales and the conditions in Western
Australian prisons that led to the cases of discrimination being taken by
prisoners to the Equal Opportunity Tribunal in that State between 1992-4.
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Prison officers have debated whether to strike if condoms are brought into
prisons or HIV infected persons are not segregated. The presence of AIDS
has seen Heads of Corrective Services and governments face facts about the
incidence of high-risk activities taking place in Australian prisons. Policies of
condom and syringe distribution in prisons could not operate side-by-side
with the penalty provisions for drug use and sexual intercourse on the
outside. These issues for consideration within the prisons have brought to the
forefront the need to reconsider areas of legal prohibition in the community.
Governments have a long-standing political history of avoiding
issues such as how to control prostitution and drug use. This fact was
debated in chapter two. Heroin use in particular has been frequently cited by
academics and social historians alike as the result of deep rooted social-
cultural problems. The matterof decriminalisation ofdrug use reared its head
again in the context of HIV. One unsatisfactory feature of the AIDS debate to
date is the fact that there is still very little forward movement or frank
discussion by governments since the late 1980s about what to do about drug
abuse in Australia. There is no doubt that a comprehensive attack on the use
of illicit drugs cannot be successful without addressing the psychosocial and
environmental conditions that produce substance abuse. Current policy
makers have been particularly reluctant to address the environmental
correlates of substance abuse,- since that requires developing strategies to
redress fundamental gender, racial, ethnic, and economic inequalities in our
society. The present writer believes that studies need to be undertaken to
determine the correlation if any between alcohol and substance abuse and
engaging in sexual and needle-sharing behaviours that are high-risk for
transmission of HIV/AIDS. In addition, if unemployment, homelessness and
poverty are relevant factors then an increase in any of these will impact on
the criminal justice system. If there is such a correlation then we must
address drug abuse and consider the contribution that the institutions of
criminal justice can make to controlling the problem of drug use in society
apart from pure criminalisatibn strategies.
In summary, chapters two, four and five of this thesis have
shown that the peculiar sociopolitical conditions of a country, its public health
tradition, the role of differing conceptions of the claims of privacy, the legal
and social status of homosexuality, prostitution and drug use and the level of
organisation and sophistication of the gay community, have all contributed to
shaping AIDS politics and prevention efforts.
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The second objective of this thesis was to 'provide support for
the view that the criminal law should have a limited role in preventing the
spread of the epidemic' (at p. 5). In order to substantiate this view chapter
two considered the aims of the criminal law and determined whether they
were suited to a disease such as HIV. It was recognised that the question of
using the criminal law to prosecute instances of transmission of HIV lead
inevitably back to a consideration of social power relations and the political
and paternalistic role of criminal law. In this context it was necessary to
consider that 'harm minimisation' or the 'least restrictive intervention' have
become metaphors for the way in which criminalisation is considered in the
1990s. In addition, we have entered an era of increased personal autonomy
in both the sphere of criminal law and more particularly in public health law.
However, chapters three, four, five and six of this thesis reveal that respect
for individual autonomy can conflict with the purpose of preventing HIV
transmission.
The anti-criminalisation or anti-prosecution regime in this thesis
had three platforms. The first consisted of the theoretical and historical
arguments which were used to criticise such laws because they
misunderstand what the problem they are tryirig to solve is about. This is the
claim of the anti-symbolist. The present writer does not see the purpose in
placing provisions in statutes that are not really attempting to remedy a
problem but are purely symbolic. There are instances of criminal provisions
that have this purpose and there are a number of academic writers who
believe that the criminal law should be used for this purpose in controlling
AIDS. Fundamentally, criminal law provisions were not developed for and
are inadequate to deal with transmission of disease. They reflect the fact that
responsibility for curbing disease should not be a function of the criminal law.
By contrast, the Tasmanian HIV/AIDS Preventative Measures Act (1993)
illustrates that in the public health arena it is possible to draft provisions in an
educative tone which will be more likely to gain the desired compliance.
The second platform involved a philosophical critique which,
offered principled objections to interference in an individuals life for reasons
beyond the protection of innocent others. Chapter two rekindled the debate
between the aims of the criminal law: the enforcement of morality against the
prevention of harm to others. It was indicated in this thesis that historically
people turn to the lawmaker to unravel and eradicate social problems. More
particularly people expect that unruly, undesirable or immoral behaviour will
or should be controlled by the criminal law.
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The thesis concluded that the overriding aim of the criminal law
should be the prevention of harm, not the enforcement of morality or
paternalism. This theory is applicable not only to AIDS but any other social
problem for which guidance is sought from the criminal law. The theory was
derived in large part from an analysis of the failure of the criminalisation
model for drug use. Prosecutions should not be mounted against persons
who infect others during consensual sexual intercourse or needle-sharing
episodes. The categorisation of perpetrator and victim is not easily
established in this scenario in the absence of any deliberate attempt by one
party to misrepresent his or her infected status. The only justification left for
imposing criminal liability in those circumstances is for the purpose of
enforcing morality. History reveals that the criminal law has failed to enforce
morality in the past through criminalising homosexual conduct, prostitution
and drug use. In addition, prosecutions based on symbolic or deterrence
grounds are likely to be counterproductive to those already oppressed
minority groups in society who are in need of care and counselling.
The third platform encompassed the practical argumerits that we
have better things on which to spend law enforcement dollars. Problems
with enforcement, proof, the death of the accused and/or the victim and the
presumption of innocence were canvassed in the context of AIDS. In the early
years of the epidemic prosecutorial authorities were encouraged to attempt to
apply traditional criminal laws to HIV/AIDS transmission. Many prosecutions
under such provisions had to be dropped for the variety of reasons
. considered above.
Taking these three platforms together, in the present writer's
view no new criminal law should be made unless it addresses a known
problem of such gravity and/or frequency that the law is the best or most
desirable solution; unless it is likely to achieve its objectives; unless its
projected outcomes are likely to be better than those presently existing; and
unless it is significantly free of the risk of abuse. HIV specific provisions in
criminal law cannot be justified by the gravity of the problem. Admittedly, HIV
is a problem in the community in terms of health care but it is not a feature of
all criminal activity. The history of the police selectivity in the enforcement of
crime which was identified in chapter two provide little assurance that such
provisions would be used in a responsible way. The writer concedes that
clear non-consensual wanton acts of aggression which create a risk of
transmission of HIV do harm others and are deserving of punishment. In
those instances current criminal law provisions will be applicable. Instead of
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creating a myriad of offences policy makers would be wise to address
problems that will arise with respect to those offences that would most likely
be relevant. As set out in chapter three, it is the offences of assault and
sexual assault that can be realistically considered in the context of HIV.
Presently the law does not protect the party who consents to sexual
intercourse where circumstances involve misrepresentations as to HIV status
by the other party. There needs to be legislative direction on the need to
obtain informed consent and what an informed consent entails in the criminal
law.
As indicated in the introduction, the main aim within this second
objective was to set out what should be the appropriate nexus for the criminal
law vis-a-vis public health law. It was clear that guidance as to the proper
nexus lay in the theme or overall strategy for control of HIV in Australia. That
theme has been clearly identified through the National HIV/AIDS Strategy as
one of 'prevention' rather than 'prohibition'. It was argued that public health
law with its history of useful objectives such as contract tracing, partner
notification, the provision of counselling was better suited to curb the spread
of HIV where the theme of prevention was foremost. However, the one
proviso placed on the application of public health to control of the spread of
HIV in this thesis is that it was the 'new' public health that was in control. The
concept of a 'new' public health warrants examination.
Public health legislation has always provided penalties for
exposing others to the risk of infection and has in place measures for
removing infected persons from the general population. Upon analysis of
these provisions it was found that many had been developed in a very
different era of infectious diseases and could not be realistically applied to a
disease such as AIDS with a very long incubation period and no cure. It
became clear that there was a need to amend archaic provisions which had
been inherited from a time when the ideology that governments of a society
had any responsibility to an individual was not accepted as a social principle. ^
The 'new' public health embodied a recognition that a
voluntarianist consensus has informed public policy decisions. The strategy
for AIDS prevention thus reflected the proposition that the defence of public
health was not dependent upon the abrogation of civil liberties and privacy,
but was, rather, dependent upon the protection of such liberal values. A
Cumpston, J. H. L., The Health of the People, Canberra, Roebuck Books, 1978, at p. 8.
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failure to recognise the importance of such values would have the
counterproductive consequence of 'driving the disease underground'.
The policy in public health is now more attuned to striking a
balance between competing interests, that of the community to be protected
from disease, and the right of the individual not to be unfairly oppressed.
The analysis in this thesis has the capacity to satisfy some of the demands of
both sides of the debate concerning the right of the State to interfere to
protect the community health. It thereby represents a balance betvyeen two
extremes. The thrust of this thesis allows the State to maintain an interest in
disease control and set limits to the appropriate behaviour of individuals while
preventing abuses of individual rights. In the past, although individual
interests and community interests have been regarded as worthy of protection
they have also been seen to be incompatible. But 1990s public health policy
reveals that this need, not be so.
Rather than focusing on detention and isolation, provisions need
to carry educational overtones and encourage persons at risk of infection to
come fonward for voluntary testing and counselling. The more novel statutes
such as the Tasmanian HIV/AIDS Preventative Measures Act (1993) are
drafted with an educative tone. However, chapter five has revealed that there
are still many public health statutes that provide broad powers for public
health officials to detain persons suffering from communicable diseases.
Such provisions need to clearly set down the behavioural options a person
has before they will be detained. Provisions need to delineate the factors that
will be relevant in issuing a public health order. If we wish to encourage
behavioural change that is long-standing then coercive measures such as
cease and desist orders are not appropriate. Behavioural changes have to be
the consequence of personal autonomy in order to be effective. Some of the
practices that have emerged over the past decade in response to AIDS
should inform the practice of public health more generally. For example, the
principle of requiring informed consent to for HIV tdsting ought to apply to all
clinical tests to which competent adults may be subject. Although many of
the changes referred to in this thesis were AIDS-motivated they were also
long overdue.
The third objective was to consider if, and if so how, the criminal
justice system can contribute to curbing the spread of HIV (at p. 5). The
problem in the past with the system of criminal justice having a useful
application to control of social problems has been the conflict between the
retributive and rehabilitation models of justice. This is a prime reason for the
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inadequacy of prison medical services for the treatment of HIV as evidenced
in chapter seven. Chapter six of the thesis has established that the criminal
justice system does have something to offer in curbing the spread of HIV. Bail
conditions could be used to encourage the use of HIV preventative practices.
In sentencing, the controversial issue of reducing the spread of HIV in
prisons could be quelled by awarding non-custodial sentences or more
usefully imposing rehabilitation and treatment on offenders; particularly, drug
users. This is an important policy direction given the evidence provided in
chapter seven which indicated that a significant proportion of persons
imprisoned in Australia were IV drug using property offenders. The fact that
there are significant numbers of IV drug users in prison and that few States
offer drug treatment programmes such as methadone treatment in prisons,
renders the the provision of these services a high priority. Admittedly in the
other arms of the criminal justice system such as the police, there is no place
available for the provision of treatment but it could be developed and such a
theme is not incompatible with criminal law. The criminal law provides many
victim-based services and these where relevant, could be extended to the
defendant.
The thesis has also identified areas within the system of criminal trial
and procedure where the needs of the accused and his or her victim are
largely unprovided for. For example, the resolution of the issue of HIV testing
in the criminal process for either the victim's benefit or to allow police to
obtain evidence to substantiate the charge against the accused needs
legislative intervention. Any resolution at that level may operate as the guide
for the proper administration of HIV testing in the general medical sphere
where the matter is currently in a state of flux.
The National HIV/AIDS Strategy has been referred to
throughout this thesis. Even though it is not legally binding, the Strategy in
both its editions 2 has been regarded as the foremost guide in the area of
HIV/AIDS and the law in Australia. The limits of legislation in disease-
control were recognised as early as 1907 when the Tasmanian Public Health
Commissioner, Elkington stated that 'it cannot be too strongly emphasised
that disease has no formal warning, it has no respect for persons, or for
statutes ... and it cannot be explained or frightened away...'. ^ The National
2 Commonwealth of Australia, National HIV/AIDS Strategy, Canberra, Australian
Government Publishing Service, 1989; Commonwealth of Australia. National HIV/AIDS
Strategy 1993-1994, 1995-1996., Canberra, Australian Government Publishing Service,
1993.
3 Health Department ofTasmania, Public Health Annual Reports 1907, at p. 1.
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HIV/AIDS Strategy recognises this in its guiding statement which says that
the law should complement and assist education and other public health
measures. The Strategy lists a number of principles and through the
various chapters of this thesis these concerns have been indirectly
considered. It is necessary to examine how successful Australia has been in
adhering to some of these principles within the theme of this thesis.
It was suggested by the Strategy that 'law reform should take a
rational, humane and responsive approach to the problems of the HIV
epidemic'. ^ interestingly, US writers in the area call for more effective
prevention and health care strategies, which they believe can only be
obtained by 'experiences and views of those hit hardest by the epidemic
[being] made more central to the conduct of scientific research and the
establishment of health policy'.6 These authors admit that in the US there is a
need to transform the approach to HIV. By contrast, the Australian response
has been characterised by a mobilisation of efforts of the Commonwealth
Government, the State government and community sectors. The code of
success in Australia is the effective partnership between government, the
medical/scientific community, affected communities and a political approach
generally supported by all major parties. , '
In this respect one would expect a rational and responsible
approach to the development of policies and legislation. But there are
instances where the spirit of the Strategy is not being adhered to and there is
also a need to realise that in the area of criminal justice there is very little
guidance as to how the major institutions of criminal justice are to manage
AIDS. Suspects in the criminal process and prisoners are still a much
maligned group where irrational interests of others seem to predominate in
policy development and day-to-day handling of these persons. There are
examples from public health where legislation has been enacted that has not
been informed and rational. For example, as reflected upon in chapter four,
early AIDS-motivated health legislation which was operable in Queensland
until 1988 had created a protective measures defences to a transmission
offence for partners in long-standing relationships only. In addition, there is
also the Tasmanian HIV/AIDS Preventative Measures Act (1993) which sets
^ National HIV/AIDS Strategy 1993-1994, 1995-1996, para. 6.0, at p. 38.
^ Ibid.
® Fee, E., and Krieger, N., 'Understanding AIDS: Historical Interpretations and the Limits of
Biomedical Individualism', Am J of Pub Health, 1993, 83/10:1477-1486, at p. 1483.
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up a process for dealing with transmission, testing, counselling and
education but potentially undermines the success of the legislation because
the government frowns upon and the legislation prohibits homosexual
conduct.
Another important guiding statement in the Strategy was that
'laws created to deal with HIV/AIDS alone require particular justification.7. in
chapter two and three of this thesis itwas recognised that as the criminal law
intrudes into peoples lives and conflicts with their rights there must be some
justification for this. Similarly, public health is one of the few areas where
personal liberty can be restricted without commission of any criminal act. The
insertion of new offences into criminal legislation in New South Wales and
Victoria which were considered in chapter three, disregard the terms of the
Strategy which were to limit interference in the criminal sphere not extend it.
Chapter three reveals that the present application of these offences is
following the pattern predicted; that they would be used to prosecute visible
groups in the population. The Victorian Crimes Act endangerment provisions
have been used to prosecute prostitutes in that State. Given that there is no
documented case of HIV being transmitted by a prostitute in Australia this is
counterproductive. Further, in 1992 Queensland increased penalties for
prostitution and reimposed imprisonment as a remedy. As many prostitutes
are IV drug users it is misguided to introduce these persons into prison
environments. Imprisonment is not the appropriate response, counselling and
education are. The Strategy recommended that States consider repealing
legislation which specifically applies to homosexuals, prostitutes and drug
users. Tasmania's continued criminalisation of homosexual activity is
therefore against the spirit of the guidelines. There have been instances
where suspects of crimes have been tested for HIV for a variety of purposes.
The Strategy particularly recommended that an order needed to be obtained
from a Magistrate to test an accused person for HIV. In only two States has
legislation of this type been enacted. There appears to be a reluctance of
legislatures to remedy the uncertainity discussed in chapter six of this thesis
about the legality of testing blood samples for HIV by police to obtain
evidence to substantiate the charge. Yet, in contrast, the issue of allowing
one person to be tested for the benefit of another has been legislatively
endorsed in specific circumstances inTasmania and Victoria.
supra note 4.
358
The Strategy also stated that 'reform measures should be as
uniform as possible, across the different jurisdictions'. ® Legislators
recognised the need for this early in the epidemic, but their response was not
motivated by clear and rational thought but by public sentiment which lead to
haphazard amendments, which in turn resulted in little uniformity between the
States. This lack of uniformity was exemplified in chapter seven by a number
of examples, including, inconsistent testing policies in Australian prisons and
the little uniformity on protections against breaches of confidentiality where
HIV testing schemes operate in prisons. Uniformity is still lacking in the area
of public health with some States yet to make any amendment to out-of-date
statutes. Not only do we have a lack of consistency, we have apathy in the
less populace jurisdictions which again illustrates the importance of politics in
the drive towards amendment.
It is true that since the development of the Strategy a clearer
policy has been laid down which has been generally free from partisan
approaches of the various political parties. All States and Territories should
adapt and give effect to the spirit of the Strategy. There is evidence, that
Australian governments generally are acting from a well-educated base in
consulting with medical, social and legal experts in drafting and passing
legislation. But there remains much to be done. Clarity and rationality must
continue to guide policy and law-makers and those who put the policy and law
into effect.
In the future there will be a number of duties imposed on
particular groups and individuals. Governments, legislators and members of
the judiciary have a duty to continue to be apprised of the variety of expert
opinion available on preventing the spread of the virus with minimal impact on
the lives of individuals infected with HIV. This applies whether the subject of
any legal prohibition or procedure is a recalcitrant HIV carrier, an accused
person, a victim, or a witness to a proceeding. For example, considerable
thought needs to be given by legislators before the enact a HIV specific
transmission offence or before statutes are enacted which permit one person
to be tested for HIV for the benefit of another. Similarly, prosecutors need to
consider the special problems presented by HIV-infection before acting to
initiate cases of HIV transmission. Judicial officers need to decide under what
circumstances non-custodial options could be more usefully applied to HIV-
infected persons. In addition, some of the sentencing decisions in chapter six
of this thesis reveal that judges need to be aware of the medical facts relating
^ supra note 4.
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to the progression of HIV to AIDS. Competing circumstances must be
weighed in each situation and more frequently courts are being called upon
as arbiters to weigh these competing interests. Their role is growing in this
regard as legislation requires that court orders be obtained for isolation,
detention and testing. Applications for testing across a broad spectrum will
require some researched analysis before they are ordered. Public health
measures adopted to restrain persons acting to the detriment of community
health during past epidemics of communicable diseases must be scrutinised
before being applied to HIV-infected persons. If the overriding aim is the
prevention of disease then criminal law and public health legislators must
work together on a preventative policy.
Medical research reveals that HIV will be with us for a long time.
During that time AIDS will resist legal sanction and continue to spread and
kill. It has been apparent early in the course of the epidemic that we cannot
expect the necessary solutions to come solely from scientists. It is incumbent
upon legislators and court personnel to take what steps they can to inhibit the
spread of the disease. Controlling the HIV epidemic and at the same time
solving other problems will require different, mutually reinforcing techniques to
reach the myriad of groups in our pluralistic society. Whether Australia's low
cases of HIV in the community are the result of good management or good
fortune will remain to be seen as we progress through this second decade of
AIDS. The key will be in our ability to develop a culture of responsibility, to
maintain the current position or correct it where necessary and to avoid either
social or legal complacency in curbing the spread of HIV/AIDS.
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